Jennings v. Jones

Filing 920091119

Opinion

var gAgent = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase()
var gWindows = ( (gAgent.indexOf( "win" ) != -1 ) || ( gAgent.indexOf( "16bit" ) != -1 ) )
var gIE = ( gAgent.indexOf( "msie" ) != -1 )
var bInlineFloats = ( gWindows && gIE && ( parseInt( navigator.appVersion ) >= 4 ) )
var floatwnd = 0

var WPFootnote1 = '                   Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.\
'

var WPFootnote2 = '                   Aside from Jennings\'s excessive force and battery claims\
against Jones, all other claims were resolved in favor of the\
defendants, either on motions for judgment as a matter of law\
(JMOL) or by the jury in its final verdict.\
'

var WPFootnote3 = '                   Jennings consistently urged that (1) Jones\'s actions\
constituted excessive force because the seriousness of the injury\
was not justified by the gravity of Jennings\'s purportedly minor\
offense. At closing argument, Jennings\'s attorney stated: "If, in\
fact, there was any serious behavior on the part of Adam Jennings\
that justified the end result of breaking his ankle in two places,\
I don\'t know what it is." He also told the jury that if Jennings\'s\
behavior before his arrest "was a crime, it wasn\'t a very serious\
crime," and "if there is a serious injury, a serious physical\
injury, you can take that into consideration when you\'re\
considering whether the force is excessive or not." \
              Further, Jennings argued at trial that (2) the force used\
against him was excessive because he should not have been arrested\
in the first place. Jennings testified that he in fact complied\
with all the officers\' directions at every stage (though both\
videotape evidence and testimony from officers flatly contradicted\
this). Jennings\'s attorney restated this point during both opening\
and closing arguments.\
              Jennings also argued throughout the trial that (3) the force\
used was excessive because Jones continued to use the ankle\
technique even after Jennings claimed he stopped resisting. \
Pointing to a videotape of the encounter as evidence, Jennings\
argued that after he was taken to the ground and Jones started\
using the ankle technique, Jones "holds that position for quite\
some time, even when it is clear from the video that there is no\
longer any struggling going on." He added during closing argument\
that "obviously at the point that Trooper Hill gets up, that in and\
of itself is an announcement that there isn\'t anything going on\
down on the floor that is worthy of any kind of very serious\
application of force."\
              Jennings further claimed excessive force on the grounds that,\
(4) faced with strange men whom he believed were robbing the shop\
and harassing his mother, his initial, obstructive behavior had\
been justified.\
'

var WPFootnote4 = '                   At the close of the plaintiff\'s presentation at trial,\
the defendants moved for JMOL on the basis of defenses, which\
included qualified immunity. This was the first time the qualified\
immunity defense was raised; the defendants explained that it was\
not raised earlier because Jones and the other officers were not\
named as defendants until after the parties had filed their\
pretrial motions. The district court granted the motion in part\
but denied it as to Jennings\'s excessive force and battery claims\
against Jones. The court apparently overlooked the immunity issue,\
which it did not explicitly address.\
              After the close of all evidence, defendants renewed their\
motion for JMOL, but did not explicitly renew their qualified\
immunity argument. The district court again granted the motion in\
part but denied it as to the excessive force and battery claims\
against Jones; again, the court did not address the qualified\
immunity defense.\
'

var WPFootnote5 = '                   The court also concluded that under Rhode Island law,\
Jones was shielded from liability for the state law battery claim. \
Id. at *11–13.\
'

var WPFootnote6 = '                   The decision did not disturb the district court\'s grant\
of JMOL on Jennings\'s state law battery claim, which Jennings had\
not challenged on appeal. Jennings II, 499 F.3d at 7 n.8.\
'

var WPFootnote7 = '                   Had the verdict been based on a maintenance of force\
theory, the panel opinion in Jennings II conceded that it was\
arguable Jones was entitled to qualified immunity. Jennings II,\
499 F.3d at 11-12.\
'

var WPFootnote8 = '                   We apply the same standard of review to a district\
court\'s grant of a new trial motion as we do to its denial of one. \
Compare Goulet v. New Penn Motor Exp., Inc., 512 F.3d 34, 44 (1st\
Cir. 2008)("We review the district court\'s denial of a motion for\
new trial for abuse of discretion only."), with Kearns, 863 F.2d at\
181 ("[O]nly on a finding of an abuse of discretion [in the grant\
of a new trial motion] should a reviewing court set aside the trial\
court\'s determination.").\
'

var WPFootnote9 = '                   To be sure, even a grant of JMOL does not violate the\
Seventh Amendment. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386\
U.S. 317, 321 (1967).\
'

var WPFootnote10 = '                   Indeed, the majority in Jennings II concluded that the\
standard of review compelled it to focus on the increased force\
theory as opposed to other theories. Jennings II, 499 F.3d at 10.\
'

var WPFootnote11 = '                   Unfortunately, a later opinion, Stuart v. United States,\
337 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2003), misinterpreted Transamerica and\
conflated the two standards. Id. at 37; see generally Wright,\
Miller & Kane, supra, § 2806, at 63 (observing "recurrent tendency\
on the part of courts to confuse the standard for a new trial with\
that for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the\
verdict"). Citing Stuart\'s misinterpretation, the court again\
incorrectly conflated the two standards in Baron v. Suffolk County\
Sherriff\'s Dep\'t, 402 F.3d 225, 245 (1st Cir. 2005). Neither Baron\
nor Stuart\'s statement that inferences must be drawn in favor of\
the verdict are good law. In later decisions, we returned to the\
appropriate distinction. See, e.g., Casillas-Díaz, 463 F.3d at\
80-81. Moreover, the Supreme Court case Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415,\
limited review of a new trial motion to abuse of discretion and did\
not require drawing of all inferences in favor of the verdict.\
'

var WPFootnote12 = '                   There is no requirement that the district court make\
specific findings. "[A] trial judge is not required to enter\
supporting findings of facts and conclusions of law when granting\
a new-trial motion." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S.\
33, 36 n.3 (1980).\
'

var WPFootnote13 = '                   Plaintiff argues on appeal that Exhibit A, the police\
videotape, compels the conclusion that Jones increased his force in\
holding Jennings\'s ankle after Officer Hill got up. Exhibit A does\
no such thing; there is no view of the ankle nor the holding of the\
ankle. Plaintiff also argues that Exhibit A shows a placid arrest\
scene. Again, Exhibit A shows no such thing.\
'

var WPFootnote14 = '                   Monroe testified that Jones "cranked down harder" on\
Jennings\'s ankle after telling Jennings that his ankle would stop\
hurting if he ceased his resistance; Piccoli stated that Jones\
"[j]ust twisted more" after Jennings asked him to release his\
ankle.\
'

var WPFootnote15 = '                   Piccoli also testified that he could see Jones "gritting\
his teeth" as Jones increased his force. However, Piccoli conceded\
Jones was looking down and did not look back in Piccoli\'s\
direction, toward the doorway and outside. \
'

var WPFootnote16 = '                   Jennings may be correct that the district court had the\
wrong door in mind when it noted that the camera man would have\
blocked Piccoli\'s view; the camera man was not between Piccoli\'s\
asserted location and Jones. Our own review of the videotape\
evidence indicates, however, that the court\'s determination that\
Piccoli was unable to observe Jones\'s actions was not clearly\
erroneous because other individuals were standing in the correct\
doorway. See Muniz, 453 F.3d at 13 ("Under the clear error\
standard, [plaintiff] must convince us that there was only one\
permissible interpretation of the [video] footage, and that the\
district court\'s interpretation was clearly incorrect.").\
'

var WPFootnote17 = '                   The smoke shop\'s security videotape plainly shows\
officers struggling to pull Jennings\'s hands from the counter,\
contrary to Jennings\'s claim that he complied with all of the\
officers\' instructions.\
'

function WPShow( WPid, WPtext )
{
if( bInlineFloats )
eval( "document.all." + WPid + ".style.visibility = 'visible'" );
else
{
if( floatwnd == 0 || floatwnd.closed )
floatwnd = window.open( "", "comment", "toolbars=0,width=600,height=200,resizable=1,scrollbars=1,dependent=1" );
floatwnd.document.open( "text/html", "replace" );
floatwnd.document.write( "\r\n" );
floatwnd.document.write( " p { margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:1px; } \r\n" );
floatwnd.document.write( "\r\n" );
floatwnd.document.write( WPtext );
floatwnd.document.write( 'Close');
floatwnd.document.write( "