LOCKARD v. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, IN et al
ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 50 Lawrenceburg's Motion for Summary Judgment and 53 the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. 79 Lockard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. A final judgment will accompany this entry. See Entry for details. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 9/6/2011. (LBT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
THE CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG,
INDIANA, BRIAN MILLER, in his Individual )
Capacity, DEARBORN COUNTY HOSPITAL, )
RONALD C. CHEEK, M.D., MICHAEL
LANNING, DEBORAH WALSTON, JOHN )
DOE #1, JOHN DOE #2, JANE DOE #1, AND )
JANE DOE #2
JAMIE N. LOCKARD,
Case No. 4:09-cv-113-TWP-TAB
ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case raises difficult questions about the conflict between a person’s right to bodily
integrity and law enforcement’s need to obtain evidence. Specifically, this lawsuit stems from
the involuntary catheterization of Plaintiff Jamie Lockard (“Mr. Lockard”), administered
after he had already voluntarily provided a blood sample but was either unwilling or unable to
provide a urine sample to comply with a search warrant that required both samples. Lockard has
sued all parties associated with his catheterization, including Lawrenceburg Police Officer Brian
Miller (“Officer Miller”), Lawrenceburg Police Officer Michael Lanning (“Officer Lanning”),
the City of Lawrenceburg, Dr. Ronald Cheek (“Dr. Cheek”), Deborah Walston, R.N. (“Nurse
Walston”), and the Dearborn County Hospital (collectively, “Defendants”).
This matter is currently before the Court on three motions: (1) Officer Miller, Officer
Lanning, and the City of Lawrenceburg’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Lawrenceburg’s
Motion”); (2) Dr. Cheek, Nurse Walston, and Dearborn County Hospital’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (the “Hospital’s Motion”); and (3) Mr. Lockard’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (“Lockard’s Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, Lawrenceburg’s Motion (Dkt.
50) and the Hospital’s Motion (Dkt. 53) are GRANTED in their entirety and Lockard’s Motion
(Dkt. 79) is DENIED.
At approximately 10:40 p.m. on March 13, 2009, Officer Miller pulled over Mr. Lockard
after observing him driving at a high rate of speed and failing to stop at two stop signs. While
speaking with Mr. Lockard, Officer Miller detected an odor of alcohol and observed
physiological signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Officer Miller
began an OWI investigation, performing a series of field sobriety tests, which Mr. Lockard
failed, and administering a portable breath test, which registered a reading of 0.07%. Officer
Miller then asked Mr. Lockard to submit to a chemical test after advising him of Indiana’s
Implied Consent Law, but Mr. Lockard refused. Accordingly, Officer Miller arrested Mr.
Lockard and applied for a search warrant. A search warrant was issued on March 14, 2009, at
12:10 a.m. by Magistrate Kimberly Schmaltz of the Dearborn Superior Court.
Importantly, the warrant provides: “You are hereby authorized and ordered, in the name
of the State of Indiana with the necessary and proper assistance to obtain and remove a blood
and urine sample from Jamie N. Lockard.” (emphasis added). The warrant goes on to say that
Officer Miller was “ordered to seize such sample, obtained on such search, and forward such
samples for immediate analysis.” Officer Miller requested both blood and urine samples in the
warrant application, in part, because he had been trained that both should be obtained.
Specifically, in November 2008, Officer Miller attended a recertification continuing education
course at which Dr. Wagner, the head of the Department of Toxicology at Indiana University,
told the officer that Indiana University Department of Toxicology needed samples of both urine
and blood specimens when completing toxicology kits. On this point, Officer Miller testified
that the Department of Toxicology does “preliminary testing on the urine to have an idea what to
test for in the blood. . . [t]hat way they don’t use the blood sample just running queries to see
what may test positive in it.”1 Moreover, the state kit from the Department of Toxicology
contained vials for both blood and urine. Finally, Officer Miller testified that because the
warrant required both blood and urine samples, he felt obligated to obtain both, stating that
“[i]t’s an order from the judge . . . I’m complying with the judge’s order.”
After obtaining the search warrant, Officer Miller drove Mr. Lockard to Dearborn County
Hospital, arriving at 12:34 a.m. Upon arrival, Officer Miller took Mr. Lockard to the registration
desk and presented the search warrant to hospital personnel. At approximately 1:05 a.m., Mr.
Lockard voluntarily provided a blood sample. Around this time, Officer Lanning arrived at the
hospital to assist Officer Miller.
Officer Miller then asked Mr. Lockard to provide a urine sample. According to Officer
Miller’s testimony, Mr. Lockard initially went into the bathroom but then came out and stated
that he could not give a sample. During his deposition, however, Mr. Lockard adamantly
maintained that he had never entered a bathroom at the hospital, testifying that he “[n]ever
stepped foot in no bathroom.” Officer Miller testified that he then asked Mr. Lockard if he
It is worth noting that Officer Miller had requested blood and urine search warrants prior
to hearing Dr. Wagner speak. However, Officer Miller testified that Dr. Wagner’s discussion
“confirmed” that seeking both samples was the appropriate course of action.
needed a drink of water and repeatedly presented him with other options to help him urinate, but
Mr. Lockard declined them.2 Officer Miller further testified that Mr. Lockard stated, “that he
wasn’t going to give a sample and I could do what I had to do [referring to the catheterization].”
On this point, Mr. Lockard testified as follows: “I didn’t refuse . . . I just said I didn’t have to go
right then” and, similarly, “I told him several times I didn’t have to go because he scared me.”
In sum, for purposes of the present motions, Mr. Lockard was either unable or unwilling to
provide a urine sample.3
In light of these circumstances, Officer Miller and/or Dr. Cheek ordered the
catheterization.4 Dr. Cheek, in turn, told Nurse Walston to catheterize Mr. Lockard, and, at 1:29
a.m., Nurse Walston noted that Mr. Lockard was “here with police officer for a court ordered
cath.” Around this time, Nurse Walston testified that she asked Mr. Lockard, “Why don’t you
just urinate” and he responded “Because I don’t want to.”
Somewhat confusingly, Mr. Lockard testified as follows on this issue: “I told him I
didn’t have to go. [Officer Miller] said ‘Would a glass of water help?’ I said, ‘Probably not.’ I
was never offered no glass of water.”
The parties dispute whether Mr. Lockard refused to provide a sample or whether he was
simply unable to provide a sample. Because the evidence must be viewed in the light most
reasonably favorable to the non-movant, the Court will assume that Mr. Lockard was unable to
provide a sample for purposes of Defendants’ motions but that he was unwilling to provide a
sample for purposes of Mr. Lockard’s motion. Neither position is unreasonable in light of the
evidence. On one hand, it is perhaps unlikely that Mr. Lockard could not urinate, given his
testimony that he had consumed two beers and three Pepsis that afternoon/night. On the other
hand, it is curious why Mr. Lockard would refuse a urine sample after already voluntarily
submitting to a blood test. Moreover, fear and stress can certainly manifest themselves in the
form of a shy bladder, which can greatly impede a person’s ability to urinate on command. On
this point, Mr. Lockard testified that he was unable to go “because [Officer Miller] had scared”
him. In the end, however, the Court’s decision does not turn on this factual dispute.
This is a disputed issue of fact, but regardless, it does not meaningfully affect the
At roughly 1:35 a.m., Officer Miller and Officer Lanning took Mr. Lockard to bed
number nine in the Emergency Department; the curtains were pulled around the bed to protect
Mr. Lockard’s privacy; Officer Miller handcuffed Mr. Lockard to the bed; and Officer Miller
and Officer Lanning grabbed Mr. Lockard’s ankles in order to restrain him “so he wouldn’t kick
any of the nurses.” Officer Miller testified that during this time, Mr. Lockard was actively
resisting the procedure. When asked if he complied with the catheterization, Mr. Lockard
testified that he was “forced into complying.” Mr. Lockard told Nurse Walston that he did not
want to be catheterized. Nonetheless, Nurse Walston pulled down Mr. Lockard’s pants,
exposing his genitalia, and prepared a sterile field by putting on sterile gloves and cleansing Mr.
Lockard’s penis with Betadine.
Nurse Walston subsequently prepared a straight size 16 Foley catheter for insertion by
applying lubrication to the catheter. She then attempted to catheterize Mr. Lockard by beginning
to insert the Foley catheter into his penis. Around this time, Mr. Lockard informed Nurse
Walston that he had an enlarged prostrate. For this reason (and because she was perceiving a
lack of cooperation on Mr. Lockard’s part), Nurse Walston removed the Foley catheter and
began preparing a Coude catheter, which is smaller and can pass through an enlarged prostrate.
The procedure with the Coude catheter was completed and a urine specimen was obtained in
roughly two minutes. Mr. Lockard claims that he suffered considerable pain during the
procedure, describing it as “[j]ust as if somebody would take a burning hot coal and stick it up
your penis” and “worse than a toochache.” Mr. Lockard was not examined following the
catheterization, and he was discharged from the Dearborn County Hospital shortly after 2:00
a.m., into the custody of the Lawrenceburg police.
Mr. Lockard was taken to jail and charged with OWI, OWI Refusal, and Obstruction of
Justice for refusing to consent or cooperate in the catheterization.5 While at jail, Mr. Lockard
noticed that his urine was “cloudy.” Roughly one week after the incident, on March 20, 2009,
Mr. Lockard visited Dr. Lynn Eiler for problems related to burning urination. Dr. Eiler
prescribed Mr. Lockard antibiotics, which apparently cured the burning. However, Mr.
Lockard’s urinalysis was negative for infection. On June 15, 2009, Mr. Lockard again sought
treatment for urination problems, this time with Dr. Samantha Wood. Dr. Wood referred Mr.
Lockard to Mr. Michael Maggio, who, on July 6, 2009, noted that Mr. Lockard’s prostate “was
tender consistent with clinical prostatis.” That said, it is worth noting that Dr. Michael Koch, a
physician hired by defense counsel, has reviewed the relevant evidence and opined that the
catheterization at issue was “atraumatic and no urologic injury occurred to [Mr. Lockard].”
On April 3, 2009, the Indiana State Department of Toxicology received Mr. Lockard’s
blood and urine specimens for testing purposes. Weeks later, on April 20, 2009, Mr. Lockard
entered into a plea agreement, in which he pleaded guilty to reckless driving and received a 180
day suspended sentence, 180 days of probation, a $100.00 fine, and was assessed $165.00 in
court costs. On June 23, 2009, the Department of Toxicology reported that Mr. Lockard’s blood
ethanol level was 54 mg/dl (or 0.05%) and his urine ethanol level was 85 mg/dl (or 0.08%). On
July 6, 2009, the Department of Toxicology reported that Mr. Lockard’s blood tested positive for
benzodiazepines, opiates, marijuana, oxycodone, opiods, and MDMA (i.e. ecstacy). Mr.
Lockard’s urine tested positive for benzodiazepines, opiates, marijuana, oxycodone, and
While not relevant to this dispute, it is interesting to note that soon after the incident, the
local news began covering Mr. Lockard’s story. At one point, Mr. Lockard did a three-minute
interview on live television.
hydromorphine/hydrocodone. At his deposition, Mr. Lockard described these results as “bogus,”
“trumped up,” and “fantasy land.” Additional facts are added below as needed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d
487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews
“the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest
on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is
a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation
omitted). “In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of
evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on
the merits of a claim.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation and
internal quotations omitted). “[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc.,
129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the Court is faced with cross-motions for summary judgment. However, these
motions are not subject to a unique standard. “In such situations, courts must consider each
party’s motion individually to determine if that party has satisfied the summary judgment
standard.” Tippecanoe Associates, LLC v. OfficeMax North America, Inc., 2009 WL 798745, at
*3 (S.D. Ind. March 20, 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Mr. Lockard has brought both federal and state claims against Defendants. These claims
are addressed in turn.
All of Mr. Lockard’s state law claims falter for the same reason: He failed to comply with
the Indiana Tort Claims Act when he failed to file a tort claim notice on any of the defendants .
See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8(a). For this reason, both Lawrenceburg’s Motion and the Hospital’s
Motion are GRANTED as to Mr. Lockard’s state law claims.
Mr. Lockard’s federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. While not itself a
source of substantive rights, §1983 instead provides “a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it
describes.” City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9
(1999) (citation and internal quotations omitted). To prevail on § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
show that “(1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law.” J.H. ex rel.
Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Mr. Lockard has sued two entities in this matter: The City of Lawrenceburg and
Dearborn County Hospital. A government entity is responsible under § 1983 “when execution of
a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. . .”. Monell v. Dep’t. of
Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipality cannot be held liable solely
on the grounds of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. In order to hold an entity liable, there must be:
(1) an express policy that would cause a constitutional deprivation if enforced; (2) a common
practice that is so widespread and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of
law even though it is not authorized by written law or express policy; or (3) an allegation that a
person with final policy-making authority caused the constitutional injury. See Wragg v. Village
of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, by failing to respond to Defendants’
arguments, Mr. Lockard tacitly concedes that there is no evidence to support a Monell claim
against either the City of Lawrenceburg or the Dearborn County Hospital. Accordingly, both the
City of Lawrenceburg’s Motion and Dearborn County Hospital’s Motion are GRANTED as to
Mr. Lockard’s Monell claims.
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The individual Defendants make numerous arguments in favor of summary judgment on
Mr. Lockard’s Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment claims.6 However, because it is dispositive, the
Court’s analysis begins and ends with the doctrine of qualified immunity.7
The Fourth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants also argued that they are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity
because they were acting at the specific direction of a valid state court order (i.e. the search
warrant). Defendants ostensibly have some support for this position. See, e.g., Henry v. Farmer
City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1986) (sheriff enjoyed quasi-judicial absolute
immunity when, in the process of enforcing a money judgment entered by the court, he
Qualified Immunity Principles
The applicability of qualified immunity is determined by a two-part inquiry established in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). First, the court “must consider . . . this threshold question:
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. Second, the Court must decide
whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the officer’s alleged
misconduct. Id. The answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for
plaintiff to defeat an officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2002).
Saucier mandated a two-step sequence in which the first inquiry had to be answered
before the second. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Simply stated, many courts
did not like this rigidity; some voiced criticism of the rule, while others eschewed it altogether.
Id. at 234-35. Consequently, the Supreme Court revisited and loosened the Saucier mandate
through Pearson. Id. at 227. Now, the Court need not resolve the two inquiries in a sequential
fashion and is free to address the second inquiry before the first. Id. at 236 (“The judges of the
district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).
Here, the Court finds the second qualified immunity prong dispositive. Specifically, this
wrongfully entered home, seized non-exempt personal property, and sold it at a public auction).
Importantly, however, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to the execution of
a search warrant, which is “always subject to judicial review for unreasonableness.” Irwin v. City
of Lawrenceburg, Indiana, 693 F. Supp. 2d 846, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (citing Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)).
inquiry – whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s
alleged misconduct – “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition. . .”. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. For the right to be clearly established,
“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Thus, as long as “officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [the] issue, immunity
should be recognized.” Wagner v. Washington County, 493 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
Summary of Applicable Fourth Amendment Case Law
Before applying these qualified immunity principles, the Court believes it would be
instructive to review the right at issue by briefly tracing the evolution of Fourth Amendment law,
especially the jurisprudence governing searches that concern bodily integrity. The Fourth
Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is “reasonableness.” United States v.
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998). Specifically, when analyzing conduct under the Fourth
Amendment, courts must balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests” against “the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 296 (1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Importantly, this basic “reasonableness” analysis also governs the method of executing a
warrant. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71.
There are two leading Supreme Court cases addressing whether the state’s intrusion into
a criminal suspect’s body constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. First, in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the police did not violate the
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments when, with probable cause but without a warrant, they had a
physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunk driving who had declined a
breathalyzer test and objected to a blood test. Id. at 772.
Of course, not all intrusions into a suspect’s body are permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. This point was driven home in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), where the
Supreme Court ruled that the State of Virginia could not compel a criminal suspect to undergo a
surgical procedure to remove a bullet lodged in his chest, even though the bullet would have
been helpful to the state in prosecuting the suspect for attempted robbery. Id. at 767. To that
end, Winston emphasized that “a search for evidence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it
endangers the life or health of the suspect.” Id. at 761. Moreover, Winston applied the
Schmerber balancing test, which weighs the following factors: (1) the extent to which the
procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual; (2) the extent of intrusion upon the
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity; and (3) the community’s
interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. Id. at 761-63.8 One upshot of
Winston is that the “reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depends on a case-bycase approach, in which the individual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed against
society’s interests in conducting the procedure.” Id. at 760.
Here, the Court sees no need to explicitly apply the Schmerber balancing test, given that
its ruling turns on the second qualified immunity prong.
Clearly, in terms of intrusiveness, a case like Mr. Lockard’s – involving forced
catheterization – falls in between Schmerber and Winston. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has
expressly recognized that removing urine through the placement of a catheter is not as intrusive
as the removal of a bullet, but that it is worse than a blood draw. See Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d
259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A catheter is more intrusive than a needle but less intrusive than a
scalpel, making it hard to classify the procedure under an objective reasonableness inquiry.”).
Further, at the time of the incident – March 13 and14, 2009 – the Seventh Circuit had addressed
forced catheterizations in the context of § 1983 on two occasions.
First, in Sparks, cited above, prison guards found a syringe in a prisoner’s (Sparks) shoe
during a prison shakedown and therefore suspected him of drug use. Id. at 260. Prison guards
asked Sparks for a urine sample, which Sparks claimed he could not provide. Id. Finding his
story unbelievable, the prison guards escorted Sparks to the infirmary where the prison physician
placed a catheter and found that his bladder was in fact empty. Id. A urine sample that Sparks
provided several hours later tested positive for drugs. Id.
Sparks subsequently sued under § 1983, claiming that the prison guards violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by using a catheter in attempt to extract urine from his bladder. Id.
Following a bench trial, the district court judge found that, indeed, the forced catheterization
violated Sparks’ Fourth Amendment rights “because the prison could have waited for nature to
take its course.” Id. at 260-61. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Id. at 262. In doing so,
the Seventh Circuit did not determine whether a constitutional violation had occurred, but
instead ruled that the prison guards were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. (“Legal uncertainty
surrounding the use of invasive medical procedures in prison entitles these defendants to
immunity.”). In doing so, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s opinion that it would
have been more reasonable for the defendants to wait for a natural urination. Id. After all, the
law is well-established that immunity does not hinge on “whether another reasonable, or more
reasonable” course of action was available. Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted; also
citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 559 n. 40 (1979) (the Fourth Amendment does not require
the use of “less intrusive [yet] equally effective alternatives to [body] cavity inspections.”)).
Finally, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the uncertainty in this area of the law, observing,
“[r]ights of all kinds are much diminished in prison – and the right ro be free of unwelcome
medical procedures has an uncertain scope even for persons suspected but not yet convicted of
crime.” Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
Nine years later, in 2004, the Seventh Circuit again addressed forced catheterizations in
Sullivan v. Bornemann, 384 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2004). There, the plaintiff Sullivan was arrested
for disorderly conduct. Id. at 373. Due to his high breathalyzer test results, the local jail refused
to admit him. Id. To obtain clearance, two officers took Sullivan to the emergency room of a
local hospital. Id. After Sullivan failed to voluntarily give a urine sample, the emergency room
doctor ordered a catheterization, and, at the direction of medical personnel, the defendant
officers physically restrained Sullivan during the procedure. Id.
Sullivan subsequently sued under § 1983, contending that the officers’ actions violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, relying heavily on the “clearly established” prong.
Id. at 373, 375. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that no constitutional
violation had occurred. Id. at 377. In its analysis, Sullivan narrowed the operative question: “did
the officers’ acquiescence in the nurse’s request to help her restrain Sullivan during the brief
catheterization procedure violate his rights under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments?”
Id. at 376. The Seventh Circuit answered “no,” emphasizing that the catheterization was
performed “solely to assure Sullivan’s medical well-being before he was transported to the
county jail.” Id. The Seventh Circuit expressed “no opinion” as to how its analysis would be
modified if, for instance, the catheterization was done to compile evidence. Id. In the end, the
Seventh Circuit did not reach the clearly established prong for purposes of determining qualified
immunity. Id. at 377.
Moreover, at the time of Mr. Lockard’s catheterization, numerous courts outside of the
Seventh Circuit had addressed cases involving forced catheterizations. A review of some of
these cases follows. In Lovett v. Boddy, 810 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Ky. 1993), plaintiff crashed his
car following a high speed chase with police and was rushed to the hospital. Id. at 845. There, a
police officer arrested plaintiff. Id. Meanwhile, emergency room staff provided treatment to
stabilize plaintiff; in the process, they took blood and urine samples through catheterization for
medical testing and transferred remaining samples to the police officer. Id. at 845-46. The
samples revealed that plaintiff had alcohol in his system at the time of the accident. Id. at 846.
Plaintiff sued the police officer and a nurse under § 1983, alleging that the extraction of
blood and urine violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 846. With respect to the blood test, the
district court found that no constitutional violation occurred because the officer had probable
cause to believe that plaintiff had been driving while intoxicated; the administration of the test
without a warrant was reasonable in light of the quickly-perishing nature of blood alcohol
content; and the test was performed by competent medical personnel in a medical setting. Id. at
847-48. Notably, however, the district court recognized that the urine draw presented more
difficult questions, given that a catheter involves unique risks, trauma, and pain. Id. at 848.
Moreover, although a urine test is a highly effective means for identifying the presence of
alcohol, its necessity diminished once the police obtained a blood sample. Id. Importantly, the
district court stated that the Fourth Amendment's protection of “human dignity and privacy”
might require “a warrant at the very least before government officials could compel a citizen to
undergo a catheterization.” Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). In the end, though, the
district court did not address whether the urine draw violated the Fourth Amendment because no
evidence tied the officer to the catheterization. Id. at 848-49. Instead, the evidence showed that
the hospital doctor was entirely responsible for ordering the catheterization. Id. Although the
police officer observed the catheterization take place and took possession of a urine sample, no
genuine issues of material fact suggested that the officer ordered that the plaintiff be subjected to
a catheterization. Id. at 849.
In Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008), a state inmate claimed that a
correctional officer and prison nurses violated his Fourth Amendment rights by forcing him to
undergo catheterization to avoid prison discipline when he could not provide a urine sample for
random drug testing. Id. at 685. The district court found that the officer violated plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights because “involuntary catheterization of a 68-year-old man with a history of
prostate problems, as part of a random drug screening and without suspicion, is unreasonable
when other less intrusive options are available, such as keeping [plaintiff] in a room until he was
able to urinate.” Id. at 688 (quotations omitted). Nonetheless, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant, relying on the “clearly established” qualified immunity prong.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court assumed a fact – that the officer
ordered the catheterization – that was not supported by the record. Id. at 688. Along those lines,
even if the corrections officer ordered plaintiff to go to the medical unit, that officer had no
contact with medical professionals and no authority to direct them to perform the procedure. Id.
at 689. Because no evidence supported a finding that the officer was personally responsible for
the catheterization, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred in concluding that the
officer violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
In Rudy v. Village of Sparta, 990 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Mich. 1996), police arrested
plaintiff for driving under the influence and took him to the sheriff’s department for a
breathalyzer test. Id. at 926. Because the plaintiff’s attempts to blow into the breathalyzer
machine were inadequate, officers obtained a search warrant to withdraw his blood. Id. The
nurse at the sheriff’s department, however, refused to draw plaintiff’s blood without first
receiving medical clearance. Id. Consequently, officers transported plaintiff to a hospital, where
he was unable to provide a urine sample. Id. at 926-27. When nurses told plaintiff that they
would forcibly catheterize him, he became combative, so the doctor ordered nurses to inject
plaintiff with a sedative and obtain a urine sample to screen for possible drug abuse. Id. at 927.
After waiting some time, a technician asked plaintiff to provide a urine sample, but he was
unable to do so. Id. The hospital doctor thereafter verbally ordered that plaintiff be catheterized.
Id. Plaintiff alleged that after he noted that the search warrant said nothing about urine, an officer
grabbed his arm and ordered the technician to perform the catheterization. Id.
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued under § 1983 alleging, among other things, that the
officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the officer, finding that the hospital doctor and staff, not the officer, caused the alleged
violation. Id. at 929. The district court stated that at most, the officer’s instruction for the
technician to “just do” the procedure was a “mere scintilla of evidence” that was insufficient to
defeat summary judgment. Id.9
Last but not least, in Ellis v. Cotton, 2008 WL 4182359 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2008), the
plaintiff was arrested for evading arrest after leading police on a high-speed chase. Id. at *1-2.
Plaintiff was ultimately taken to the hospital after an officer observed that he was dazed and
disoriented. Id. at *2. At the hospital, the plaintiff behaved in a disorderly fashion, cursing at
medical staff and kicking at paramedics. Id. At the hospital, plaintiff admitted that he had
recently “shot up” meth. Id. Plaintiff was ultimately restrained, a catheter was placed, and shots
were administered to calm him down. Id. Plaintiff claimed that he subsequently “passed out”
and, thereafter, blood was drawn and urine was extracted. Id.
Plaintiff sued under § 1983, alleging, among other things, that the forcible taking of
blood and urine amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at *5. In ruling for the
defendant, the Northern District of Texas reasoned that this case was “remarkably similar to
Schmerber.” Id. at *6. Going further, the Court held that “[e]ven if Defendant violated
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, he would still be immune from suit” because taking blood
and urine samples is “a proper method of seizing evidence for a person suspected of committing
an intoxication offense.” Id. at *7-8.
A similar conclusion was reached in Saulsberry v. Maricopa County, 151 F. Supp. 2d
1109 (D. Ariz. 2001).
Are the Individual Defendants Entitled to Qualified Immunity?
Given this backdrop, the Court returns to the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis to determine whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the
incident. See Powers v. Lightner, 820 F.2d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 1987) (right must be “clearly
established at the time the incidents occurred”). Under Seventh Circuit precedent, a violation is
“clearly established” where: (1) a closely analogous case establishes that the conduct is
unconstitutional; or (2) the violation is so obvious that a reasonable state actor would know that
his actions violated the Constitution. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted). Finally, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the violation of a
clearly established right. Forman v. Richmond Police Dept., 104 F.3d 950, 957-58 (7th Cir.1997)
Beginning with the first method of showing the existence of a “clearly established” right,
the Court simply cannot find that, at the time of Mr. Lockard’s catheterization, a closely
analogous case established that any of the individual Defendants’ conduct was unconstitutional.
To the contrary, Seventh Circuit precedent is clear that an involuntary catheterization does not
automatically violate the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law, even in the absence of a
warrant. See Sparks, 71 F.3d 648. Significantly, here, the warrant required the removal of both
blood and urine samples.
However, this determination is not fatal to Mr. Lockard’s claim if Lockard can show that
the violation was clearly established, because the violation was so obvious that a reasonable
state actor would know that his actions violated the Constitution. Siebert, 256 F.3d at 654-55.
Analogous case law is not necessarily required to show a clearly established violation, partially
because “in the most extreme cases, an analogous case might never arise because the existence
of the right was so clear, as a matter of the wording of a constitutional or statutory provision or
decisions in other circuits or in the state courts, that no one thought it worthwhile to litigate the
issue.” Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000) (“a reasonable person
would have known that it was unconstitutional to use the government’s power to cause . . . the
unjustified removal of a six-year-old child from his parents in order to destroy the family, based
simply on the family’s religious beliefs.”).
Thus, the Court is now tasked with determining if the right at issue was so obvious that a
reasonable actor would know that Mr. Lockard’s forced catheterization violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. On this point, Mr. Lockard repeatedly contends that he does not challenge
the validity of the warrant itself, but instead the manner in which it was executed. That is, Mr.
Lockard asserts the Defendants improperly executed the search warrant when they resorted to
forced catheterization, as the warrant did not expressly order or refer to catheterization. (See,
e.g., Dkt. 80 at 24-25).
The Court respectfully disagrees. To assess Mr. Lockard’s arguments, the Court again
returns to the facts of this case. A neutral and detached magistrate issued a valid search warrant,
which stated as follows: “You are hereby authorized and ordered, in the name of the State of
Indiana with the necessary and proper assistance to obtain and remove a blood and urine sample
from Jamie N. Lockard.” In terms of obtaining Mr. Lockard’s urine sample, there were really
only two realistic ways to comply with the directive of the warrant: (1) wait for the suspect to
voluntarily relieve himself; or (2) use a catheter.10 Significantly, it is well-settled that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard does not necessarily require the employment of “alternative
less intrusive means” when executing a warrant. U.S. v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir.
2006) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (the Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to declare that only the least
intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”); Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (“it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to
determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by
warrant – subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (providing an officer’s reliance on a
search warrant is presumptively reasonable and explaining that “an officer cannot be expected to
question the [judge’s] probable cause determination . . . [o]nce the warrant issues, there is
literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law, and penalizing
the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations”). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has expressly
rejected the notion that, when collecting a urine sample, the only reasonable course of action is
to wait for the levies to break, so to speak. See Sparks, 71 F.3d at 262.
Further, the use of the word “remove” in the warrant authorizes the forcible taking of
Defendants emphasize that more invasive procedures were not considered or ordered,
“such as the use of a nephrostomy tube or a cystostomy tube for removing urine directly from the
kidney or bladder,” which “would have involved incisions into the skin and those respective
organs.” (Dkt. 92 at 4). Obviously, barring some extenuating circumstances that the Court
cannot imagine at this time, the use of these incredibly invasive procedures in lieu of a catheter
to obtain a urine sample would be absurd.
urine in the absence of consent. In the Court’s view, the warrant’s language obviously
contemplated the potential use of a catheter, a common and well-accepted medical procedure,
even though the warrant did not use that exact word. On this point, “[n]othing in the language of
the Constitution or in this Court’s decisions interpreting that language suggests that . . . search
warrants . . . must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be
executed.” Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257-58. And, as a practical matter, the need for a catheter may be
especially acute in OWI cases like this one, where, quite literally, the evidence dissipates by the
minute. Ultimately, where a search warrant specifically orders a urine sample, but the suspect
will not or simply cannot urinate, then a catheter can be a reasonable means of effectuating the
requirements of the warrant.
Additionally, the evidence shows that the catheterization itself was performed in a
reasonable manner. By all accounts, Mr. Lockard’ catheterization was carried out by medical
professionals in a hospital setting according to accepted medical practices. As the Schmerber
Court emphasized, “[w]e are thus not presented with the serious questions which would arise if a
search involving use of a medical technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made by
other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment – for example, it were
administered by police in the privacy of a station house.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the curtain was pulled around the bed before the procedure was
performed in order to protect Mr. Lockard’s privacy. While the Court has no illusions about the
indignity and physical pain that Mr. Lockard endured as a result of this unpleasant procedure, the
Court cannot rule that the method of effectuating the catheter was unreasonable.
There remains one looming case that the Court must address. Importantly, in February
2010 – almost one year after the incident in question – the Southern District of Indiana addressed
the issue of involuntary catheterization in Elliott v. Sheriff of Rush County, Ind., 686 F. Supp. 2d
840 (S.D. Ind. 2010), ruling that fact issues precluded summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim
that law enforcement officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights in connection with a forced
catheterization. Mr. Lockard uses Elliott as the centerpiece of most of his arguments. And with
good reason; after all, the facts of Elliott are, in many ways, strikingly similar to those in the
After pulling over the plaintiff for speeding, officers suspected Mr. Elliott of DUI and
possession of marijuana. Id. at 849–50. Plaintiff refused to consent to a chemical or blood test.
Id. at 850–51. Officers thereafter obtained a search warrant authorizing them to obtain medical
professional assistance “to obtain and remove a blood or urine sample from [plaintiff]” and to
use reasonable force to do so. Id. at 851 (emphasis added). After obtaining the warrant, officers
transported plaintiff to the hospital, where, after seeing the search warrant, the plaintiff signed a
consent form authorizing the hospital to take a blood and/or urine sample. Id. Thereafter,
hospital staff drew two vials of blood and provided them to police. Id. Plaintiff then drank five
cups of waters in an attempt to facilitate urination, but these efforts proved fruitless. Id.
Consequently, the officers decided to use a catheter. Id. The officers handcuffed plaintiff to a
surgical table, pulled down his pants and held his legs open while a nurse inserted a catheter. Id.
at 851–52. The urine analysis showed the presence of THC and benzodiazepines in plaintiff's
system. Id. at 852.
Plaintiff sued the officers under § 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment rights,
alleging, among other things, that by procuring the urine sample through forced catheterization,
officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant and used excessive force. Id. at 853.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that their actions were lawful and that
qualified immunity shielded them from liability. Id. The district court found that by requiring
plaintiff to give a urine sample after he had already provided a blood sample, officers exceeded
the scope of the warrant, and that the law was clearly established that a law enforcement officer
may not exceed the scope of a lawfully obtained search warrant unless an exception to the
warrant requirement applied. Id. at 856-57. This Court wholeheartedly agrees with Elliot’s
conclusion on this front, as the language of the warrant unmistakably limited its reach to either a
blood or urine sample.
Going further, Elliott found assuming arguendo that officers if had not exceed the scope
of the search warrant, they still violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to
undergo a forced catheterization. Id. at 857–62. To reach this conclusion, the court balanced the
Schmerber factors and concluded that balance of the factors weighed in finding a Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. Then, with respect to defendants’ claim of qualified immunity, the
district court first acknowledged that it was unable to find any on-point authority that would
create a “clearly established” right, but then ruled that “[t]his case falls into the obvious category
[because a] reasonable law enforcement officer should have known that ordering Plaintiff to
submit to a medical catheterization against his will and without the issuance of a search warrant
specifically authorizing the same, was an unreasonable search.” Id. at 863.
Mr. Lockard’s reliance on Elliott is certainly understandable, but, in the end, the Court is
not persuaded. As an initial matter, it is important to note that within the Seventh Circuit, “a
district judge’s decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other
courts, on other judges in the district, or even on other cases before the same judge.” Hicklin v.
WBH Evansville, Inc., 2001 WL 1708827 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 2001) (citing, inter alia, Howard v.
Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, the Court respectfully
disagrees as it believes this case is distinguishable with three portions of the qualified immunity
analysis found in Elliott.
First, Elliott ruled that a “reasonable law enforcement officer should have known that
ordering Plaintiff to submit to a medical catheterization against his will and without the issuance
of a search warrant specifically authorizing the same, was an unreasonable search.” Elliott, 686
F. Supp. 2d at 863 (emphasis added). In the present case, however, the search warrant implicitly
authorized the use of a catheter, as the warrant ordered the officers to “obtain and remove a
blood and urine sample from Jamie N. Lockard.” As discussed above, a urine sample can only
be realistically obtained in two ways, and a catheterization is one reasonable way when a suspect
is either unable or unwilling to urinate.
Second, Elliott distinguishes the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sparks, 71 F.3d 648 by
highlighting that “the plaintiff was a prison inmate at the time of the search of his person” and
noting that prison inmates have a lesser expectation of privacy than others in society. Elliott, 686
F. Supp. 2d at 863. This is certainly true, but, to some degree, this analysis paints an incomplete
picture. After all, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that where, as here, a suspect is arrested,
his reasonable expectation of privacy is “diminished substantially . . .”. Sullivan, 384 F.2d at
377. Stated differently, although an arrestee may have a larger expectation of privacy than a
prisoner, the arrestee’s expectation of privacy is still shrunken compared to society at large.
Finally, Elliott, cited a “trend in the case law,” which led it to believe that “the
recognition of controlling precedent was merely a question of time.” Elliott, 686 F. Supp. 2d at
863 (citation and internal quotations omitted). To bolster this position, Elliott relied on six
cases. However, in the Court’s view, at three of these cases are readily distinguishable because
they involved procedures that are far more invasive than catheterization. See Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (suppressing evidence obtained when the police had the
defendant’s stomach pumped to retrieve capsules that they could not forcibly extract from his
mouth); Winston, 470 U.S. 753 (compelled surgical removal of a bullet to be used as evidence
was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Adams v. State, 299 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. 1973)
(subjecting robbery suspect to a surgical procedure to extract a bullet pursuant to a valid search
warrant was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Moreover, one of the cited cases did
not really tilt in plaintiff’s favor. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (a state may, over a suspect’s
protests, have a physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunk driving without
violating the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights)
The other two cases relied on by the Elliott court – Lovett, 810 F. Supp. 844 and Levine,
550 F.3d 684, both of which were summarized above – involved forced catheterizations, but are
otherwise distinguishable. Lovett involved the warrantless withdrawal of urine and specifically
noted that “the Fourth Amendment’s protection of human dignity and privacy might require a
warrant at the very least before government officials could compel a citizen to undergo a
catheterization.” 810 F. Supp. at 848 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here, there was
such a warrant. In Levine, the Eighth Circuit ultimately ruled that prison nurses’ actions in
attempting to catheterize an inmate in order to obtain a urine sample for random drug testing
were objectively reasonable. 550 F.3d at 689. Once again, Levine did not involve a warrant
requiring the removal of a urine sample. Simply stated, because of the specific warrant
distinction, this Court cannot discern the same trend in the case law that was highlighted in
On this point, it is worth noting that there are at least two post-Elliott cases granting
qualified immunity in the context of forced catheterizations. See Miller v. Idaho State Patrol,
252 P.3d 1274, 1287 (Idaho 2011) (officer entitled to qualified immunity after DUI suspect was
catheterized without a warrant after he refused to provide a urine sample following his arrest;
“[g]iven the foregoing legal uncertainty as to whether a forced warrantless catheterization is
constitutional, the district court should have dismissed Miller’s § 1983 claim under the doctrine
of qualified immunity.”); and Hooper v. Pearson, 2010 WL 2990809 (D. Utah July 26, 2010) (no
Fourth Amendment violation involving excessive force where DUI arrestee was involuntarily
catheterized pursuant to a warrant for seizure of bodily fluids; even if forced catheterization was
not objectively reasonable, the individual defendants would still be entitled to qualified
immunity). That said, in one recent case, Cook v. Olathe Medical Center, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d
990 (D. Kan. 2011), the district court ruled that qualified immunity was inappropriate in the
context of a forced catheterization under the unique circumstances. Id. at 1012 (“the law is
clearly established that a reasonable officer would have known that absent probable cause and
exigent circumstances, [a forced catheterization] constitutes an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.”). Significantly, however, the officers in the Cook case did not have a
warrant authorizing the removal of a urine sample. In any event, given these developments, the
existence and/or direction of any discernable trend in the law concerning forcible
catheterizations is far from clear.
In light of this somewhat diverging patchwork of well-reasoned cases, the Court cannot
help but find that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity shielding them
from liability. This case is in nebulous territory. See Sparks, 71 F.3d at 261 (“the right ro be free
of unwelcome medical procedures has an uncertain scope even for persons suspected but not yet
convicted of crime”). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “officials are not liable for bad
guesses in gray areas: they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Gordon v. Whitted, 2005
WL 1290644, at *10 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Because this case is in a quintessential “gray area,” the conclusion is inescapable: The individual
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court would be remiss not to mention one last point of emphasis. Under these
circumstances, the argument for applying qualified immunity to Dr. Cheeks and Nurse Walston
is particularly strong. These individuals knew that a court, through a search warrant, had
ordered the removal of a urine sample. Common sense suggests that their corresponding use of a
catheter was reasonable. Plainly stated, doctors and nurses are not Fourth Amendment gurus.
See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 469 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Since a physician is
required to have no knowledge of the law of search and seizure to practice his profession, any
such enumeration of the facts to the doctor would be a meaningless ritual . . . comparable to
requiring the police to recite to a locksmith the basis for their probable cause before he could
legally open a lock for them.”); Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, 345 F.3d 1157,
1180 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Nurses and other medical personnel have neither nor the information
that would be necessary to second-guess police determinations regarding probable cause, exigent
circumstances, and the like.”). Doctors and nurses are not individuals who frequently engage in
quintessential police activities. Cf. Shelby Industrial Park, Inc. v. City of Shelbyville, 2011 WL
767724, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 25, 2011) (refusing to apply relaxed standard of qualified immunity
to former police officer who was acting as a private investigator during the incident; defendant
was not subject to a more forgiving standard “just because he has traded his police uniform for
civilian garb”). For this reason, qualified immunity is also appropriate for Dr. Cheek and Nurse
For the reasons set forth below, Lawrenceburg’s Motion (Dkt. 50) and the Hospital’s
Motion (Dkt. 53) are GRANTED and Lockard’s Motion (Dkt. 79) is DENIED. A Final
Judgment will accompany this entry.
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Steven J. Cohen
ZEIGLER COHEN & KOCH
Jeremy Michael Dilts
Douglas A. Garner
ZERBE GARNER MILLER & BLONDELL
Edward J. Liptak