Jaquillard v. The Home Depot U.S.A. et al
ORDER granting 38 Motion Expert Exclusion; denying 31 Motion to Exclude Testimony of Kelly B. Kennett, denying 51 Motion for Daubert Hearing. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 02/16/2012. (thb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
THE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.,
AND JOHN DOES 3-10,
Presently pending before the Court are Angelena Jaquillard's
("Plaintiff") Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Kelly Kennett
(doc. no. 31), Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to
Exclude the Testimony and Report of James Steven Hunt (doc. no.
38), and Defendant's Motion for Daubert Hearing (doc. no. 51).
This case arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained as a result
of a slip and tall accident that occurred at the Home Depot store
located on Victory Drive in Savannah, Georgia ("Defendant's
store") . On July 3, 2008, Plaintiff was shopping in the outdoor
garden center of Defendant's store when she slipped and fell in the
plant aisle. Plaintiff claims that the area where she fell was wet
because a vendor was watering plants a few aisles over from her
(Compl. ¶ 12.)
On June 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit
against Defendant in the State Court of Chatham County, Georgia
alleging claims of negligence and requesting punitive damages.
(Doc. no. 1 at 3.) On July 28, 2010, Defendants removed this case
to the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs expert testimony,
states as follows;
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.
Rule 702 requires district courts to ensure "that an expert's
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to
the task at hand." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 597 (19 -93). This "gatekeeping" function must be performed
with regard both to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence
and to that of expert technical evidence.
See United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Daubert, 509
U.S. at 589 n. 7 & 597) . 'This function inherently requires the
trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of
expert opinions to ensure they meet the standards for admissibility
under Rule 702."
Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, courts
must conduct a three-part inquiry to determine whether:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently
regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the
methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions
is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of
inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony
assists the trier of fact, through the applications of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Id. (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d
548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)) . Courts may consider the following
factors to determine whether a specific methodology is reliable:
whether the methodology can and has been tested; whether the
methodology has been subjected to peer review and publication; the
known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling operation of the methodology; and whether
the methodology has gained general acceptance in the scientific
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; accord Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) . This inquiry is a
flexible one," and the focus "must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Daubert,
509 U.S. at 594-95.
Under Rule 702, the proponent of expert testimony has the
burden of showing that the testimony complies with Daubert. Cook
ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402
F.3d 1092, 1107 (11th Cir. 2005) .
To meet its burden as to an
expert, the proponent must demonstrate that the expert's proffered
opinion satisfies each prong of Rule 702. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v.
Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) . Assuming that
the proponent meets the basic requirements of Rule 702, 'it is not
the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to
the persuasiveness" of the expert's testimony. Quiet Tech. DC-8,
Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003).
Rather, "[vi igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible" expert testimony. Id.
A. Motion for Daubert Hearing
Defendant has requested a Daubert hearing, a decision
committed to the Court's sound discretion. Cook, 402 F.3d at 1113.
"Daubert hearings are not required, but may be helpful in
complicated cases involving multiple expert witnesses." Id.
(internal quotes omitted) . For example, "[a] district court should
conduct a Daubert inquiry when the opposing party's motion for a
hearing is supported by conflicting medical literature and expert
testimony." U.S. v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001)
Although there are multiple expert witnesses in this case, their
testimony is not particularly complicated, and Plaintiff relies on
no contrary expert testimony to support her Daubert motion.
Accordingly, the Court declines to hold a hearing, and Defendant's
Motion for a Daubert Hearing (doc. no. 51) is DENIED.
B. Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Kelly Kennett
Defendant seeks to call Kelly Kennett, M.S. ("Kennett") as an
expert witness to: (1) evaluate and provide testimony addressing
the kinematics of Plaintiff's alleged fall, and (2) determine the
extent to which the injury complained of by Plaintiff is consistent
with the mechanics of the various descriptions of her fall. (Doc.
no. 53 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks to exclude the testimony of Kennett
"as it relates to the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and
pain" and "to the extent that [Kennett] testifies that the
proximate cause of [Plaintiff's] fall was something other than the
wet ground at [Defendant's store] ." (Doc. no. 32 at 12-13.)
1. Kennebt's Qualifications to Testify about the
Cause of Plaintiff's Injuries
Plaintiff does not appear to dispute Kennett's general
qualifications as a biomechanical engineer.- Plaintiff, however,
argues that Kennett is not qualified to testify about the cause of
Plaintiff's knee injuries. (Doc. no. 32 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts
that, as a biomechanical engineer, Kennett "does not possess the
requisite medical training in order to set forth what is or what is
not the precise cause of a specific injury."
(Id. at 9.)
Kennett graduated from the University of Virginia with a Master of
Science degree from the Department of Mechanical Engineering where he studied
in the biomechanical program. (Kennett Dep. at 13; Kennett Report at 6.)
The entirety of his work experience has been in the biomechanical engineering
field. (Kennett Dep. at 10.) Including his graduate thesis, Kennett has
researched and written on the implantation of load cells in the lower
extremities for measurements of impact loads and on lower extremity injuries.
(Id.) Within the subset of impact biomechanics, lower extremity injuries are
contrast, Defendant argues that Kennett has not made an attempt to
diagnose Plaintiff's injury, but rather has assumed a diagnosis
made by someone else. (Doc. no. 53 at 4-5.) Defendant contends
that Kennett's testimony on causation simply opines that "the
descriptions of the fall do not correlate to the Plaintiff's
(Id. at 7.)
To determine whether Kennett's education, training, and
experience as a biomechanical engineer qualify him to testify about
the cause of Plaintiff's injuries, it is helpful to first
understand what a biomechanical engineer's work entails. See
Bowers V. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1377 (M.D. Ga.
2007) . Biomechanical engineers apply "the principles in mechanics
to the facts of a specific accident and provide information about
the forces generated in that accident."
Id. (quoting Smelser v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997)).
also "explain how the body moves in response to those forces, and
determine what types of injuries would result from the forces
generated." Id. Thus, biomechanical engineering is closely
related to, and may sometimes overlap with, the field of medicine.
In the context of litigation, biomechanical engineers are
typically found to be qualified to render an opinion as to the
forces generated in a particular accident and the general types of
injuries those forces may generate. Smelser, 105 F.3d at 305;
Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 (finding biomechanical engineer
qualified to testify to the effect of locomotive vibrations on the
human body and the types of injuries that may result from exposure
to various levels of vibration); Berner v. Carnival Corp.. 632 F.
Supp. 2d 1208, 1212-13 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (finding biomechanical
engineer can give an opinion as to the energy involved in a fall to
the floor and whether the energy is sufficient to have caused an
injury of the type that the plaintiff alleges to have suffered)
Biomechanical engineers, however, are not ordinarily permitted to
give opinions about the "precise cause of a specific injury."
"This is because biomechanical engineers lack the medical training
necessary to identify the different tolerance levels and
preexisting medical conditions of individuals, both of which could
have an effect on what injuries resulted from an accident.'"
Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 (quoting Smelser, 105 F.3d at 305)
Biomechanical engineers are qualified to testify about how
forces affect or injure an individual, and Kennett, by his
education, knowledge, and training as a biomechanical engineer, is
qualified to testify about the forces involved here and the kinds
of injuries that may have resulted theretrom. Berner, 632 F. Supp.
2d at 1213. Kennett is qualified to render an opinion in this case
as to general causation, but not as to specific causation. Bowers,
537 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. Therefore, Kennett may not offer an
opinion as to whether Plaintiff's fall caused her specific
However, he may provide an opinion about the energy
involved in Plaintiff's fall and if the force is sufficient to
cause an injury of the type Plaintiff allegedly suffered.
Berner, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
2. Kennett's Methodology Underlying the Opinions in
his Expert Report
Plaintiff argues that any testimony offered by Kennett
regarding his opinion as to the cause of Plaintiff's fall should be
(Doc. no. 32 at 12.)
Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that Kennett's "report insinuates that a possible cause of
Plaintiffs fall was her choice of footwear" despite the fact that
Kennett never inspected Plaintiff's footwear.
(Id. at 2.)
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that because Kennett has not
inspected the location of the fall or taken the coefficient of
friction measurements of the location, he lacks the necessary
foundation to determine the cause of Plaintiff's fall.
Plaintiff's argument is largely undisputed by Defendant. In
fact, in his expert report, Kennett states that he lacks sufficient
information to determine the specifics of Plaintiff's fall
mechanics or the available friction in the location of the fall.
(Kennett Report at 4-5.) Defendant argues that Kennett's testimony
is only provided to highlight the deficiencies in Plaintiff's
evidence and in her expert's proposed testimony.
(Doc. no. 53 at
As stated above, Kennett is qualified to testify as to matters
within a biomechanical engineer's expertise, such as the forces
generated in a specific slip and fall accident. Therefore, it is
within Kennett's competency to describe the information that he
would need to determine the exact forces involved in the accident.
Kennett's expert report does not provide an alternate cause of
Plaintiff's slip and fall but merely states that he lacks the
evidence necessary to determine the forces involved in this slip
and fall. Accordingly, Kennett's expert report is admissible to
the extent it discusses the types of information relevant to
determining the cause of a sup and fall accident. To the extent
that Kennett wishes to testify that there is another cause of
Plaintiff's accident, he will be prevented from doing so as he has
not performed the relevant testing and analysis.
3. Relevancy of Kenne's Testimony
Kennett's testimony is relevant because it will aid the trier
of fact in determining the causation element of Plaintiff's
negligence claim. Specifically, Kennett's testimony regarding
whether the descriptions of Plaintiff's fall are consistent with
her injuries will assist the trier of fact in determining whether
Defendant's alleged negligence was the proximate cause of
Plaintiff's damages. Because Kennett is qualified to testify about
general causation, his methodology is sufficiently reliable for his
expert report opinions, and his testimony is relevant to aid the
trier of fact in this case, Kennett will be allowed to testify at
trial in the manner outlined above.
Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Kennett is DENIED.
C. Motion to Exclude Expert James Steven Hunt
Plaintiff seeks to call James Steven Hunt ("Hunt") to testify
that: (1) allowing plant watering during the day at Defendant's
store creates an unreasonably hazardous condition; (2) the plant
watering should either be done only at night or, if the plants have
to be watered while customers are present, the watering area should
be barricaded off from customers; (3) Defendant's warnings were
insufficient because they "turn[ed] the order of the safety
hierarchy upside down;" and (4) Plaintiff "did not see the water on
the floor," "did nothing that was unreasonable or contributed to
this incident," and "had no reason to look down at her feet."
(Hunt Report at 9-10.) Defendant seeks to exclude testimony by
Hunt and his expert report because Hunt's reliance on the "safety
hierarchy" is unreliable under Daubert.
(Doc. no. 38 at 4.)
1. Hunt's Opinion that Water on Garden Center Floor
Constituted an Unreasonable Hazard
The Court finds that Hunt's opinion that a wet garden floor
constitutes an unreasonable hazard is unreliable. Hunt has
testified that he believes that any amount of water on the outside
garden center floor creates an unreasonable risk.
(Hunt Dep. at
He opines that a store must maintain a "clean and dry
[walking surface] when customers are in that area." (Id. at 82,)
Hunt, however, has failed to conduct any relevant tests upon
the walking surface in the garden center of Defendant's store.2
Based on the Court's review of relevant federal case law on the
admission of experts in slip and fall cases, experts who are
admitted to testify that a hazardous walking surface exists have
performed extensive testing on the surface.
See Rosenfeld v.
The Court notes that Plaintiff argues Kennett should not be allowed to
testify as to the cause of Plaintiff's accident because he has not taken any
coefficient of friction measurements. This argument is also applicable to
Plaintiffs own expert, Hunt, who also failed to take any coefficient of
Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F. 3d 1190, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2011);
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cutrer, 298 F.2d 79, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1962)
(noting that both the plaintiff and defendant presented expert
evidence about the coefficient of friction on the steps and
sidewalk where the plaintiff slipped and fell); Santos v. Posadas
De Puerto Rico Assocs., Inc., 452 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2006)
(approving the admission of expert testimony regarding the variable
friction between pool steps and their edges on the grounds that it
was crucial to the plaintiff's theory of the case). In fact, the
Eleventh Circuit has instructed that a qualified expert who uses
reliable testing methodology may testify to the safety of a
defendant's walking surface as determined by the surface's
coefficient of friction. See Rosenfield, 654 F.3d at 1193.
In forming his opinion, Hunt observed the garden center floor,
spoke with Plaintiff regarding her fall, reviewed various pieces of
literature, and read the deposition testimony of other potential
witnesses. Hunt, however, did not perform objective scientific
testing on the garden center floor, such as a coefficient of
friction test. 4 In fact, it appears he forms his opinion that a wet
outdoor garden center floor is a hazard based on what appears to be
common knowledge - that water acts as a lubricant to make walking
surfaces more slippery when wet. (See Hunt Dep. at 82.) The Court
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981) (holding Fifth Circuit decisions made on or before September 30, 1981,
are binding precedent in Eleventh Circuit)
Although it appears that Hunt measured the slope of the garden center,
the only conclusion that he drew from these measurements is that the floor
was sloped downwards. (Hunt Dep. at 76-77.)
cannot allow Hunt to attach his "expert" conclusion to an opinion
that is merely based on common sense and not on a
method. See Smelser, 105 F.3d at 304 ("Daubert teaches that expert
opinion testimony qualifies as scientific knowledge under Rule 702
only if it is derived by the scientific method and is capable of
Furthermore, to the extent that Hunt's opinion is based solely
on his experience, the Court must reject it. To allow an expert to
give a subjective
merely because he is designated as an
expert would eliminate the requirement of reliability. The burden
is on the proponent to explain how his experience as an expert led
to the conclusion he reached, why that experience was a sufficient
basis for that opinion, and just how that experience was reliably
applied to the facts of the case. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1265. "The
trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply
'taking the expert's word for it.'" Wiggins v. Belk, No, 4-11-cv88, 2012 WL 135595, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2012.)
Although Hunt states he has significant experience in slip and
fall cases, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how Hunt's experience
provides him with a sufficient basis to form his opinions in this
case. Hunt has extensive experience regarding falls in the roofing
industry context. (Hunt Dep. 109-10.) Hunt also relies on his
work with grocery stores to form his opinion that a dry floor is
necessary for safe walking. (Id. 82.) However, Plaintiff fails to
indicate how Hunt's experience with falls from heights and indoor
walking surfaces translates to potential slip and falls on outdoor
walking surfaces. Accordingly, the lack of any relevant testing
and Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate how Hunt's experience was
reliably applied to form his opinion precludes Hunt from testifying
that a wet garden center floor creates an unreasonable hazard.
2. The Safety Hierarchy as Applied to the Facts of this
Hunt bases several of his other opinions on his application of
the Safety Hierarchy to the facts of this case. 5 These opinions
include: (1) Defendant should not water the plants in the garden
center while the customers are present, (2) if the plants have to
be watered while the customers are present, the watering area
should be barricaded off from customers, and (3) the warnings
posted by Defendant are insufficient to notify customers of the wet
floors. (Hunt Report at 10.) Based on a thorough review of Hunt's
expert report and deposition testimony, the Court concludes that
Hunt's reliance on the Safety Hierarchy in this case is unreliable.
The primary concern with Hunt's application of the Safety
Hierarchy to the facts of this case is that it fails to qualify as
reliable scientific knowledge or methodology under Rule 702. Hunt
has not performed any testing regarding the application of the
Safety Hierarchy to slips and falls nor is he aware of any testing
of the Safety Hierarchy in general.
In fact, during his
Hunt describes the Safety Hierarchy as a widely accepted methodology
on safety design. (Hunt Report at 11.) Based on the Safety Hierarchy, the
design steps should be addressed in the following order; (1) eliminate the
hazard if possible; (2) if the hazard cannot be eliminated, provide
safeguarding of the hazard through design;
if safeguarding through design
is not feasible, warn of the hazard; and (4) then set up procedures to avoid
deposition, Hunt stated that '[he] do[esn't] know if [the Safety
Hierarchy] is a tested thing."
(Hunt Dep. at 103.) Nor can Hunt
identify the original source of the Safety Hierarchy.
Instead, Hunt declares that the Safety Hierarchy is
effective because he has 'utilized it [himself]," (Id. at 104.)
Thus, it is clear that Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the
Safety Hierarchy has been tested in a premises liability context.
b) Peer Review or Publication
Plaintiff contends that the Safety Hierarchy has been peer
reviewed as evidenced in Hunt's 'Safety Hierarchy Bibliography."
However, the articles listed in the bibliography appear to be
predominantly focused on the heavy machinery or products liability
context, and none of the titles include the term Safety Hierarchy.
Furthermore, none of the articles attached to Hunt's expert report
apply the Safety Hierarchy in the context of walking surfaces or
premises liability. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to put forth any
evidence that Hunt has ever published his theories regarding the
application of the Safety Hierarchy to slips and falls or that
there has ever been any peer review of Hunt's theory.
c) Known Error Rate
There is no known error rate regarding the Safety Hierarchy in
its application to this case. Plaintiff has provided no evidence
of a known error rate regarding the Safety Hierarchy in any
context, much less as applied to walking surfaces in a garden
In fact, Hunt only provides assurances that he knows of
the Safety Hierarchy's effectiveness based on his own experience.
(Hunt Dep. at 113.)
d) General Acceptance Within the Scientific
Finally, Plaintiff argues that experts have been admitted to
testify about the Safety Hierarchy in federal court in support of
his claim that the hierarchy is reliable. In Martinez v. Terex
Corporation, 241 F.R.D. 631 (D. Arz. 2007), the court allowed an
expert to testify regarding the Safety Hierarchy as used in the
field of engineering, specifically regarding machinery.
637. The court, however, determined that the expert could not
testify that the defendants failed to comply with the Safety
Hierarchy with respect to the machinery at issue and its warnings.
Id. The court found that the expert's testimony that the machinery
was "defectively and unreasonably dangerous as a result of its
design and inadequate warnings" was unreliable based on Daubert.
Id. at 637-641.
In fact, the Court's review of relevant case law indicates
that the only contexts where an expert has been permitted to
testify in federal Court regarding the Safety Hierarchy have been
in cases dealing with products liability claims or machinery
defects. See In re Stand 'N Seal, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (N.D.
Ga. 2009) (noting expert in products liability case based her
opinions in part on the Safety Hierarchy); Covas v. Coleman Co.,
No. 00-8541-d y , 2005 WL 6166740, at *11 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2008)
(noting one of the bases that expert relied upon in forming his
opinion regarding defective design of a heater was his personal
knowledge of the Safety Hierarchy); Martinez, 241 F.R.D. at 637
(finding expert qualified to testify regarding general principles
of Safety Hierarchy in defective design of concrete mixer case)
The Court can find no instance where an expert has applied the
Safety Hierarchy to a walking surface in a premises liability case,
much less in a slip and fall case on an outdoor garden center
Furthermore, Plaintiff's assertion that the Safety Hierarchy
is generally accepted because a lay witness for Defendant, Lisa
Foley, recognized some of the general principles is without merit.
First, Lisa Foley is not a member of the scientific community, and
thus her recognition of the principles of the Safety Hierarchy does
nothing to convince this Court that the Safety Hierarchy is a
generally accepted method to assess and control risk in the
premises liability context. Additionally, a layperson's conceptual
understanding of certain assertions proposed by an expert may
actually show that the suggested principles are ones that could be
appreciated by the jury without the need for expert testimony.
Based on the foregoing, Hunt cannot render an opinion based on his
application of the Safety Hierarchy to the facts of this case.
3. Hunt's Opinion that Plaintiff Did Nothing
First, the Court notes that Hunt does not appear qualified to
opine on whether Plaintiff 'had no reason to look down at her feet"
or that she "did nothing that was unreasonable or contributed to
the incident." (Hunt Report at 13.) Federal courts have admitted
human factors engineers as experts to testify as to whether a
plaintiff was aware of a condition that allegedly caused an
accident. See Ahuja v. Cumberland Mall, LLJC.,
2011 WL 4479216, at *4 (N.D.
- F. Supp. 2d -
Ga. Sept. 26, 2011) .
In Ahuja, the
court found that the expert's research, education, and experience
in the field of human factors qualified him to offer an opinion on
how a reasonable mall patron would perceive the site of the
plaintiff's slip and fall accident. Id. Here, Hunt is not a human
factors engineer nor does his experience as a safety consultant
appear to provide him with the necessary experience to determine
how a reasonable garden center patron would perceive the site of
Plaintiff's slip and fall accident.
(See Hunt Dep. at 117-18.)
Moreover, Hunt's methodology in reaching his conclusion is
unreliable. Specifically, it appears that Hunt has no methodology.
His expert report cites one source for the proposition that
Plaintiff had no reason to look down at the surface she was walking
on at the time of the incident. In support of this opinion, he
states that "[t]he normal line of sight is about 15 degrees below
the horizontal relative to the eyes" and that "[most] of the time
people do not walk around looking down at their feet."
Report at 10 (citing Roger L. Brauer,
SAFETY AND HEALTH FOR ENGINEERS 113
When forming his opinion, however, Hunt fails to account for
the numerous warning signs posted around the garden center warning
customers that floors are slippery when wet and that frequent
watering occurs. In fact, Hunt states that a warning sign of the
type Defendant posted in its garden center could provide a customer
with reason to take extra caution. (Hunt Dep. at lOD.) Moreover,
Hunt is not aware of whether water was present on the garden center
floor at the time that Plaintiff slipped and fell. (Id. 97-98.)
Because Hunt fails to consider important factors in reaching his
opinion, the Court finds his methodology unreliable. Accordingly,
Defendant's Motion to Exclude Hunt's Testimony and Expert Report
(doc. no. 38) is
and Plaintiff's proffered expert James
Steven Hunt is excluded.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the
Testimony of Kelly Kennett (doc. no. 31) is DENIED, Defendant's
Motion to Exclude James Steven Hunt's Testimony and Expert Report
(doc. no. 38) is
Hearing (doc. no. 51) is
and Defendant's Motion for Daubert
ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this
HONOR A E J. RANDAL HALL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTRERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA