US v. Bunchan

Filing 920090902

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = '  1UOL was first presented to investors as the retail-store arm\
of WMDS\'s operation, whereby investors would open stores to sell\
WMDS products. Toward the end of the pyramid schemes, however,\
1UOL was described as a passive investment vehicle, just like WMDS.\
'

var WPFootnote2 = '  Appellant inappropriately labeled much of his spending, such\
as his children\'s tuition and tennis lessons, gambling, purchases\
from Louis Vuitton, and his hairpieces, as "business expenses" on\
company records. \
'

var WPFootnote3 = '  About $500,000 of the money appellant spent on casinos came\
from Bunchan\'s personal accounts, while the rest came from company\
accounts containing investor funds. Of the $3.8 million spent on\
casinos, $1.2 million was sent back to appellant\'s personal bank\
account from the casinos; appellant later put some, but not all, of\
that money back into the companies\' accounts. Agent Niro was not\
able to identify any source of income to appellant during 2000-2005\
other than WMDS and 1UOL.\
'

var WPFootnote4 = '  Approximately $500,000 of the investor funds went to Seng\
Tan and $300,000 to Christian Rochon.\
'

var WPFootnote5 = ' On May 4, 2009, following a jury trial, appellant was\
separately convicted in the District Court of Massachusetts of\
using a facility of interstate commerce to commit murder-for-hire,\
18 U.S.C. § 1958, and solicitation of a crime of violence, 18\
U.S.C. § 373, for this conduct. He was sentenced to twenty-five\
years imprisonment, with the first five years of that sentence to\
be served concurrently with his sentence in this case. United\
States v. Bunchan, No. 07-cr-10085-DPW (D. Mass.).\
'

var WPFootnote6 = '  Tan initiated an appeal to this court, but later moved to\
voluntarily dismiss the appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of\
Appellate Procedure 42. Her appeal was dismissed on September 5,\
2007.\
'

var WPFootnote7 = '  The PSR applied the 2007 Guidelines, and we cite to those\
Guidelines.\
'

var WPFootnote8 = '  Although the endangerment of the solvency or financial\
security of 100 or more victims would normally occasion a four-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(13)(B)(iii), the guidelines\
state that the cumulative adjustments from sections 2B1.1(b)(2) and\
2B1.1(b)(13)(B) shall not exceed eight levels. U.S.S.G.\
§ 2B1.1(b)(13)(C). Because a six-level enhancement was applied\
pursuant to 2B1.1(b)(2), the Office of Probation only recommended\
a two-level enhancement pursuant to subsection (b)(13). (We note\
that as of the 2008 edition of the Guidelines, the enhancement for\
endangerment of the solvency or financial security of 100 or more\
victims is found at U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.(b)(14)(iii)).\
'

var WPFootnote9 = '  No matter a defendant\'s CHC, the Guidelines prescribe "life"\
(and not a true sentencing range such as "360 months - life") for\
an offense level of forty-three.\
'

var WPFootnote10 = '  Although appellant tries to elevate his evidentiary\
argument to a constitutional claim under the Sixth Amendment right\
of confrontation, that argument is advanced so perfunctorily that\
we deem it waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st\
Cir. 1990). In any event, our analysis of the district court\'s\
appropriate exercise of its discretion answers any possible\
constitutional claim. \
'

var WPFootnote11 = ' Appellant makes a poorly developed argument that the\
district court improperly punished appellant "for attempted murder\
without jury trial and conviction, by way of the guidelines\
enhancement for obstruction of justice." This argument is waived\
because of its perfunctory quality. Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17\
("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by\
some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived."). \
Nonetheless, we note that there was no error in the district\
court\'s finding of facts by a preponderance of the evidence to\
support the U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement for obstruction of\
justice, as facts supporting such enhancements may be found by a\
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Gonsalves, 435\
F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[J]udicial fact-finding alone does\
not violate a defendant\'s sixth amendment rights so long as the\
defendant is sentenced at or below the statutory maximum for the\
offense of conviction.").\
'

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