Cortes-Reyes, et al v. Salas-Quintana, et al

Filing 920100617

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = 'Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.\
'

var WPFootnote2 = ' The plaintiffs have not appealed the denial of their request\
for reinstatement.\
'

var WPFootnote3 = ' According to the record, "Republicanos" is a term used to\
refer to members or sympathizers of the NPP, or those who are pro-statehood.\
'

var WPFootnote4 = ' The district court dismissed all claims against defendant\
Nieves. That determination has not been appealed. The eight\
original plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed are not parties to\
this appeal.\
'

var WPFootnote5 = ' Although this testimony might have been excluded on hearsay\
grounds, no such objection was made by the defendants.\
'

var WPFootnote6 = ' Lugo-González made this statement as part of his response to\
the question on direct examination, "[w]as there any other source\
of pressure, concerning the appointment of the cadets?" The\
defendants\' hearsay objection to this testimony was overruled at\
trial and they have not pressed the issue on appeal.\
'

var WPFootnote7 = ' Although Cabezudo denied ever meeting any of the plaintiffs,\
the jury was free to make the credibility determination favoring\
the plaintiffs. \
'

var WPFootnote8 = ' The defendants contend that the plaintiffs\' showing of a\
political motive for the plaintiffs\' firings is undercut by\
evidence that some of the cadets who were dismissed were members of\
the PDP, while others who were not dismissed were members of the\
NPP. The defendants direct us to no evidence in support of the\
former claim. The defendants direct us to only one page of\
testimony in support of the latter contention. That testimony\
seems to suggest that two cadets who were not fired along with the\
majority of the class may have been NPP members. Another portion\
of the testimony, however, indicates that both of those cadets\
"were also dismissed" at a later date. Taken in the light most\
favorable to the verdict, the additional information that two NPP\
cadets were fired later than the plaintiffs does not suggest that\
the jury was unreasonable in its conclusion that seven of the\
plaintiffs were fired because of their political affiliation. \
'

var WPFootnote9 = ' The defendants introduce no additional arguments in support\
of their claim that they were entitled to a new trial beyond their\
assertion that the jury verdict was against the clear weight of the\
evidence. As described above, the evidence supporting the\
political discrimination claim was more than sufficient to support\
the verdict. The district court did not abuse its discretion when\
it denied the motion for a new trial. \
'

var WPFootnote10 = ' Although the district court did not address this qualified\
immunity claim in its opinion denying the defendants\' motion for\
judgment as a matter of law, the defendants raised their claim of\
qualified immunity in both their 50(a) and 50(b) motions as well as\
on appeal. Thus, it is properly before us. We review the implicit\
denial of qualified immunity de novo. Rodríguez-Marín, 438 F.3d at\
84. \
'

var WPFootnote11 = ' The district court erroneously submitted the question of\
qualified immunity to the jury. Whether defendants are entitled to\
qualified immunity "is a legal question for the court to decide." \
Rodríguez-Marín, 438 F.3d at 83. The jury\'s role is to "determine\
any preliminary factual questions" so that the court can determine\
the "legal issue of the official\'s reasonableness." Id. at 83-84. \
'

var WPFootnote12 = '  There may be additional relevant cases, but the plaintiffs\
have not cited them nor have we been provided with translations. \
'

var WPFootnote13 = ' There was a factual dispute at trial over the implications\
of the Ranger bylaws. "When, as here, the defendants appeal from\
a denial of qualified immunity after a jury verdict has been\
rendered, the evidence is construed in the light most hospitable to\
the party that prevailed at trial, and deference is accorded the\
jury\'s discernible resolution of disputed factual issues." \
Guillemard-Ginorio, 585 F.3d at 525 (internal quotation marks and\
citation omitted). We therefore read the cadet bylaws to support\
the proposition that the cadets would become Rangers so long as\
their training was successfully completed.\
'

var WPFootnote14 = ' The defendants also argue that they were entitled to\
qualified immunity from suit on the political discrimination claim. \
They provide no support for that argument, beyond the claim that\
the evidence was "insufficient to establish Plaintiffs\' prima facie\
case." Having determined that the jury reasonably found that\
Salas-Quintana and Cabezudo were motivated by political animus when\
they fired the cadets, we need not tarry long over this claim. \
"[I]t is clearly established, and was at the time of the events in\
question, that terminating a non-policy-making employee based on\
political affiliation violates the First Amendment." Costa-Urena,\
590 F.3d at 21. \
'

var WPFootnote15 = ' The district court did not have the benefit of our recent\
decision in De Jesús Nazario, in which we held definitively that\
our earlier holding in Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, 69 F.3d\
1205 (1st Cir. 1995), on which the district court relied, did not\
apply to section 1983 actions. De Jesús Nazario, 554 F.3d at 205.\
'

var WPFootnote16 = ' Nominal damages are available in a § 1983 action for the\
violation of a procedural due process right even without a\
corollary finding of injury or an award of compensatory damages.\
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). Several circuits have\
held that, "although the Supreme Court\'s decision in Carey involved\
nominal damages after a procedural due process violation, nominal\
damages are similarly appropriate in the context of a First\
Amendment violation." KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465\
F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Familias Unidas v.\
Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 1980) (nominal damages for\
violation of First Amendment rights); Draper v. Combs, 792 F.2d\
915, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (nominal damages for violation of\
either procedural or substantive constitutional right); Risdal v.\
Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000) (nominal damages for\
First Amendment rights). Given the absence of a challenge to the\
nominal damages award, we see no need to address the merits of that\
question here. Procedurally, if a jury in a case brought pursuant\
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 finds a violation of the plaintiff\'s\
constitutional rights, but fails to award compensatory damages, a\
plaintiff "may ask the trial court for nominal damages on the\
occasion of, or immediately after, the return of the verdict." \
Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89, 98-99 (1st Cir. 1999). Such\
a procedure was followed in this case. \
'

var WPFootnote17 = ' Since the injury in this case for a due process violation\
and a First Amendment violation would seem to be the same - the\
loss of a job - it does seem odd that the jury awarded compensatory\
damages on the due process claim but not on the First Amendment\
claim. The district court speculated that the jury might have\
chosen that outcome because of the court\'s admonition in its\
instructions that the jury could not award double damages for the\
same injury. With a properly structured verdict form, the jury\
might have been able to indicate an award of compensatory damages\
for the First Amendment claim and the due process claim without\
violating the rule on double damages. However, such a verdict form\
was not submitted to the jury.\
'

var WPFootnote18 = ' The requirement for an award of punitive damages in an\
action pursuant to § 1983 is rigorous. See Méndez-Matos v.\
Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding\
punitive damages cannot be assessed in an action under § 1983\
unless the plaintiff proves that the "defendant \'discriminate[d] in\
the face of a perceived risk that its actions [would] violate\
federal law\'") (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass\'n, 527 U.S. 526,\
536 (1999)). As noted, however, the appellants did not argue on\
appeal that this requirement was not met.\
'

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