I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL, Inc. et al
Filing: 122
Claim Construction Brief (Opening) filed by AOL Inc., Gannett Company, Inc., Google Inc., IAC Search & Media, Inc., Target Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(Noona, Stephen)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
NORFOLK DIVISION
I/P ENGINE, INC.
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-512
v.
AOL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
DEFENDANTSâ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
Introduction
Plaintiff I/P Engine, Inc. (âPlaintiffâ) seeks to use claim construction as an opportunity to
redefine â and inappropriately broaden â the scope of its patents. For example, even though the
Patents concern Internet search using a combination of content filtering with collaborative
filtering â which the parties agree requires feedback from other users with similar interests or
needs â Plaintiff seeks to eliminate this collaborative requirement from many of the claims.
Further, even though the patents recite a particular âscanningâ process that requires crawling link
to link for information, Plaintiff conflates scanning with a generic search process that is
appropriately referred to as âsearchingâ elsewhere in the Patents. And even though each asserted
system claim recites three separate systems that perform disparate tasks, Plaintiff argues that
these three systems may somehow be one and the same. Plaintiffâs attempt to redefine and
broaden its patents should be rejected, and Defendantsâ proposed constructions should be
adopted.
Factual Background
I.
OVERVIEW OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
Plaintiff alleges infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,314,420 (âthe â420 Patentâ) and U.S.
Patent No. 6,775,664 (âthe â664 Patentâ). Both patents are directed to the concept of filtering
search results based partly on collaborative feedback, as expressly stated in their titles. The â420
Patent is entitled âCollaborative/Adaptive Search Engine.â The â664 Patent is entitled
âInformation Filter System and Method for Integrated Content-Based and
Collaborative/Adaptive Feedback Queries.â (emphases added.) Plaintiff asserts infringement of
claims 10, 14, 15, 25, 27, and 28 from the â420 Patent and claims 1, 5, 6, 21, 22, 26, 28, and 38
from the â664 Patent.
The two Patents claim priority to the same parent application and share a common
specification. The asserted claims involve âscanningâ (i.e., crawling) a network to retrieve
information responsive to a user query, and then filtering the retrieved information through both
content-based filters and collaborative filters. For example, â420 claim 10 recites:
A search engine system comprising:
[a] a system for scanning a network to make a demand search for informons
relevant to a query from an individual user;
[b] a content-based filter system for receiving the informons from the scanning
system and for filtering the informons on the basis of applicable content profile
data for relevance to the query; and
[c] a feedback system for receiving collaborative feedback data from system users
relative to informons considered by such users;
[d] the filter system combining pertaining feedback data from the feedback
system with the content profile data in filtering each informon for relevance to the
query.1
1
Throughout this brief, Defendants have added bracketed letters denoting the various
claim steps or elements, for the Court's convenience.
2
â420 Claim 25 is substantially similar, but is a method claim.
Similar to the â420 claims, claim 1 of the â664 Patent recites:
A search system comprising:
[a] a scanning system for searching for information relevant to a query associated with a
first user in a plurality of users;
[b] a feedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query
by other users;
[c] a content-based filter system for combining the information from the feedback
system with the information from the scanning system and for filtering the
combined information for relevance to at least one of the query and the first user.
â664 Claim 26 is substantially similar, but is a method claim.
II.
THE SPECIFICATION RECITES USING CONTENT-BASED AND
COLLABORATIVE FILTERING FOR INTERNET SEARCHING
As the Asserted Patentsâ specification acknowledges, search engines were well-known in
the art. (See 1:20-26.)2 The patents disclose a purported improvement to known search engines
by using two types of filtering also known in the art â content-based filtering and collaborative
filtering â to filter search results. (See 2:20-27.) For example, the Background of Invention
states, âThe present invention is directed to an information processing system . . . with
collaborative feedback data and content-based data and adaptive filter structuring, being used in
filtering operations to produce significantly improved results.â (2:20-27.) Elsewhere, the
specification states that â[t]he present invention combines collaborative filtering with contentbased filtering in measuring informons [information entities] for relevancy.â (23:39-41.) The
2
While the Asserted Patentsâ specifications are substantively identical, their line
numbers are slightly different â e.g., a passage that appears at column 2, line 1 of the '420 Patent
may appear at column 2, line 9 of the '664 Patent. Unless otherwise noted, all specification
citations are taken from the '420 Patent.
3
patentees call their invention âCASE,â for âcollaborative, adaptive search engine,â emphasizing
that the addition of collaborative filtering was the heart of the disclosed invention. (23:30-32.)
The specification also explains that the preliminary step of âscanningâ a network, which
is used to gather candidate search results for filtering, entails the use of a spider system that
crawls the network. (See 25:39-40 (âa spider system scans a network to find informons for a
current demand search.â))3 The specification notes that âscanningâ is a process generally used
by search engines in the prior art. (See 1:23-24.)
III.
THE ACCUSED TECHNOLOGY
Plaintiff accuses several Google services of infringing the Asserted Patents, including
Google AdWords and AdSense for Search. Plaintiff accuses the other Defendants to the extent
they use AdWords or AdSense for Search. Plaintiff also separately accuses Defendant AOLâs
Sponsored Listings service and Defendant IAC Search & Mediaâs Ask Sponsored Listings
service.
In an attempt to ensnare these services, Plaintiff improperly tries to twist and broaden the
claim language. For instance, even though the specification repeatedly emphasizes that the
claims require collaborative feedback data â i.e., data from other users with similar interests and
needs â Plaintiff tries to read this requirement out of at least the â664 Patent. Plaintiff
presumably adopts this strategy because none of the accused services utilize feedback data from
users with similar interests and needs. For instance, each accused advertising service employs
âclick-through rateâ data as part of the process of ranking candidate ads that may be shown to
3
Much of the specification (and many of the patent claims) discusses the use of a
âwire,â which the patents describe as a query submitted continuously that is stored and updated
over time. (1:57-58.) During prosecution, the Examiner relied on the wire as the point of
novelty that rendered all â420 claims patentable, even though some of the â420 claims, including
those asserted here, omit the wire element altogether. (Sohn Decl., Ex. H at 2.) None of the
â664 claims contain the wire element.
4
users. Plaintiff alleges that this click-through rate meets the collaborative feedback limitations
from the claims. However, the accused clickthrough rate data gives no regard to whether these
past users are similar to each other or whether they are similar to any current user of the
advertising service.
Further, even though the claims require a particular âscanningâ process that requires an
item-by-item web crawl, Plaintiff construes scanning merely as âsearchingâ to get around the
fact that the accused Internet advertising systems do not perform web crawling. Finally, even
though each asserted system claim recites three different systems, each of which performs a
different task in the information retrieval and filtering process, Plaintiff argues that these three
systems may all be one and the same system â because Plaintiff cannot point to three different
systems in Defendantsâ accused services.
Argument
I.
COLLABORATIVE FEEDBACK AND RELATED TERMS
Term/Phrase
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
âcollaborative feedback
dataâ (â420 Claim 10, 25)
data from users with similar
interests or needs regarding what
informons such users found to be
relevant
information concerning what
informons other users with
similar interests or needs found
to be relevant
â[feedback system for]
receiving information
found to be relevant to the
query by other usersâ
(â664 Claim 1, 26)
[System using a process of
filtering information by]
determining what information
other users with similar interests
or needs found to be relevant
[feedback system for]
receiving information
concerning what other users
found to be relevant to the
query
A.
Defendantsâ construction of âcollaborative feedback dataâ properly
recognizes that âdataâ must come from similar users
The partiesâ dispute as to âcollaborative feedback dataâ is fairly narrow. The parties
agree that this term refers to what other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant.
5
They disagree, however, over the precise formulation of the construction. Defendantsâ
construction recites that collaborative feedback data is âdataâ that comes from âusers with
similar interests or needs regarding what informons such users found to be relevant.â Plaintiffâs
construction, however, needlessly replaces âdataâ with âinformationâ and eliminates the
requirement that this data comes from other users with similar interests or needs â instead
requiring only that it âconcernâ (whatever that means) such users.
1.
Defendantsâ construction is supported by the intrinsic evidence.
Defendantsâ construction appropriately makes clear that the collaborative feedback data
must come from the other users with similar interests or needs. For example, Claim 25[c] recites
âreceiving collaborative feedback data from system users relative to informons considered by
such users.â Thus, according to the plain language of the claims, the collaborative feedback data
must come from these users. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (holding that claim construction begins with the words of the claims themselves).
The specification also explains that â[c]ollaborative filtering employs additional data
from other usersâ (24:37-38) and that âmaking effective use of collaborative input (CI) from
other users U is a difficult problemâ that the Patents had to allegedly solve. (16:32-33)
(emphases added). Thus, like the claims, the specification supports Defendantsâ position that
âcollaborative feedback dataâ must come from users with similar interests or needs. See Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1315 (âthe specification âis always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.ââ)
Plaintiffâs construction, however, merely provides that the collaborative feedback data
âconcernâ what informons other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. This
makes it unclear whether the collaborative feedback data must come from the other users as
required by the claims and specification.
6
2.
Plaintiffâs construction improperly swaps âdataâ for âinformation.â
Plaintiffâs construction also redefines âdataâ as âinformation.â But this merely swaps
one commonplace word for another, which adds no clarity to the claim and is thus improper. See
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Intâl, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (E.D. Ky. 2007)
(âsimply swapping words with synonyms is not construction.â) By contrast, Defendantsâ
construction sensibly recognizes that the word âdataâ needs no further interpretation.
B.
Defendantsâ construction of â[feedback system for] receiving information
found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ includes the collaborative
element that is necessary to the claimed invention
â664 claim 1 requires a âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant
to the query by other users,â while â664 claim 26 requires âreceiving information found to be
relevant to the query by other users.â The parties dispute as to these terms is whether the other
users have âsimilar interests or needsâ as the intrinsic evidence requires.
1.
Defendantsâ construction is supported by the intrinsic evidence.
There is no dispute that âcollaborative filteringâ and âcollaborative feedback dataâ are
defined by reference to other users with similar interests or needs. As noted above, the parties
agree that âcollaborative feedback dataâ requires data or information about what informons other
users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. This point is critical, because the
patentees repeatedly explain that the claimed invention requires âcollaborative feedback dataâ
and âcollaborative filtering.â Thus, the âfeedback system for receiving information found to be
relevant to the query by other usersâ in claim 1 must be construed as a feedback system for
receiving collaborative information â i.e., information that other users with similar interests or
needs found to be relevant, and the step of âreceiving information found to be relevant to the
query by other usersâ in claim 26 (a recast method claim of claim 1) must be interpreted as
7
requiring collaborative information. Only with these constructions would claims 1 and 26
contain the collaborative element of the claimed invention required by the intrinsic evidence.
For example, the final sentence of the specificationâs âBackground of the Inventionâ
section, which distinguishes the claimed invention from the prior art, explains that âthe present
invention is directed to an information processing system . . . with collaborative feedback data
and content-based data . . .â (Id. at 2:28-33) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the specification
states: âThe present invention combines collaborative filtering with content-based filtering in
measuring informons for relevancy, and further preferably applies adaptive updating of the
content-based filtering operation.â (Id. at 23:41-44 (emphasis added)). These general statements
of âthe present inventionâ are appropriately used to define and limit the claims. See Am.
Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (âa statement in a
specification that describes the invention as a whole can support a limiting construction of a
claim termâ); Honeywell Intâl Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(finding that use of âthis inventionâ and âthe present inventionâ established that the patentee
intended to limit the meaning of a term to that disclosed in the specification); C.R. Bard, Inc. v.
U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing a claimed plug as requiring
pleats because â[i]n two places, the patent describes in general terms what it deems to be the
invention. In both places, the patent unequivocally defines the claimed plug as having pleats.â)
Likewise, the Abstract states that â[a] user feedback system provides collaborative
feedback data for integration with content profile data in the operation of the
collaborative/content-based filter.â âThe abstract is not an explanation of the preferred
embodiment, which cannot limit the claims, but a summary of the invention itself on which the
claims are based.â Al-Site Corp. v. Cable Car Sunglasses, 911 F. Supp. 410, 415 (N.D. Cal.
8
1994) (emphasis added). Thus, defining the claims to conform with the Abstractâs description of
the invention is appropriate as well. See Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d
1337, 1341 fn * (Fed. Cir. 2000) (âWe have frequently looked to the abstract to determine the
scope of the inventionâ); see also Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d
1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that statements in a patentâs Abstract and Summary of
Invention limited the scope of a phrase in the claims to a specific technique).
It is also telling that the specification states âthe present invention combines collaborative
filtering with content-based filtering in measuring informons for relevancy, and further
preferably applies adaptive updating of the content-based filtering operation.â (id. at 23:41-44
(emphasis added)). While adaptive updating is merely a âpreferableâ feature of the claimed
invention, collaborative filtering has no such qualifying language. Rather, collaborative filtering
is a required feature of the claimed invention.
Because the intrinsic evidence shows that the claimed âpresent inventionâ requires
collaborative feedback data, the step of âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query
by other usersâ in â664 claim 26 is properly limited to receiving collaborative information â i.e.,
information that other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. Likewise, the
âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in
â664 claim 1 must be construed as a feedback system for receiving collaborative information â
information that other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant.
2.
Plaintiffâs construction ignores the relevant intrinsic evidence.
Plaintiffâs construction, âreceiving information concerning what other users found to be
relevant to the query,â merely shuffles the words in the claim. See Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Acer, Inc.,
712 F. Supp. 2d 549, 574 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (rejecting proposed construction that âmerely
rearrange[s] the words of the term to be construed.â) And it makes no reference to other users
9
with similar interests or needs as necessary to capture the collaborative filtering required by the
â664 Patent. Notably, Plaintiff has never provided any intrinsic evidence support for its
construction.4 Given the specificationâs repeated statements that collaborative feedback and
filtering is an essential element of the claimed invention, Plaintiffâs attempt to read this element
out of the claims is improper and Plaintiffâs construction should be rejected.
Further, Plaintiff does not even propose a construction for the âfeedback systemâ portion
of the term âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other
users;â it just repeats the phrase. This too shows that Plaintiff's construction should be rejected.
II.
âSCANNINGâ TERMS
Term/Phrase
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
âscan[ning] a networkâ (â420
Claims 10, 25)
Spider[ing] or crawl[ing] a
network
looking for items in a network
âa scanning systemâ (â664
Claim 1)
a system used to scan a
network
a system used to search for
information
Defendants construe âscanning a networkâ as âspidering or crawling a network,â in
accordance with the specificationâs definition of this term, and construe âa scanning systemâ in
the â664 Patent as âa system used to scan a network,â in accordance with the meaning of that
same term in the â420 Patent.5 By contrast, Plaintiff improperly equates âscanningâ with the
more generic term âsearching.â
4
As explained at length in Defendantsâ Opposition to Plaintiffâs Motion to Compel
Compliance with the Courtâs Scheduling Order, Plaintiffâs failure to provide intrinsic evidence â
and, in many cases, constructions themselves â has been consistent throughout the claim
construction process. (See Dkt. 109 at 5-6.)
5
At Plaintiff's request, Defendants agreed to construe âscanning a networkâ and a
âscanning systemâ rather than the larger phrases in which they appear, such as âscanning a
network to make a demand search.â Defendants continue to maintain that the broader phrases
are invalid as indefinite and/or for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. However, to
narrow the issues at the claim construction hearing, Defendants have agreed raise such
10
A.
Defendantsâ construction of âscanning a networkâ is compelled by the
intrinsic evidence.
Claims 10 and 25 of the â420 Patent recite âscanning a network to make a demand
search.â The specification discloses that âscanning a networkâ to make a demand search
involves spidering:6 âa spider system scans a network to find informons for a current demand
search.â (25:39-40.) And in their discussion of the prior art, the patentees repeatedly link
âscanningâ to the operation of a spider. (See 1:23-24 (âThereafter, the search site typically
employs a âspiderâ scanning system . . .â)) The parent application to the â420 Patent also defines
âscanning a networkâ to require the operation of a spider. (See 1:45-61 (âIn the patent
application which is parent to this continuation-in-part application . . . A continuously operating
âspiderâ scans the network.â)). Because every instance of âscanningâ in the specification is tied
to the operation of a spider, the term âscanningâ is properly construed as requiring such a spider.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(construing the term âwoundâ as limited to skin wounds because â[a]ll the examples in the
specification involve skin woundsâ). Thus, âscanning a networkâ should be construed as
âspidering or crawling a networkâ â with âcrawlingâ being used a synonym for âspideringâ given
that spiders operate by crawling.
This meaning is consistent with the relevant extrinsic evidence as well, which makes
clear that âspidersâ do indeed operate through crawling and can be considered âcrawlers.â See,
e.g., Ira S. Nathanson, âInternet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with
indefiniteness and enablement issues apart from claim construction of portions of these phrases,
which will not resolve the 112 issues. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d
1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (âEven if a claim termâs definition can be reduced to words, the
claim is still indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the definition into
meaningfully precise claim scope.â).
6
As explained below, âspideringâ connotes a process of crawling from link to link in a
network like the Internet.
11
Metatags,â 12 HARV. J. L & TECH. 43, 61 (1998) (âA spider (also known as a robot, crawler or
indexer) is a program that scans the Web, crawling from link to linkâ); MICROSOFT COMPUTER
DICTIONARY (5th Ed. 2002) at 493 (using âcrawlerâ as a synonym for âspiderâ). Even the
extrinsic evidence that Plaintiff cited along with its Preliminary Constructions supports this
conclusion, since Plaintiffâs evidence defines âscanningâ to require a sequential, item-by-item
crawl. (See Preliminary Constructions (Sohn Decl., Ex. C) at 6 (âScan -- . . . Computer
Technology. 1. to examine sequentially each item in a list, each record in a file . . .â))
B.
âA scanning systemâ is used to scan a network.
âA scanning systemâ in â664 claim 1 should be construed simply as âa system used to
scan a network,â with âscan a networkâ defined as âspider or crawl a networkâ as explained
above. By way of illustration, claim 25 of the â420 Patent recites a first step of âscanning a
network to make a demand search for informonsâ and a second step of âreceiving the informons .
. . from the scanning system.â Thus, in the â420 Patent, the âscanning systemâ is used to scan a
network (for informons). The same conclusion applies to the âscanning systemâ of â664 claim 1,
since there is no suggestion that the âscanning systemsâ of the â420 and â664 Patents differ in
any way. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(âBecause NTPâs patents all derive from the same parent application and share many common
terms, we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted patents.â)
C.
Plaintiff improperly equates âscanningâ with âsearchingâ
Plaintiff seeks to construe scanning a network as âlooking for items in a network.â
Plaintiffâs overbroad construction is unsupported by the specification, which repeatedly ties
âscanningâ to the operation of a web crawler or spider system. Ironically, the improper nature of
Plaintiff's construction is shown by the only intrinsic evidence Plaintiff points to in purported
12
support of its construction. (Preliminary Constructions at 6 (quoting 25:39-40 (âspider system
46C scans a network 44C to find informons for a demand search.â) (emphasis added))).
Instead, Plaintiffâs construction of âscanningâ as âlooking for itemsâ equates âscanningâ
a network with âsearchingâ a network. The everyday meaning of âsearchingâ is âlooking for
items.â See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2nd Ed. 1993) at 1727 (search: 4. âto
look at, read, or examine (a record, writing, collection, repository, etc.) for informationâ).
Similarly, Plaintiff has construed âa scanning systemâ as âa system used to search for
information.â
The claims, however, make clear that âscanningâ is not the same as âsearching.â For
example, â664 claim 26 requires âsearching for information relevant to a query associated with a
first user in a plurality of users.â Dependant claim 38 recites â[t]he method of claim 26 wherein
the searching step comprises scanning a network . . .â The fact that the patentees used
âsearchingâ in claim 26 and âscanningâ in claim 38 implies that these terms are different from
each other, not synonyms as Plaintiffâs construction would provide.
Moreover, claim 38 depends from claim 26 and recites that claim 26âs searching step
comprises scanning, which implies that âscanningâ is a narrower subset of âsearchingâ rather
than a synonym. See Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (âdependant claims are presumed to be of narrower scope than the independent claims
from which they dependâ); see also Sta-Rite Industries, LLC v. ITT Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 738,
743 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (âCourts presume a difference in meaning and scope when a patentee uses
different phrases in separate claims.â).
13
III.
âCOMBININGâ (â420 CLAIMS 10, 25; â664 CLAIMS 1, 26)
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
Plain meaning; alternatively, bringing together
uniting into a single number or expression
The parties dispute whether âcombiningâ should have its plain and ordinary meaning, as
Defendants assert, or whether it should be inappropriately limited to Plaintiffâs incorrect
interpretation of one of the embodiments in the specification.
A.
Defendantsâ construction accords with the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.
When the asserted claims invoke the language of âcombining,â they simply refer to
various pieces of information being somehow brought together. For example, claim 26 of the
â664 Patent requites âcombining the information found to be relevant to the query by other users
with the searched information.â Nothing in the claim language specifies how that combination
occurs; it merely requires that âinformation found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ â
i.e., the collaborative feedback data â be combined, in some way, with âthe searched
information.â7 Because there is no limitation on how this âcombiningâ must occur, the term
âcombiningâ should be given its broad plain meaning of âbringing together.â See, e.g., RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTERâS COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1999) (combine: âto bring into or join in a close
union or whole.â).
7
Defendants had originally proposed that terms such as âcombining the information
from the feedback system with the information from the scanning systemâ are indefinite. At
Plaintiff's request, Defendants agreed to construe just the word âcombining.â As with the longer
phrases containing âscanning a networkâ or âa scanning system,â Defendants continue to
maintain that the broader phrases containing âcombiningâ or âcombinedâ are invalid as indefinite
and/or for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Here, too, Defendants have agreed to raise
such indefiniteness and enablement issues apart from claim construction, to narrow the issues for
the Claim Construction Hearing.
14
The specification supports this plain meaning. The preferred embodiment indicates that
the claimed combination occurs through a sequential application of filters. After a âquery
processorâ receives a query from an individual user (25:9-10), it determines whether it should
execute a âwire searchâ or a âdemand search.â (25:10-18; see also Fig. 8.) A content-based
filter structure performs either the wire search or demand search (25:27-30), then passes the
resultant âdemand search informons or wire search informonsââi.e., the âsearched
informationââto a âsearch return processor.â (25:53-56.) The search return processor has its
own informon rating system that combines the already content-based filtered data with
âcollaborative feedback rating data.â (25:57-61.) The search results are then returned to the
user. (26:1-7.) Thus, the specification teaches that âcombiningâ content-based and collaborative
filters involves bringing these two types of filters together in some manner and using them to
sequentially filter information.
B.
Plaintiffâs construction of âcombiningâ is contrary to the plain meaning and
the intrinsic evidence.
1.
Plaintiffâs âuniting into a single number or expressionâ construction is
contrary to the claims
Plaintiff instead proposes a construction of combining in a mathematical context, such
that it must involve uniting âinto a single number or expression.â Yet, the claim language does
not support such a crabbed and narrow construction.
For example, â664 claim 1 requires: [a] âa scanning system for searching for information
relevant to a queryâ; [b] âa feedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the
query by other usersâ; and [c] âa content-based filter system for combining the information
found to be relevant to the query by other users with the searched information and for filtering
the combined information.â It is difficult to see how the disparate pieces of information from
Steps [a] and [b] could be âunited into a single expression,â much less âunited into a single
15
number.â Rather, âcombiningâ these pieces of information more naturally means bringing them
together in some way (albeit unspecified), such as in a list of search results.
Moreover, Step [c] requires the âcombined informationâ be filtered. Plaintiffâs
construction would thus require that a âsingle number of expressionâ (the output of the
âcombiningâ step under Plaintiffâs construction) be âfiltered.â Yet there is no disclosure in the
Patents of ânumbersâ or âexpressionsâ being filtered, nor would it make sense to do so.
Finally, dependent claim 5 recites â[t]he search system of claim 1 wherein the filtered
information is an advertisement.â Since the âfiltered informationâ is also the âcombined
informationâ under claim 1[c], claim 5 essentially requires that an advertisement be the
âcombined information.â Under Plaintiffâs construction, an advertisement would be what is
âunited into a single number or expression.â But this makes no sense, as an advertisement is not
âa single number or expression.â Thus, Plaintiffâs position that âcombiningâ is limited to
âuniting into a single number or expressionâ is demonstrably incorrect.
2.
Plaintiffâs construction reads out a preferred embodiment.
As detailed above, a preferred embodiment first uses âcontent-based filteringâ and then
passes the filtered informons to a âsearch return processorâ that performs the requisite
collaborative filtering. The specification â none of which actually uses the words in Plaintiff's
construction â describes that the âsearch return processor receives [] informons passed by the
content-based filter structureâ (25:53-55), i.e. the web pages themselves. There is no disclosure
of the âsearch return processorâ receiving the content-based filtering data employed by the
content-based filter structure. Plaintiffâs requirement that the âcombiningâ be performed by
âuniting into a single number or expressionâ rather than by using two filters sequentially would
thus exclude the preferred embodiment â a result the Federal Circuit has cautioned is ârarely, if
16
ever, correct.â Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.. 362 F.3d 1367, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffâs remaining intrinsic evidence is similarly unavailing. Plaintiff cites Fig. 6 of
the Patents to support its âcombiningâ construction (Preliminary Constructions at 7). But the
embodiment in Fig. 6 is simply a general rating system with an option of incorporating contentbased data and collaborative feedback data, depending on the system in which it is used. It is not
required to do so. For example, the content-based filtering used to perform the wire search or
demand search similarly uses the system described by Fig. 6. (25:27-30.) Yet at this point in its
execution, the search engine embodiment of the specification has no collaborative feedback data
to incorporate. (Cf. 25:53-61.) Accordingly, that the Fig. 6 embodiment has the ability to use a
certain type of data does not mean that it must use that type of dataâparticularly when there is
no evidence that Fig. 6 has access to that type of data.
IV.
THE SEPARATENESS OF THE CLAIMED SYSTEMS
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
The claimed âsystem for scanning a
network,â âcontent-based filter system,â and
âfeedback systemâ of â420 Claim 10 must
be different systems
The claim language does not require the claimed
system for scanning, content-based filter system,
and feedback system of claim 10 of the â420
patent to be the same or different âsystemsâ
The claimed âscanning system,â âfeedback
system,â and âcontent-based filter systemâ
of â664 Claim 1 must be different systems
The claim language does not require the
scanning system, content-based filter system,
and feedback system of claim 1 of the â664
patent to be the same or different âsystemsâ
The parties dispute whether the claimed scanning systems, content-based filter systems,
and feedback systems must be separate and distinct from the other systems recited in the claims
(Defendants), or whether each of these disparately claimed systems can be the same system
17
(Plaintiff). This issue is important because Plaintiffâs infringement allegations focus on a single
system, not the disparate systems recited in the claims.
A.
Defendantsâ construction is compelled by the claims
The claims recite the separate nature of the claimed systems; each system is given a
unique task. In â664 claim 1, the scanning system is tasked with âsearching for information
relevant to a query,â the feedback system is tasked with âreceiving information found to be
relevant to the query by other users,â and the content-based filter system is tasked with
âcombining the information from the feedback system with the information from the scanning
system and [] filtering the combined information for relevance to at least one of the query and
the first user.â â420 claim 10 recites a similar division of labor for the claimed systems.
If the patentees intended that a single system could handle all these tasks, then there
would be no need to recite three separate systems, all of which bear different names and are
given different tasks. Rather, the patentees could have recited a single, unitary system that
performed all these tasks. They did not. Thus, these systems are separate and different from
each other, not one system. See Bristol Co. Ltd. Pâship v. Bosch Rexroth Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d
1245, 1294 (D. Colo. 2010) (ruling that two claimed âsignalsâ must be separate from each other
given that they serve different functions in the claims).
B.
Plaintiff provides no support for its constructions
Plaintiff has no support for its position that âthe claim language does not require the
scanning system, content-based filter system, and feedback system . . . to be the same or different
âsystems.ââ Plaintiff has never provided any basis for why each of these systems are claimed
separately if they could be the same system.
Plaintiffâs position is also inconsistent with its own validity contentions. While Plaintiff
now says the claims are agnostic as to whether the scanning system, content-based filter system,
18
and feedback system must be the same or different systems, Plaintiff stated in its validity
contentions that these systems cannot be different systems. (See, e.g., Sohn Decl., Ex. D
(Plaintiffâs Responses and Objections to Googleâs Third Set of Interrogatories) at 11 (âLashkari
does not âcombineâ the features that Defendants allege meet each of the two components
[scanning system and feedback system] because the cited features are parts of different
systems.â) (emphasis added)). In a meet-and-confer of April 4, 2012, Defendants pointed out
this inconsistency in Plaintiffâs position and asked for an explanation. Plaintiff did not provide
one.
Plaintiffâs inconsistent interpretations should be rejected and Defendantsâ construction
adopted.
V.
âDEMAND SEARCHâ (â420 Claims 10, 25)
Defendantsâ Construction
search engine query
Plaintiffâs Construction
a one-time search performed upon a user request
The dispute here is whether Defendantsâ simple construction of âsearch engine queryâ
should be adopted over Plaintiffâs cumbersome and ambiguous construction of âa one-time
search performed upon a user request.â
A.
Defendantsâ construction is supported by the specification and would be
readily understandable by a jury
The Patents make clear that a âdemand searchâ is just a regular search engine query â i.e.,
the type of query that is performed by regular search engines such as those in the prior art.
Specifically, the Patents explain that the claimed invention can operate in one of two modes:
âdemand searchâ or âwire searchâ mode. (See 25:19-20; 25:27-28.) Unlike âwireâ searches,
which are continuous searches that rely on a stored query, âdemandâ searches are performed
through the normal operation of regular search engines: âan integrated collaborative/content19
based filter is operated to provide ongoing or continuous searching for selected user queries, with
a âwireâ being established for each query. On the other hand, a regular search engine is operated
to make immediate or short-term âdemandâ searches for other user queries.â (23:45-51)
(emphasis added.) The specification elsewhere explains that â[w]hen a user makes a query for
which a wire already exists, wire search results are preferably returned instead of regular search
engine results . . . Otherwise, block 28C commands a demand search by a regular query engine.â
(23:65-24:8 (emphasis added).)
As shown by these passages, the Patents repeatedly state that a âdemand searchâ is a
normal search engine query made with a regular search engine (as opposed to the specialized,
continuous queries that require a âwireâ). Because every example of a âdemand searchâ in the
specification is a normal search query made by a normal search engine, Defendantsâ simple
construction of âdemand searchâ as âsearch engine queryâ accurately captures what the patentees
meant by this term. See Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1018-19 (construing âwoundâ as limited
to skin wounds because â[a]ll the examples in the specification involve skin wounds.â)
Moreover, âsearch engine queryâ is a simple construction that would be readily
understood by a jury â and the goal of claim construction is to reduce claim language to simple
language that a jury could understand. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Z & J
Tech. GmbH, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (âClaim construction is intended to
clarify the legal meaning of claim language in the context of a particular case so that a jury can
make a simple factual determination as to infringement or invalidity.â)
B.
Plaintiffâs construction would be confusing and ambiguous for a jury to
apply
Plaintiffâs construction of âdemand searchâ â âa one-time search performed upon a user
requestâ â is confusing and ambiguous. For example, if a demand search for âcarsâ was issued
20
by two different users at two different times, do these searches cease being âdemand searchesâ
because they are no longer âone-timeâ? If a single user performs two demand searches, do these
searches cease being âdemand searchesâ under the same logic? Plaintiffâs construction provides
no answers to these questions and no clarity to a jury. It should be rejected.
Plaintiff seeks to support its construction with the following sentence of the Abstract:
â[t]he search engine system employs a regular search engine to make one-shot or demand
searches for information entities which provide at least threshold matches to user queries.â
(Preliminary Constructions at 6-7.) Yet Plaintiffâs construction of âdemand searchâ has virtually
no words in common with this Abstract sentence. The Abstract sentence does not include
âperformed upon a user request,â as does Plaintiffâs construction, and it includes the concept of
threshold matching, which Plaintiffâs construction does not. If anything, this sentence supports
Defendantsâ construction by emphasizing, as does the remainder of the specification, that a
demand search is made by a âregular search engineâ and thus should be construed simply as a
âsearch engine query.â
Moreover, while Plaintiff may argue that the Abstractâs description of a demand search as
âone-shotâ requires Plaintiffâs use of the term âone-time,â this argument would be misplaced.
The Abstract uses the term âone-shotâ simply to distinguish âdemand searchesâ from the
continuous âwire searches.â (See id. (âThe search engine system employs a regular search
engine to make one-shot or demand searches . . . The search engine system also employs a
collaborative/content-based filter to make continuing searches for information entities which
match existing wire queries.â)) Because none of the wire claims are at issue in this litigation,
there is no need to distinguish demand searches from continuing wire searches by using the
21
adjective âone-shotâ or âone-timeâ to describe the demand searches, or anything else. Rather,
for the reasons explained above, such language would only serve to confuse the jury.
VI.
âINDIVIDUAL USERâ / âFIRST USERâ
Defendantsâ Construction
particular user
Plaintiffâs Construction
No further construction necessary beyond other terms
The parties agree that âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ mean the same thing.
Defendantsâ construction of these terms comes from the intrinsic evidence. Plaintiff contends
that no construction of these terms is necessary because the parties agreed to construe âuserâ as
âan individual in communication with [a/the] network.â (Appendix A; Sohn Decl., Ex. E.)
A.
Defendantsâ constructions are faithful to the specification and claim language
As for the construction of âfirst user,â the â664 claim step of âfiltering the combined
information for relevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ demonstrates that the
relevance determination is made as to the first user â i.e. the particular user. Because different
users would find different items to be relevant, the relevance-filtering step makes sense only if
the filtering is done for relevance to the particular user.
As for the construction of âindividual user,â the specification states that â[a] query
processor receives queries from an individual user and other users.â (25:11-12; accord 26:1112.) By distinguishing the âindividual userâ from all the other users, the specification suggests
that this particular user is different from the other users for purposes of the claimed invention.
Defendantsâ construction properly acknowledges this âparticularityâ requirement.
B.
Plaintiff has declined to provide a construction for these terms
As with most terms, Plaintiff initially provided no construction for these terms. Then, on
April 5, Plaintiff proposed that âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ both should be construed as
22
âa/the individual user.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. G.) On April 11, the day before Opening Briefs were due,
Plaintiff said that no further construction was necessary for these terms because the parties had
already agreed on a construction for âuser.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. E.)
But the parties have not agreed on a construction for âindividual userâ and âfirst user.â
Specifically, Plaintiff has not confirmed an agreement that these terms refer to the âparticular
userâ as to whom the claimed method is performed, or whether, as Plaintiffâs lack of agreement
would seem to imply, the âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ could be any user at all. As the
proper construction of âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ remains in dispute, the Court should
resolve this dispute. See O2 Micro Intâl Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d
1351, 1362-3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (âWhen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the
scope of a claim term, it is the courtâs duty to resolve it.â)
VII.
RELEVANT/RELEVANCE TERMS
Term/Phrase
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
ârelevance to at least one of
the query and the first userâ
(â664 Claims 1, 26)
how well information satisfies
the information need of at least
one of the query and the first
user
No further construction
necessary beyond other
terms
â[informons/information]
relevant to a queryâ (â420
Claims 10, 25; â664 Claims 1,
26)
[informons/information] that
satisfy the individual userâs
information need expressed in
the query
[informons/information]
having relevance to the
[individual/first] userâs
information need in the
query
A.
Defendantsâ constructions flow from the specification and the claims
The specification states that âthe ârelevanceâ of a particular informon broadly describes
how well it satisfies the userâs information need.â (4:5-6). In keeping with this definition, the
parties agree that ârelevance to a queryâ means âhow well an informon satisfies the individual
23
userâs information need in the query.â (See Appendix A.) Defendantsâ constructions flow from
this agreed definition in the specification.
For example, Defendantsâ construction of ârelevance to at least one of the query and the
first userâ takes this specification definition and applies it to the âquery and first userâ context.
If ârelevanceâ is defined as how well an informon satisfies the userâs information need, then
ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ must be âhow well information satisfies
the information need of at least one of the query and the first user.â
Defendantsâ constructions for âinformons relevant to a queryâ and âinformation relevant
to a queryâ take the specification definition and apply it to the âqueryâ context. If ârelevanceâ is
defined as how well an informon satisfies the userâs information need, then âinformons relevant
to a queryâ are informons that do in fact satisfy the individual userâs information need expressed
in the query and âinformation relevant to a queryâ is information that does in fact satisfy the first
userâs information need expressed in the query. Because Defendantsâ constructions take the
specificationâs definition of ârelevanceâ and faithfully apply it to the various claim terms,
Defendantsâ constructions should be adopted.
B.
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
Plaintiffâs constructions are grammatically nonsensical
Plaintiffâs constructions of âinformons relevant to a queryâ and âinformation relevant to a
queryâ are grammatically nonsensical. Plaintiff construes these terms as
â[informons/information] having relevance to the [individual/first] userâs information need in the
query.â Again, however, the parties agree that ârelevance to a queryâ should be construed as
âhow well an informon satisfies the individual userâs information need in the query.â Applying
this agreed ârelevanceâ construction to Plaintiffâs proposed constructions, the phrase âhaving
relevanceâ in Plaintiffâs constructions would mean âhaving how well an informon satisfies . . .â,
24
which is grammatically nonsensical. Defendants pointed this out to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff had
no response, merely stating that the parties would need to âagree to disagree.â
Plaintiff has not offered any construction for ârelevance to at least one of the query and
the first user.â In an email of April 11, Plaintiff justified its refusal to provide a construction by
stating that âthe parties have already agreed to constructions for each of the components of this
limitation.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. E). While it is true that the parties have agreed to a construction
for ârelevance to a query,â which has some overlap with the longer phrase ârelevance to at least
one of the query and the first user,â construing the shorter phrase does not eliminate the need to
construe the latter. To the contrary: because the agreed construction of ârelevance to a queryâ
includes the words âqueryâ and âuser,â the jury might be confused about what additional
meaning the additional phrase ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ has,
absent a construction for this phrase. Specifically, Defendantsâ construction clarifies that this
phrase refers to how well the information satisfies the information need of either the query issued
by the first user or the first user himself.
VIII. ORDER OF STEPS (â420 CLAIM 25; â664 CLAIM 26)
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
â420 Claim 25: Step [a] must be performed before Step [b];
Steps [b] and [c] must be performed before Step [d]
No construction necessary
â664 Claim 26: Steps [a] and [b] must be performed before
Step [c]; Step [c1] must be performed before Step [c2]
1.
Defendantsâ constructions acknowledge the logical order of steps in
the claims
It is well-settled that method steps must be performed in the recited order âwhen the
method steps implicitly require that they be performed in the order written,â such as when âeach
25
subsequent step reference[s] something logically indicating the prior step has been performed.â
Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
(a)
â420 claim 25
Under these principles, and as shown in the annotations below, Step [a] of â420 Claim 25
must be performed before Step [b] because Step [b] âreferences something logically indicating
the prior step has been performed.â Specifically, Step [a] recites âscanning a network . . . for
informons,â and Step [b] involves âreceiving the informons in a content-based filter system from
the scanning system.â Assuming that âthe scanning systemâ is what âscans the network for
informons,â8 it is impossible for the content-based filter system to receive informons from the
scanning system (as required in Step [b]) until after the scanning system has scanned the network
for these informons (as required in Step [a]). Accordingly, Step [a] must be performed before
Step [b].
For similar reasons,
Steps [b] and [c] must be
performed before Step [d].
Step [b] requires filtering
on the basis of content
profile data, Step [c]
requires receiving
collaborative feedback data, and Step [d] requires âcombiningâ the feedback data from Step [c]
with the content profile data from Step [b]. Because Step [d] thus combines the output of Steps
[b] and [c], Step [d] cannot be performed until after Steps [b] and [c] are completed.
8
See Section II(B), supra (explaining why âa scanning systemâ should be construed as
"a system used to scan a network.")
26
(b)
â664 claim 26
For â664 claim 26, as shown in the annotations below, Steps [a] and [b] must be
performed before Step [c] because Step [c] references something logically indicating that Steps
[a] and [b] have been performed. Specifically, Step [c] requires âcombining the information
found to be relevant to the query by other users with the searched information.â The
âinformation found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in Step [c] refers to the output of
Step [b], since Step [b] involves âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query by
other users.â The âsearched informationâ in Step [c] refers to the output of Step [a], since Step
[a] requires âsearching for information.â Thus, Step [c] requites âcombiningâ the output of Step
[a] and Step [a], meaning that Step [c] must be performed after Steps [a] and [b] are completed.
For similar reasons,
Step [c1] must be
performed before Step [c2].
Step [c1] recites
âcombining the information
. . .â, while Step [c2] recites
âfiltering the combined
information.â Because the information must be combined before this combined information may
be filtered, Step [c1] must be performed before Step [c2].
2.
Plaintiff improperly seeks to avoid an order of steps construction
Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges that some steps from â420 claim 25 and â664 claim 26 must
be performed in order. However, Plaintiff refuses to take a position on what these claim steps
are, recently stating: âTo the extent that some limitations presuppose that one of the earlier
limitations be performed, that (limited) required ordering is clear from the claim language itself
27
and no construction is necessary.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. F.) Plaintiff argues that no order of steps
construction is necessary â not because the claim steps may be performed in any order, but
because order of steps âis an issue that will be addressed by the experts.â (Id.).
Plaintiffâs apparent position that order of steps is a matter for expert discovery instead of
claim construction is incorrect, as the Federal Circuit has held. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony
Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (deciding the requisite order of steps as a matter of
claim construction); Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1342 (same).
Moreover, because Plaintiff has refused to agree to Defendantsâ proposed order of steps,
or even say which steps must happen in order, the Court has a duty to resolve this dispute. See
O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362-3. Thus, the Court should reject Plaintiffâs attempt to avoid an order
of steps construction and adopt Defendantsâ order of steps for â420 claim 25 and â664 claim 26.
IX.
ANTECEDENT BASIS TERMS
Term/Phrase
Defendantsâ Construction
Plaintiffâs Construction
âinformonsâ / âthe
informonsâ (â420 Claims 10,
25)
âinformonsâ and âthe
informonsâ are the same
informons
âinformonsâ provides
antecedent basis for âthe
informonsâ
âusersâ / âsuch usersâ (â420
Claims 10, 25)
âusersâ and âsuch usersâ are the
same users
âusersâ provides antecedent
basis for âsuch usersâ
âa queryâ /âthe queryâ (â420
Claims 10, 25; â664 Claims
1, 26)
âa queryâ and âthe queryâ are
the same query
âa queryâ provides
antecedent basis for âthe
queryâ
âa feedback systemâ / âthe
feedback systemâ (â420
Claim 10; â664 Claim 1)
âa feedback systemâ and âthe
feedback systemâ are the same
feedback system
âa feedback systemâ provides
antecedent basis for âthe
feedback systemâ
âa scanning systemâ / âthe
scanning systemâ (â664
Claim 1)
âa scanning systemâ and âthe
scanning systemâ are the same
scanning systemâ
âa scanning systemâ provides
antecedent basis for âthe
scanning systemâ
28
âa first userâ / âthe first userâ âa first userâ and âthe first userâ âa first userâ provides
(â664 Claims 1, 26)
are the same first user
antecedent basis for âthe first
userâ
âa content-based filter
systemâ / âthe content-based
filter systemâ (â664 Claims
1, 21)
âa content-based filter systemâ
and âthe content-based filter
systemâ are the same contentbased filter system
âa content-based filter
systemâ provides antecedent
basis for âthe content-based
filter systemâ
The seven term dyads recited above are instances in which a term is first introduced in a
claim and then referred to with a definite article (âtheâ or âsuchâ) later in the claim. For
instance, â664 claim 1 introduces âa scanning systemâ and later refers to âthe scanning systemâ;
â420 claim 10 introduces âusersâ and later refers to âsuch usersâ; etc.9 Under the basic canon of
âantecedent basis,â the second term in each dyad must be the same as the first term in the dyad.
In other words, âa scanning systemâ in â664 claim 1 is the same scanning system as âthe
scanning systemâ recited later in the claim, âusersâ in â420 claim 10 are the same users as âthe
usersâ recited later in the claim, etc. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 364,
388 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (âThe use of the definite article âtheâ requires that âsession keyâ have an
antecedent basis, which is necessarily a session key referenced earlier in the claim stepsâ)
(emphasis added); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., No. 93-5041, 1995 WL 275591, *5 (N.D.
Ill. May 8, 1995) (âAn indefinite article (âaâ or âanâ) is used to introduce an element. A definite
article (âtheâ or âsaidâ) is used when a term has already been introduced, thereby making mention
of the earlier recitation of the elementâ) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff does not dispute that terms such as âthe scanning systemâ would be indefinite
without a corresponding antecedent basis. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514
9
In the final dyad from this list (âa content-based filter systemâ / âthe content-based
filter systemâ), âa content-based filter systemâ is introduced in '664 claim 1 and âthe contentbased filter systemâ appears in '664 claim 21 (which depends from claim 1). For all the other
dyads, both terms in the dyad appear in the same claim.
29
F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining a claim could be indefinite âif a term does not have
proper antecedent basis.â) Plaintiff thus asserts that, for example, âa scanning systemâ provides
antecedent basis for âthe scanning systemâ so as to preserve the validity of the claims.
Yet Plaintiff steadfastly refuses to acknowledge the consequence of the antecedent basis
canon â namely, that the second term in each dyad must be the same as the first. Plaintiff
initially refused to provide any construction for these dyads at all. (Preliminary Constructions at
8). Plaintiff now states that the first item in each dyad âprovides antecedent basis forâ the
second. Plaintiff thus would leave open the possibility that âthe scanning systemâ in â664 claim
1 is a different scanning system than âa scanning systemâ recited earlier in the claim, etc. But
the antecedent basis canon forecloses this possibility. See Tuna Processors, Inc. v. Hawaii
Intern. Seafood, Inc., Nos. 2008-1410, 2008-1435, 2009 WL 1084197, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23,
2009) (â[T]he introduction of a new element is accomplished through the use of an indefinite
article, not through the use of a definite article.â); SSL Servs., 816 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
Furthermore, Plaintiffâs construction would only serve to confuse a lay jury. It would
provide no benefit to say, for example, âa first user provides the antecedent basis to the first
user.â The jury will not know what to do with that. Only Defendantsâ constructions for these
term dyads, which specify that the second term in each dyad must be the same as the first term in
the dyad, would provide any useful meaning for the jury.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendantsâ constructions should be adopted.
Dated: April 12, 2012
By: /s/ Stephen E. Noona
Stephen E. Noona
KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C.
150 West Main Street
Post Office Box 3037
Norfolk, VA 23514
30
Telephone: (757) 624.3000
Facsimile: (757) 624.3169
By: /s/ David A. Perlson
David A. Perlson
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN LLP
50 California Street, 22nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 875-6600
Facsimile: (415) 875-6700
Counsel for Defendants GOOGLE INC., IAC
SEARCH & MEDIA, INC., TARGET CORP., and
GANNETT COMPANY, INC.
By: /s/ Stephen E. Noona
Stephen E. Noona
KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C.
150 West Main Street
Post Office Box 3037
Norfolk, VA 23514
Telephone: (757) 624.3000
Facsimile: (757) 624.3169
Robert L. Burns
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
Two Freedom Square
11955 Freedom Drive
Reston, VA 20190
Telephone: (571) 203-2700
Facsimile: (202) 408-4400
Cortney S. Alexander
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
3500 SunTrust Plaza
303 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 94111
Telephone: (404) 653-6400
Facsimile: (415) 653-6444
Counsel for Defendant AOL, INC.
31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 12, 2012, I will electronically file the foregoing with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to
the following:
Jeffrey K. Sherwood
Kenneth W. Brothers
DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP
1825 Eye Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 420-2200
Facsimile: (202) 420-2201
sherwoodj@dicksteinshapiro.com
brothersk@dicksteinshapiro.com
Counsel for Plaintiff, I/P Engine, Inc.
Stephen E. Noona
Virginia State Bar No. 25367
KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C.
150 W. Main Street, Suite 2100
Norfolk, VA 23510-1665
Telephone: (757) 624-3239
Facsimile: (757) 624-3169
senoona@kaufcan.com
Counsel for AOL Inc., Google, Inc.,
Gannett Co., Inc., Target Corporation and
IAC Search & Media, Inc.
/s/ Stephen E. Noona
Stephen E. Noona
Virginia State Bar No. 25367
KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C.
150 West Main Street, Suite 2100
Norfolk, VA 23510
Telephone: (757) 624-3000
Facsimile: (757) 624-3169
senoona@kaufcan.com
11649500_1.DOC
32
