Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC
Filing: 25
ORDER granting 7 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim and denying as futile 16 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend its Complaint. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on August 22, 2012. (AYB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
KENNETH M. SEATON, d/b/a GRAND
RESORT HOTEL & CONVENTION CTR.,
Plaintiff,
TRIPADVISOR, LLC,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
) No. 3:11-cv-549
) (Phillips)
)
)
)
ORDER
I.
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court concerning Defendantâs Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
[Doc. 7] and Plaintiffâs Motion to Amend the Complaint [Doc. 16] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
15. For the reasons stated herein, Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffâs
Motion to Amend is DENIED AS FUTILE.
II.
Jurisdiction
This action arose in Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee but has since been
properly removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) and 1446, et seq. The Court notes
that it has jurisdiction over the defamation claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as there is
complete diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
III.
Statement of the Facts
A.
The Parties
Plaintiff Kenneth M. Seaton is the sole proprietor of Grand Resort Hotel and Convention
Center (âGrand Resortâ) in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. [Complaint, Doc. 1-1, ¶ 1.] Seaton is and
has been in the hotel, restaurant, and convention business in Pigeon Forge since 1982. Id.
Plaintiff claims that Grand Resort established itself as a valuable business in the State of
Tennessee and City of Pigeon Forge, and that it justly and properly gained and kept the
confidence and goodwill of the public generally, including the many tourists that vacation in the
Smokey Mountains. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff also reports that the Grand Resort was viewed favorably by
the local Department of Health. Id.
Defendant TripAdvisor, LLC (âTripAdvisorâ) is a limited liability company incorporated
in Delaware, with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. It is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Proposed Defendants Expedia, Inc. and TripAdvisor Holdings, LLC. [Doc. 1-1, ¶
3.] Defendant TripAdvisor does business throughout the United States and worldwide by means
of an internet website located at www.TripAdvisor.com. It is in the business of providing travel
research information, including reviews, reports, opinions, surveys, and other information
regarding hotels, resorts, restaurants, or other similar businesses of interest to persons traveling,
or making travel plans worldwide. Defendant advertises that it adheres to certain rules and
regulations of fairness in its ratings and reports concerning the hotels and restaurants it surveys.
Id. ¶ 4. Its website proclaims that Defendant TripAdvisor provides the worldâs âmost trusted
travel advice.â Id.
Visitors to TripAdvisorâs website use its forums to exchange information relating to
travel issues. TripAdvisor users are further encouraged to post comments and reviews and to
answer surveys regarding hotels, resorts, restaurants, or other such places of interest.
TripAdvisor also creates and publishes on its website various lists, reports, or rankings
pertaining to hotels, resorts, or other similar businesses in the travel or vacation industry. One
such report is the âDirtiest Hotelsâ list created, published, and distributed annually by
TripAdvisor from 2006 to 2011. The annual feature is composed of a bold heading that reads,
â2011 DIRTIEST HOTELS,â and a list of ten hotels, ranked from one through ten, with number
âoneâ designated as the âdirtiest hotel.â When compiling its âDirtiest Hotelsâ list, TripAdvisor
relies solely on customer reviews; it does not inquire about, investigate, or consider any hotels
except those receiving comments or reviews on the TripAdvisor website.
B.
The 2011 Dirtiest Hotels List
On January 25, 2011, Defendant TripAdvisorâs â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list reported that
Grand Resort was âthe dirtiest hotel in America.â [Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7.]The survey was published via
TripAdvisorâs website and several media entities, including CNN, ABC, NBC, and WATE. Id.
The list was published in different configurations in different media outlets, with Grand Resort
ranking ânumber oneâ on the list in each configuration. One configuration contained the
following statements, which Plaintiff claims exhibit âan effort to assure the public and the media
that this list is factual, reliable, and trustworthyâ: (1) âWorldâs Most Trusted Travel Adviceâ; (2)
âTripAdvisor lifts the lid on Americaâs Dirtiest Hotelsâ; (3) âTop 10 U.S. Crime-Scenes
Revealed, According to Traveler Cleanliness Ratingsâ; (4) âNow in its sixth year, and true to its
promise to share the whole truth about hotels to help travelers plan their trips, TripAdvisor
names and shames the nationâs most hair-raising hotels.â; (5) âThis year, the tarnished title of
Americaâs dirtiest hotel goes to Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center, in Pigeon Forge,
Tennessee.â The list incorporated a photograph and a quote from TripAdvisor users about each
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of the ten hotels, as well as a link to each hotelâs page on TripAdvisorâs website. The user quote
for Grand Resort was: âThere was dirt at least ½â thick in the bathtub which was filled with lots
of dark hair;â the photograph for Grand Resort was of a ripped bedspread.
IV.
Statement of the Case
The Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Sevier County,
Tennessee on October 11, 2011. On October 17, 2011, Defendant removed the matter to this
Court. Plaintiffâs original Complaint charges that Defendant is liable for âmaliciously and
wrongfully contriving, designing and intending to cause respected customers to lose confidence
in the Plaintiff and to cause the public to cease and refrain from doing business with the Plaintiff
and to cause great injury and irreparable damage to and to destroy Plaintiffs business and
reputation by false and misleading means . . . .â [Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7.] Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant âdefam[ed] the Plaintiffs business with unsubstantiated rumors and grossly distorted
ratings and misleading statements to be used by consumers,â [Id.], âsingled out Plaintiffs
business and directly advised customers not to trust them,â [Id.] ¶ 8, âused a rating system which
is flawed and inconsistent and distorts actual performance and perspective,â [Id.] ¶ 9, âoverstates
the level of trust that can be placed in Defendants review of the Plaintiff site, thereby seeking to
influence,â [Id.] ¶ 10, and âacted recklessly and with disregard to Plaintiffâs right to carry out its
business . . . ,â [Id.] ¶ 11.
Plaintiff claims that TripAdvisor consequently damaged and destroyed Grand Resortâs
excellent reputation, goodwill, confidence, and business advantage and caused great damages,
economic and otherwise, to Plaintiff and Grand Resort. [Id.] ¶¶ 7, 11. Plaintiff prays for five-
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million dollars in compensatory damages and five-million dollars in punitive damages. [Doc. 11, Prayer, at 2.]
V.
Analysis
A.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if a plaintiff fails to proffer âenough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.â Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must treat all of the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint as true and construe all of the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). However, the Court
âneed not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and [c]onclusory
allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.â In re
Travel Agent Commân Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009). To avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect
to all material elements of the claim.
Typically, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion unless the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Weiner v.
Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider any documents
attached to a motion to dismiss to be part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffâs
complaint and are central to the plaintiffâs claim. Id. at 89. In this case, Plaintiffâs allegations
concern Defendantâs online âDirtiest Hotelsâ list and the manner in which the list was portrayed
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to online viewers. Thus, the Court will consider the online pages cited by Plaintiff and Defendant
without converting this Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
1.
Defamation and False Light
To assert a prima facie case of defamation in Tennessee, the plaintiff must establish that
(1) the defendant published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement was false and
defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with
negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement. Sullivan v. Baptist Memâl Hosp., 995
S.W.3d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999). "Publication" is a term of art meaning the communication of
defamatory matter to a third person. Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d
818, 821 (Tenn. 1994). To establish a prima facie case of the related tort of false light invasion
of privacy in Tennessee, the plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) publicity; (2)
that places the plaintiff in a false light; (3) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4)
that was made with the knowledge that the statement was false or with recklessness as to the
falsity of the statement. West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 643-44 (Tenn.
2001). In recognition of the kinship between defamation and false light, the Tennessee Supreme
Court has defined the contours of the tort of false light with reference to the Tennessee law on
defamation. Id. at 645-49.
The first question for a court to address, regarding defamation, is whether the statement
is capable of being understood as defamatory. See Gallagher v. E.W. Scripps Co., 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45709, *20 (W.D. Tenn. May 28, 2009) (writing that, â[w]hile the issue of whether
a statement may be understood by readers in a defamatory sense is ultimately a question for the
jury, preliminary determination of whether a statement is capable of being so understood is a
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question of law to be determined by the court.â); See also, Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 569
S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978)(holding that â[a] trial court is permitted to determine that a statement
is not defamatory as a matter of law . . . only when it can say that the statement is not reasonably
capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory
sense.â) Id. *16 (quoting Biltcliffe v. Haileyâs Harbor, Inc., 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 676 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2005)). However, â[i]f the court determines that the statement or
communication is not defamatory, then dismissal of the action is appropriate . . . .â Battle v. A&E
TV Networks, LLC, 837 F. Supp. 767, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2011).
Any defamation case, by its very nature, at least passively implicates the First
Amendment, forcing courts to further refine and identify protected versus tortious speech.
Acknowledging that the freedom to speak oneâs mind is a fundamental right, courts have been
reluctant to âchillâ the exercising of that freedom by penalizing opinions, even opinions that
deeply offend the target. See Snyder v. Phelps et.al., 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed. 2d
172 (2011)(holding that the First Amendment shields Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist
Church when they picket the funerals of fallen service officers while holding signs such as âGod
hates Americaâ and âYouâre Going to Hellâ). The Court in Snyder reasoned âWestboro may
have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been
particularly hurtful to [the victim]. That does not mean that its speech should be afforded less
than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case.â.1
1
 In Snyder, The Supreme Court ruled that âmatters of public concernâ received the âhighest levelâ of First
Amendment Protection. 131 S. Ct. 1207 at 179. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Snyder that the law
determining which matters are of âpublic concern,â and which matters are not public concern, is not well developed;
however, it is not necessary to determine whether TripAdvisorâs conduct is of public concern since the Plaintiff fails
to allege facts sufficient to satisfy a defamation claim in any case. Id.
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The First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the
Tennessee Constitution protect âstatement[s] of pure opinion, hyperbole, or rhetorical
exaggeration.â Ogle v. Hocker, 279 Fed. Appâx 391, 397 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jolliff v.
NLRB, 513 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Johnson v. Carnes, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS
727, *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (âIn order to be actionable the statement must involve
fact and not a matter of simple opinion.â) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20
(1990)); See also, Anderson v. Watchtown Bible & Tract Socây of N.Y., Inc., 2007 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 29, *101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (â[T]he First Amendmentâs freedom of speech
provision bars defamation claims based on statements that are expressions of ideas or opinions
and that âcannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.ââ).
The Supreme Court and Tennessee courts recognize that not all opinions are
automatically protected by the First Amendment. Malmquist v. Hearst Corp., (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
(citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; Revis v. McClean, 31 S.W.3d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). The
Plaintiff correctly points out, some opinions can give rise to a defamation claim when they imply
an assertion of fact or when the opinion is based upon erroneous information. Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 18-19. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has âa flawed methodology or arbitrary
natureâ that âreskless[ly] or negligent[ly]⦠resulted in damages to the Plaintiff and his
business.â [Doc. 15 at 5]. As observed by the Supreme Court in Milkovich, âexpressions of
âopinionâ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.â 497 U.S. at 18. Further, â[e]ven if the
speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or
incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
assertion of fact.â Id. at 18-19. Accordingly, defamation and false light causes of action require a
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plaintiff to allege that the defaming party communicated a false or misleading statement of fact,
or statement of opinion that implies having a basis in defamatory facts. Steele v. Ritz, 2009 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 843, *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec., 16, 2009).
2.
Inherently Subjective versus Objectively Verifiable
In Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of whether Moodyâs credit rating system can be considered defamatory. 499 F.3d 520
(6th Cir. Mich. 2007). The Sixth Circuit writes, âa viable defamation claim exists only where a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the challenged statement connotes actual, objectively
verifiable facts.â Id at 529. The Sixth Circuit continues, âWe find no basis upon which we could
conclude that the credit rating itself communicates any provably false factual connotation. Even
if we could draw any fact-based inferences from this rating, such inferences could not be proven
false because of the inherently subjective nature of Moody's ratings calculation.â Id.
In order for the Plaintiff to properly state a claim for defamation or false light, the
Plaintiff must allege that the Defendant communicated a false or misleading statement of fact, or
a statement of opinion that implies having a basis in defamatory facts. Steele, 2009 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 843, *9. Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss in a defamation case, the
analysis necessarily turns on semantics2. See Revis v. McClean, 31 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2000)) (holding that â[i]n determining whether a statement is capable of a defamatory
meaning, the â[a]llegedly defamatory statements should be judged within the context in which
they are made,â and given their usual meaning, âas a person of ordinary intelligence would
2
The term âsemanticsâ has, at times, suffered from a bad reputation. Here, the term is meant only to describe that the
nature of the Courtâs analysis must necessarily center upon the objective meaning of the allegedly offending terms.
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understand them in light of the surrounding circumstances.ââ) Since the tort of defamation
requires either a) a false or misleading statement of fact, or b) a statement of opinion that implies
having a basis in defamatory fact, the task of the Court, at this stage, is to determine the legal
significance of the underlying utterance, and then, once determined, to see whether that utterance
then gives rise to a cause of action in tort. Adding complexity to the analysis, the subjective
impression that the utterance gives to the alleged victim, Grand Resort, is immaterial; the
standard is an objective one i.e. the impression that a âreasonable personâ would draw from the
language at issue is the only relevant inquiry for the Court to consider at this stage. Revis, 31
S.W.3d 250, 253. Contrary to the Plaintiffâs argument in chief, the intent of the alleged tortfeasor
is equally irrelevant in deciding whether a statement can be considered defamatory as a matter of
law.3 Id. Again, the question for the court is whether a reasonable person could understand the
language in question as an assertion of fact, or, on the other hand, regard the language merely
hyperbolic opinion or rhetorical exaggeration. Hocker, 279 Fed. Appâx 391, 397.
i.
The Objective Meaning of the â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ List
In Plaintiffâs Response to Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff succinctly
summarizes the central features of its argument in the following words:
3
 Defamation is not a strict liability offense; however, the Plaintiff makes several references to the Defendantâs intent
to issues a defamatory statement; Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant ââ¦clearly overstated the accuracy, reliability,
or level of trust that could be placed in the â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list due to the flawed methodology or arbitrary
nature used in creating the list of which TripAdvisor knew, should have known, or was reckless or negligent in
disregarding the truth of the statement.â [Doc. 15] at 5 (internal citations omitted). The Plaintiff misstates the tort of
defamation. It is true that defamation requires that alleged offender âknowinglyâ issued a false statement,
ârecklesslyâ disregarded the truth, or ânegligently, failed to ascertain the truth; however, the scienter, or mental state,
requirements are not for determining whether the statement was defamatory as a matter of law; rather, the scienter
requirements are requisite to attach a charge of defamation to a particular defendant. Sullivan, 995 S.W.3d 569 In
other words, if a statement is legally innocuous, or not capable of a defamatory meaning, then whether the defendant
intended it to be defamatory need not be consideredâonly after a statement is determined to be capable of a
defamatory meaning should the Court need to consider the Defendantâs intent so as to establish liability.
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The Plaintiff submits that TripAdvisor, in publishing its â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list, was
obviously implying to a reasonable person that the Grand Resort Hotel and Convention
Center was the dirties hotel in the United States, the dirtiest hotel on the ten hotels on the
âDirtiest Hotelsâ list, and/or one of the dirtiest hotels in the United States. A reasonable
person reading TripAdvisorâs â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list would not dismiss the message
about the dirtiest hotels in making their hotel and travel plans. Furthermore, the [list]
cannot be considered [hyperbole] because, in sharp contrast to typical hyperboleâ¦[the]
list is put forth with an actual numerical ranking, with comments suggesting that the
rankings are actual, verifiable and factualâ¦[A] ruling in favor of TripAdvisorâ¦will
allow TripAdvisor [to] become more impenetrable and more dangerous than ever in a
âlawless no-manâs land on the Internet.
[Doc. 15 at 13-14 & 21]. While the Plaintiff argument is compelling, the Court disagrees.
Plaintiff states that â[a] reasonable person reading TripAdvisorâs â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list
would not dismiss the message about the dirtiest hotels in making their hotel and travel plans.â
Id. It is true that a reasonable person could likely consider TripAdvisorâs list when weighing
hotel options; however, âpropensity to initiate negative mental contemplation on behalf of a
potential patronâ is not the test for defamation; if the fact finder were considering damages, the
likelihood that a patron may read the list and be influenced would be relevant; however, at this
stage of the proceeding, loss of business is not the Courtâs consideration. In order for the
Plaintiff to sufficiently allege the tort of defamation, the Plaintiff must allege that TripAdvisorâs
list is defamatory, and to do that, the Court will not consider whether the list is compelling, as
Plaintiff suggests, but whether a reasonable person could understand the language in question as
an assertion of fact, or, on the other hand, is the language merely hyperbolic opinion or rhetorical
exaggeration. Hocker, 279 Fed. Appâx 391, 397.
In further support of Plaintiffâs argument, Plaintiff asserts that âthe [list] cannot be
considered [hyperbole] because, âin sharp contrast to typical hyperboleâ¦[the] list is put forth
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with an actual numerical ranking, with comments suggesting that the rankings are actual,
verifiable and factualâ¦â Id. [Doc. 15 at 13-14]. It is true that the Defendant published an article
with a numerical ranking, and that the Defendant suggests reasons to support its opinions,
including that â87 percent of those who reviewed [Grand Resort] recommended against staying
there,â but neither the fact that Defendant numbers its opinions one through ten, nor that it
supports its opinions with data, converts its opinions to objective statements of fact. Any
reasonable person can distinguish opinions based on reasons from facts based on reasonsâjust
because TripAdvisor states its reasons for including Grand Resort on its list does not make the
assertion one of objective fact. A person who is unable to distinguish the phrase âit is hot,â a
subjective opinion, from âit is one-hundred degrees,â an objective fact, is hardly âreasonable.â
Similarly, TripAdvisorâs âDirtiest Hotelsâ list is clearly unverifiable rhetorical hyperbole.
TripAdvisorâs list is of the genre of hyperbole that is omnipresent. From law schools to
restaurants, from judges to hospitals, everything is ranked, graded, ordered and critiqued.
Undoubtedly, some will accept the array of âBestâ and âWorstâ rankings as impenetrable
maxims. Certainly, some attempt to obfuscate the distinction between fact and opinion as part of
their course of business. For those that read âeat here,â âsleep thereâ or âgo to this law schoolâ
and are unable to distinguish measured analysis of objective facts from sensational âcarnival
barking,â compliance will be both steadfast and assured. Nevertheless, the standard, fortunately,
is what a âreasonable personâ would believe. A reasonable person would not confuse a ranking
system, which uses consumer reviews as its litmus, for an objective assertion of fact; the
reasonable person, in other words, knows the difference between a statement that is âinherently
subjectiveâ and one that is âobjectively verifiable.â
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It does not appear to the Court that a reasonable person could believe that TripAdvisorâs
article reflected anything more than the opinions of TripAdvisorâs millions of online users.
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that would lead this Court to find that TripAdvisor made a
statement of fact, or a statement of opinion that it intended readers to believe was based on
facts.4Finally, though TripAdvisorâs method of arriving at its conclusions, unverified online user
reviews, is a poor evaluative metric, it is not a system sufficiently erroneous so as to be labeled
âdefamatoryâ under the legal meaning of the term.
Accordingly, Defendantâs motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim
[Doc. 7] will be GRANTED.
B.
Freedom of Speech
In the Defendantâs Memorandum in Support of Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiffâs Response, the parties disagree as to whether the allegedly defamatory list is protected
4
 Plaintiffâs Response to Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss relies heavily upon the deposition of Christopher Emmins,
who testified that his company, KwikChex, conducted an investigation of TripAdvisorâs claims of trustworthiness,
which ultimately led to the Advertising Standards Authorityâs (âASAâ) investigation of TripAdvisor and its claims of
reliability. The ASA concluded that because the site does not verify its user reviews, and because its âclaims [of
trustworthiness] implied that consumers could be assured that all review content on the TripAdvisor site was
genuine, when we understood that might not be the case, we concluded that the claims were misleading.â The ASA
prohibited TripAdvisor from claiming or implying that all reviews on its website were from real travelers or were
honest, real, or could be trusted. While such documents are outside the scope of the Courtâs consideration in this
motion to dismiss, the Court notes that the ASAâs investigation does not support Plaintiffâs assertion that
Defendantâs website, in this instance, made a statement of fact about Plaintiff, nor does the deposition prove,
more generally, that TripAdvisorâs analysis and subsequent compilation of user reviews into the âdirtiest hotelsâ
list amounts to an assertion of fact.  The ASAâs study concludes that âcustomers would understand the claims [on
TripAdvisorâs website regarding the trustworthiness of its reviewsâ] . . . to mean that they could be certain that the
reviews posted on the site were from genuine travellers, and accurately reflected those travellersâ experiences of
the places they visited.â Thus, while the ASA prohibited TripAdvisor from claiming that all of its reviews were
trustworthy, its study only affirms TripAdvisorâs assertion that it is clear from their website that the reviews are
just that: usersâ opinions. Whether or not the reviews are from genuine travelers is irrelevant to the question of
whether TripAdvisor insinuated that its â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list was based on anything other than opinion
evidence.
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under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19 of the
Tennessee Constitution. [Doc. 8 at 7]; [Doc. 15 at 6]. The Court need not consider the question
of whether the list is constitutionally-protected speech as the Court does not find the list to be
defamatory; therefore, since the list is not defamatory, no balancing test weighing the virtue of
free speech against the harm of reckless or injurious speech need be discussed by this Court.
C.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15: Motion to Amend the Complaint
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that where, as here, a defendant
has already served a responsive pleading to the original complaint, âa party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing partyâs written consent or the courtâs leave.â It further provides,
âThe court should freely give leave when justice so requires.â Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In
determining whether to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, the Court balances
multiple factors, including undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith
by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts,
448 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2006); Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 458-49 (6th Cir.
2001).
A trial court may appropriately assess the legal sufficiency of a contemplated amendment
in considering the propriety of granting leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and deny the
motion if amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Amendment
would be futile if the proposed amended complaint ââwould not survive a motion to dismiss [for
failure to state a claim] under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).ââ Bell v. Tennessee,
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2012 WL 996560, *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2012) (citing Campbell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 600 F.3d
667, 677 (6th Cir. 2010)).
While it is evident to the Court that Plaintiffâs motion to amend was made in a timely
manner, was not made in bad faith, and would not unduly prejudice Defendants, after
consideration of the claims alleged in Plaintiffâs Proposed Amended Complaint, the Court holds
that it must deny Plaintiffâs motion as futile. The Court has addressed in Part V(A)(2)(i)of this
Memorandum and Order why Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for defamation/libel and false
light. Such failure is not ameliorated by Plaintiffâs inclusion in its Proposed Amended Complaint
of supplemental facts and more organized legal pleadings. Plaintiffâs proposed claim of âTrade
Libel/Injurious Falsehoodâ also fails to state a claim. To the extent that Tennessee common law
recognizes trade libel and injurious falsehood as causes of action, such claims require proof of
the publication of a false statement of fact. See Kan. Bankers Sur. Co. v. Bahr Consultants, Inc.,
69 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1015 (E.D. Tenn. 1999); see also AmMed. Direct, LLC v. Liberty Med.
Supply, Inc., 2009 WL 3680539, *8 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2009); Medison Am., Inc. v. Preferred
Med. Sys., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 567, 584 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). Therefore, Plaintiffâs trade libel
claim fails to state a claim under Tennessee common law and in light of the Courtâs findings in
Part V(a)(2).
Defendantâs new claim for tortious interference with prospective business relationships
would require a showing of the following elements: (1) an existing business relationship with
specific third parties or a prospective relationship with an identifiable class of third persons; (2)
the defendantâs knowledge of that relationship and not a mere awareness of the plaintiffâs
business dealings with others in general; (3) the defendantâs intent to cause the breach or
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termination of the business relationship; (4) the defendantâs improper motive or improper means;
and (5) damages resulting from the tortious interference. See Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002). Examples of âimproper meansâ include:
[T]hose means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as violations of
statute, regulations, or recognized common-law rules; violence, threats or
intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit,
defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of inside or confidential information,
or breach of fiduciary relationship; and those means that violate an established
standard of a trade or profession, or otherwise involve unethical conduct, such as
sharp dealing, overreaching, or unfair competition.
Id. To prove improper motive, the plaintiff must âdemonstrate that the defendantâs predominant
purpose was to injure the plaintiff.â Id. at 701, n.5.
The Court does not find that Plaintiffâs Proposed Amended Complaint contains sufficient
direct or inferential allegations with respect to elements (3) and (4) of its claim for tortious
interference with prospective business relationships. Regarding the element of intent, Plaintiffâs
assertion that, in publishing its â2011 Dirtiest Hotelsâ list, Defendant âintended to cause the
breach or termination of the business relationships enjoyed by the Plaintiffâ and âintended to and
did damage or destroy the confidence, goodwill and reputation enjoyed by the plaintiff,â are
legal conclusions, unsupported by any factual allegations in the Complaint. [Doc. 16-1, ¶ 28.]
And regarding the element of âimproper meansâ or âimproper motive,â the only assertion
Plaintiff makes is that Defendant âemployed an improper means . . . in that it used faulty, false,
subjective, and/or unverified information as a basis for its statements, or made the statements
with no factual basis whatsoever.â Id. In light of the Courtâs finding in Part V(A)(2)(i)that
Defendant did not make any false statements of fact concerning Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot rely
solely upon its defamation claim as proof of Defendantâs âimproper means.â Plaintiffâs claim for
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tortious interference of prospective business relationships does not contain plausible allegations
of the âintentâ or âimproperâ elements, and therefore addition of such a claim in this case would
be futile.
Finally, because Plaintiff has failed to successfully state such claims against Defendant
TripAdvisor, the Court finds that Defendantâs action against Expedia, Inc. and TripAdvisor
Holdings, LLC also must fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiffâs motion to amend its
Complaint [Doc. 16] will be DENIED AS FUTILE.
VI.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim [Doc. 7] will be GRANTED, and Plaintiffâs Motion to Amend its Complaint [Doc.
16] will be DENIED AS FUTILE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ Thomas W. Phillips
United States District Judge
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