Ungar, et al v. Palestinien Authority, et al

Filing 920100324

Opinion

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var WPFootnote1 = 'Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme\
Court of the United States, sitting by designation\
'

var WPFootnote2 = ' We refer generically to the plaintiffs without identifying\
each of them. We note, however, that because Efrat Ungar was not\
a citizen of the United States, her estate and heirs are no longer\
parties. We use the term "defendants" to designate the PLO and the\
PA, jointly and severally. Even though others were sued, these two\
are the only defendants that matter now.\
'

var WPFootnote3 = ' The PA and PLO are jointly and severally liable for the\
damage award. However, each is liable to the plaintiffs for a\
different amount of attorneys\' fees. The court thus entered a\
judgment of $116,421,048 against the PA and of $116,415,468 against\
the PLO.\
'

var WPFootnote4 = ' This list parallels the list of factors employed in\
evaluating claims of good cause to vacate entries of default under\
Rule 55(c). See, e.g., Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir.\
1989). The primary difference is the greater ease with which\
motions under Rule 55(c) are granted. See id.\
'

var WPFootnote5 = ' The impetus for this masquerade is usually temporal. Rule\
60(b)(1) is available only if a motion is made within one year\
after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Rule\
60(b)(6) motions are timely so long as they are brought "within a\
reasonable time" following entry of the judgment. Id.\
'

var WPFootnote6 = ' We do not in any way suggest that the flexibility of Rule\
60(b)(6) somehow transmutes it into an easier road to relief for\
willful defaulters than for those whose requests rest on different\
circumstances. The opposite is true: a willful defaulter faces an\
uphill climb in making the requisite showing of exceptional\
circumstances. See Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 891. That climb is likely\
to be steeper for the willful defaulter than, say, for a movant\
alleging inadvertence or mistake.\
'

var WPFootnote7 = ' We do think it prudent to point out that, on remand, the\
district court has a range of options. It may, for example, deny\
the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, grant the motion outright, or grant it\
upon conditions, which may include requiring a bond to ensure\
payment of a future judgment, see, e.g., Knox, 248 F.R.D. at 433,\
or requiring the payment of costs and expenses incurred by the\
plaintiffs due to the defendants\' original obstinacy, see, e.g.,\
Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1989). \
'

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