Klaucke v. Daly

Filing 920100209

Opinion

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var gAgent = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase() var gWindows = ( (gAgent.indexOf( "win" ) != -1 ) || ( gAgent.indexOf( "16bit" ) != -1 ) ) var gIE = ( gAgent.indexOf( "msie" ) != -1 ) var bInlineFloats = ( gWindows && gIE && ( parseInt( navigator.appVersion ) >= 4 ) ) var floatwnd = 0 var WPFootnote1 = 'Klaucke pled his state cause of action under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.\ ch. 12, § 11H-1. Because Section 11H governs civil rights actions\ brought by the Attorney General, and because Section 11H-1 does not\ exist, we assume, like the district court, that Klaucke meant to\ bring a claim pursuant to Section I, which creates a private cause\ of action for individuals alleging a deprivation of state or\ federal constitutional freedoms.\ ' var WPFootnote2 = 'Klaucke argues that summary judgment is inappropriate due to the\ existence of factual disputes concerning why Officer Daly suspected\ Klaucke had alcoholic beverages in his bag. For example, Officer\ Daly explained in his deposition that he suspected Klaucke had\ alcohol only after seeing Klaucke attempt to conceal the bag, at\ which point Daly claims he saw a wine bottle protruding from the\ top of the bag. Klaucke disputes these facts, but they are not\ material. Rather, under Terry, we view the circumstances attending\ the investigative stop through an objective lens, and therefore\ have no need to resolve ancillary disputes rooted in allegations\ regarding the officer\'s actual, subjective beliefs, even if those\ beliefs were mistaken. United States v. Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d 25, 29\ (1st Cir. 2008) (reasonable suspicion "is not dependent on an\ individual officer\'s subjective motives").\ ' var WPFootnote3 = 'Klaucke suggests that he was "coerced" into producing his\ identification by an unlawful threat of arrest. Assuming for\ argument\'s sake that more than reasonable suspicion was required to\ threaten arrest, we conclude that the totality of information known\ to Officer Daly at the time, including Klaucke\'s behavior in\ refusing to produce his proof of age, was sufficient to allow\ Officer Daly\'s reasonable suspicion to ripen into probable cause to\ believe that Klaucke had violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, sec.\ 34C. See Acosta v. Ames Dep\'t Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 11 (1st\ Cir. 2004)("The test for probable cause [to support an arrest] does\ not require the officers\' conclusion to be ironclad, or even highly\ probable. Their conclusion that probable cause exists need only be\ reasonable."). On these facts, the choice Officer Daly presented\ to Klaucke was a lawful and common sense response to an impasse of\ Klaucke\'s own creation.\ ' function WPShow( WPid, WPtext ) { if( bInlineFloats ) eval( "document.all." + WPid + ".style.visibility = 'visible'" ); else { if( floatwnd == 0 || floatwnd.closed ) floatwnd = window.open( "", "comment", "toolbars=0,width=600,height=200,resizable=1,scrollbars=1,dependent=1" ); floatwnd.document.open( "text/html", "replace" ); floatwnd.document.write( "\r\n" ); floatwnd.document.write( " p { margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:1px; } \r\n" ); floatwnd.document.write( "\r\n" ); floatwnd.document.write( WPtext ); floatwnd.document.write( 'Close'); floatwnd.document.write( "

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