Boston and Maine Corporation v. Massachusetts Bay Transportati

Filing 920091124

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = '                   An important question, not raised by the parties, is\
whether the precedent the parties have cited, which primarily\
involves judicial efforts to resolve the competing policies of\
federal bankruptcy law and other federal statutes, applies here,\
where the issue involves one state statute and one federal statute. \
One rule of statutory construction applies when courts are\
construing two federal statutes and courts are attempting to\
effectuate the purposes of both. Midlantic Nat\'l Bank v. N.J.\
Dep\'t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1986); In re Hemingway\
Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1993). "The choice\
between two federal statutes requires an analysis of both, to see\
if they are indeed incompatible or if they can be harmonized, and\
if they are incompatible to decide which one Congress meant to take\
precedence." Coker v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 579,\
583-84 (7th Cir. 1999). For example, when trying to effectuate the\
purposes of both § 77 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and of CERCLA,\
courts "attempt . . . to reconcile the conflicting goals of\
environmental cleanup and a \'fresh start\' for bankruptcy debtors." \
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. (Chicago II), 3\
F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993).\
              That rule of construction is inapplicable when there are not\
two federal statutes at issue. Here, there is only one federal\
statute, the Bankruptcy Act, and the claim sought to be excused\
from the discharge arises under state law. But no party raised\
this point with the district court, and it has not been briefed. \
Rather, the parties have in their briefs assumed that the relevant\
caselaw is that of whether bankruptcy discharges bar federal\
environmental claims. We will assume, dubitante, that this is so.\
              In any event, we do engage in construction of the term "claim"\
as under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act itself. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469\
U.S. 274 (1985). \
'

var WPFootnote2 = '                   In N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. at 301, the Supreme\
Court declined to bar claims of a creditor who had not received\
actual notice from the court of the claims bar date. Section 77\
itself requires that "reasonable notice" of the bankruptcy\
proceeding be provided to potential creditors. 11 U.S.C. §\
205(c)(8) (repealed 1978). There is no claim by the MBTA that it\
did not have notice of the bankruptcy proceeding itself. \
'

var WPFootnote3 = '                   The Third Circuit has held a pre-discharge antitrust\
claim barred when the plaintiffs had no actual knowledge of the\
facts giving rise to the claim but had notice of the discharge\
date. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 771 F.2d 762, 769 (3d Cir.\
1985). \
'

var WPFootnote4 = '                   When state law creates obligations on debtors in\
bankruptcy, courts must determine whether those obligations\
constitute "claims" within the meaning of federal law such that\
they are discharged. See Davis v. Cox, 356 F.3d 76, 81-85 (1st\
Cir. 2004); In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P\'ship, 262 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st\
Cir. 2001).\
'

var WPFootnote5 = '                   Additionally, CERCLA had been enacted in 1980, and it was\
not legally foreclosed that there was CERCLA exposure for the MBTA\
and contribution against B&M for at least waste oil contamination. \
In re Crystal Oil, 158 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1998). The MBTA\
points out that CERCLA specifically exempts petroleum, crude oil,\
and crude oil fractions from the definition of hazardous\
substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). But it was far from clear that\
waste oil was not covered by CERCLA, and by April 1985 the EPA had\
concluded it was. Notification Requirements; Reportable Quantity\
Adjustments, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,456 (Apr. 4, 1985). \
'

var WPFootnote6 = '                   The MBTA distinguishes its contribution claim from a\
direct claim by a regulatory agency like DEQE. The MBTA conceded\
at oral arguments that under § 77 any claims by the state against\
B&M under Chapter 21E would have been discharged in this case. It\
argues that whereas a regulatory agency need simply know of the\
contamination to foresee a claim, a private party must not only\
know of the contamination but also have reason to contemplate being\
compelled to take remedial action that would give rise to a\
contribution claim. We see no reason why a private party should be\
treated better than a state.\
'

var WPFootnote7 = '                   To the extent B&M sought an order that the MBTA was in\
contempt of the injunctive relief portion of the Consummation\
Order, it has abandoned that claim. \
'

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