I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL, Inc. et al

Filing: 122

Share |

Claim Construction Brief (Opening) filed by AOL Inc., Gannett Company, Inc., Google Inc., IAC Search & Media, Inc., Target Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(Noona, Stephen)

PDF Document Download PDF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA NORFOLK DIVISION I/P ENGINE, INC. Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-512 v. AOL, INC., et al., Defendants. DEFENDANTSâ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF Introduction Plaintiff I/P Engine, Inc. (âPlaintiffâ) seeks to use claim construction as an opportunity to redefine â and inappropriately broaden â the scope of its patents. For example, even though the Patents concern Internet search using a combination of content filtering with collaborative filtering â which the parties agree requires feedback from other users with similar interests or needs â Plaintiff seeks to eliminate this collaborative requirement from many of the claims. Further, even though the patents recite a particular âscanningâ process that requires crawling link to link for information, Plaintiff conflates scanning with a generic search process that is appropriately referred to as âsearchingâ elsewhere in the Patents. And even though each asserted system claim recites three separate systems that perform disparate tasks, Plaintiff argues that these three systems may somehow be one and the same. Plaintiffâs attempt to redefine and broaden its patents should be rejected, and Defendantsâ proposed constructions should be adopted. Factual Background I. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS Plaintiff alleges infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,314,420 (âthe â420 Patentâ) and U.S. Patent No. 6,775,664 (âthe â664 Patentâ). Both patents are directed to the concept of filtering search results based partly on collaborative feedback, as expressly stated in their titles. The â420 Patent is entitled âCollaborative/Adaptive Search Engine.â The â664 Patent is entitled âInformation Filter System and Method for Integrated Content-Based and Collaborative/Adaptive Feedback Queries.â (emphases added.) Plaintiff asserts infringement of claims 10, 14, 15, 25, 27, and 28 from the â420 Patent and claims 1, 5, 6, 21, 22, 26, 28, and 38 from the â664 Patent. The two Patents claim priority to the same parent application and share a common specification. The asserted claims involve âscanningâ (i.e., crawling) a network to retrieve information responsive to a user query, and then filtering the retrieved information through both content-based filters and collaborative filters. For example, â420 claim 10 recites: A search engine system comprising: [a] a system for scanning a network to make a demand search for informons relevant to a query from an individual user; [b] a content-based filter system for receiving the informons from the scanning system and for filtering the informons on the basis of applicable content profile data for relevance to the query; and [c] a feedback system for receiving collaborative feedback data from system users relative to informons considered by such users; [d] the filter system combining pertaining feedback data from the feedback system with the content profile data in filtering each informon for relevance to the query.1 1 Throughout this brief, Defendants have added bracketed letters denoting the various claim steps or elements, for the Court's convenience. 2 â420 Claim 25 is substantially similar, but is a method claim. Similar to the â420 claims, claim 1 of the â664 Patent recites: A search system comprising: [a] a scanning system for searching for information relevant to a query associated with a first user in a plurality of users; [b] a feedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other users; [c] a content-based filter system for combining the information from the feedback system with the information from the scanning system and for filtering the combined information for relevance to at least one of the query and the first user. â664 Claim 26 is substantially similar, but is a method claim. II. THE SPECIFICATION RECITES USING CONTENT-BASED AND COLLABORATIVE FILTERING FOR INTERNET SEARCHING As the Asserted Patentsâ specification acknowledges, search engines were well-known in the art. (See 1:20-26.)2 The patents disclose a purported improvement to known search engines by using two types of filtering also known in the art â content-based filtering and collaborative filtering â to filter search results. (See 2:20-27.) For example, the Background of Invention states, âThe present invention is directed to an information processing system . . . with collaborative feedback data and content-based data and adaptive filter structuring, being used in filtering operations to produce significantly improved results.â (2:20-27.) Elsewhere, the specification states that â[t]he present invention combines collaborative filtering with contentbased filtering in measuring informons [information entities] for relevancy.â (23:39-41.) The 2 While the Asserted Patentsâ specifications are substantively identical, their line numbers are slightly different â e.g., a passage that appears at column 2, line 1 of the '420 Patent may appear at column 2, line 9 of the '664 Patent. Unless otherwise noted, all specification citations are taken from the '420 Patent. 3 patentees call their invention âCASE,â for âcollaborative, adaptive search engine,â emphasizing that the addition of collaborative filtering was the heart of the disclosed invention. (23:30-32.) The specification also explains that the preliminary step of âscanningâ a network, which is used to gather candidate search results for filtering, entails the use of a spider system that crawls the network. (See 25:39-40 (âa spider system scans a network to find informons for a current demand search.â))3 The specification notes that âscanningâ is a process generally used by search engines in the prior art. (See 1:23-24.) III. THE ACCUSED TECHNOLOGY Plaintiff accuses several Google services of infringing the Asserted Patents, including Google AdWords and AdSense for Search. Plaintiff accuses the other Defendants to the extent they use AdWords or AdSense for Search. Plaintiff also separately accuses Defendant AOLâs Sponsored Listings service and Defendant IAC Search & Mediaâs Ask Sponsored Listings service. In an attempt to ensnare these services, Plaintiff improperly tries to twist and broaden the claim language. For instance, even though the specification repeatedly emphasizes that the claims require collaborative feedback data â i.e., data from other users with similar interests and needs â Plaintiff tries to read this requirement out of at least the â664 Patent. Plaintiff presumably adopts this strategy because none of the accused services utilize feedback data from users with similar interests and needs. For instance, each accused advertising service employs âclick-through rateâ data as part of the process of ranking candidate ads that may be shown to 3 Much of the specification (and many of the patent claims) discusses the use of a âwire,â which the patents describe as a query submitted continuously that is stored and updated over time. (1:57-58.) During prosecution, the Examiner relied on the wire as the point of novelty that rendered all â420 claims patentable, even though some of the â420 claims, including those asserted here, omit the wire element altogether. (Sohn Decl., Ex. H at 2.) None of the â664 claims contain the wire element. 4 users. Plaintiff alleges that this click-through rate meets the collaborative feedback limitations from the claims. However, the accused clickthrough rate data gives no regard to whether these past users are similar to each other or whether they are similar to any current user of the advertising service. Further, even though the claims require a particular âscanningâ process that requires an item-by-item web crawl, Plaintiff construes scanning merely as âsearchingâ to get around the fact that the accused Internet advertising systems do not perform web crawling. Finally, even though each asserted system claim recites three different systems, each of which performs a different task in the information retrieval and filtering process, Plaintiff argues that these three systems may all be one and the same system â because Plaintiff cannot point to three different systems in Defendantsâ accused services. Argument I. COLLABORATIVE FEEDBACK AND RELATED TERMS Term/Phrase Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction âcollaborative feedback dataâ (â420 Claim 10, 25) data from users with similar interests or needs regarding what informons such users found to be relevant information concerning what informons other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant â[feedback system for] receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ (â664 Claim 1, 26) [System using a process of filtering information by] determining what information other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant [feedback system for] receiving information concerning what other users found to be relevant to the query A. Defendantsâ construction of âcollaborative feedback dataâ properly recognizes that âdataâ must come from similar users The partiesâ dispute as to âcollaborative feedback dataâ is fairly narrow. The parties agree that this term refers to what other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. 5 They disagree, however, over the precise formulation of the construction. Defendantsâ construction recites that collaborative feedback data is âdataâ that comes from âusers with similar interests or needs regarding what informons such users found to be relevant.â Plaintiffâs construction, however, needlessly replaces âdataâ with âinformationâ and eliminates the requirement that this data comes from other users with similar interests or needs â instead requiring only that it âconcernâ (whatever that means) such users. 1. Defendantsâ construction is supported by the intrinsic evidence. Defendantsâ construction appropriately makes clear that the collaborative feedback data must come from the other users with similar interests or needs. For example, Claim 25[c] recites âreceiving collaborative feedback data from system users relative to informons considered by such users.â Thus, according to the plain language of the claims, the collaborative feedback data must come from these users. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that claim construction begins with the words of the claims themselves). The specification also explains that â[c]ollaborative filtering employs additional data from other usersâ (24:37-38) and that âmaking effective use of collaborative input (CI) from other users U is a difficult problemâ that the Patents had to allegedly solve. (16:32-33) (emphases added). Thus, like the claims, the specification supports Defendantsâ position that âcollaborative feedback dataâ must come from users with similar interests or needs. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (âthe specification âis always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.ââ) Plaintiffâs construction, however, merely provides that the collaborative feedback data âconcernâ what informons other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. This makes it unclear whether the collaborative feedback data must come from the other users as required by the claims and specification. 6 2. Plaintiffâs construction improperly swaps âdataâ for âinformation.â Plaintiffâs construction also redefines âdataâ as âinformation.â But this merely swaps one commonplace word for another, which adds no clarity to the claim and is thus improper. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Intâl, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (âsimply swapping words with synonyms is not construction.â) By contrast, Defendantsâ construction sensibly recognizes that the word âdataâ needs no further interpretation. B. Defendantsâ construction of â[feedback system for] receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ includes the collaborative element that is necessary to the claimed invention â664 claim 1 requires a âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other users,â while â664 claim 26 requires âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query by other users.â The parties dispute as to these terms is whether the other users have âsimilar interests or needsâ as the intrinsic evidence requires. 1. Defendantsâ construction is supported by the intrinsic evidence. There is no dispute that âcollaborative filteringâ and âcollaborative feedback dataâ are defined by reference to other users with similar interests or needs. As noted above, the parties agree that âcollaborative feedback dataâ requires data or information about what informons other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. This point is critical, because the patentees repeatedly explain that the claimed invention requires âcollaborative feedback dataâ and âcollaborative filtering.â Thus, the âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in claim 1 must be construed as a feedback system for receiving collaborative information â i.e., information that other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant, and the step of âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in claim 26 (a recast method claim of claim 1) must be interpreted as 7 requiring collaborative information. Only with these constructions would claims 1 and 26 contain the collaborative element of the claimed invention required by the intrinsic evidence. For example, the final sentence of the specificationâs âBackground of the Inventionâ section, which distinguishes the claimed invention from the prior art, explains that âthe present invention is directed to an information processing system . . . with collaborative feedback data and content-based data . . .â (Id. at 2:28-33) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the specification states: âThe present invention combines collaborative filtering with content-based filtering in measuring informons for relevancy, and further preferably applies adaptive updating of the content-based filtering operation.â (Id. at 23:41-44 (emphasis added)). These general statements of âthe present inventionâ are appropriately used to define and limit the claims. See Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (âa statement in a specification that describes the invention as a whole can support a limiting construction of a claim termâ); Honeywell Intâl Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that use of âthis inventionâ and âthe present inventionâ established that the patentee intended to limit the meaning of a term to that disclosed in the specification); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing a claimed plug as requiring pleats because â[i]n two places, the patent describes in general terms what it deems to be the invention. In both places, the patent unequivocally defines the claimed plug as having pleats.â) Likewise, the Abstract states that â[a] user feedback system provides collaborative feedback data for integration with content profile data in the operation of the collaborative/content-based filter.â âThe abstract is not an explanation of the preferred embodiment, which cannot limit the claims, but a summary of the invention itself on which the claims are based.â Al-Site Corp. v. Cable Car Sunglasses, 911 F. Supp. 410, 415 (N.D. Cal. 8 1994) (emphasis added). Thus, defining the claims to conform with the Abstractâs description of the invention is appropriate as well. See Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 fn * (Fed. Cir. 2000) (âWe have frequently looked to the abstract to determine the scope of the inventionâ); see also Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that statements in a patentâs Abstract and Summary of Invention limited the scope of a phrase in the claims to a specific technique). It is also telling that the specification states âthe present invention combines collaborative filtering with content-based filtering in measuring informons for relevancy, and further preferably applies adaptive updating of the content-based filtering operation.â (id. at 23:41-44 (emphasis added)). While adaptive updating is merely a âpreferableâ feature of the claimed invention, collaborative filtering has no such qualifying language. Rather, collaborative filtering is a required feature of the claimed invention. Because the intrinsic evidence shows that the claimed âpresent inventionâ requires collaborative feedback data, the step of âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in â664 claim 26 is properly limited to receiving collaborative information â i.e., information that other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. Likewise, the âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in â664 claim 1 must be construed as a feedback system for receiving collaborative information â information that other users with similar interests or needs found to be relevant. 2. Plaintiffâs construction ignores the relevant intrinsic evidence. Plaintiffâs construction, âreceiving information concerning what other users found to be relevant to the query,â merely shuffles the words in the claim. See Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Acer, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 549, 574 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (rejecting proposed construction that âmerely rearrange[s] the words of the term to be construed.â) And it makes no reference to other users 9 with similar interests or needs as necessary to capture the collaborative filtering required by the â664 Patent. Notably, Plaintiff has never provided any intrinsic evidence support for its construction.4 Given the specificationâs repeated statements that collaborative feedback and filtering is an essential element of the claimed invention, Plaintiffâs attempt to read this element out of the claims is improper and Plaintiffâs construction should be rejected. Further, Plaintiff does not even propose a construction for the âfeedback systemâ portion of the term âfeedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other users;â it just repeats the phrase. This too shows that Plaintiff's construction should be rejected. II. âSCANNINGâ TERMS Term/Phrase Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction âscan[ning] a networkâ (â420 Claims 10, 25) Spider[ing] or crawl[ing] a network looking for items in a network âa scanning systemâ (â664 Claim 1) a system used to scan a network a system used to search for information Defendants construe âscanning a networkâ as âspidering or crawling a network,â in accordance with the specificationâs definition of this term, and construe âa scanning systemâ in the â664 Patent as âa system used to scan a network,â in accordance with the meaning of that same term in the â420 Patent.5 By contrast, Plaintiff improperly equates âscanningâ with the more generic term âsearching.â 4 As explained at length in Defendantsâ Opposition to Plaintiffâs Motion to Compel Compliance with the Courtâs Scheduling Order, Plaintiffâs failure to provide intrinsic evidence â and, in many cases, constructions themselves â has been consistent throughout the claim construction process. (See Dkt. 109 at 5-6.) 5 At Plaintiff's request, Defendants agreed to construe âscanning a networkâ and a âscanning systemâ rather than the larger phrases in which they appear, such as âscanning a network to make a demand search.â Defendants continue to maintain that the broader phrases are invalid as indefinite and/or for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. However, to narrow the issues at the claim construction hearing, Defendants have agreed raise such 10 A. Defendantsâ construction of âscanning a networkâ is compelled by the intrinsic evidence. Claims 10 and 25 of the â420 Patent recite âscanning a network to make a demand search.â The specification discloses that âscanning a networkâ to make a demand search involves spidering:6 âa spider system scans a network to find informons for a current demand search.â (25:39-40.) And in their discussion of the prior art, the patentees repeatedly link âscanningâ to the operation of a spider. (See 1:23-24 (âThereafter, the search site typically employs a âspiderâ scanning system . . .â)) The parent application to the â420 Patent also defines âscanning a networkâ to require the operation of a spider. (See 1:45-61 (âIn the patent application which is parent to this continuation-in-part application . . . A continuously operating âspiderâ scans the network.â)). Because every instance of âscanningâ in the specification is tied to the operation of a spider, the term âscanningâ is properly construed as requiring such a spider. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (construing the term âwoundâ as limited to skin wounds because â[a]ll the examples in the specification involve skin woundsâ). Thus, âscanning a networkâ should be construed as âspidering or crawling a networkâ â with âcrawlingâ being used a synonym for âspideringâ given that spiders operate by crawling. This meaning is consistent with the relevant extrinsic evidence as well, which makes clear that âspidersâ do indeed operate through crawling and can be considered âcrawlers.â See, e.g., Ira S. Nathanson, âInternet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with indefiniteness and enablement issues apart from claim construction of portions of these phrases, which will not resolve the 112 issues. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (âEven if a claim termâs definition can be reduced to words, the claim is still indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the definition into meaningfully precise claim scope.â). 6 As explained below, âspideringâ connotes a process of crawling from link to link in a network like the Internet. 11 Metatags,â 12 HARV. J. L & TECH. 43, 61 (1998) (âA spider (also known as a robot, crawler or indexer) is a program that scans the Web, crawling from link to linkâ); MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY (5th Ed. 2002) at 493 (using âcrawlerâ as a synonym for âspiderâ). Even the extrinsic evidence that Plaintiff cited along with its Preliminary Constructions supports this conclusion, since Plaintiffâs evidence defines âscanningâ to require a sequential, item-by-item crawl. (See Preliminary Constructions (Sohn Decl., Ex. C) at 6 (âScan -- . . . Computer Technology. 1. to examine sequentially each item in a list, each record in a file . . .â)) B. âA scanning systemâ is used to scan a network. âA scanning systemâ in â664 claim 1 should be construed simply as âa system used to scan a network,â with âscan a networkâ defined as âspider or crawl a networkâ as explained above. By way of illustration, claim 25 of the â420 Patent recites a first step of âscanning a network to make a demand search for informonsâ and a second step of âreceiving the informons . . . from the scanning system.â Thus, in the â420 Patent, the âscanning systemâ is used to scan a network (for informons). The same conclusion applies to the âscanning systemâ of â664 claim 1, since there is no suggestion that the âscanning systemsâ of the â420 and â664 Patents differ in any way. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (âBecause NTPâs patents all derive from the same parent application and share many common terms, we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted patents.â) C. Plaintiff improperly equates âscanningâ with âsearchingâ Plaintiff seeks to construe scanning a network as âlooking for items in a network.â Plaintiffâs overbroad construction is unsupported by the specification, which repeatedly ties âscanningâ to the operation of a web crawler or spider system. Ironically, the improper nature of Plaintiff's construction is shown by the only intrinsic evidence Plaintiff points to in purported 12 support of its construction. (Preliminary Constructions at 6 (quoting 25:39-40 (âspider system 46C scans a network 44C to find informons for a demand search.â) (emphasis added))). Instead, Plaintiffâs construction of âscanningâ as âlooking for itemsâ equates âscanningâ a network with âsearchingâ a network. The everyday meaning of âsearchingâ is âlooking for items.â See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2nd Ed. 1993) at 1727 (search: 4. âto look at, read, or examine (a record, writing, collection, repository, etc.) for informationâ). Similarly, Plaintiff has construed âa scanning systemâ as âa system used to search for information.â The claims, however, make clear that âscanningâ is not the same as âsearching.â For example, â664 claim 26 requires âsearching for information relevant to a query associated with a first user in a plurality of users.â Dependant claim 38 recites â[t]he method of claim 26 wherein the searching step comprises scanning a network . . .â The fact that the patentees used âsearchingâ in claim 26 and âscanningâ in claim 38 implies that these terms are different from each other, not synonyms as Plaintiffâs construction would provide. Moreover, claim 38 depends from claim 26 and recites that claim 26âs searching step comprises scanning, which implies that âscanningâ is a narrower subset of âsearchingâ rather than a synonym. See Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (âdependant claims are presumed to be of narrower scope than the independent claims from which they dependâ); see also Sta-Rite Industries, LLC v. ITT Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (âCourts presume a difference in meaning and scope when a patentee uses different phrases in separate claims.â). 13 III. âCOMBININGâ (â420 CLAIMS 10, 25; â664 CLAIMS 1, 26) Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction Plain meaning; alternatively, bringing together uniting into a single number or expression The parties dispute whether âcombiningâ should have its plain and ordinary meaning, as Defendants assert, or whether it should be inappropriately limited to Plaintiffâs incorrect interpretation of one of the embodiments in the specification. A. Defendantsâ construction accords with the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. When the asserted claims invoke the language of âcombining,â they simply refer to various pieces of information being somehow brought together. For example, claim 26 of the â664 Patent requites âcombining the information found to be relevant to the query by other users with the searched information.â Nothing in the claim language specifies how that combination occurs; it merely requires that âinformation found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ â i.e., the collaborative feedback data â be combined, in some way, with âthe searched information.â7 Because there is no limitation on how this âcombiningâ must occur, the term âcombiningâ should be given its broad plain meaning of âbringing together.â See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTERâS COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1999) (combine: âto bring into or join in a close union or whole.â). 7 Defendants had originally proposed that terms such as âcombining the information from the feedback system with the information from the scanning systemâ are indefinite. At Plaintiff's request, Defendants agreed to construe just the word âcombining.â As with the longer phrases containing âscanning a networkâ or âa scanning system,â Defendants continue to maintain that the broader phrases containing âcombiningâ or âcombinedâ are invalid as indefinite and/or for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Here, too, Defendants have agreed to raise such indefiniteness and enablement issues apart from claim construction, to narrow the issues for the Claim Construction Hearing. 14 The specification supports this plain meaning. The preferred embodiment indicates that the claimed combination occurs through a sequential application of filters. After a âquery processorâ receives a query from an individual user (25:9-10), it determines whether it should execute a âwire searchâ or a âdemand search.â (25:10-18; see also Fig. 8.) A content-based filter structure performs either the wire search or demand search (25:27-30), then passes the resultant âdemand search informons or wire search informonsââi.e., the âsearched informationââto a âsearch return processor.â (25:53-56.) The search return processor has its own informon rating system that combines the already content-based filtered data with âcollaborative feedback rating data.â (25:57-61.) The search results are then returned to the user. (26:1-7.) Thus, the specification teaches that âcombiningâ content-based and collaborative filters involves bringing these two types of filters together in some manner and using them to sequentially filter information. B. Plaintiffâs construction of âcombiningâ is contrary to the plain meaning and the intrinsic evidence. 1. Plaintiffâs âuniting into a single number or expressionâ construction is contrary to the claims Plaintiff instead proposes a construction of combining in a mathematical context, such that it must involve uniting âinto a single number or expression.â Yet, the claim language does not support such a crabbed and narrow construction. For example, â664 claim 1 requires: [a] âa scanning system for searching for information relevant to a queryâ; [b] âa feedback system for receiving information found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ; and [c] âa content-based filter system for combining the information found to be relevant to the query by other users with the searched information and for filtering the combined information.â It is difficult to see how the disparate pieces of information from Steps [a] and [b] could be âunited into a single expression,â much less âunited into a single 15 number.â Rather, âcombiningâ these pieces of information more naturally means bringing them together in some way (albeit unspecified), such as in a list of search results. Moreover, Step [c] requires the âcombined informationâ be filtered. Plaintiffâs construction would thus require that a âsingle number of expressionâ (the output of the âcombiningâ step under Plaintiffâs construction) be âfiltered.â Yet there is no disclosure in the Patents of ânumbersâ or âexpressionsâ being filtered, nor would it make sense to do so. Finally, dependent claim 5 recites â[t]he search system of claim 1 wherein the filtered information is an advertisement.â Since the âfiltered informationâ is also the âcombined informationâ under claim 1[c], claim 5 essentially requires that an advertisement be the âcombined information.â Under Plaintiffâs construction, an advertisement would be what is âunited into a single number or expression.â But this makes no sense, as an advertisement is not âa single number or expression.â Thus, Plaintiffâs position that âcombiningâ is limited to âuniting into a single number or expressionâ is demonstrably incorrect. 2. Plaintiffâs construction reads out a preferred embodiment. As detailed above, a preferred embodiment first uses âcontent-based filteringâ and then passes the filtered informons to a âsearch return processorâ that performs the requisite collaborative filtering. The specification â none of which actually uses the words in Plaintiff's construction â describes that the âsearch return processor receives [] informons passed by the content-based filter structureâ (25:53-55), i.e. the web pages themselves. There is no disclosure of the âsearch return processorâ receiving the content-based filtering data employed by the content-based filter structure. Plaintiffâs requirement that the âcombiningâ be performed by âuniting into a single number or expressionâ rather than by using two filters sequentially would thus exclude the preferred embodiment â a result the Federal Circuit has cautioned is ârarely, if 16 ever, correct.â Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.. 362 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Plaintiffâs remaining intrinsic evidence is similarly unavailing. Plaintiff cites Fig. 6 of the Patents to support its âcombiningâ construction (Preliminary Constructions at 7). But the embodiment in Fig. 6 is simply a general rating system with an option of incorporating contentbased data and collaborative feedback data, depending on the system in which it is used. It is not required to do so. For example, the content-based filtering used to perform the wire search or demand search similarly uses the system described by Fig. 6. (25:27-30.) Yet at this point in its execution, the search engine embodiment of the specification has no collaborative feedback data to incorporate. (Cf. 25:53-61.) Accordingly, that the Fig. 6 embodiment has the ability to use a certain type of data does not mean that it must use that type of dataâparticularly when there is no evidence that Fig. 6 has access to that type of data. IV. THE SEPARATENESS OF THE CLAIMED SYSTEMS Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction The claimed âsystem for scanning a network,â âcontent-based filter system,â and âfeedback systemâ of â420 Claim 10 must be different systems The claim language does not require the claimed system for scanning, content-based filter system, and feedback system of claim 10 of the â420 patent to be the same or different âsystemsâ The claimed âscanning system,â âfeedback system,â and âcontent-based filter systemâ of â664 Claim 1 must be different systems The claim language does not require the scanning system, content-based filter system, and feedback system of claim 1 of the â664 patent to be the same or different âsystemsâ The parties dispute whether the claimed scanning systems, content-based filter systems, and feedback systems must be separate and distinct from the other systems recited in the claims (Defendants), or whether each of these disparately claimed systems can be the same system 17 (Plaintiff). This issue is important because Plaintiffâs infringement allegations focus on a single system, not the disparate systems recited in the claims. A. Defendantsâ construction is compelled by the claims The claims recite the separate nature of the claimed systems; each system is given a unique task. In â664 claim 1, the scanning system is tasked with âsearching for information relevant to a query,â the feedback system is tasked with âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query by other users,â and the content-based filter system is tasked with âcombining the information from the feedback system with the information from the scanning system and [] filtering the combined information for relevance to at least one of the query and the first user.â â420 claim 10 recites a similar division of labor for the claimed systems. If the patentees intended that a single system could handle all these tasks, then there would be no need to recite three separate systems, all of which bear different names and are given different tasks. Rather, the patentees could have recited a single, unitary system that performed all these tasks. They did not. Thus, these systems are separate and different from each other, not one system. See Bristol Co. Ltd. Pâship v. Bosch Rexroth Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1294 (D. Colo. 2010) (ruling that two claimed âsignalsâ must be separate from each other given that they serve different functions in the claims). B. Plaintiff provides no support for its constructions Plaintiff has no support for its position that âthe claim language does not require the scanning system, content-based filter system, and feedback system . . . to be the same or different âsystems.ââ Plaintiff has never provided any basis for why each of these systems are claimed separately if they could be the same system. Plaintiffâs position is also inconsistent with its own validity contentions. While Plaintiff now says the claims are agnostic as to whether the scanning system, content-based filter system, 18 and feedback system must be the same or different systems, Plaintiff stated in its validity contentions that these systems cannot be different systems. (See, e.g., Sohn Decl., Ex. D (Plaintiffâs Responses and Objections to Googleâs Third Set of Interrogatories) at 11 (âLashkari does not âcombineâ the features that Defendants allege meet each of the two components [scanning system and feedback system] because the cited features are parts of different systems.â) (emphasis added)). In a meet-and-confer of April 4, 2012, Defendants pointed out this inconsistency in Plaintiffâs position and asked for an explanation. Plaintiff did not provide one. Plaintiffâs inconsistent interpretations should be rejected and Defendantsâ construction adopted. V. âDEMAND SEARCHâ (â420 Claims 10, 25) Defendantsâ Construction search engine query Plaintiffâs Construction a one-time search performed upon a user request The dispute here is whether Defendantsâ simple construction of âsearch engine queryâ should be adopted over Plaintiffâs cumbersome and ambiguous construction of âa one-time search performed upon a user request.â A. Defendantsâ construction is supported by the specification and would be readily understandable by a jury The Patents make clear that a âdemand searchâ is just a regular search engine query â i.e., the type of query that is performed by regular search engines such as those in the prior art. Specifically, the Patents explain that the claimed invention can operate in one of two modes: âdemand searchâ or âwire searchâ mode. (See 25:19-20; 25:27-28.) Unlike âwireâ searches, which are continuous searches that rely on a stored query, âdemandâ searches are performed through the normal operation of regular search engines: âan integrated collaborative/content19 based filter is operated to provide ongoing or continuous searching for selected user queries, with a âwireâ being established for each query. On the other hand, a regular search engine is operated to make immediate or short-term âdemandâ searches for other user queries.â (23:45-51) (emphasis added.) The specification elsewhere explains that â[w]hen a user makes a query for which a wire already exists, wire search results are preferably returned instead of regular search engine results . . . Otherwise, block 28C commands a demand search by a regular query engine.â (23:65-24:8 (emphasis added).) As shown by these passages, the Patents repeatedly state that a âdemand searchâ is a normal search engine query made with a regular search engine (as opposed to the specialized, continuous queries that require a âwireâ). Because every example of a âdemand searchâ in the specification is a normal search query made by a normal search engine, Defendantsâ simple construction of âdemand searchâ as âsearch engine queryâ accurately captures what the patentees meant by this term. See Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1018-19 (construing âwoundâ as limited to skin wounds because â[a]ll the examples in the specification involve skin wounds.â) Moreover, âsearch engine queryâ is a simple construction that would be readily understood by a jury â and the goal of claim construction is to reduce claim language to simple language that a jury could understand. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Z & J Tech. GmbH, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (âClaim construction is intended to clarify the legal meaning of claim language in the context of a particular case so that a jury can make a simple factual determination as to infringement or invalidity.â) B. Plaintiffâs construction would be confusing and ambiguous for a jury to apply Plaintiffâs construction of âdemand searchâ â âa one-time search performed upon a user requestâ â is confusing and ambiguous. For example, if a demand search for âcarsâ was issued 20 by two different users at two different times, do these searches cease being âdemand searchesâ because they are no longer âone-timeâ? If a single user performs two demand searches, do these searches cease being âdemand searchesâ under the same logic? Plaintiffâs construction provides no answers to these questions and no clarity to a jury. It should be rejected. Plaintiff seeks to support its construction with the following sentence of the Abstract: â[t]he search engine system employs a regular search engine to make one-shot or demand searches for information entities which provide at least threshold matches to user queries.â (Preliminary Constructions at 6-7.) Yet Plaintiffâs construction of âdemand searchâ has virtually no words in common with this Abstract sentence. The Abstract sentence does not include âperformed upon a user request,â as does Plaintiffâs construction, and it includes the concept of threshold matching, which Plaintiffâs construction does not. If anything, this sentence supports Defendantsâ construction by emphasizing, as does the remainder of the specification, that a demand search is made by a âregular search engineâ and thus should be construed simply as a âsearch engine query.â Moreover, while Plaintiff may argue that the Abstractâs description of a demand search as âone-shotâ requires Plaintiffâs use of the term âone-time,â this argument would be misplaced. The Abstract uses the term âone-shotâ simply to distinguish âdemand searchesâ from the continuous âwire searches.â (See id. (âThe search engine system employs a regular search engine to make one-shot or demand searches . . . The search engine system also employs a collaborative/content-based filter to make continuing searches for information entities which match existing wire queries.â)) Because none of the wire claims are at issue in this litigation, there is no need to distinguish demand searches from continuing wire searches by using the 21 adjective âone-shotâ or âone-timeâ to describe the demand searches, or anything else. Rather, for the reasons explained above, such language would only serve to confuse the jury. VI. âINDIVIDUAL USERâ / âFIRST USERâ Defendantsâ Construction particular user Plaintiffâs Construction No further construction necessary beyond other terms The parties agree that âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ mean the same thing. Defendantsâ construction of these terms comes from the intrinsic evidence. Plaintiff contends that no construction of these terms is necessary because the parties agreed to construe âuserâ as âan individual in communication with [a/the] network.â (Appendix A; Sohn Decl., Ex. E.) A. Defendantsâ constructions are faithful to the specification and claim language As for the construction of âfirst user,â the â664 claim step of âfiltering the combined information for relevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ demonstrates that the relevance determination is made as to the first user â i.e. the particular user. Because different users would find different items to be relevant, the relevance-filtering step makes sense only if the filtering is done for relevance to the particular user. As for the construction of âindividual user,â the specification states that â[a] query processor receives queries from an individual user and other users.â (25:11-12; accord 26:1112.) By distinguishing the âindividual userâ from all the other users, the specification suggests that this particular user is different from the other users for purposes of the claimed invention. Defendantsâ construction properly acknowledges this âparticularityâ requirement. B. Plaintiff has declined to provide a construction for these terms As with most terms, Plaintiff initially provided no construction for these terms. Then, on April 5, Plaintiff proposed that âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ both should be construed as 22 âa/the individual user.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. G.) On April 11, the day before Opening Briefs were due, Plaintiff said that no further construction was necessary for these terms because the parties had already agreed on a construction for âuser.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. E.) But the parties have not agreed on a construction for âindividual userâ and âfirst user.â Specifically, Plaintiff has not confirmed an agreement that these terms refer to the âparticular userâ as to whom the claimed method is performed, or whether, as Plaintiffâs lack of agreement would seem to imply, the âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ could be any user at all. As the proper construction of âindividual userâ and âfirst userâ remains in dispute, the Court should resolve this dispute. See O2 Micro Intâl Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362-3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (âWhen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the courtâs duty to resolve it.â) VII. RELEVANT/RELEVANCE TERMS Term/Phrase Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ (â664 Claims 1, 26) how well information satisfies the information need of at least one of the query and the first user No further construction necessary beyond other terms â[informons/information] relevant to a queryâ (â420 Claims 10, 25; â664 Claims 1, 26) [informons/information] that satisfy the individual userâs information need expressed in the query [informons/information] having relevance to the [individual/first] userâs information need in the query A. Defendantsâ constructions flow from the specification and the claims The specification states that âthe ârelevanceâ of a particular informon broadly describes how well it satisfies the userâs information need.â (4:5-6). In keeping with this definition, the parties agree that ârelevance to a queryâ means âhow well an informon satisfies the individual 23 userâs information need in the query.â (See Appendix A.) Defendantsâ constructions flow from this agreed definition in the specification. For example, Defendantsâ construction of ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ takes this specification definition and applies it to the âquery and first userâ context. If ârelevanceâ is defined as how well an informon satisfies the userâs information need, then ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ must be âhow well information satisfies the information need of at least one of the query and the first user.â Defendantsâ constructions for âinformons relevant to a queryâ and âinformation relevant to a queryâ take the specification definition and apply it to the âqueryâ context. If ârelevanceâ is defined as how well an informon satisfies the userâs information need, then âinformons relevant to a queryâ are informons that do in fact satisfy the individual userâs information need expressed in the query and âinformation relevant to a queryâ is information that does in fact satisfy the first userâs information need expressed in the query. Because Defendantsâ constructions take the specificationâs definition of ârelevanceâ and faithfully apply it to the various claim terms, Defendantsâ constructions should be adopted. B. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Plaintiffâs constructions are grammatically nonsensical Plaintiffâs constructions of âinformons relevant to a queryâ and âinformation relevant to a queryâ are grammatically nonsensical. Plaintiff construes these terms as â[informons/information] having relevance to the [individual/first] userâs information need in the query.â Again, however, the parties agree that ârelevance to a queryâ should be construed as âhow well an informon satisfies the individual userâs information need in the query.â Applying this agreed ârelevanceâ construction to Plaintiffâs proposed constructions, the phrase âhaving relevanceâ in Plaintiffâs constructions would mean âhaving how well an informon satisfies . . .â, 24 which is grammatically nonsensical. Defendants pointed this out to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff had no response, merely stating that the parties would need to âagree to disagree.â Plaintiff has not offered any construction for ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first user.â In an email of April 11, Plaintiff justified its refusal to provide a construction by stating that âthe parties have already agreed to constructions for each of the components of this limitation.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. E). While it is true that the parties have agreed to a construction for ârelevance to a query,â which has some overlap with the longer phrase ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first user,â construing the shorter phrase does not eliminate the need to construe the latter. To the contrary: because the agreed construction of ârelevance to a queryâ includes the words âqueryâ and âuser,â the jury might be confused about what additional meaning the additional phrase ârelevance to at least one of the query and the first userâ has, absent a construction for this phrase. Specifically, Defendantsâ construction clarifies that this phrase refers to how well the information satisfies the information need of either the query issued by the first user or the first user himself. VIII. ORDER OF STEPS (â420 CLAIM 25; â664 CLAIM 26) Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction â420 Claim 25: Step [a] must be performed before Step [b]; Steps [b] and [c] must be performed before Step [d] No construction necessary â664 Claim 26: Steps [a] and [b] must be performed before Step [c]; Step [c1] must be performed before Step [c2] 1. Defendantsâ constructions acknowledge the logical order of steps in the claims It is well-settled that method steps must be performed in the recited order âwhen the method steps implicitly require that they be performed in the order written,â such as when âeach 25 subsequent step reference[s] something logically indicating the prior step has been performed.â Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). (a) â420 claim 25 Under these principles, and as shown in the annotations below, Step [a] of â420 Claim 25 must be performed before Step [b] because Step [b] âreferences something logically indicating the prior step has been performed.â Specifically, Step [a] recites âscanning a network . . . for informons,â and Step [b] involves âreceiving the informons in a content-based filter system from the scanning system.â Assuming that âthe scanning systemâ is what âscans the network for informons,â8 it is impossible for the content-based filter system to receive informons from the scanning system (as required in Step [b]) until after the scanning system has scanned the network for these informons (as required in Step [a]). Accordingly, Step [a] must be performed before Step [b]. For similar reasons, Steps [b] and [c] must be performed before Step [d]. Step [b] requires filtering on the basis of content profile data, Step [c] requires receiving collaborative feedback data, and Step [d] requires âcombiningâ the feedback data from Step [c] with the content profile data from Step [b]. Because Step [d] thus combines the output of Steps [b] and [c], Step [d] cannot be performed until after Steps [b] and [c] are completed. 8 See Section II(B), supra (explaining why âa scanning systemâ should be construed as "a system used to scan a network.") 26 (b) â664 claim 26 For â664 claim 26, as shown in the annotations below, Steps [a] and [b] must be performed before Step [c] because Step [c] references something logically indicating that Steps [a] and [b] have been performed. Specifically, Step [c] requires âcombining the information found to be relevant to the query by other users with the searched information.â The âinformation found to be relevant to the query by other usersâ in Step [c] refers to the output of Step [b], since Step [b] involves âreceiving information found to be relevant to the query by other users.â The âsearched informationâ in Step [c] refers to the output of Step [a], since Step [a] requires âsearching for information.â Thus, Step [c] requites âcombiningâ the output of Step [a] and Step [a], meaning that Step [c] must be performed after Steps [a] and [b] are completed. For similar reasons, Step [c1] must be performed before Step [c2]. Step [c1] recites âcombining the information . . .â, while Step [c2] recites âfiltering the combined information.â Because the information must be combined before this combined information may be filtered, Step [c1] must be performed before Step [c2]. 2. Plaintiff improperly seeks to avoid an order of steps construction Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges that some steps from â420 claim 25 and â664 claim 26 must be performed in order. However, Plaintiff refuses to take a position on what these claim steps are, recently stating: âTo the extent that some limitations presuppose that one of the earlier limitations be performed, that (limited) required ordering is clear from the claim language itself 27 and no construction is necessary.â (Sohn Decl., Ex. F.) Plaintiff argues that no order of steps construction is necessary â not because the claim steps may be performed in any order, but because order of steps âis an issue that will be addressed by the experts.â (Id.). Plaintiffâs apparent position that order of steps is a matter for expert discovery instead of claim construction is incorrect, as the Federal Circuit has held. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (deciding the requisite order of steps as a matter of claim construction); Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1342 (same). Moreover, because Plaintiff has refused to agree to Defendantsâ proposed order of steps, or even say which steps must happen in order, the Court has a duty to resolve this dispute. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362-3. Thus, the Court should reject Plaintiffâs attempt to avoid an order of steps construction and adopt Defendantsâ order of steps for â420 claim 25 and â664 claim 26. IX. ANTECEDENT BASIS TERMS Term/Phrase Defendantsâ Construction Plaintiffâs Construction âinformonsâ / âthe informonsâ (â420 Claims 10, 25) âinformonsâ and âthe informonsâ are the same informons âinformonsâ provides antecedent basis for âthe informonsâ âusersâ / âsuch usersâ (â420 Claims 10, 25) âusersâ and âsuch usersâ are the same users âusersâ provides antecedent basis for âsuch usersâ âa queryâ /âthe queryâ (â420 Claims 10, 25; â664 Claims 1, 26) âa queryâ and âthe queryâ are the same query âa queryâ provides antecedent basis for âthe queryâ âa feedback systemâ / âthe feedback systemâ (â420 Claim 10; â664 Claim 1) âa feedback systemâ and âthe feedback systemâ are the same feedback system âa feedback systemâ provides antecedent basis for âthe feedback systemâ âa scanning systemâ / âthe scanning systemâ (â664 Claim 1) âa scanning systemâ and âthe scanning systemâ are the same scanning systemâ âa scanning systemâ provides antecedent basis for âthe scanning systemâ 28 âa first userâ / âthe first userâ âa first userâ and âthe first userâ âa first userâ provides (â664 Claims 1, 26) are the same first user antecedent basis for âthe first userâ âa content-based filter systemâ / âthe content-based filter systemâ (â664 Claims 1, 21) âa content-based filter systemâ and âthe content-based filter systemâ are the same contentbased filter system âa content-based filter systemâ provides antecedent basis for âthe content-based filter systemâ The seven term dyads recited above are instances in which a term is first introduced in a claim and then referred to with a definite article (âtheâ or âsuchâ) later in the claim. For instance, â664 claim 1 introduces âa scanning systemâ and later refers to âthe scanning systemâ; â420 claim 10 introduces âusersâ and later refers to âsuch usersâ; etc.9 Under the basic canon of âantecedent basis,â the second term in each dyad must be the same as the first term in the dyad. In other words, âa scanning systemâ in â664 claim 1 is the same scanning system as âthe scanning systemâ recited later in the claim, âusersâ in â420 claim 10 are the same users as âthe usersâ recited later in the claim, etc. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 364, 388 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (âThe use of the definite article âtheâ requires that âsession keyâ have an antecedent basis, which is necessarily a session key referenced earlier in the claim stepsâ) (emphasis added); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., No. 93-5041, 1995 WL 275591, *5 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1995) (âAn indefinite article (âaâ or âanâ) is used to introduce an element. A definite article (âtheâ or âsaidâ) is used when a term has already been introduced, thereby making mention of the earlier recitation of the elementâ) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not dispute that terms such as âthe scanning systemâ would be indefinite without a corresponding antecedent basis. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 9 In the final dyad from this list (âa content-based filter systemâ / âthe content-based filter systemâ), âa content-based filter systemâ is introduced in '664 claim 1 and âthe contentbased filter systemâ appears in '664 claim 21 (which depends from claim 1). For all the other dyads, both terms in the dyad appear in the same claim. 29 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining a claim could be indefinite âif a term does not have proper antecedent basis.â) Plaintiff thus asserts that, for example, âa scanning systemâ provides antecedent basis for âthe scanning systemâ so as to preserve the validity of the claims. Yet Plaintiff steadfastly refuses to acknowledge the consequence of the antecedent basis canon â namely, that the second term in each dyad must be the same as the first. Plaintiff initially refused to provide any construction for these dyads at all. (Preliminary Constructions at 8). Plaintiff now states that the first item in each dyad âprovides antecedent basis forâ the second. Plaintiff thus would leave open the possibility that âthe scanning systemâ in â664 claim 1 is a different scanning system than âa scanning systemâ recited earlier in the claim, etc. But the antecedent basis canon forecloses this possibility. See Tuna Processors, Inc. v. Hawaii Intern. Seafood, Inc., Nos. 2008-1410, 2008-1435, 2009 WL 1084197, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23, 2009) (â[T]he introduction of a new element is accomplished through the use of an indefinite article, not through the use of a definite article.â); SSL Servs., 816 F. Supp. 2d at 388. Furthermore, Plaintiffâs construction would only serve to confuse a lay jury. It would provide no benefit to say, for example, âa first user provides the antecedent basis to the first user.â The jury will not know what to do with that. Only Defendantsâ constructions for these term dyads, which specify that the second term in each dyad must be the same as the first term in the dyad, would provide any useful meaning for the jury. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendantsâ constructions should be adopted. Dated: April 12, 2012 By: /s/ Stephen E. Noona Stephen E. Noona KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C. 150 West Main Street Post Office Box 3037 Norfolk, VA 23514 30 Telephone: (757) 624.3000 Facsimile: (757) 624.3169 By: /s/ David A. Perlson David A. Perlson QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP 50 California Street, 22nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 875-6600 Facsimile: (415) 875-6700 Counsel for Defendants GOOGLE INC., IAC SEARCH & MEDIA, INC., TARGET CORP., and GANNETT COMPANY, INC. By: /s/ Stephen E. Noona Stephen E. Noona KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C. 150 West Main Street Post Office Box 3037 Norfolk, VA 23514 Telephone: (757) 624.3000 Facsimile: (757) 624.3169 Robert L. Burns FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP Two Freedom Square 11955 Freedom Drive Reston, VA 20190 Telephone: (571) 203-2700 Facsimile: (202) 408-4400 Cortney S. Alexander FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP 3500 SunTrust Plaza 303 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 94111 Telephone: (404) 653-6400 Facsimile: (415) 653-6444 Counsel for Defendant AOL, INC. 31 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 12, 2012, I will electronically file the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following: Jeffrey K. Sherwood Kenneth W. Brothers DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP 1825 Eye Street NW Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 420-2200 Facsimile: (202) 420-2201 sherwoodj@dicksteinshapiro.com brothersk@dicksteinshapiro.com Counsel for Plaintiff, I/P Engine, Inc. Stephen E. Noona Virginia State Bar No. 25367 KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C. 150 W. Main Street, Suite 2100 Norfolk, VA 23510-1665 Telephone: (757) 624-3239 Facsimile: (757) 624-3169 senoona@kaufcan.com Counsel for AOL Inc., Google, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Target Corporation and IAC Search & Media, Inc. /s/ Stephen E. Noona Stephen E. Noona Virginia State Bar No. 25367 KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C. 150 West Main Street, Suite 2100 Norfolk, VA 23510 Telephone: (757) 624-3000 Facsimile: (757) 624-3169 senoona@kaufcan.com 11649500_1.DOC 32