Benitez-Garcia v. Gonzalez-Vera

Filing 920061103

Opinion

Download PDF
var gAgent = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase() var gWindows = ( (gAgent.indexOf( "win" ) != -1 ) || ( gAgent.indexOf( "16bit" ) != -1 ) ) var gIE = ( gAgent.indexOf( "msie" ) != -1 ) var bInlineFloats = ( gWindows && gIE && ( parseInt( navigator.appVersion ) >= 4 ) ) var floatwnd = 0 var WPFootnote1 = ' The default judgment was never formally lifted against\ defendant Department of Education, although it subsequently\ participated in the case throughout the litigation and even\ successfully moved to dismiss some of the claims against it.\ Defendant Adalberto Gonzalez-Vega also appears to have been\ participating in the litigation despite being in default; his\ motion to set aside the default was pending at the time the\ district court dismissed plaintiffs\' claims.\ ' var WPFootnote2 = ' The ISC order also set out a number of other deadlines. It\ set March 21, 2006 as the deadline for filing dispositive motions,\ June 21, 2006 as the date for the pre-trial conference, and June\ 28, 2006 as the trial date.\ ' var WPFootnote3 = ' In addition to citing this rule, the district court also\ claimed authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), which allows the\ court to dismiss an action "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to\ prosecute or to comply with . . . any order of court." For\ purposes of this appeal, we need not examine which of these rules\ provides proper authority for dismissal of an action for failure to\ comply with an ISC order.\ ' var WPFootnote4 = ' The portions of the ISC order that plaintiffs sought to\ amend in their pending motion do not appear to be the portions that\ the district court found they had disobeyed. Nevertheless, the\ plaintiffs\' motion did allege that the defendants were hampering\ discovery in this case, and in addition to asking for specific\ modifications, the plaintiffs also asked for "any order [the court]\ might see fit." Cf. Enlace Mercantil Int\'l, Inc. v. Senior Indus.,\ Inc., 848 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1988) (reversing a district\ court\'s dismissal when the record left open the possibility that\ plaintiff\'s delay resulted from waiting for the district court to\ rule on a pending and relevant motion).\ ' var WPFootnote5 = ' It is true that in Robson we stated that "[r]epeated \ disobedience of a scheduling order is inherently prejudicial." 81\ F.3d at 4. Robson did not, however, explain how much prejudice\ results from such violations. Moreover, the violations in Robson\ occurred on the eve of trial and appear not to have been brought to\ the court\'s attention until the morning of trial itself. Id. at 2. \ The inherent prejudice in Robson was thus far more obvious from the\ record than is the case here.\ ' var WPFootnote6 = ' Under D.P.R. R. 7.1(b), an opposing party is deemed to have\ waived objection to a motion unless he files a written objection\ within ten days. D.P.R. R. 7.1(d) explains that these ten days are\ calculated according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), which in turn\ excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays when a rule\'s time\ period is less than 11 days. Excluding weekends and the Veterans\ Day holiday, plaintiffs\' response to the motion filed on November\ 3, 2005 was due at least no earlier than November 18, 2005. In\ fact, plaintiffs may even have been entitled to several more days\ beyond that. The record indicates that defendants\' motion for\ sanctions was filed electronically using the CM/ECF system, and\ that service was made on opposing counsel through this system. \ Under the district court\'s local rules, it appears that this\ mechanism of service entitled plaintiffs to an additional three\ days. See D.P.R. R. 5.1(e); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e). \ ' var WPFootnote7 = ' The district court may have been relying on a mistaken\ docket entry, made at the bottom of the entry for defendants\'\ motion for sanctions, indicating that a response was due on\ November 16, 2005. Nevertheless, we can find nothing in the record\ indicating that this deadline was entered as a formal order of the\ court, and in the absence of such the district court\'s local rules\ were controlling.\ ' var WPFootnote8 = ' The Supreme Court has held that the term "excusable neglect"\ should be interpreted flexibly. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.\ Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P\'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993). It\ instructed the lower courts to engage in an equitable balancing\ test, looking to all relevant circumstances, including the degree\ of prejudice to the adverse party, the potential impact on judicial\ proceedings, and the reasons for delay. Id. at 395. This court\ has held that Pioneer was meant to apply more broadly, in other\ circumstances in which the party who missed a deadline argues\ excusable neglect. See Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18, 19-20 (1st\ Cir. 1997); see also Graphic Commc\'ns Int\'l Union, Local 12-N v.\ Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001)\ (applying Pioneer to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)); Hospital del Maestro v.\ NLRB, 263 F.3d 173, 174-75 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying Pioneer\ to NLRB rules).\ ' var WPFootnote9 = ' To the extent the Supreme Court upheld dismissal in Link\ without notice, that case is distinguishable. There, at the time\ of the dismissal the district court had already been appraised of\ the party\'s reason for noncompliance. See Link, 376 U.S. at 628. \ Also, there is no indication in Link that the district court was\ acting contrary to local rules. See id. at 633 n.8. Also\ distinguishable is Cintron-Lorenzo v. Departamento de Asuntos del\ Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522 (1st Cir. 2002), which upheld a sua sponte\ dismissal. In that case there was a lengthy silence from the\ plaintiff and little indication that she was even actively\ participating in the litigation. Id. at 524-25. The district\ court also warned the plaintiff that it was specifically\ considering dismissal based on her conduct in the litigation thus\ far; the plaintiff did not take this opportunity to present her\ side to the court. See id. at 526.\ ' function WPShow( WPid, WPtext ) { if( bInlineFloats ) eval( "document.all." + WPid + ".style.visibility = 'visible'" ); else { if( floatwnd == 0 || floatwnd.closed ) floatwnd = window.open( "", "comment", "toolbars=0,width=600,height=200,resizable=1,scrollbars=1,dependent=1" ); floatwnd.document.open( "text/html", "replace" ); floatwnd.document.write( "\r\n" ); floatwnd.document.write( " p { margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:1px; } \r\n" ); floatwnd.document.write( "\r\n" ); floatwnd.document.write( WPtext ); floatwnd.document.write( 'Close'); floatwnd.document.write( "

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?