Perry et al v. Schwarzenegger et al

Filing 36

Memorandum in Opposition re 7 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed byMartin F. Gutierrez, Dennis Hollingsworth, Mark A. Jansson, Gail J. Knight, ProtectMarriage.com - Yes on 8, A Project of California Renewal, Hak-Shing William Tam. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Proposed Order, # 8 Certificate of Service)(Raum, Brian) (Filed on 6/11/2009)

Perry et al v. Schwarzenegger et al Doc. 36 Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page1 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW P. PUGNO Andrew P. Pugno (CA Bar No. 206587) andrew@pugnolaw.com 101 Parkshore Drive, Suite 100, Folsom, California 95630 Telephone: (916) 608-3065, Facsimile: (916) 608-3066 ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND Timothy Chandler (CA Bar No. 234325) tchandler@telladf.org 101 Parkshore Drive, Suite 100, Folsom, California 95630 Telephone: (916) 932-2850, Facsimile: (916) 932-2851 Benjamin W. Bull (AZ Bar No. 009940) bbull@telladf.org Brian W. Raum (NY Bar No. 2856102)* braum@telladf.org James A. Campbell (OH Bar No. 0081501)* jcampbell@telladf.org 15100 North 90th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 Telephone: (480) 444-0020, Facsimile: (480) 444-0028 Jordan W. Lorence (DC Bar No. 385022)+ jlorence@telladf.org Austin R. Nimocks (TX Bar No. 24002695)+ animocks@telladf.org 801 G Street NW, Suite 509, Washington, D.C. 20001 Telephone: (202) 637-4610, Facsimile: (202) 347-3622 ATTORNEYS FOR PROPOSED INTERVENORS DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, GAIL J. KNIGHT, MARTIN F. GUTIERREZ, HAK-SHING WILLIAM TAM, MARK A. JANSSON, and PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM ­ YES ON 8, A PROJECT OF CALIFORNIA RENEWAL * Admitted pro hac vice + Pro hac vice application forthcoming UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA KRISTIN M. PERRY, SANDRA B. STIER, PAUL T. KATAMI, and JEFFREY J. ZARRILLO, Plaintiffs, v. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, in his official capacity as Governor of California; EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., in his official capacity as Attorney General of California; MARK B. HORTON, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Public Health and State Registrar of Vital Statistics; LINETTE SCOTT, in her official CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Date: July 2, 2009 Time: 10:00 a.m. Judge: Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker Location: Courtroom 6, 17th Floor PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Dockets.Justia.com Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page2 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 capacity as Deputy Director of Health Information & Strategic Planning for the California Department of Public Health; PATRICK O'CONNELL, in his official capacity as Clerk-Recorder for the County of Alameda; and DEAN C. LOGAN, in his official capacity as Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk for the County of Los Angeles, Defendants, and PROPOSITION 8 OFFICIAL PROPONENTS DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, GAIL J. KNIGHT, MARTIN F. GUTIERREZ, HAKSHING WILLIAM TAM, and MARK A. JANSSON; and PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM ­ YES ON 8, A PROJECT OF CALIFORNIA RENEWAL, Proposed Intervenors. PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page3 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. 5. 6. 3. 4. C. 3. B. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................... ii INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 FACTS ................................................................................................................................................. 1 ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 2 I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR CLAIMS ......................................... 2 A. The Supreme Court's Decision In Baker v. Nelson Forecloses Plaintiffs' Claims ..... 2 1. 2. Baker Is Dispositive Of The Issues Presented In This Case ............................ 3 Baker Is Binding Supreme Court Precedent .................................................... 4 Plaintiffs Cannot Succeed On Their Due-Process Claim ............................................ 6 1. 2. The Fundamental Right To Marry Recognized By The Supreme Court Is The Right To Enter A Legal Union Between A Man and A Woman.............. 7 Plaintiffs' Interest In Marrying A Person Of The Same Sex Is Not A Protected Interest Under The Due Process Clause .......................................... 9 Proposition 8 Satisfies Rational-Basis Review.............................................. 11 Plaintiffs Cannot Succeed On Their Equal-Protection Claim ................................... 15 1. 2. Proposition 8 Does Not Invidiously Discriminate Against A Class of Persons ........................................................................................................... 15 Same-Sex Couples Are Not Similarly Situated To Opposite-Sex Couples For The Purpose Of The Marriage Laws ....................................................... 16 Proposition 8 Is Unlike The State Constitutional Amendment Invalidated In Romer ........................................................................................................ 17 Proposition 8 Does Not Impermissibly Discriminate On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation ......................................................................................... 19 Proposition 8 Does Not Impermissibly Discriminate On The Basis Of Sex ................................................................................................................. 22 Proposition 8 Does Not Violate Brown v. Board of Education ..................... 22 THE IRREPARABLE-HARM, BALANCE-OF-EQUITIES, AND PUBLIC-INTEREST FACTORS ALL WEIGH IN FAVOR OF DENYING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ........................................ 23 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 25 i PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page4 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 FEDERAL CASES TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ........................................................................................ 5 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)............................................................................................. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................. 20 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................. 20 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)............................................................................................................... 11 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987)............................................................................................................... 21 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)............................................................................................................... 20 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)................................................................................................... 15, 22, 23 California Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 2 Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................................. 23 Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................................... 16 Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................. 20 City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Fund, 538 U.S. 188 (2003)......................................................................................................... 15, 19 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)......................................................................................................... 15, 21 Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................. 24 Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................... 20 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993)............................................................................................................... 11 ii PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page5 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) ......................................................................................... 20, 21 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)............................................................................................................... 21 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)............................................................................................................... 11 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)............................................................................................................. 3, 4 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) ..................................................................................... 20, 21, 22 In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) .............................................................. 5, 10, 13, 22 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)................................................................................................................. 10 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................. 20 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)............................................................................................................... 14 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)............................................................................................................... 23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)......................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 8, 20, 21 Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................... 20 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)................................................................................................................. 7, 8 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986)............................................................................................................... 20 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977)............................................................................................................. 3, 5 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)......................................................................................................... 11, 12 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)............................................................................................................... 20 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)................................................................................................................. 7 iii PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page6 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976) ..................................................................................................... 5 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)......................................................................................................... 15, 16 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998)............................................................................................................... 16 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S 15 (1885).................................................................................................................. 10 New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345 (1977)....................................................................................................... 24, 25 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)................................................................................................................. 9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)................................................................................................................... 9 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)........................................................................................................... 9, 10 Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) ............................................................................................. 20 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)............................................................................... 4, 5, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)................................................................................................................. 16 Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................. 20 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)........................................................................................................... 8, 15 Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ...................................................................... 5, 6, 10, 22 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)................................................................................................................. 9 Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................................. 24 Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ................................................................................................. 20 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)................................................................................................................... 23 iv PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page7 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)................................................................................................................... 8 Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................. 20 Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979)................................................................................................................. 3 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)......................................................................................................... 15, 19 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)............................................................................................. 6, 8, 9, 11, 13 Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ........................................................................ 5, 10, 11 Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................. 8, 21 Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ............................................................................................. 20 Wright v. Lane County Dist. Ct., 647 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981) ................................................................................................... 3 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)....................................................................................................... 7, 8, 17 STATE CASES Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) ................................................................................... 7, 10, 12, 22 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) ................................................................................................ 3 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) ........................................................................................................ 22 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) .......................................................................... 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 22 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) ................................................................................................ 10 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).............................................................................. 10, 13, 14, 19, 22 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) ............................................................................................. 1, 11, 22 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004) ........................................................................................................... 5 v PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page8 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) .......................................................................... 10, 13, 14 Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ......................................................................................... 14 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 1 U.S.C. § 7........................................................................................................................................ 10 13 Del. Code § 101 ............................................................................................................................ 10 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704 ................................................................................................................... 10 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/212 .................................................................................................................. 10 Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03 ................................................................................................................... 10 Alaska Const. art. I, § 25 ................................................................................................................... 10 Ariz. Const. art. XXX § 1 .................................................................................................................. 10 Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1-3 ............................................................................................................. 10 Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 ................................................................................................................... 2, 10 Cal. Civ. Code § 51............................................................................................................................ 18 Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7......................................................................................................................... 18 Cal. Educ. Code § 220 ....................................................................................................................... 18 Cal. Educ. Code § 51500 ................................................................................................................... 18 Cal. Fam. Code § 297 ........................................................................................................................ 18 Cal. Fam. Code § 7570(a) .................................................................................................................. 14 Cal. Penal Code § 422.55 .................................................................................................................. 18 Col. Const. art. II, § 31 ...................................................................................................................... 10 Fla. Const. art. I, § 27 ........................................................................................................................ 10 Ga. Const. art. I, § IV......................................................................................................................... 10 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 ..................................................................................................................... 10 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-3 ..................................................................................................................... 10 Idaho Const. art. III, § 28 ................................................................................................................... 10 Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1........................................................................................................................ 10 Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16 .................................................................................................................. 10 vi PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page9 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Ky. Const. § 233A ............................................................................................................................. 10 La. Const. art. XII, § 15 ..................................................................................................................... 10 Md. Code, Fam. Law § 2-201 ............................................................................................................ 10 Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 ..................................................................................................................... 10 Minn. Stat. § 517.01 .......................................................................................................................... 10 Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A ........................................................................................................... 10 Mo. Const. art. I, § 33 ........................................................................................................................ 10 Mont. Const. art. XIII § 7 .................................................................................................................. 10 Neb. Const. art. I, § 29 ....................................................................................................................... 10 Nev. Const. art. I, § 21 ....................................................................................................................... 10 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2..................................................................................................................... 10 N.D. Const. art. IX, § 28 .................................................................................................................... 10 N.J. Stat. § 37:1-1 .............................................................................................................................. 10 N.M. Stat. § 40-1-1 ............................................................................................................................ 10 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 5-7................................................................................................................. 10 Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11 .................................................................................................................. 10 Okla. Const. art. II, § 35 .................................................................................................................... 10 Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a ..................................................................................................................... 10 R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 ­ 15-1-5 ...................................................................................................... 10 S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 ................................................................................................................ 10 S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9.................................................................................................................... 10 Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 .................................................................................................................. 10 Tex. Const. art. I, § 32 ....................................................................................................................... 10 Utah Const. art. I, § 29 ....................................................................................................................... 10 Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A..................................................................................................................... 10 Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010-20 ...................................................................................................... 10 Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13 ................................................................................................................. 10 vii PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page10 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 W. Va. Code § 48-2-603 .................................................................................................................... 10 Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101 ........................................................................................................................ 10 OTHER AUTHORITIES Baker v. Nelson, Jurisdictional Statement, No. 71-1027 (Oct. Term 1972) ........................................ 3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations (September 2, 1990) .................................. 12 For a Better Understanding of Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, American Psychological Association (2008) .................................................................................................................... 21 Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child's Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do about It?, Child Trends Research Brief (June 2002) . 12 viii PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page11 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs labor mightily to frame their claimed constitutional right to same-sex marriage as a logical extension of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The overarching and constant theme of Plaintiffs' position is that California law, by denying them the right to marry, reflects nothing more than moral condemnation and social prejudice. But this is a grotesque caricature of California's laws and what is at stake in this case. California's laws are among the most progressive in the Nation in terms of the benefits and protections afforded gay and lesbian individuals and their committed relationships. By contrast, the Texas law at issue in Lawrence criminalized "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. Here, punishment is simply not at issue. Instead, the issue is whether the Constitution requires the people of California to grant affirmative, official, and legal imprimatur to same-sex unions to the extent of redefining the institution of marriage, which has always been understood as the union of a man and a woman. Nothing in the Constitution requires such a radical redefinition of the ancient institution of marriage, and no court has accepted Plaintiffs' federal constitutional argument--indeed, the Supreme Court has summarily rejected Plaintiffs' core legal theory. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). FACTS The legal institution of marriage in this Nation has always been the union of one man and one woman. See infra fn. 3. To confirm that timeless tradition, Proposed Intervenors in the fall of 2007 began the task of qualifying Proposition 8 for the state ballot. (See, e.g., Doc # 8-2 at 5 ¶ 10.) In April 2008, after six months of tireless work, they submitted signature petitions to countyelection officials for verification--the last affirmative step for placing Proposition 8 before the voters. (See, e.g., Doc # 8-2 at 6 ¶ 19.) Then, on May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), overruled by Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5, which judicially redefined marriage to include same-sex couples. Shortly thereafter, the California Secretary of State announced that Proposition 8 qualified for the November 2008 ballot. (See, e.g., Doc # 8-2 at 6 ¶ 21.) In the 2008 General Election Voter Information Guide, the California Attorney General 1 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page12 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 stated the purpose of Proposition 8 as changing "the California Constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry in California." (Doc # 7 at 8.) Proposed Intervenors so vigorously objected to this characterization that they filed a lawsuit to compel the Attorney General to change it. See Jansson v. Bowen, No. 34-2008-00017351, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. August 7, 2008) (attached as Exhibit B). Proposed Intervenors argued that the Attorney General's proffered purpose "focus[ed] too narrowly on the measure's effect on same-sex couples." (Ex. B at 4.) Proposition 8's actual purpose was to reaffirm California's definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman. (Ex. B at 5.) And the obvious corollary of that purpose requires the government to refrain from recognizing as marriages any variation from that definition, including but not limited to polygamous, polyamorous, and same-sex relationships. (Ex. B at 5-6.) In the end, the state court declined to force the Attorney General to change the ballot language. (Ex. B at 6.) On November 4, 2008, more than 7 million California voters approved Proposition 8, and, on the very next day, it became Article I, Section 7.5 of the California Constitution, which states: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5. While Californians believe that marriage is the union of a man and a woman, they have chosen to officially recognize and grant benefits to same-sex relationships, see Cal. Fam. Code § 297, and they have relentlessly strived to eradicate discrimination against gay and lesbian individuals from all facets of society, see infra fn. 7. ARGUMENT Before this Court may enjoin the application of a state constitutional provision, Plaintiffs must prove that "they are likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." California Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of these standards. I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR CLAIMS. A. The Supreme Court's Decision In Baker v. Nelson Forecloses Plaintiffs' Claims. The United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question" an appeal from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which 2 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page13 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 rejected a same-sex couple's claim that the State's denial of their request to marry violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. By dismissing that appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker is binding precedent and requires that Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed. 1. Baker Is Dispositive Of The Issues Presented In This Case. In Baker, 409 U.S. at 810, the Supreme Court considered and rejected claims by two men that Minnesota's law defining marriage as a union between two persons of the opposite sex violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. That ruling affirmed the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision, which held (1) that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Due Process Clause, and (2) that excluding same-sex couples from marriage "is no[t] irrational or invidious discrimination" under the Equal Protection Clause. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The Supreme Court's dismissal of the Baker appeal for "want of a substantial federal question" was a decision on the merits, which binds all federal district courts: Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). The Supreme Court's summary dismissal in Baker "represents [the] view that the judgment appealed from was correct as to those federal questions raised and necessary to the decision." Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 476 n.20 (1979). And the precedential value of that "dismissal . . . extends beyond the facts of the particular case to all similar cases." Wright v. Lane County Dist. Ct., 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir. 1981). The question presented to the Court in Baker was whether Minnesota's marriage laws "deprive[d] [same-sex couples] of liberty . . . in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses." Baker v. Nelson, Jurisdictional Statement, No. 71-1027, at 11 (Oct. Term 1972) (attached 3 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page14 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 as Exhibit C). The Baker plaintiffs directly asserted that they, as a same-sex couple, had a fundamental right to marry "protected by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 11. And they argued that "[b]y not allowing [them] the legitimacy of their marriages, the [S]tate [was] denying them this basic right and unlawfully meddling in their privacy." Id. at 18. The Supreme Court's dismissal of the Baker appeal directly rejected the merits of these claims. This Court is "not free to disregard this pronouncement." Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344. As a result, Plaintiffs lack a cognizable legal theory that can succeed on the merits. 2. Baker Is Binding Supreme Court Precedent. Lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court's summary decision in Baker until "the Court informs them that they are not" either by expressly overruling that decision or through "`doctrinal developments'" that are necessarily incompatible with it. Id. at 344-45. To date, the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Baker, nor do any of its later decisions undermine it. Plaintiffs argue that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), represent "doctrinal developments" that release this Court from its obligation to follow Baker. (Doc # 7 at 16 n.6.) But that argument is unpersuasive. Lawrence dealt with whether criminalizing private homosexual conduct violates due process; it did not involve government recognition of a relationship. In fact, the Lawrence Court expressly distinguished between protecting private sexual conduct and forcing government recognition of a relationship, emphasizing that the facts of that case did not involve "whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. And, in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made it clear that Lawrence did not disturb the principles announced in Baker. See id. at 585 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (confirming that many "laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals," such as those "preserving the traditional institution of marriage," would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). Neither does Romer undermine the efficacy of Baker's holding. The Court in Romer applied rational-basis review to invalidate a breathtakingly broad state constitutional amendment that "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . . homosexual persons." Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. The Court 4 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page15 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 made no effort to revisit Baker or the constitutionality of defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman. Thus, neither Lawrence nor Romer "informed" the lower courts that they are no longer bound by Baker. Federal courts, including one California district court, have considered Baker's precedential value and consistently found it controlling. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp 2d 1298, 1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that Baker "is binding precedent upon this Court and Plaintiffs' case against [Federal DOMA] must be dismissed"); McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (finding "the Baker case controlling" and concluding that a "state law which rejects a purported marriage between persons of the same sex [did] not violate the due process or the equal protection clause"), aff'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 504 (Cal. 2004) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Baker "prevents lower courts . . . from coming to the conclusion that a state law barring marriage between persons of the same sex violates the equal protection or due process guarantees"). Plaintiffs point to Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005), rev'd in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006), as a dissenting voice. But the court in Smelt held that Baker was not applicable because the plaintiffs in that case were seeking the federal benefits of marriage and "not address[ing] what relationships states may recognize as marriages." Id. at 872. "Th[e] issue of allocating benefits is different from the issue of sanctifying a relationship presented in Baker's jurisdictional statement." Id. at 873; see also In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 137 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (distinguishing between seeking the benefits of marriage and the status of marriage). Here, Plaintiffs seek the status of marriage--the precise issue decided in Baker. They do not seek benefits as in Smelt. (See Doc # 7 at 6 (acknowledging that Plaintiffs have or can obtain "most of the substantive rights that accompany the status of marriage").) Thus, even under the Smelt court's analysis, Baker controls here. In sum, "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided" in Baker were whether defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman violates the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. Those same issues 5 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page16 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 are presented here. Baker has neither been overruled nor undermined by subsequent "doctrinal developments." Accordingly, Baker controls this case, and as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.1 B. Plaintiffs Cannot Succeed On Their Due-Process Claim. Plaintiffs assert that Proposition 8 violates their due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment "because it impermissibly impairs their fundamental right to marry." (Doc # 7 at 11.) The right asserted by Plaintiffs, however, is not the longstanding right to marry recognized by the Supreme Court but a newly fashioned right to same-sex marriage. Substantive-due-process analysis begins with a threshold inquiry--determining whether the right asserted is fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs would prefer to gloss over this important inquiry, but the Court must engage in this necessary threshold analysis to prevent the improvident expansion of constitutional jurisprudence and the corresponding interference with legislative prerogatives. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("[E]xtending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest . . . place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action"). That inquiry requires the Court to "carefully formulat[e]" the asserted right and determine whether it "has any place in our Nation's traditions." Id. at 722-23. Engaging in that analysis here unmistakably demonstrates that Plaintiffs' asserted "right" does not pass this threshold test. Plaintiffs also contend that their challenge is sufficiently distinguishable from Baker because, in that case, Minnesota did not provide any of the legal benefits associated with marriage to couples of the same sex, whereas, in this case, California provides many such benefits to domestic partners. (Doc # 7 at 16 n.6.) But despite this factual difference, the complained-of injury in both cases is identical--the government's refusal to redefine the longstanding and clearly established definition of marriage to encompass same-sex couples. See Smelt, 374 F. Supp 2d at 872 (explaining that Baker addressed "what relationships states may recognize as marriages"--not the legal benefits associated with the marriage relationship); id. at 873 ("Th[e] issue of allocating benefits is different from the issue of sanctifying a relationship presented in Baker's jurisdictional statement"); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 137 (similar). And it stands to reason that if a State does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing both to redefine the traditional understanding of marriage and to provide any of the legal benefits associated with that status to same-sex couples, then it certainly does not violate that constitutional provision to retain the long-established definition of marriage while granting almost all the legal benefits associated with marriage to domestic partners. Indeed, California's progressive Domestic Partnership Law confirms that Proposition 8 is not animated by any sort of discriminatory purpose. 6 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW 1 Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page17 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1. The Fundamental Right To Marry Recognized By The Supreme Court Is The Right To Enter A Legal Union Between A Man and A Woman. "All of the [Supreme Court's] cases infer that the right to marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature of the relationship and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of our species." Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007); see also Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 978 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion). From the earliest relevant cases, the Supreme Court has always tied the significance of marriage to its procreative aspect. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888), for example, the Court described marriage as "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress." Id. at 211. This understanding of marriage--linking that institution directly to procreation, i.e., the future of "civilization"--permeates the Court's discussions of the fundamental right to marry. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978). Plaintiffs pluck phrases about the fundamental right to marry from Supreme Court precedent and attempt to use those out-of-context quotes to support their effort to redefine marriage. But when those phrases are read in context, it becomes readily apparent that the fundamental right to marry recognized in the Constitution is limited to unions between one man and one woman. Plaintiffs, for example, rely heavily on Loving, a case which invalidated Virginia's antimiscegenation laws. But Loving involved a marriage between a man and a woman, and the Court's discussion of the fundamental right focused on the link between marriage and procreation, stating that "[m]arriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added; quotations omitted). This recognition of the inextricable interplay between marriage and procreation demonstrates that the Court's discussion of this fundamental right contemplated the unique union of a man and a woman. Plaintiffs also cite Zablocki repeatedly for the proposition that the "right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals." Yet again they ignore the context of the Court's statement. That case struck down a Wisconsin statute prohibiting persons obligated to pay child support from marrying without first obtaining a court order granting permission. The Court held 7 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page18 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 that the challenged statute violated the right "to marry and raise [a] child in a traditional family." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. The Court explained: Long ago . . . the Court characterized marriage as the most important relation in life and as the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress . . . . [T]he Court recognized that the right to marry, establish a home and bring up children is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . . [M]arriage was described as fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. Id. at 384 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, as in Loving, the Zablocki Court's discussion of marriage's fostering "survival of the race" links its reasoning directly to procreative marriage between a man and a woman. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"). That some married couples choose not to bear children or are infertile does not undermine the unavoidable conclusion that, for constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court has consistently linked the fundamental right to marry with the procreative aspect of marriage. For the Court, protecting the right to marry is about ensuring "our very existence and survival," Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; maintaining our "civilization," Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; and "rais[ing] . . . child[ren] in a traditional family," id. at 386. This inherently procreative nature of marriage is unique to opposite-sex couples, and thus, the fundamental right to marry arises from that sort of relationship. Accordingly, the right Plaintiffs assert is not the Court-recognized fundamental right to marry but a novel legal theory--the alleged "right" to same-sex marriage.2 Plaintiffs also allege that Proposition 8 burdens the due-process "right to personal sexual autonomy" recognized in Lawrence. (Doc # 7 at 13 n.3.) But Proposition 8 affects only the publicly recognized institution of marriage, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (stating that marriage is a "public commitment"); it does not regulate Plaintiffs' private sexual behavior. Again, the Lawrence decision itself recognized that it did "not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. And, for this reason, this Court should not apply the intermediate scrutiny created by the Ninth Circuit in Witt v. Department of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008), which is reserved for cases where "the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights identified in Lawrence[.]" Id. That sort of government "intrusion" is not at issue here. 8 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW 2 Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page19 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2. Plaintiffs' Interest In Marrying A Person Of The Same Sex Is Not A Protected Interest Under The Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has "always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in [that] unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, a federal court "place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action." Id. Courts should thus "exercise the utmost care whenever . . . asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of" the judiciary. Id. (quotations omitted). This judicial restraint is particularly appropriate in the area of marriage. Domestic relations is "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) ("The State . . . has [the] absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation . . . shall be created."), overruled on other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Federal courts should thus be reluctant to delve into a sensitive area of social policy best left to the States. The Supreme Court has established a two-part "substantive-due-process analysis" for determining whether to recognize a fundamental right. First, a court must ascertain a "`careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. Plaintiffs throughout their memorandum of law refer broadly to their asserted liberty interest as the "right to marry." But a "careful description" of their interest is the "right" to same-sex marriage. Second, a court must determine whether the "carefully described" interest is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people" that it is considered "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), "such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the interest] were sacrificed," Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. "Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking." Id. (quotations omitted). "The mere novelty of . . . a claim is reason enough to doubt that `substantive due process' sustains it" because such a novel "right . . . cannot be considered so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Reno v. 9 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page20 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) ("If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it"). The right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition. The Supreme Court, as demonstrated above, has always understood marriage as "the union . . . of one man and one woman." See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S 15, 45 (1885). Before 2003, for over two hundred years of our Nation's history, there was never a time in the United States that marriage meant anything other than the union of a man and a woman. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (judicially creating same-sex marriage in Massachusetts). And, recently, large majority of voters and legislators have strongly reaffirmed marriage as the union of one man and one woman. The law in 44 States now defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman, and 30 of those States have enshrined that definition in their constitutions.3 Federal law also defines "marriage" as "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7. In light of this background, then, it is not surprising that every federal court, and a majority of state appellate courts, that have addressed this issue have declined to find a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Wilson, 354 F. Supp 2d at 1307; Smelt, 374 F. Supp 2d at 879; Kandu, 315 B.R. at 140; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 627; Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 978 (collecting cases); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 32-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). This Court should likewise hold that there is no fundamental right to same-sex 3 See Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03; Alaska Const. art. 1, § 25; Ariz. Const. art. XXX § 1; Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1-3; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5; Col. Const. art. II, § 31; 13 Del. Code § 101; Fla. Const. art. I § 27; Ga. Const. art. I, §IV; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-3; Idaho Const. art. III, § 28; Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16; Ky. Const. § 233A; La. Const. art. XII, § 15; Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A; Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Neb. Const. art. I, § 29; Nev. Const. art. I, § 21; N.D. Const. art. IX, § 28; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const. art. II, § 35; Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9; Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Utah Const. art. I, § 29; Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A; Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/212; Ind. Code § 3111-1-1; Md. Code, Fam. Law § 2-201; Minn. Stat. § 517.01; N.J. Stat. § 37:1-1; N.M. Stat. § 401-1; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 5-7; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704; R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 ­ 15-1-5; Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010-20; W. Va. Code § 48-2-603; Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101. 10 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page21 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 marriage in the Fourteenth Amendment. To hold otherwise, this Court would part ways with every federal court that has addressed this issue, abandon over a century of Supreme Court precedent, and drastically change the institution of marriage in America.4 3. Proposition 8 Satisfies Rational-Basis Review. With Plaintiffs' theory of fundamental rights foreclosed, Proposition 8 need only "be rationally related to legitimate government interests." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. Rational-basis review is "a paradigm of judicial restraint," and not "a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 31314 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Wilson, 354 F. Supp 2d at 1307 (quoting Kandu, 315 B.R. at 145). A law analyzed under rational-basis review has "a strong presumption of validity," see Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314; "the burden is upon the challenging party to negat[e] any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quotations omitted). Rational-basis review does not require that a law be crafted with precision; "[a] classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Californians possess at least two closely related interests for defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman, both of which derive from the government's legitimate--indeed compelling--interest in promoting the welfare of children, the State's most precious and vulnerable citizens.5 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852-53 (1990) ("[A] State's interest in Severing the fundamental right to marry from its link to procreation would subject the marriage laws in all States to searching scrutiny and would inevitably jeopardize their validity. For example, state statutes that restrict marriages between people who are closely related by blood would likely be struck down under Plaintiffs' view of strict scrutiny. While the government certainly has an interest in discouraging unions that would normatively yield genetically deficient children, Plaintiffs' reasoning, if followed to its logical conclusion, would mean that such laws, by restricting unions between infertile relatives, are over-inclusive and thus irrational. Breaking this new constitutional ground would also jeopardize the States' polygamy restrictions by subjecting them to the judiciary's most searching review. What Plaintiffs invite this Court to do reaches far beyond its application to same-sex couples and threatens to invalidate many legitimate state marriage laws. 5 California, like other States, also has a legitimate interest in preserving the traditional understanding marriage. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 470 (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The legitimate purpose of the statutes defining marriage is to preserve the traditional understanding of the institution"); Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630 ("[T]he State has a legitimate interest (Continued) 11 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW 4 Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page22 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of [children] is compelling") (alterations and quotations omitted). First, the government has a compelling interest in creating a legal structure that promotes the raising of children by both of their biological parents. Only marriage as defined by Proposition 8 unites the biological, legal, and social dimensions of parenthood. Second, the government has a compelling interest in "responsible procreation"--that is, directing the inherent procreative capacity of sexual intercourse between men and women into stable, legally bound relationships. Marriage between a man and a woman is the only legal construct that maintains the link between a child and both biological parents and that encourages both biological parents to jointly raise their children. Promoting this biological connection benefits children and society. Children, on average, develop best when raised by their biological mother and father. See Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child's Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do about It?, Child Trends Research Brief, at 1-2 (June 2002) (attached as Exhibit D) ("[I]t is not simply the presence of two parents, as some have assumed, but the presence of two biological parents that seems to support children's development"). Well-developed children, in turn, benefit society by decreasing criminal conduct and other forms of antisocial behavior. And aside from these individual and societal benefits, the government has a profound interest in maintaining this biological cohesion and fulfilling the innate desire of every person to know and be raised by their biological parents. See Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations (September 2, 1990) (excerpts attached as Exhibit E) ("The child shall . . . , as far as possible, [have] the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents"). Only a relationship between a man and a woman "is capable of producing biological offspring of both members." Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630-31; see also Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982-83. Thus, recognizing those relationships as marriages directly and rationally furthers the government's interest in encouraging the raising of children by their biological mother and father. In contrast, no (Cont'd) in maintaining and promoting its police powers over the traditional institution of marriage and its binary, opposite-sex nature."). Proposed Intervenors recognize that there are other government interests supporting Proposition 8, and they reserve the right to assert those later in this litigation. 12 PROPOSED INTERVENORS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document36 Filed06/11/09 Page23 of 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 matter what measures are taken by same-sex couples, they cannot both be a biological parent of the same child. In fact, the only way for same-sex couples to produce children is to involve a third party, a process that risks commoditizing children and intentionally deprives them of having both biological parents in their family. Thus, recognizing same-sex relationships as marriages does not further the government's interest in encouraging children to be raised by both biological parents. Not surprisingly, then, many courts have found that this government interest satisfies rational-basis review. See, e.g., Kandu, 315 B.R. at 146 (collecting cases and holding that "encourag[ing] the maintenance of stable relationships that facilitate to the maximum extent possible the rearing of children by both of their biological parents is a legitimate . . . concern"). Government interests may be "symbolic and aspirational as well as practical." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-29. The institution of marriage--consisting of unions between one man and one woman--communicates to society that, when at all possible, children should be raised by both biological parents in a stable, legally binding relationship. But forcing Californians to redefine marriage to include same-sex couples would eradicate this timeless structure for supporting the vital connection between children and their biological mother and father. In effect, it would force the government to communicate that the biological connection between parent and child is unimportant--a message belied by social science.6 Furthermore, the government has an interest in promoting "responsible procreation" among its citizens. The government's interest in responsible procreation is rooted in a concern for children, i.e., the natural result of sexual intercourse between men and women. Relationships between men and women are unique in that they may