David Chamberlin, et al v. Stoughton, MA, et al

Filing 920100401

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = 'Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.\
'

var WPFootnote2 = 'Those grounds included a lack of compensable damages, coupled\
with a lack of evil motive or intent sufficient to award punitive\
damages; the fact that many of the alleged retaliatory acts took\
place prior to the December hostile work environment letters; a\
lack of knowledge by the defendants of the plaintiffs\' grand jury\
testimony; a lack of retaliatory acts by the Selectmen or Ciampa;\
and a lack of a policy or custom of retaliation by the Town. The\
district court said, however, that it did not adopt in full the\
defendants\' reading of current First Amendment doctrine.\
'

var WPFootnote3 = 'See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Mt. Healthy\
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);\
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563\
(1968).\
'

var WPFootnote4 = 'The Whistleblower Statute imposes liability on the state,\
local towns, and other public entities that retaliate against an\
employee through "adverse employment action" for specified conduct,\
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 185(a), (b); and the protected conduct,\
subject to certain conditions, includes--to paraphrase two of the\
subsections that follow: (1) disclosing to a supervisor or "public\
body" activity by the employer that the complaining employee\
believes to be unlawful or dangerous; and (2) providing information\
or testimony to a "public body" conducting an investigation into\
unlawful conduct or a threat to safety. Id. ch. 149, § 185(b).              \
'

var WPFootnote5 = 'The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court later reversed\
Cohen\'s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, on the\
grounds that the trial court had violated Cohen\'s right to a public\
trial by restricting access to the courtroom during jury selection. \
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 919 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 2010).\
'

var WPFootnote6 = 'Earle is far from the only example. See, e.g., Goulet v. New\
Penn Motor Express, Inc., 512 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2008); Senra v.\
Cunningham, 9 F.3d 168, 174 (1st Cir. 1993); Dixon v. City of\
Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990); James v. Nico Energy\
Corp., 838 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1988); Mello v. K-Mart Corp.,\
792 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1986); Juneau Square Corp. v. First\
Wisconsin Nat\'l Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 814 n.17 (7th Cir. 1980);\
Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855\
(9th Cir. 1977).\
'

var WPFootnote7 = 'The ones of some arguable substance included Cachopa\'s\
altering of Chamberlin and Wohlgemuth shifts; Cachopa\'s appointment \
of Ciampa; and several other actions taken by Ciampa but seemingly\
at Cachopa\'s direction: a requirement that Chamberlin requalify to\
carry firearms and confinement to station until this occurred; a\
reduction in Wohlgemuth\'s duties; and an official reprimand in\
Chamberlin\'s personnel file.\
'

var WPFootnote8 = 'Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) creates a hearsay\
exception for reports of "public offices or agencies, setting forth\
. . . factual findings resulting from an investigation made\
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of\
information or other circumstances indicate lack of\
trustworthiness." The plaintiffs also cite Rule 801(d)(2)(C),\
which covers statements by authorized persons, and Rule\
801(d)(2)(D), which covers statements by agents.\
'

var WPFootnote9 = 'Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7 ("The inquiry into the protected\
status of speech is one of law, not fact."); Curran v. Cousins, 509\
F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is the judge who decides as a\
matter of law the issues in the two steps Garcetti identifies.");\
Lewis v. City of Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 219 (1st Cir. 2003).\
'

var WPFootnote10 = ' We note that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 was amended\
in 1991, and "the term judgment as a matter of law was adopted to\
refer to preverdict (directed verdict) and postverdict (judgment\
notwithstanding the verdict) motions with a terminology that does\
not conceal the common identity of two motions made at different\
times in the proceeding." Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Carribean\
Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 199 n.14 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal\
quotation marks omitted). We refer to the district court\'s ruling\
as a directed verdict to remain consistent with the majority\'s\
terminology. \
'

var WPFootnote11 = ' I join the majority\'s decision in all other respects.\
'

var WPFootnote12 = ' Instead, defendants contended in their briefing, in the\
traditional manner, that no reasonable jury could find for\
plaintiffs on their retaliation claims based on the evidence\
presented at the first trial, and therefore the directed verdict\
was properly granted. Defendants contended, inter alia, that there\
was no evidence Ciampa or Cachopa knew that plaintiffs cooperated\
with the special prosecutor or testified before the grand jury, and\
that any retaliation that occurred after plaintiffs\' December 2004\
hostile work environment letters did not rise to the level of an\
adverse employment action. The only suggestion by defendants of an\
argument even resembling the majority\'s harmless error analysis is\
their statement, in a footnote, that "the jury verdict in Cachopa\'s\
favor in Trial Two further supports the reasonableness of the\
Court\'s entry of a Directed Verdict in Trial One."\
'

var WPFootnote13 = ' The court acknowledged that Earle provided evidence of other\
more trivial confrontations with police, such as being stopped for\
alleged traffic violations, but concluded that no jury could have\
found that any of these incidents constituted a deprivation of a\
constitutional right, as required for a § 1983 civil rights\
conspiracy. Id. at 845. \
'

var WPFootnote14 = ' My research has uncovered a smattering of other cases, from\
our own circuit and others, applying harmless error analysis to a\
directed verdict. Like Earle, these decisions have found harmless\
error where the jury verdict "necessarily defeats the claim" on\
which a directed verdict was incorrectly granted. Goulet, 512 F.3d\
at 43; see id. at 42-43 (concluding that any error in directed\
verdict for employer on plaintiff\'s hybrid Labor Management\
Relations Act § 301 claim was harmless, where the jury\'s ultimate\
rejection of plaintiff\'s § 301 claim against union was "fatal" to\
claim against employer); see also, e.g., Uphoff-Figueroa v.\
Alejandro, No. 08-1921, 2010 WL 728784, at *7 (1st Cir. Mar. 4,\
2010) (holding that even if court erred in directing verdict for\
employer on plaintiff\'s state law retaliation claim, it was\
harmless given the jury\'s finding for employer on "identical"\
federal law retaliation claim); Snyder v. Ag Trucking, Inc., 57\
F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that directing a verdict for\
employer on claim for willful violation of ADEA was harmless error\
because, given jury\'s rejection of underlying ADEA claim, it "could\
not" have found willful violation of ADEA); Dixon v. City of\
Lawton, Okla., 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding any\
error in failing to submit § 1983 claim to jury harmless, given\
jury\'s conclusion that no defendants violated plaintiff\'s\
constitutional rights by use of excessive force); Mello v. K-Mart\
Corp., 792 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that error\
in directing verdict for manufacturer was harmless where jury\
ultimately rejected product liability claims against vendor, and in\
reaching that verdict jury necessarily had to find that there was\
no manufacturing defect); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d\
449, 453 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that any error in directing\
verdict for defendant on plaintiff\'s claim for conspiracy to\
defraud was harmless, given that jury ultimately rejected\
underlying fraud claim). \
'

var WPFootnote15 = ' The Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law,\
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the\
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a\
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United\
States, than according to the rules of the common law." \
'

var WPFootnote16 = ' Unlike in Earle, no special verdict form or special\
questions were put to the jury in the second trial, and therefore\
we cannot know the basis for the jury\'s verdict for Cachopa. \
'

var WPFootnote17 = ' In addition, some evidence of adverse conduct, including\
changes made to plaintiffs\' training locations, was presented at\
the second trial without a clear showing of whether Cachopa or\
Ciampa was the primary actor. \
'

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