Carmen Rodriguez-Garcia v. William Miranda-Marin, et al

Filing 920100621

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = 'Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.\
'

var WPFootnote2 = ' The title of this department (in Spanish, "Departamento de\
Limpieza, Ornato y Urbanismo") has been variously translated by the\
parties as "Beautification," "Ornate," "Cleaning, Beautification\
and Urbanism," and "Public Works." We will refer to it as Public\
Works.\
'

var WPFootnote3 = ' This is actually the third time this case has come before\
us. Initially, the district court granted summary judgment for\
defendants on the ground that Rodríguez-García\'s claims were time-barred. We vacated that decision and remanded the case for further\
proceedings. See Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354\
F.3d 91, 100 (1st Cir. 2004) (Rodríguez I). \
'

var WPFootnote4 = ' The facts of this case substantially overlap with the facts\
recounted in Rodríguez II. Where appropriate, we borrow verbatim\
from our previous recitation of the facts and procedural history.\
'

var WPFootnote5 = ' Medical testimony at trial revealed that Rodríguez-García\
had a history of depression and other psychological ailments and\
had been prescribed a variety of medications. \
'

var WPFootnote6 = ' Rodríguez-García hand-delivered her letter to Human\
Resources and the office of the vice mayor.\
'

var WPFootnote7 = ' The petition was subsequently amended to include a political\
discrimination claim; the amended petition did not include Flores\
as a defendant as she had died in the interim. Rodríguez-García\
later filed and was granted a voluntary dismissal of the petition\
without prejudice.\
'

var WPFootnote8 = ' The court noted that Rodríguez-García had also pursued a\
theory of municipal liability based on Miranda-Marín\'s conduct, but\
that the court had dismissed the claims against the mayor on his\
Rule 50(a) motion.\
'

var WPFootnote9 = ' Defendants\' motion for a new trial under Rule 59 focused on\
the requested jury instruction and the damages award. Although the\
motion contained a conclusory statement that the verdict was\
against the weight of the evidence, it made no argument on this\
point. Accordingly, the trial court treated defendants\' motion for\
judgment as a matter of law as raising a challenge to the\
sufficiency of the evidence, and their motion for a new trial as\
raising challenges to the damages award and the court\'s refusal to\
give the requested jury instruction. \
'

var WPFootnote10 = ' Such a violation of First Amendment rights by a state actor\
is actionable under section 1983, which imposes liability on any\
person who, under color of state law, "subjects, or causes to be\
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the\
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the\
Constitution and laws . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\
'

var WPFootnote11 = ' Defendants also claim that Rodríguez-García\'s sworn\
testimony before the Ethics Office does not constitute speech on a\
"matter of public concern," see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146\
(1983), because Carrasquillo, not Rodríguez-García, initiated the\
complaint with the Ethics Office. Defendants did not raise this\
argument in the district court, in either their Rule 50(a) or 50(b)\
motions, and it is therefore waived. See Parker v. Gerrish, 547\
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (issue is waived on appeal if not\
pressed in Rule 50 motion). Defendants also direct our attention\
to Garcetti, in which the Supreme Court held that "when public\
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the\
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment\
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their\
communications from employer discipline." 547 U.S. at 421. \
However, defendants make no effort to explain how Garcetti applies,\
if at all, to the facts of this case, and we thus deem this\
argument waived for lack of appellate development. United States\
v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).\
'

var WPFootnote12 = '  Defendants also suggest, based largely on the testimony of\
the director of Federal Funds, Gilberto Charriez, that Rodríguez-García performed many job tasks in Federal Funds and seemed happy\
in her position there. However, the jury was free to credit\
Rodríguez-García\'s description of her working conditions and reject\
Charriez\'s conflicting testimony. \
'

var WPFootnote13 = ' In addition, there is no evidence indicating that Rodríguez-García\'s repeated requests for reinstatement between February 2000\
and 2003 would have been refused even in the absence of her\
protected conduct.\
'

var WPFootnote14 = ' Defendants also suggest that, under the second prong of our\
test outlined above, the First Amendment interests in this case are\
outweighed by a legitimate government interest in curtailing\
plaintiff\'s speech. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. However,\
instead of addressing the nature of Rodríguez-García\'s speech and\
why they had legitimate interests in curtailing it, defendants\
simply reiterate their contention that Rodríguez-García was\
transferred at her own request rather than in retaliation for her\
Ethics Office complaint. This contention relates to defendants\'\
motivation for the adverse employment action, not to the balancing\
of employee speech and government interests. To the extent that\
defendants intend to raise a distinct argument under Pickering, it\
is deemed waived for lack of appellate development. Zannino, 895\
F.2d at 17.\
'

var WPFootnote15 = ' Miranda-Marín asserted that the lawsuit was part of a scheme\
by Rodríguez-García\'s lawyer, who had appeared in an earlier\
political commercial against the mayor, and that Rodríguez-García\
was related to Carrasquillo, who allegedly had a personal agenda\
against the mayor. \
'

var WPFootnote16 = ' Relying on our decision in Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447\
(1st Cir. 2003), defendants suggest that a single incident of\
misconduct cannot expose a municipality to § 1983 liability. We\
squarely rejected this same argument in Welch. See 542 F.3d at\
942.\
'

var WPFootnote17 = ' Defendants further contend that the mayor is entitled to\
qualified immunity because he did not cause any violation of a\
constitutional right. In support of this position, defendants\
simply reiterate their contentions that Rodríguez-García was\
transferred based on her own request and not in retaliation for her\
Ethics Office testimony and that the mayor had no knowledge of her\
transfer and request for reinstatement. As discussed above, ample\
evidence supports a jury finding to the contrary on both of these\
points.\
'

var WPFootnote18 = ' The special verdict form used in the second trial asked the\
jury whether they found "by a preponderance of the evidence that\
plaintiff\'s transfer, or failure to be reinstated, resulted from\
Mayor William Miranda Marín\'s direct acts or omissions, or from his\
indirect conduct that amounted to condonation or tacit\
authorization." Thus, the verdict form does not indicate whether\
the jury found the mayor liable on a direct or indirect theory of\
liability. Where a general verdict or special verdict question\
encompasses multiple claims or multiple theories of liability, one\
of which is unsupported by the evidence or otherwise defective, "a\
new trial is usually warranted." See Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v.\
QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 73 (1st Cir. 2009); see\
also David v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2001). \
However, this rule is "by no means rigid;" instead, "we apply a\
generous harmless error analysis in order to determine whether it\
is reasonably likely that the jury in fact relied on a theory with\
adequate evidentiary support." Mass. Eye & Ear, 552 F.3d at 73. \
Rodríguez-García\'s evidence and argument at trial focused entirely\
on a direct rather than an indirect theory of liability. \
Therefore, it is reasonably likely that the jury relied on a direct\
theory of liability, a theory amply supported by the evidence.\
'

var WPFootnote19 = ' Rodríguez-García\'s complaint contained one mention of Law\
115, invoking supplemental jurisdiction "for causes of action\
arising under the Puerto Rico Constitution and laws of the\
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, among them, Act 115 . . . ." \
However, the complaint\'s asserted causes of action included several\
claims arising under Puerto Rico law, but did not include a claim\
under Law 115. The complaint\'s prayer for relief likewise did not\
request double damages under Law 115, although it generally\
requested "all damages to which [Rodríguez-García] is entitled."\
'

var WPFootnote20 = ' In the 2004 pretrial order, in addition to her federal law\
claims, Rodríguez-García asserted claims under Article II, §§ 1, 6\
and 7 of the Puerto Rico Constitution; the Puerto Rico Public\
Service Personnel Act, Act No. 5 of Oct. 14, 1975, P.R. Laws Ann.,\
tit. 3, §§ 1301-1323 (repealed Aug. 3, 2004); and Articles 1802 and\
1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31, §§\
5141, 5142.\
'

var WPFootnote21 = ' The following day, Rodríguez-García objected to the jury\
instructions, requesting an instruction under Law 115. The court\
did not rule on this objection, and Rodríguez-García did not raise\
the issue again.\
'

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