WAMPLER v. INDIANAPOLIS COLTS
ORDER denying 48 Motion for Leave to File to file a Second Amended Complt and granting 20 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 8/13/2012. (CBU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
Case No. 1:11-cv-0606-TWP-TAB
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
#20) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #48). In May
2010, Plaintiff Malori Wampler (“Ms. Wampler”) joined the cheerleading squad of the
Defendant Indianapolis Colts (the “Club”). During her pre-hire interview, Ms. Wampler assured
the Club that she had never previously posed nude for any photographs. On or about November
12, 2010, the Club received an anonymous letter from a fan, which included photographs of Ms.
Wampler attending a Playboy party wearing only body paint over her private parts. Almost
immediately, the Club terminated Ms. Wampler’s employment. According to the Club, it did so
because of the risqué nature of the photographs and the lie she told during the pre-hire interview.
In the aftermath of the termination, Ms. Wampler filed this lawsuit, alleging that the Club
terminated her employment because of her gender and her race, both in violation of Title VII.1
Following the Club’s motion for summary judgment, Ms. Wampler dropped her gender
discrimination claim, leaving only her race and national origin claim. Specifically, Ms. Wampler
alleges that she was terminated because she is Indonesian. For the reasons set forth below, the
Initially, Ms. Wampler filed her race discrimination claim as a Section 1981 claim, since she had not yet received a
right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). However, she recently received
that letter and has requested leave to update her complaint accordingly.
Club’s Motion (Dkt. #20) is GRANTED. And, Ms. Wampler’s Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint is DENIED.
Professional sports organizations go to great lengths to protect their reputations in the
community. As any Indianapolis Pacers fan can attest, one bad incident (such as an ugly
courtside brawl involving Detroit Pistons fans) can tarnish an organization’s reputation and have
a lasting negative impact on ticket sales. See Josh Sanburn, NBA Playoffs: Why Indiana Pacers
Fans Aren’t Showing Up to Games, TIME, http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/ 2012/05/17/
indiana-pacers-fans-dont-attend-games/ (last visited August 6, 2012) (noting that low attendance
in 2012 may be partially because “fans . . . are still nursing a decade-long hangover from the
ugliness that was the Detroit brawl,” which likely “pushed a good number of Hoosiers away
from the franchise”). The Club is no exception, making “every effort to protect its public
image.” (Dkt. #22-2 at 1.)
Indianapolis Colts Cheerleaders are, in the Club’s view, “ambassadors in the community
and throughout the state.” Id. at 2. As such, Club cheerleaders must abide by the “Indianapolis
Colts Cheerleader Agreement,” which contains the following covenant:
Cheerleader agrees not to commit any act that will or may create notoriety
(including, but not limited to, posing nude or semi-nude in or for any media or
publication whatsoever), bring Cheerleader into public disrepute, or reflect
adversely on Club or its sponsors. Cheerleader understands that she will serve as
a public representative of the Club from time to time and that it is important to
this employment relationship that she be viewed in a positive manner.
Cheerleader agrees to behave in accordance with socially acceptable mores and
(Dkt. 40-3 at 3) (emphasis added).
By way of background, Ms. Wampler is a female American citizen of Indonesian descent.
Her parents are both American citizens, and her father is Indonesian, making her half Indonesian.
Nonetheless, as the Club notes (directly above her photograph, which is inserted into the brief
itself), “[w]hile Ms. Wampler is certainly an attractive young lady, she does not have obviously
Asian features.” (Dkt. #21 at 3.)
In May 2010, Ms. Wampler earned a spot on the Club’s cheerleading squad and signed
the “Indianapolis Colts Cheerleader Agreement.”2 As a cheerleader, Ms. Wampler attended
practices, performed at games, made appearances at various Club events, and was featured in a
Cheerleaders are paid $100.00 per home game and after their 20th
appearance, may earn $100.00 per appearance. (Dkt. #39 at 8.) Ms. Wampler prepared a short
biography for the Club, which was scheduled to be included in the January 1, 2011 issue of the
in-house magazine “Scout.” The biography that Ms. Wampler prepared read as follows:
Malori was born in Honolulu, Hawaii while her parents were stationed in the
Army. Her mom is originally from Canada and her dad is from Indonesia, but she
was raised in Indianapolis since she was 2 years old.
Notably, however, because Ms. Wampler was terminated months before the magazine issued her
biography was never published.
Significant to this dispute, during her pre-hire interview, Ms. Wampler informed the
Club’s cheerleading coordinator, Theresa Pottratz (“Ms. Pottratz”), that she had been involved
with the Playboy organization in the past. Specifically, Ms. Wampler was selected to be a “Girl
of Golf” (i.e., a host) at various golf scrambles throughout the country sponsored by Playboy
Golf. Not surprisingly, Playboy-sponsored parties were often held following the Playboy golf
scrambles. Prior to two of these parties, one in 2009 and one in 2010, a Playboy Golf employee
asked Ms. Wampler to wear latex-based body paint – “a painted on bikini or painted on lingerie”
Notably, when Ms. Wampler made the squad, she decided to delay pursuing a physical therapy position for one
year so that she could devote her time to the Club. Presently, Ms. Wampler holds a Doctorate of Physical Therapy
from Indiana University and works as a physical therapist.
(Dkt. #40-1 at 4) – to the Playboy golf parties. Ms. Wampler agreed, and an artist applied latexbased paint to the breasts, pelvic area and buttocks of her nude body. She also posed for various
photographs. During her pre-hire interview, Ms. Wampler assured Ms. Pottratz that she had not
posed nude for any photographs during her stint with Playboy. This arguable fib unraveled on
November 12, 2010, when the Club received an anonymous letter from a fan, which included
photographs (apparently downloaded from a website) of Ms. Wampler posing in pictures with
only body paint covering her breast, pelvic area and buttocks.
On November 15, 2010, after the photographs surfaced, a meeting was held among
various Club employees. In the end, Pete Ward (“Mr. Ward”), the Club’s Chief Operating
Officer, took a hard line and directed Tom Zupancic (Mr. Zupancic”), the Club’s Senior Vice
President of Sales and Marketing, to terminate Ms. Wampler’s employment “because of her nude
pictures and her dishonesty.” (Dkt. #21 at 5.)3 According to Mr. Ward’s affidavit, he has “never
met Ms. Wampler or read any biographical sketch of her” and “was unaware that Ms. Wampler
claimed her race to be anything other than Caucasian and it was [his] belief that she was
Caucasian.” (Dkt. #22-1 at 3.) By way of affidavit, Mr. Zupancic echoes this same statement
regarding his lack of knowledge about Ms. Wampler’s race. (Dkt. #22-2.) Once Mr. Ward
issued the order, Mr. Zupancic and Ms. Pottratz met with Ms. Wampler and told her that she was
terminated effective immediately.
The day after her termination, Ms. Wampler sent Ms. Pottratz the following email:
I’m still in shock right now and very taken aback by how suddenly this happened.
I am hurt/disappointed that there was not even a warning or discussion about the
situation. It’s hard to believe that I was literally cheering on the field the day
before. Did this just come up on Monday? If not, when did this come about?
Other evidence suggests that additional individuals were also involved in the decision to terminate Ms. Wampler’s
employment, but that fact makes no difference to the outcome of this case.
I feel that now that I’ve had time to think, a lot of things aren’t coming together
for me and I have a lot of questions. Can you send me the picture? Who received
the picture and how was it sent (e-mail, mail)? And who sent it? To me I just
don’t understand why this is happening now and I feel like there is someone who
is being malicious/out to get me. Anything that is out there has been there for a
while now and does not have my name on it.
My involvement with Playboy was known during the interview process. I have
never posed nude or been in the magazine. And I had said that I had been to a
mansion party. This was long before the Colts and I feel I have done nothing but
try to be anything and everything for the organization. I’ve tried to do everything
right and revolved my life around cheerleading.
It’s an embarrassing/humiliating situation to be in and I just don’t understand why
I wouldn’t be allowed to just finish out the season. I also find it a bit hypocritical
when there have been girls on the squad who have had relations with players,
scouts, and mascots or have things such as lingerie pictures online WHILE they
were Colts Cheerleaders. How is my situation, which was before making the
team and also talked about during the interview process worse to the point where I
am not even able to finish the season?
The next day, on November 17, 2010, Ms. Wampler received the following email from
Theresa passed your note on to me so please consider this your response from the
Colts organization. You carried out your duties as a cheerleader very
professionally. Your commitment on and off the field was outstanding and for
that I thank you. Our Cheerleaders are ambassadors in the community and
represent the organization across the state and beyond. Colts cheerleaders are
held in high esteem by the Colts organization and by our fans. We were made
aware of the photos on Monday and reacted immediately to the situation which
resulted in your dismissal. Regarding our knowledge of your involvement with
Playboy, it was never brought up that these pictures existed and that they would
be posted on a website. The nature of the pictures constitutes inappropriate
conduct for a Colt’s cheerleader. I hope you understand our position and why our
decision was to dismiss you. Thank you again for your hard work this season and
good luck in your future endeavors.
Shortly thereafter, on November 23, 2010, Ms. Wampler, through counsel, filed an
EEOC charge alleging sex discrimination under Title VII. The EEOC charge did not mention
race or national origin. Then, on May 5, 2011, Ms. Wampler filed a complaint in this Court,
alleging gender discrimination and race discrimination under Title VII. Following the Club’s
motion for summary judgment, Ms. Wampler dropped her gender discrimination claim (in which
she alleged that she was similarly situated to Indianapolis Colts football players, despite the
innumerable differences between the two jobs), leaving only her race and national origin claim.
Additional facts are added below as needed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476
F.3d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
reviews “the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party=s favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue
may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations,
that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490
(citation omitted). “In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in
search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a
paper trial on the merits of a claim.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citation and internal quotations omitted). Finally, “neither the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion
Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
After amending her complaint (Dkt. #8), Ms. Wampler’s race and national origin claims
arise under Title VII. Ms. Wampler proceeds with her discrimination claim using the familiar
burden-shifting framework inaugurated by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Using the indirect method of proof, Ms. Wampler can meet the elements of a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
was meeting the Club’s legitimate performance expectations; (3) she suffered a material, adverse
employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals
outside of her protected class. Pantoja v. American NTN Bearing Manufacturing Corp., 495
F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the Club must
state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Smeigh v.
Johns Manville, Inc., 643 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2011). If a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason is offered, Ms. Wampler must then come forward with evidence that the stated reason is
not the true reason one but rather a false pretext, thus allowing an inference of discrimination. Id.
Elements (1), (2), and (3) are largely undisputed. Ms. Wampler is Indonesian, she was
meeting the Club’s expectations, and she was terminated. The real dispute, then, is whether she
was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside of her protected class.
“Whether two employees are ‘similarly situated’ is a common sense inquiry that depends on the
employment context.” Filar v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 526 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). Similarly situated employees must be directly comparable in “all
material respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002)
Relevant factors for making this determination include “whether the
employees (i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were
subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and other
qualifications. . . .” Bio v. Federal Express Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation and
internal quotations omitted).
To satisfy the similarly situated element, Ms. Wampler points to Breanna Fonner (Ms.
Fonner”), a fellow Club cheerleader who is Caucasian.
At first blush, Ms. Fonner’s
circumstances appear quite similar to those of Ms. Wampler. Ms. Fonner posed in lingerie as
part of a promotional advertisement for a jewelry store, and the photos appeared on the
photographer’s website. Although he photographer for her photo shoot was also the Club’s
photographer, Ms. Fonner did not get prior approval for the photo shoot, as required by the Colts
Cheerleader Agreement. In the photos, Ms. Fonner is on top of a bed with one or two men.
And, as fate would have it, shortly after Ms. Wampler’s termination, yet another fan sent Ms.
Pottratz a letter, which read as follows:
I was appalled to find very unprofessional, inappropriate photos of your Cheerleader,
Breanna (attached) floating around on the internet. There is an entire photoshoot
labeled BlumLux consisting of many lingerie photos of Breanna and a man. I think
these photographs are extremely inappropriate and explicit when a Colts Cheerleader
is wearing black lingerie posing in a bed with TWO men for the world to view.…
After receiving the letter, Ms. Pottratz spoke with Ms. Fonner, who informed her that she
thought the photos were “okay,” in part because the photographer was the Club photographer.
For her transgression (failing to secure the Club’s permission to do the modeling shoot, in
violation of paragraph 9(C) of the Cheerleader Agreement), the Club denied Ms. Fonner an allexpense paid trip to the Pro Bowl, but did not terminate her. In fact, Ms. Fonner remains a Club
From Ms. Wampler’s standpoint, she is clearly similarly situated to Ms. Fonner. Both
were selected to be Club cheerleaders for the 2010-2011 season and had the same supervisors.
Both were required to sign the same Cheerleader Agreement. Both were required to abide by the
same Special Cheerleader Covenants, which require that the Cheerleaders “behave in accordance
with socially acceptable mores and conventions.”
Both posed for risqué photos, which
compelled fans to complain. But only one of them, Ms. Wampler, was terminated.
However, for two reasons, it is questionable whether Ms. Fonner and Ms. Wampler are,
in fact, similarly situated. First, Ms. Fonner wore lingerie in her photograph, whereas Ms.
Wampler did not wear any clothing, but wore only body paint. From the Club’s vantage point,
Ms. Wampler’s photos were more scandalous than Ms. Fonner’s.
Second, Ms. Wampler
arguably lied about posing nude, whereas Ms. Fonner simply did not address the issue with the
Club before modeling for the photo shoot. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d
392, 397 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that former employee who lied about misconduct until his
termination meeting was not similarly situated to employee who came clean at an earlier time).
Perhaps Ms. Fonner’s conduct could be construed as a lie by omission, but the ethical disclosure
duties of NFL cheerleaders is a question best left for another day. In the end, it might be a close
call whether these differentiating variables are enough to defeat the similarly situated element.
But, as explained below, the Court finds that Ms. Wampler’s claim fails for a separate reason.
Therefore, the Court will assume that Ms. Wampler can meet this element. This is not an absurd
assumption. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “a plaintiff need not present a doppelganger who
differs only by having remained in the employer’s good graces.” Filar, 526 F.3d at 1061.
Assuming Ms. Wampler can make out a prima facie case, the Club must state a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The Club has done so:
Ms. Wampler was photographed in arguably unseemly pictures and lied about it. In accord with
the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden now shifts to Ms. Wampler to show that the
Club’s explanation is pretextual. “Pretext means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an
oddity or an error.” O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citation and internal quotations omitted). For pretext determinations, the Court’s only concern
“is the honesty of the employer’s explanation.” Id. at 984 (citation and internal quotations).
Here, Ms. Wampler offers four reasons why the Club’s explanation is pretextual: (1) the
Club has offered shifting or inconsistent reasons for Ms. Wampler’s termination; (2) the Club
knew that Ms. Wampler was Indonesian; (3) the Club did not uniformly apply its cheerleading
policies; and (4) Ms. Wampler’s conduct was insufficient to motivate her termination. Each of
these arguments is addressed in turn.
First, as Ms. Wampler highlights, “[o]ne can reasonably infer pretext from an employer’s
shifting or inconsistent explanations for the challenged employment decision.” Appelbaum v.
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 340 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2003). Ms. Wampler argues that this
is precisely what the Club has done. To bolster this claim, Ms. Wampler claims that the Club
has offered four different explanations for her termination:
(1) the explanation provided to Wampler at the time of her termination: a fan had
mailed in “painted pictures” and the Colts did not want to be “affiliated with
(2) the explanation provided by Zupancic in his November 17, 2010 e-mail to
Wampler: the nature of the pictures constitutes inappropriate conduct for a
Club cheerleader and “it was never brought up that these pictures existed and
they would be posted on a website”;
(3) the explanation provided by the Club in response to Wampler’s first EEOC
charge: Wampler posed semi-nude and failed to disclose it to the Club; and
(4) the explanation provided during the lawsuit: Wampler posed nude and lied
(Dkt. #39 at 23-24). In the Court’s view, Ms. Wampler’s argument elevates semantics over
substance, as these explanations are neither shifting nor inconsistent.
Although the stated
reasons may be phrased differently, they are, from a substantive and common-sense standpoint,
virtually the same. Indeed, it would perhaps be more suspicious if the Club used the exact same
language to describe the reason for her termination each time it was prompted. As the Club
notes, “if a hundred people looked at the pictures, not everyone would describe them using the
same words or agree on whether Ms. Wampler was ‘nude’ or ‘semi-nude,’ whatever those terms
mean.” (Dkt. #42 at 9).
Second, Ms. Wampler emphasizes that the Club knew that she was Indonesian. This, in
Ms. Wampler’s view, contradicts the Club’s claim that Ms. Pottratz, Mr. O’Hara, Mr. Zupancic,
and Mr. Ward believed that Ms. Wampler was actually Caucasian. But, notably, the evidence
establishes that Mr. Ward was the key decision-maker, and nothing establishes that he actually
knew that Ms. Wampler was non-Caucasian (or that he was influenced by Ms. Pottratz under Ms.
Wampler’s unrealistic cat’s paw theory). See Holmes v. Potter, 384 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir.
2004) (“Usually, an employer’s lack of knowledge about a protected category rings a death knell
for discrimination claims.”) (citation omitted). Besides, even if the Club knew that Ms. Wampler
was Indonesian, this would not show pretext.
Rather, it would merely establish that the
employer knew that the employee at issue was not one hundred percent Caucasian, which is an
undisputed point in the vast majority of employment discrimination cases that involve a racial
Third, pointing to the situation with Ms. Fonner, Ms. Wampler argues that the Club did
not uniformly apply its rules. The Court is not persuaded. As a practical matter, Ms. Wampler’s
argument appears to be an invitation to merge the similarly-situated prong of the prima facie
case with a showing of pretext. It is true that the two inquires “are not hermetically sealed off
from one another.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 857-58 (7th Cir. 2012). But they are
not perfectly fungible, especially where, as here, there are obvious distinguishing features
between the two employees that reasonably explain the employer’s disparate treatment. Thus,
Ms. Wampler’s argument and evidence does nothing to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
Fourth, and finally, Ms. Wampler argues that her conduct was simply insufficient to
motivate her termination. This argument boils down to Ms. Wampler’s view that her body-paint
photos were not very scandalous, given the highly-sexualized nature of the Club cheerleading
position. As Ms. Wampler notes, in her capacity as a Club cheerleader she posed in a swimsuit
calendar wearing a skimpy bikini. Moreover, she participated in a half-time dance routine where
the cheerleaders tore off their uniforms revealing bra-like tops and “booty” shorts and danced
provocatively to Lenny Kravitz’s blockbuster song “American Woman”. In one portion of the
routine, the cheerleaders sat with their legs straddled apart while rolling their heads back and
forth flipping their hair around. (Dkt. #39 at 9.) In Ms. Wampler’s view, how could the Club
fire her for doing something that is similar in nature to her day-to-day duties as a cheerleader?
To be sure, NFL cheerleaders are not puritans – nor should they be. The job necessarily entails
wearing somewhat revealing outfits, dancing somewhat provocatively (but within reason, since
NFL games are family affairs), and maintaining a fit and attractive physical appearance.4
This argument is well-taken, but the Court is not persuaded. The Club clearly had
reasonable grounds for terminating Ms. Wampler’s employment, and no evidence casts doubt on
This statement is certainly not meant to disparage the character of NFL cheerleaders. In the Court’s view, NFL
cheerleaders are, by and large, hard-working and accomplished young women who contribute to the community,
motivate the players, and enrich the NFL fan’s experience.
the honesty of the Club’s rationale for its decision. Simply stated, the pictures at issue violated
the “Indianapolis Colts Cheerleader Agreement.” Moreover, during her pre-hire interview, Ms.
Wampler arguably lied about posing nude. Whether it was actually a lie depends on your
conception of nudity. If a person uses latex body paint to cover his or her private parts, does that
constitute nudity? Perhaps reasonable minds could disagree on this issue. (And the answer may
turn on the quality and opaqueness of the paint at issue.) The relevant point is that the Club
reasonably construed Ms. Wampler’s statement as a lie.
In the end, perhaps the Club overreacted by terminating Ms. Wampler’s employment.
After all, qualitatively, what Ms. Wampler did at the Playboy mansion may not be significantly
different than posing for a swimsuit calendar in a slinky bikini or performing a titillating dance
number while wearing a bra-like top and booty shorts. In this sense, Ms. Wampler’s frustration
is understandable. But, when it comes to a pretext analysis, “we look not at the wisdom of the
employer’s decision, but rather at the genuineness of the employer’s motives.” Stalter v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). As the Club notes, it
has a legitimate interest in drawing “a line between its cheerleaders dressing provocatively and
being naked.” (Dkt. #42 at 7). This is presumably what Mr. Ward was referring to when he
professed that the Club expects its cheerleaders to be “alluring without being trashy.” (Dkt. #221 at 2). In the end, no evidence casts doubt on the Club’s stated reason for firing Ms. Wampler
or suggests that her Indonesian race or national origin was in any way a motivating factor in that
decision. In the Court’s view, this case has nothing whatsoever to do with race and everything to
do with perceived nudity and perceived lies. Because no reasonable juror could reach a different
conclusion, the Club’s motion must be granted.
Finally, shortly before this order was set to be issued, Ms. Wampler filed her Motion for
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #48), seeking to formally drop her gender
discrimination claim and to change her race discrimination claim from a Section 1981 claim to a
Title VII claim (the EEOC recently issued a related right to sue letter). While this motion is
well-taken, any amendment would ultimately be futile, since the Title VII race discrimination
claims and Section 1981 race discrimination claims are subject to virtually identical standards.
See Malone v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., No. 06-2736, 213 Fed. Appx. 490, 495 (7th Cir. 2007).
This Court’s analysis under Section 1981 or Title VII would render the same analysis and
decision. Therefore, the Motion for Leave is denied.
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
#20) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt.
#48) is DENIED. Final judgment will accompany this Entry.
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Jonathan A. Bont
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
Daniel C. Emerson
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
Kimberly D. Jeselskis
JESELSKIS LAW OFFICES, LLC
Andrew M. McNeil
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP