Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC

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ORDER granting 7 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim and denying as futile 16 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend its Complaint. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on August 22, 2012. (AYB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE KENNETH M. SEATON, d/b/a GRAND RESORT HOTEL & CONVENTION CTR., Plaintiff, TRIPADVISOR, LLC, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) No. 3:11-cv-549 ) (Phillips) ) ) ) ORDER I. Introduction This matter comes before the Court concerning Defendantâs Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [Doc. 7] and Plaintiffâs Motion to Amend the Complaint [Doc. 16] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. For the reasons stated herein, Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffâs Motion to Amend is DENIED AS FUTILE. II. Jurisdiction This action arose in Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee but has since been properly removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) and 1446, et seq. The Court notes that it has jurisdiction over the defamation claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as there is complete diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. III. Statement of the Facts A. The Parties Plaintiff Kenneth M. Seaton is the sole proprietor of Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center (âGrand Resortâ) in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. [Complaint, Doc. 1-1, ¶ 1.] Seaton is and has been in the hotel, restaurant, and convention business in Pigeon Forge since 1982. Id. Plaintiff claims that Grand Resort established itself as a valuable business in the State of Tennessee and City of Pigeon Forge, and that it justly and properly gained and kept the confidence and goodwill of the public generally, including the many tourists that vacation in the Smokey Mountains. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff also reports that the Grand Resort was viewed favorably by the local Department of Health. Id. Defendant TripAdvisor, LLC (âTripAdvisorâ) is a limited liability company incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Proposed Defendants Expedia, Inc. and TripAdvisor Holdings, LLC. [Doc. 1-1, ¶ 3.] Defendant TripAdvisor does business throughout the United States and worldwide by means of an internet website located at www.TripAdvisor.com. It is in the business of providing travel research information, including reviews, reports, opinions, surveys, and other information regarding hotels, resorts, restaurants, or other similar businesses of interest to persons traveling, or making travel plans worldwide. Defendant advertises that it adheres to certain rules and regulations of fairness in its ratings and reports concerning the hotels and restaurants it surveys. Id. ¶ 4. Its website proclaims that Defendant TripAdvisor provides the worldâs âmost trusted travel advice.â Id. Visitors to TripAdvisorâs website use its forums to exchange information relating to travel issues. TripAdvisor users are further encouraged to post comments and reviews and to answer surveys regarding hotels, resorts, restaurants, or other such places of interest. TripAdvisor also creates and publishes on its website various lists, reports, or rankings pertaining to hotels, resorts, or other similar businesses in the travel or vacation industry. One such report is the âDirtiest Hotelsâ list created, published, and distributed annually by TripAdvisor from 2006 to 2011. The annual feature is composed of a bold heading that reads, â2011 DIRTIEST HOTELS,â and a list of ten hotels, ranked from one through ten, with number âoneâ designated as the âdirtiest hotel.â When compiling its âDirtiest Hotelsâ list, TripAdvisor relies solely on customer reviews; it does not inquire about, investigate, or consider any hotels except those receiving comments or reviews on the TripAdvisor website. B. The 2011 Dirtiest Hotels List On January 25, 2011, Defendant TripAdvisorâs â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list reported that Grand Resort was âthe dirtiest hotel in America.â [Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7.]The survey was published via TripAdvisorâs website and several media entities, including CNN, ABC, NBC, and WATE. Id. The list was published in different configurations in different media outlets, with Grand Resort ranking ânumber oneâ on the list in each configuration. One configuration contained the following statements, which Plaintiff claims exhibit âan effort to assure the public and the media that this list is factual, reliable, and trustworthyâ: (1) âWorldâs Most Trusted Travel Adviceâ; (2) âTripAdvisor lifts the lid on Americaâs Dirtiest Hotelsâ; (3) âTop 10 U.S. Crime-Scenes Revealed, According to Traveler Cleanliness Ratingsâ; (4) âNow in its sixth year, and true to its promise to share the whole truth about hotels to help travelers plan their trips, TripAdvisor names and shames the nationâs most hair-raising hotels.â; (5) âThis year, the tarnished title of Americaâs dirtiest hotel goes to Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center, in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee.â The list incorporated a photograph and a quote from TripAdvisor users about each -3- of the ten hotels, as well as a link to each hotelâs page on TripAdvisorâs website. The user quote for Grand Resort was: âThere was dirt at least ½â thick in the bathtub which was filled with lots of dark hair;â the photograph for Grand Resort was of a ripped bedspread. IV. Statement of the Case The Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee on October 11, 2011. On October 17, 2011, Defendant removed the matter to this Court. Plaintiffâs original Complaint charges that Defendant is liable for âmaliciously and wrongfully contriving, designing and intending to cause respected customers to lose confidence in the Plaintiff and to cause the public to cease and refrain from doing business with the Plaintiff and to cause great injury and irreparable damage to and to destroy Plaintiffs business and reputation by false and misleading means . . . .â [Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7.] Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant âdefam[ed] the Plaintiffs business with unsubstantiated rumors and grossly distorted ratings and misleading statements to be used by consumers,â [Id.], âsingled out Plaintiffs business and directly advised customers not to trust them,â [Id.] ¶ 8, âused a rating system which is flawed and inconsistent and distorts actual performance and perspective,â [Id.] ¶ 9, âoverstates the level of trust that can be placed in Defendants review of the Plaintiff site, thereby seeking to influence,â [Id.] ¶ 10, and âacted recklessly and with disregard to Plaintiffâs right to carry out its business . . . ,â [Id.] ¶ 11. Plaintiff claims that TripAdvisor consequently damaged and destroyed Grand Resortâs excellent reputation, goodwill, confidence, and business advantage and caused great damages, economic and otherwise, to Plaintiff and Grand Resort. [Id.] ¶¶ 7, 11. Plaintiff prays for five- -4- million dollars in compensatory damages and five-million dollars in punitive damages. [Doc. 11, Prayer, at 2.] V. Analysis A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if a plaintiff fails to proffer âenough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.â Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must treat all of the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe all of the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). However, the Court âneed not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and [c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.â In re Travel Agent Commân Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements of the claim. Typically, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider any documents attached to a motion to dismiss to be part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffâs complaint and are central to the plaintiffâs claim. Id. at 89. In this case, Plaintiffâs allegations concern Defendantâs online âDirtiest Hotelsâ list and the manner in which the list was portrayed -5- to online viewers. Thus, the Court will consider the online pages cited by Plaintiff and Defendant without converting this Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. 1. Defamation and False Light To assert a prima facie case of defamation in Tennessee, the plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement was false and defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement. Sullivan v. Baptist Memâl Hosp., 995 S.W.3d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999). "Publication" is a term of art meaning the communication of defamatory matter to a third person. Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn. 1994). To establish a prima facie case of the related tort of false light invasion of privacy in Tennessee, the plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) publicity; (2) that places the plaintiff in a false light; (3) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4) that was made with the knowledge that the statement was false or with recklessness as to the falsity of the statement. West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 643-44 (Tenn. 2001). In recognition of the kinship between defamation and false light, the Tennessee Supreme Court has defined the contours of the tort of false light with reference to the Tennessee law on defamation. Id. at 645-49. The first question for a court to address, regarding defamation, is whether the statement is capable of being understood as defamatory. See Gallagher v. E.W. Scripps Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45709, *20 (W.D. Tenn. May 28, 2009) (writing that, â[w]hile the issue of whether a statement may be understood by readers in a defamatory sense is ultimately a question for the jury, preliminary determination of whether a statement is capable of being so understood is a -6- question of law to be determined by the court.â); See also, Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978)(holding that â[a] trial court is permitted to determine that a statement is not defamatory as a matter of law . . . only when it can say that the statement is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense.â) Id. *16 (quoting Biltcliffe v. Haileyâs Harbor, Inc., 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2005)). However, â[i]f the court determines that the statement or communication is not defamatory, then dismissal of the action is appropriate . . . .â Battle v. A&E TV Networks, LLC, 837 F. Supp. 767, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2011). Any defamation case, by its very nature, at least passively implicates the First Amendment, forcing courts to further refine and identify protected versus tortious speech. Acknowledging that the freedom to speak oneâs mind is a fundamental right, courts have been reluctant to âchillâ the exercising of that freedom by penalizing opinions, even opinions that deeply offend the target. See Snyder v. Phelps et.al., 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed. 2d 172 (2011)(holding that the First Amendment shields Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church when they picket the funerals of fallen service officers while holding signs such as âGod hates Americaâ and âYouâre Going to Hellâ). The Court in Snyder reasoned âWestboro may have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been particularly hurtful to [the victim]. That does not mean that its speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case.â.1 1  In Snyder, The Supreme Court ruled that âmatters of public concernâ received the âhighest levelâ of First Amendment Protection. 131 S. Ct. 1207 at 179. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Snyder that the law determining which matters are of âpublic concern,â and which matters are not public concern, is not well developed; however, it is not necessary to determine whether TripAdvisorâs conduct is of public concern since the Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy a defamation claim in any case. Id. -7- The First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution protect âstatement[s] of pure opinion, hyperbole, or rhetorical exaggeration.â Ogle v. Hocker, 279 Fed. Appâx 391, 397 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jolliff v. NLRB, 513 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Johnson v. Carnes, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727, *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (âIn order to be actionable the statement must involve fact and not a matter of simple opinion.â) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)); See also, Anderson v. Watchtown Bible & Tract Socây of N.Y., Inc., 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29, *101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (â[T]he First Amendmentâs freedom of speech provision bars defamation claims based on statements that are expressions of ideas or opinions and that âcannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.ââ). The Supreme Court and Tennessee courts recognize that not all opinions are automatically protected by the First Amendment. Malmquist v. Hearst Corp., (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; Revis v. McClean, 31 S.W.3d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). The Plaintiff correctly points out, some opinions can give rise to a defamation claim when they imply an assertion of fact or when the opinion is based upon erroneous information. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has âa flawed methodology or arbitrary natureâ that âreskless[ly] or negligent[ly]⦠resulted in damages to the Plaintiff and his business.â [Doc. 15 at 5]. As observed by the Supreme Court in Milkovich, âexpressions of âopinionâ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.â 497 U.S. at 18. Further, â[e]ven if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact.â Id. at 18-19. Accordingly, defamation and false light causes of action require a -8- plaintiff to allege that the defaming party communicated a false or misleading statement of fact, or statement of opinion that implies having a basis in defamatory facts. Steele v. Ritz, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 843, *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec., 16, 2009). 2. Inherently Subjective versus Objectively Verifiable In Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of whether Moodyâs credit rating system can be considered defamatory. 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. Mich. 2007). The Sixth Circuit writes, âa viable defamation claim exists only where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the challenged statement connotes actual, objectively verifiable facts.â Id at 529. The Sixth Circuit continues, âWe find no basis upon which we could conclude that the credit rating itself communicates any provably false factual connotation. Even if we could draw any fact-based inferences from this rating, such inferences could not be proven false because of the inherently subjective nature of Moody's ratings calculation.â Id. In order for the Plaintiff to properly state a claim for defamation or false light, the Plaintiff must allege that the Defendant communicated a false or misleading statement of fact, or a statement of opinion that implies having a basis in defamatory facts. Steele, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 843, *9. Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss in a defamation case, the analysis necessarily turns on semantics2. See Revis v. McClean, 31 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)) (holding that â[i]n determining whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning, the â[a]llegedly defamatory statements should be judged within the context in which they are made,â and given their usual meaning, âas a person of ordinary intelligence would 2 The term âsemanticsâ has, at times, suffered from a bad reputation. Here, the term is meant only to describe that the nature of the Courtâs analysis must necessarily center upon the objective meaning of the allegedly offending terms. -9- understand them in light of the surrounding circumstances.ââ) Since the tort of defamation requires either a) a false or misleading statement of fact, or b) a statement of opinion that implies having a basis in defamatory fact, the task of the Court, at this stage, is to determine the legal significance of the underlying utterance, and then, once determined, to see whether that utterance then gives rise to a cause of action in tort. Adding complexity to the analysis, the subjective impression that the utterance gives to the alleged victim, Grand Resort, is immaterial; the standard is an objective one i.e. the impression that a âreasonable personâ would draw from the language at issue is the only relevant inquiry for the Court to consider at this stage. Revis, 31 S.W.3d 250, 253. Contrary to the Plaintiffâs argument in chief, the intent of the alleged tortfeasor is equally irrelevant in deciding whether a statement can be considered defamatory as a matter of law.3 Id. Again, the question for the court is whether a reasonable person could understand the language in question as an assertion of fact, or, on the other hand, regard the language merely hyperbolic opinion or rhetorical exaggeration. Hocker, 279 Fed. Appâx 391, 397. i. The Objective Meaning of the â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ List In Plaintiffâs Response to Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff succinctly summarizes the central features of its argument in the following words: 3  Defamation is not a strict liability offense; however, the Plaintiff makes several references to the Defendantâs intent to issues a defamatory statement; Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant ââ¦clearly overstated the accuracy, reliability, or level of trust that could be placed in the â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list due to the flawed methodology or arbitrary nature used in creating the list of which TripAdvisor knew, should have known, or was reckless or negligent in disregarding the truth of the statement.â [Doc. 15] at 5 (internal citations omitted). The Plaintiff misstates the tort of defamation. It is true that defamation requires that alleged offender âknowinglyâ issued a false statement, ârecklesslyâ disregarded the truth, or ânegligently, failed to ascertain the truth; however, the scienter, or mental state, requirements are not for determining whether the statement was defamatory as a matter of law; rather, the scienter requirements are requisite to attach a charge of defamation to a particular defendant. Sullivan, 995 S.W.3d 569 In other words, if a statement is legally innocuous, or not capable of a defamatory meaning, then whether the defendant intended it to be defamatory need not be consideredâonly after a statement is determined to be capable of a defamatory meaning should the Court need to consider the Defendantâs intent so as to establish liability. -10- The Plaintiff submits that TripAdvisor, in publishing its â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list, was obviously implying to a reasonable person that the Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center was the dirties hotel in the United States, the dirtiest hotel on the ten hotels on the âDirtiest Hotelsâ list, and/or one of the dirtiest hotels in the United States. A reasonable person reading TripAdvisorâs â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list would not dismiss the message about the dirtiest hotels in making their hotel and travel plans. Furthermore, the [list] cannot be considered [hyperbole] because, in sharp contrast to typical hyperboleâ¦[the] list is put forth with an actual numerical ranking, with comments suggesting that the rankings are actual, verifiable and factualâ¦[A] ruling in favor of TripAdvisorâ¦will allow TripAdvisor [to] become more impenetrable and more dangerous than ever in a âlawless no-manâs land on the Internet. [Doc. 15 at 13-14 & 21]. While the Plaintiff argument is compelling, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff states that â[a] reasonable person reading TripAdvisorâs â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list would not dismiss the message about the dirtiest hotels in making their hotel and travel plans.â Id. It is true that a reasonable person could likely consider TripAdvisorâs list when weighing hotel options; however, âpropensity to initiate negative mental contemplation on behalf of a potential patronâ is not the test for defamation; if the fact finder were considering damages, the likelihood that a patron may read the list and be influenced would be relevant; however, at this stage of the proceeding, loss of business is not the Courtâs consideration. In order for the Plaintiff to sufficiently allege the tort of defamation, the Plaintiff must allege that TripAdvisorâs list is defamatory, and to do that, the Court will not consider whether the list is compelling, as Plaintiff suggests, but whether a reasonable person could understand the language in question as an assertion of fact, or, on the other hand, is the language merely hyperbolic opinion or rhetorical exaggeration. Hocker, 279 Fed. Appâx 391, 397. In further support of Plaintiffâs argument, Plaintiff asserts that âthe [list] cannot be considered [hyperbole] because, âin sharp contrast to typical hyperboleâ¦[the] list is put forth -11- with an actual numerical ranking, with comments suggesting that the rankings are actual, verifiable and factualâ¦â Id. [Doc. 15 at 13-14]. It is true that the Defendant published an article with a numerical ranking, and that the Defendant suggests reasons to support its opinions, including that â87 percent of those who reviewed [Grand Resort] recommended against staying there,â but neither the fact that Defendant numbers its opinions one through ten, nor that it supports its opinions with data, converts its opinions to objective statements of fact. Any reasonable person can distinguish opinions based on reasons from facts based on reasonsâjust because TripAdvisor states its reasons for including Grand Resort on its list does not make the assertion one of objective fact. A person who is unable to distinguish the phrase âit is hot,â a subjective opinion, from âit is one-hundred degrees,â an objective fact, is hardly âreasonable.â Similarly, TripAdvisorâs âDirtiest Hotelsâ list is clearly unverifiable rhetorical hyperbole. TripAdvisorâs list is of the genre of hyperbole that is omnipresent. From law schools to restaurants, from judges to hospitals, everything is ranked, graded, ordered and critiqued. Undoubtedly, some will accept the array of âBestâ and âWorstâ rankings as impenetrable maxims. Certainly, some attempt to obfuscate the distinction between fact and opinion as part of their course of business. For those that read âeat here,â âsleep thereâ or âgo to this law schoolâ and are unable to distinguish measured analysis of objective facts from sensational âcarnival barking,â compliance will be both steadfast and assured. Nevertheless, the standard, fortunately, is what a âreasonable personâ would believe. A reasonable person would not confuse a ranking system, which uses consumer reviews as its litmus, for an objective assertion of fact; the reasonable person, in other words, knows the difference between a statement that is âinherently subjectiveâ and one that is âobjectively verifiable.â -12- It does not appear to the Court that a reasonable person could believe that TripAdvisorâs article reflected anything more than the opinions of TripAdvisorâs millions of online users. Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that would lead this Court to find that TripAdvisor made a statement of fact, or a statement of opinion that it intended readers to believe was based on facts.4Finally, though TripAdvisorâs method of arriving at its conclusions, unverified online user reviews, is a poor evaluative metric, it is not a system sufficiently erroneous so as to be labeled âdefamatoryâ under the legal meaning of the term. Accordingly, Defendantâs motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim [Doc. 7] will be GRANTED. B. Freedom of Speech In the Defendantâs Memorandum in Support of Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffâs Response, the parties disagree as to whether the allegedly defamatory list is protected 4  Plaintiffâs Response to Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss relies heavily upon the deposition of Christopher Emmins, who testified that his company, KwikChex, conducted an investigation of TripAdvisorâs claims of trustworthiness, which ultimately led to the Advertising Standards Authorityâs (âASAâ) investigation of TripAdvisor and its claims of reliability. The ASA concluded that because the site does not verify its user reviews, and because its âclaims [of trustworthiness] implied that consumers could be assured that all review content on the TripAdvisor site was genuine, when we understood that might not be the case, we concluded that the claims were misleading.â The ASA prohibited TripAdvisor from claiming or implying that all reviews on its website were from real travelers or were honest, real, or could be trusted. While such documents are outside the scope of the Courtâs consideration in this motion to dismiss, the Court notes that the ASAâs investigation does not support Plaintiffâs assertion that Defendantâs website, in this instance, made a statement of fact about Plaintiff, nor does the deposition prove, more generally, that TripAdvisorâs analysis and subsequent compilation of user reviews into the âdirtiest hotelsâ list amounts to an assertion of fact.  The ASAâs study concludes that âcustomers would understand the claims [on TripAdvisorâs website regarding the trustworthiness of its reviewsâ] . . . to mean that they could be certain that the reviews posted on the site were from genuine travellers, and accurately reflected those travellersâ experiences of the places they visited.â Thus, while the ASA prohibited TripAdvisor from claiming that all of its reviews were trustworthy, its study only affirms TripAdvisorâs assertion that it is clear from their website that the reviews are just that: usersâ opinions. Whether or not the reviews are from genuine travelers is irrelevant to the question of whether TripAdvisor insinuated that its â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list was based on anything other than opinion evidence. -13- under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. [Doc. 8 at 7]; [Doc. 15 at 6]. The Court need not consider the question of whether the list is constitutionally-protected speech as the Court does not find the list to be defamatory; therefore, since the list is not defamatory, no balancing test weighing the virtue of free speech against the harm of reckless or injurious speech need be discussed by this Court. C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15: Motion to Amend the Complaint Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that where, as here, a defendant has already served a responsive pleading to the original complaint, âa party may amend its pleading only with the opposing partyâs written consent or the courtâs leave.â It further provides, âThe court should freely give leave when justice so requires.â Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In determining whether to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, the Court balances multiple factors, including undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2006); Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 458-49 (6th Cir. 2001). A trial court may appropriately assess the legal sufficiency of a contemplated amendment in considering the propriety of granting leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and deny the motion if amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Amendment would be futile if the proposed amended complaint ââwould not survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim] under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).ââ Bell v. Tennessee, -14- 2012 WL 996560, *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2012) (citing Campbell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 600 F.3d 667, 677 (6th Cir. 2010)). While it is evident to the Court that Plaintiffâs motion to amend was made in a timely manner, was not made in bad faith, and would not unduly prejudice Defendants, after consideration of the claims alleged in Plaintiffâs Proposed Amended Complaint, the Court holds that it must deny Plaintiffâs motion as futile. The Court has addressed in Part V(A)(2)(i)of this Memorandum and Order why Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for defamation/libel and false light. Such failure is not ameliorated by Plaintiffâs inclusion in its Proposed Amended Complaint of supplemental facts and more organized legal pleadings. Plaintiffâs proposed claim of âTrade Libel/Injurious Falsehoodâ also fails to state a claim. To the extent that Tennessee common law recognizes trade libel and injurious falsehood as causes of action, such claims require proof of the publication of a false statement of fact. See Kan. Bankers Sur. Co. v. Bahr Consultants, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1015 (E.D. Tenn. 1999); see also AmMed. Direct, LLC v. Liberty Med. Supply, Inc., 2009 WL 3680539, *8 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2009); Medison Am., Inc. v. Preferred Med. Sys., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 567, 584 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). Therefore, Plaintiffâs trade libel claim fails to state a claim under Tennessee common law and in light of the Courtâs findings in Part V(a)(2). Defendantâs new claim for tortious interference with prospective business relationships would require a showing of the following elements: (1) an existing business relationship with specific third parties or a prospective relationship with an identifiable class of third persons; (2) the defendantâs knowledge of that relationship and not a mere awareness of the plaintiffâs business dealings with others in general; (3) the defendantâs intent to cause the breach or -15- termination of the business relationship; (4) the defendantâs improper motive or improper means; and (5) damages resulting from the tortious interference. See Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002). Examples of âimproper meansâ include: [T]hose means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as violations of statute, regulations, or recognized common-law rules; violence, threats or intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of inside or confidential information, or breach of fiduciary relationship; and those means that violate an established standard of a trade or profession, or otherwise involve unethical conduct, such as sharp dealing, overreaching, or unfair competition. Id. To prove improper motive, the plaintiff must âdemonstrate that the defendantâs predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.â Id. at 701, n.5. The Court does not find that Plaintiffâs Proposed Amended Complaint contains sufficient direct or inferential allegations with respect to elements (3) and (4) of its claim for tortious interference with prospective business relationships. Regarding the element of intent, Plaintiffâs assertion that, in publishing its â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list, Defendant âintended to cause the breach or termination of the business relationships enjoyed by the Plaintiffâ and âintended to and did damage or destroy the confidence, goodwill and reputation enjoyed by the plaintiff,â are legal conclusions, unsupported by any factual allegations in the Complaint. [Doc. 16-1, ¶ 28.] And regarding the element of âimproper meansâ or âimproper motive,â the only assertion Plaintiff makes is that Defendant âemployed an improper means . . . in that it used faulty, false, subjective, and/or unverified information as a basis for its statements, or made the statements with no factual basis whatsoever.â Id. In light of the Courtâs finding in Part V(A)(2)(i)that Defendant did not make any false statements of fact concerning Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot rely solely upon its defamation claim as proof of Defendantâs âimproper means.â Plaintiffâs claim for -16- tortious interference of prospective business relationships does not contain plausible allegations of the âintentâ or âimproperâ elements, and therefore addition of such a claim in this case would be futile. Finally, because Plaintiff has failed to successfully state such claims against Defendant TripAdvisor, the Court finds that Defendantâs action against Expedia, Inc. and TripAdvisor Holdings, LLC also must fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiffâs motion to amend its Complaint [Doc. 16] will be DENIED AS FUTILE. VI. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim [Doc. 7] will be GRANTED, and Plaintiffâs Motion to Amend its Complaint [Doc. 16] will be DENIED AS FUTILE. IT IS SO ORDERED. ENTER: s/ Thomas W. Phillips United States District Judge -17-