Junta v. Thompson

Filing

OPINION issued by Sandra L. Lynch, Chief Appellate Judge; Juan R. Torruella, Appellate Judge and Jeffrey R. Howard, Appellate Judge. Published. [09-2333]

Case: 09-2333 Document: 00116098530 Page: 1

Date Filed: 08/12/2010

Entry ID: 5470803

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 09-2333
THOMAS JUNTA,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL THOMPSON, Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution - Shirley,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Chauncey B. Wood, with whom Wood & Nathanson, LLP, was on
brief for petitioner/appellant.
James J. Arguin, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau,
with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, were on brief for
respondent/appellee.

August 12, 2010

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Date Filed: 08/12/2010

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Entry ID: 5470803

In 2002, a Massachusetts

Superior Court jury convicted Thomas Junta ("Junta") of involuntary
manslaughter on the theory of unlawful killing by the commission of
a

battery.

See

Mass.

Gen.

Laws

ch.

265,

§

13.

After

unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, Junta petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Junta now

appeals from the denial of his federal petition for habeas corpus
relief.

The sole question before us is whether the Massachusetts

Appeals Court's rejection of Junta's claim that the prosecution
suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) violated the deferential standard of review set
forth for habeas claims in the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
We find it did not and thus affirm the denial of habeas corpus
relief by the district court.
I. Background
A.

Facts1

On the afternoon of July 5, 2000, Junta took his ten-year
old son and two friends to the Burbank Ice Arena in Reading,

1

In habeas cases, "a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct."
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to findings
of facts made by state trial and appellate courts. Teti v. Bender,
507 F.3d 50, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2007). As a result, "[w]e describe
the facts as they appear from the state court record." Id. at 53.
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Massachusetts for "stick practice," an informal hockey practice.
Commonwealth v. Junta, 815 N.E.2d 254, 256 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
During the practice, Junta watched from the stands.

Junta, after

watching the game for a period of time, believed the game had
become too rough and went down to ice-level to complain to Michael
Costin ("Costin"), an adult who was participating in the practice
with his three sons.

Id.

Costin responded, "That's hockey."

Id.

The men exchanged words, but no physical altercation took place at
that time.
The practice ended shortly thereafter, and the players
returned to the locker room.
of

their

hockey

gear,

While the players were changing out

Junta

and

Costin

again

another, first verbally and then physically.
broke up the fight.

confronted

one

Other nearby adults

Junta departed the arena, leaving his son to

finish changing in the locker room, only to return a few minutes
later.

Id.

at

257.

Upon

his

return,

Nancy

Blanchard

("Blanchard"), a rink employee, noted that Junta "appeared angry."
Id. Junta found Costin, and the two men immediately began throwing
punches at one another.

Id.

There was conflicting trial testimony as to which of the
two men was the first aggressor.

Id.

Junta claimed that Costin

attacked him first, while witnesses for the Commonwealth alleged
that it was Junta who first grabbed Costin.

Id.

Costin, who

weighed approximately 160 pounds, wound up on the ground with

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Entry ID: 5470803

Junta, who weighed approximately 270 pounds, straddled on top of
him.

Id.

Costin was punched numerous times in the face and

elsewhere.
Also at issue at the trial was the number of blows Junta
struck. Blanchard and other witnesses testified that Junta punched
Costin "many, many times," while Junta and his witnesses claimed
that

only

"two

or

three"

punches

had

been

inflicted.

Id.

Blanchard and another witness asked Junta to stop, screaming,
"you're going to kill him."

Id.

Costin did not succumb immediately to Junta's blows.
According to several witnesses, "there was a period during that
punching that [Costin] was moving, fighting, kicking, or flailing."
Id.

By the time that bystanders pulled Junta away from Costin,

Costin was motionless.

Emergency medical technicians and an

advanced life support team treated Costin while en route to the
hospital, but Costin died the next day.
The number and nature of the blows inflicted were viewed
as crucial.

"The law of [the Commonwealth of Massachusetts]

recognizes unlawful-act manslaughter only if the unlawful act is a
battery not amounting to a felony, when the defendant knew or
should have known that the battery he was committing endangered
human life." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 596 N.E.2d 1018,
1024 n.10 (Mass. 1992)).

As a result, if Junta inflicted only a

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Entry ID: 5470803

single punch or minor blows, it would tend to negate his knowledge
or imputed knowledge.
The expert testimony at trial differed as to the number
of blows.
Chief

Dr. Stanton Kessler of the Commonwealth's Office of the

Medical

Examiner,

performed the autopsy.

the

expert

for

the

prosecution,

had

Dr. Kessler testified that, in addition to

the numerous injuries on Costin's body, there were two areas of
severe trauma: the base of the neck where the vertebral artery
ruptured, cutting off twenty-five percent of the blood supply to
the brain, and internal trauma to the left side of the head above
the ear.

Junta, 815 N.E.2d at 257.

The latter injury, unrelated

to the former, resulted in "severe" and "serious" bleeding of the
brain.

Id.

The cause of death, in his opinion, was "blunt head

and neck trauma, contributory factor of bronchopneumonia [i.e.,
fluid in the lungs]."

Id. at 257-58.

Although he acknowledged on

several occasions that the injury to the vertebral artery could
have been sustained by one blow, he testified that the tearing of
the ligaments, "almost tearing the head from the neck," indicated
multiple blows.

Id. at 258.

Dr. Ira Kanfer, the defense expert, testified that the
cause of death was rupture of the vertebral artery, a rare injury
caused by minimal force, due to a single blow.

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Id.

Case: 09-2333 Document: 00116098530 Page: 6

B.

Date Filed: 08/12/2010

Entry ID: 5470803

Procedural History

On January 11, 2002, a Massachusetts Superior Court jury
convicted Junta of involuntary manslaughter on the theory of
unlawful killing by the commission of a battery.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13.

Id. at 256; see

Junta was sentenced to serve six to

ten years at the Massachusetts Correction Institution - Cedar
Junction.

Junta, 815 N.E.2d at 256.
On February 10, 2003, Junta filed a motion for new trial.

In support of his motion for a new trial, Junta submitted the
affidavit of Melissa Christie ("Christie"), who worked at the
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner.
attended

an

American

Academy

of

She alleged that she had

Forensic

Science

("AAFS")

conference in Seattle, Washington, where Dr. Kessler had given a
presentation on the technique for evaluating vertebral artery
trauma

at

autopsy.2

During

his

presentation,

Dr.

Kessler

"identified the case for the audience as being the famous 'Hockey
Dad's' case in Massachusetts," and showed slides of Costin's

2

In the abstract of the presentation, Through the Tight Canal
Swiftly – A Review of the Technique for Evaluating Vertebral Artery
Trauma Autopsy, Dr. Kessler and his co-author wrote:
To make this diagnosis [of traumatic basilar subarachnoid
hemorrhage, secondary to vertebral artery injuries] there
must not be any other traumatic injury to the brain,
dural coverings, spinal cord, or skull. Typical terminal
events usually relate to a fight in which the victim has
received only minor blows to the head from an assailant.
The victim may then be witnessed to collapse, develop
seizures and either die immediately or linger brain dead
in a surgical intensive care unit. . . .
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injuries.

Id. at 258.

Date Filed: 08/12/2010

Entry ID: 5470803

He identified the rupture of the vertebral

artery as the fatal injury and indicated that the injury can easily
occur during a chiropractor visit.

Id.

"[t]here

about

was

nothing

in

his

talk

According to Christie,
substantial

force

or

multiple blows having caused the rupture of Mr. Costin's vertebral
artery." Id. Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial judge
denied Junta's motion.

Junta filed a notice of appeal, and his two

appeals –- the first from his conviction and the second from the
denial of his motion for new trial –- were consolidated.
September

23,

2004,

the

Massachusetts

Appeals

Court

Junta's conviction and denied his motion for new trial.

On

affirmed
See id. at

262. Junta subsequently filed with the Massachusetts Supreme Court
an application for leave to obtain further appellate review, which
the court denied.
Having

exhausted

his

state

court

remedies,

on

February 15, 2006, Junta filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts.

In his petition, Junta set forth a

single claim based on the prosecution's alleged failure to disclose
exculpatory

evidence

Specifically,

Junta

in

violation

alleged

that

of
the

Brady,

373

prosecution

U.S.

at

87.

effectively

suppressed the fact that Dr. Kessler had presented his findings in
this case at an AAFS conference, and that the findings presented at
the conference contradicted his trial testimony, thus depriving

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Junta of valuable impeachment evidence.
the petition.

Entry ID: 5470803

The district court denied

Junta v. Thompson, 647 F. Supp. 2d 94, 102 (D. Mass.

2009). Junta thereafter requested, and the district court granted,
a certificate of appealability on the Brady issue.
II. Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of habeas relief de
novo.

Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 573 (1st Cir. 2007).
As a threshold matter, we must determine the proper

standard

of

disposition

review
of

with

Junta's

which

appeal.

to

review

Under

the

AEDPA,

state
"the

court's
level

of

deference owed to a state court decision [on federal habeas review]
hinges on whether the state court ever adjudicated the relevant
claim on the merits or not."

Clements v. Clarke, 592 F.3d 45, 52

(1st Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

If the state court

has adjudicated the claim on the merits, a federal habeas court
must defer to the state court adjudication unless it:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"In contrast, a state court decision that

does not address the federal claim on the merits falls beyond the
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ambit of AEDPA," Clements, 592 F.3d at 52, and the habeas court
reviews such a claim de novo.

Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 47

(1st Cir. 2001).
The
Massachusetts

Supreme
denied

Judicial
Junta's

Court

for

application

the
for

Commonwealth
leave

to

of

obtain

further appellate review, and thus, we "look through to the last
reasoned decision" to determine the basis for the state court's
holding.

Malone v. Clarke, 536 F.3d 54, 63 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008)

(internal quotations omitted).

As a result, we turn to the

decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
As to both Dr. Kessler's presentation and the abstract of
his presentation, Junta contends that we must review his Brady
claims de novo.

With respect to the presentation, Junta contends

that the Massachusetts Appeals Court did not address whether the
alleged suppression of Dr. Kessler's presentation violated Brady.
As to the abstract, Junta alleges that the Massachusetts Appeals
Court

did

not

examine

whether

the

prosecution

effectively

suppressed Dr. Kessler's abstract by disclosing it to defense
counsel on the last page of Dr. Kessler's updated C.V. on the
morning of his testimony, thereby ignoring the second prong of the
Brady analysis.

We disagree.

The Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed Junta's claim
explaining
prosecution

that

due

fails

to

process

is

produce

violated

under

Brady

'evidence

which

provides

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"if

the
some

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Entry ID: 5470803

significant aid to the defendant's case, whether it furnishes
corroboration of the defendant's story, calls into question a
material, although not indispensable, element of the prosecution's
version of the events, or challenges the credibility of a key
prosecution
Massachusetts

witness.'"
Appeals

Junta,
Court

then

815

N.E.2d

addressed

at
the

259.

The

Brady

issue,

stating:
After examining Dr. Kessler's testimony and
the abstract, we conclude, as did the motion
judge (who was also the trial judge), that the
defendant has not met his burden.
The
abstract
is
not
inconsistent
with
Dr.
Kessler's
testimony,
and,
moreover,
the
defendant overstates the factual importance of
the experts' testimony in this case. Although
the defendant urges that Dr. Kessler testified
that multiple blows caused the rupture of the
vertebral artery, he did not so testify. What
led him to the conclusion of multiple blows
was the fact that there were also other
injuries including "the injury in the middle
of the brain."
He stated, "Taking into
account the tearing of the small vessels in
the cavity of the brain we call the ventricle.
Taking into account the amount of blood and
tearing of the vertebral injury and the
bruising and hemorrhage in the vertebral
arteries on both sides. And the hemorrhage in
the neck. This is a substantial force injury.
It takes a lot of trauma to tear ligaments and
the ligaments at the back of the skull are
torn and hemorrhaged."
That the abstract
reported that tearing of the vertebral artery
may typically be caused by minor blows in no
way contradicts Dr. Kessler's testimony that
due to the severity of the injuries in this
case, multiple blows were here inflicted.
Perhaps even more important, the testimony of
the percipient witnesses belied the claim of
one or minimal blows.
No witness testified
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that the defendant hit Costin only once, and
the defendant himself testified that there
were two or three punches.
Both experts
pointed out that once the vertebral artery is
ruptured, the victim would within seconds
become unconscious or brain dead.
As the
trial judge pointed out in his well-reasoned
memorandum denying a new trial,
"there was substantial eye testimony that the
victim was still moving after a minimum of two
punches. There was also substantial testimony
from eyewitnesses that [the defendant] punched
the victim anywhere from three up to ten or
more times.
Therefore, the information
contained in Dr. Kessler's [a]bstract would
not have provided [the defendant] with
effective impeachment material."
Id. at 259-60 (footnote omitted).
A matter is "adjudicated on the merits" if there is a
"decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata
effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced,
rather than on a procedural, or other, ground."
56

(internal

quotations

and

citation

Teti, 507 F.3d at

omitted).

Here,

the

Massachusetts Appeals Court's treatment of Junta's Brady claim
constituted

a

final

decision

with

res

judicata

effect.

Additionally, the court relied on substantive grounds in reaching
its decision.
grounds

nor

"Thus, this was neither a disposition on procedural
a

summary

disposition

remained silent on the issue."

in

which

the

court

Clements, 592 F.3d at 53.

Moreover, we have previously stated that
AEDPA's trigger for deferential review is
adjudication, not explanation. When a state
court has truly avoided (or merely overlooked)
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simply

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the petitioner's federal claim, a federal
court may step into the breach and review de
novo. But judicial opacity is a far cry from
judicial avoidance. It is the result to which
we owe deference, not the opinion expounding
it.
Id. at 55-56 (internal citation omitted).

Thus, the question

before us is not whether the state court opinion engaged in the
comprehensive

analysis

typically

required

of

"a

law

school

examination," Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 2002), but
whether the substance of Junta's federal claims was addressed.
Because we find that the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed the
effective suppression of Dr. Kessler's C.V.,3 and the suppression
of

both

the

abstract

and

the

substance

of

Dr.

Kessler's

presentation, through the lens of Brady, see Junta, 815 N.E.2d at
259-60,

we

review

the

state

court's

decision

under

AEDPA's

deferential standard of review.4

3

In addressing Junta's claim that the Government effectively
suppressed the updated copy of Dr. Kessler's C.V. by providing a
copy of the C.V. at trial, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
explained that the prosecution "in fact provided defense counsel
with an updated copy of Dr. Kessler's curriculum vitae on the
morning of his testimony [but that] [t]here were "conflicting
affidavits as to whether the prosecution had pointed out to the
defense the addition of the abstract to the curriculum vitae."
Junta, 815 N.E.2d at 259 n.6. The Massachusetts Appeals Court,
however, did not decide whether the untimely disclosure of the C.V.
amounted to an effective suppression of the C.V.
Instead, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court adopted the motion judge's reasoning
that "even assuming all of the facts alleged by [Junta] are true,
[he] has failed to show that the Commonwealth's nondisclosure of
Dr. Kessler's abstract caused him prejudice.'" Id.
4

We note that the district court reviewed Junta's Brady claim
regarding the suppression of Dr. Kessler's presentation de novo.
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B.

Date Filed: 08/12/2010

Entry ID: 5470803

The Brady Claim

We now turn to the merits of Junta's claim.

Junta

contends that the prosecution effectively suppressed exculpatory
evidence in violation of his due process rights.

Specifically, he

maintains that Dr. Kessler's abstract and presentation, viewed
together,

provided

valuable

impeachment

evidence

because

they

contradicted Dr. Kessler's testimony at trial.
Junta does not contend that the state court's rejection
of his Brady claim was "contrary to" clearly established Supreme
Court precedent, and thus we limit our inquiry to whether the state
court's

decision

precedent.

was

an

"unreasonable

application

of"

such

"A state court decision is an unreasonable application

of the governing law if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's then-current
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner's case."

Aspen, 480 F.3d at 574.

The Supreme Court

See Junta, 647 F. Supp. 2d 94 at 99. The district court explained
that although the Massachusetts Appeals Court examined the evidence
regarding the presentation, it declined to issue separate findings
on materiality.
A review of the Massachusetts Appeals Court
decision reveals, however, that the court addressed the substance
of the presentation in light of Junta's Brady claim, but declined
to issue additional findings given that the presentation had not
been recorded. Junta, 815 N.E.2d at 259 n.4. Because we find that
the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed Junta's claim regarding
Dr. Kessler's presentation in light of Brady, we decline to follow
the district court's decision to review this aspect of the
Massachusetts Appeals Court decision de novo. Moreover, we note
that the district court rejected Junta's claim under de novo
review, finding that no Brady violation had occurred. Junta, 647
F. Supp. 2d 94 at 102.
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has emphasized that "an unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law."

Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (emphasis in original).

Thus,

"[a] decision can still be reasonable even if the reviewing court
thinks it is wrong; 'unreasonable' here means something more than
incorrect or erroneous."

Teti, 507 F.3d at 57 (citation omitted).

If there is "a close question [as to] whether the state decision is
in

error,

then

application."

the

state

decision

cannot

be

an

unreasonable

Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The

clearly

established

law

governing

the

mandatory

disclosure of exculpatory evidence is set forth in Brady, 373 U.S.
at 87.

The Supreme Court has identified a three-part test for

adjudicating Brady claims: (1) "[t]he evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching;" (2) "that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;" and
(3) "prejudice must have ensued."

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.

263, 281-82 (1999).
At the outset, we note that there is a dispute as to
whether the Brady obligation extends to prosecution experts, such
as a medical examiner.5

Assuming arguendo that Brady applies,

5

The Supreme Court has previously stated that the phrase "clearly
established as determined by [the Supreme] Court refers to
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's
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there is nothing to suggest that the Massachusetts Appeals Court
unreasonably applied Brady.
It was not unreasonable for the Massachusetts Appeals
Court to conclude that Dr. Kessler's C.V., the abstract, and the
substance of Dr. Kessler's presentation were not favorable to
Junta, given that they were not inconsistent with Dr. Kessler's
testimony.

At trial, Dr. Kessler conceded on several occasions

that Costin's fatal injury, rupture of the vertebral artery, could
have been caused by minimal force or a single blow.

Furthermore,

Dr. Kessler's opinion that Junta used substantial force was based

decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In Kyles v. Whitley, the
Supreme Court held that the prosecution's Brady obligation extends
even to "evidence known only to police investigators and not to the
prosecutor." 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995). The Court noted that "the
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police."
Id. at 437.
Junta relies, in part, on
Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1292 (Mass. 1998), for
the proposition that a medical examiner is a government "agent,"
but this case obviously does not present "clearly established
Federal law." The government, on the other hand, argues that, in
addition to there not being guidance from the Court as to who may
be considered to be "acting on the government's behalf," courts are
divided as to whether evidence in the possession of a medical
examiner may be attributed to the prosecution for Brady purposes.
Compare People v. Stern, 704 N.Y.S.2d 569, 579 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (holding that documents in the possession of a medical
examiner cannot be attributed to the prosecution because the Office
of Medical Examiners is "not a law enforcement agency"), with
Woodward, 694 N.E.2d at 1292 (holding that a medical examiner was
"a Commonwealth agent" for purposes of a failure to preserve
evidence claim).
Because we assume, arguendo, that a medical
examiner falls within the Brady purview and address the merits of
Junta's Brady claim, we need not resolve this issue.
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on all the injuries Costin incurred, not merely on the vertebral
artery

rupture.

Likewise,

Dr.

Kessler's

opinion

that

Junta

inflicted multiple blows was not based on the rupture of the
vertebral artery, but on the fact that Dr. Kessler found fifteen
areas of trauma throughout Costin's body.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court reasonably concluded that
the materials would not have undermined Dr. Kessler's opinion that
Junta had used substantial force and inflicted multiple blows. But
more importantly, as the Massachusetts Appeals Court noted, Junta
"overstates the factual importance of the experts' testimony in
this case."

Junta, 815 N.E.2d at 259.

Junta, outweighing Costin

by more than one hundred pounds, straddled Costin and "punched
[him] anywhere from three up to ten or more times," even after two
witnesses had screamed at Junta to stop because he was "going to
kill [Costin]" and the latter remained motionless.
260.

Id. at 257,

Given these circumstances, putting aside Dr. Kessler's

testimony, there was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude
that Junta knew or should have known that the battery he was
committing endangered Costin's life.
this conclusion into question.

The materials do not call

Thus, it was not unreasonable for

the Massachusetts Appeals Court to conclude that these materials
did not provide effective impeachment or exculpatory evidence.6

6

Given that the materials are not favorable to Junta, we need not
decide whether the prosecution "effectively" disclosed the abstract
by providing a copy of the C.V. at trial.
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In sum, we cannot say that the Massachusetts Appeals
Court's treatment of the Brady issue was unreasonable.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
denial of habeas relief.
Affirmed.

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