Pike v. Guarino

Filing 920070702

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = 'Battered woman\'s syndrome has been described as a "series of\
common characteristics that appear in women who are abused\
physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by\
the dominant male figure in their lives." State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d\
364, 371 (N.J. 1984). One of these characteristics is a type of\
learned helplessness, through which the woman believes that the\
batterer has complete control of the relationship and that she\
cannot escape. See United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501, 1505\
(D. Kan. 1995). Women suffering from the syndrome often have a\
difficult time disclosing the abuse; "it is the nature of [the]\
illness to conceal its existence." Id. at 1510. \
'

var WPFootnote2 = 'During its four-year odyssey in the district court, the\
petitioner\'s case was assigned at different times to different\
judges. Rather than matching each ruling with each judge, we take\
an institutional view and refer only to the decisions of the\
district court.\
'

var WPFootnote3 = 'Some courts have indicated that an "independent review"\
standard should guide the evaluation of mixed questions of fact and\
law in habeas cases. See Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 9 n.5 (collecting\
cases); see also 2 Childress & Davis, supra § 13.06, at 13-50. We\
do not linger over this question because independent review\
involves roughly the same tamisage that we have outlined here; that\
is, significant deference to factbound determinations and little or\
no deference to law-based determinations. See United States v.\
Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 882-83 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Scarpa, 38\
F.3d at 9 n.5 (bypassing inquiry for similar reasons).\
'

var WPFootnote4 = 'In the court below, the petitioner argued that the state\
court\'s factual findings were not entitled to a presumption of\
correctness because they were unreasonable in light of the evidence\
presented. She based this argument on the notion that AEDPA\
sections 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) operate in tandem. To support that\
notion, she cited our opinion in Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590,\
597-98 (1st Cir. 2001). The district court did not accept this\
hypothesis but, before us, the petitioner does not allege any harm\
resulting from the district court\'s refusal. Consequently, it is\
unnecessary for us to test this hypothesis.\
'

var WPFootnote5 = 'The lawyers did testify during the state court hearing, but\
at the Commonwealth\'s instance.\
'

var WPFootnote6 = 'For example, such hearings are often useful when the federal\
habeas court is asked to consider a claim based on ineffective\
assistance of state court counsel. See, e.g., Bryan, 335 F.3d at\
1215. \
'

var WPFootnote7 = 'It is worth noting that, in the end, we find the competence\
claim wanting. See infra Part IV(B). When a federal court grants\
habeas relief on an unexhausted claim, comity concerns are greater\
than when it denies relief on such a claim. See Jones v. Jones,\
163 F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)\
(authorizing a federal court to deny unexhausted habeas claims on\
the merits).\
'

var WPFootnote8 = 'The petitioner seems uncertain whether the right that she\
asserts is rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the\
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Sixth Amendment as applied to the\
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Petitioner\'s Br. at\
49. Because we find no violation of any cognizable constitutional\
right, we need not untangle this knot.\
'

var WPFootnote9 = 'Although the petitioner cites an occasional case indicating\
that trial courts have an affirmative duty to prevent the\
involuntary waiver of certain rights, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst,\
304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (discussing waivers of right to\
counsel), she has not argued that the state trial court should have\
conducted some particularized inquiry in her case; nor does she\
identify what would have put the court on notice of the need to\
conduct such an inquiry. Where, as here, an appellant has merely\
hinted obliquely at an argument but has not advanced it distinctly,\
that argument is not in the case. See United States v. Zannino,\
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention\
a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to\
do counsel\'s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put\
flesh on its bones.").\
'

var WPFootnote10 = 'It bears mentioning that, even if we were to recognize this\
new type of constitutional violation, we would likely be barred\
from granting habeas relief on this claim under the familiar\
doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality\
opinion). For two reasons — because Pike has made a colorable\
claim that the Commonwealth waived the Teague issue below and\
because the merits of this claim are relatively clear-cut — we have\
elected to bypass an in-depth Teague analysis. See Campiti v.\
Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 321-22 (1st Cir. 2003). \
'

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