Ramos-Echevarria, et al v. Pichis, Inc.

Filing

OPINION issued by Rogeriee Thompson, Appellate Judge; Bruce M. Selya, Appellate Judge and Timothy Belcher Dyk, Appellate Judge, Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. Published. [10-1522]

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-1522
PEDRO L. RAMOS-ECHEVARRÍA, GLADYS RODRIGUEZ-GALARZA,
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RAMOS-RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PICHIS, INC. d/b/a PICHIS HOTEL AND CONVENTION CENTER,
JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Selya and Dyk*
Circuit Judges.

Juan R. Rodríguez, with whom Rodriguez Lopez Law Offices,
P.S.C. was on brief, for appellants.
Manuel Núñez-Aragunde, with whom Martha L. Martínez Rodríguez
and Manuel A. Núñez Law Offices were on brief, for appellee.

October 21, 2011

*

Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

THOMPSON,

Page: 2

Circuit

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Judge.

Appellant

Entry ID: 5589962

Pedro

Ramos-

Echevarría claims that his employer, Pichis Inc. d/b/a Pichis Hotel
and Convention Center (Pichis), discriminated against him because
of his medical condition - epilepsy - in violation of federal and
state statutes including the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

The district judge entered summary

judgment in favor of Pichis, and Ramos-Echevarría appealed.
Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
As is required when reviewing an order granting summary
judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See, e.g., Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Lavigne, 617 F.3d
82, 84 (1st Cir. 2010).
Ramos-Echevarría

suffers

medication to control his condition.

from

epilepsy.

He

takes

On average, he experiences

between nine and sixteen focal seizures - which he refers to as
“episodes” - each week.

During a typical episode, he sees an

“aura” before his body begins convulsing for about eight to fifteen
seconds; he does not lose consciousness.

His cognitive abilities

are also impaired during the episode, and sometimes for a short
time afterwards.
Ramos-Echevarría has worked for Pichis as a part-time
kitchen

assistant

preparation.

since

1999,

assisting

the

chef

with

food

Since 2002, he has held a similar second job at

-2-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

another restaurant,

Page: 3

Palacio

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Chino.

Entry ID: 5589962

Ramos-Echevarría

informed

Pichis about his illness at the time he was hired by referencing it
on his job application.1

For the most part, his illness has not

affected his job performance.
Between three and six times each year, his episodes are
so

severe

that

he

has to

leave

work.

But

usually

when

he

experiences an episode at work, he simply stops moving until the
convulsions are over.

He either stabilizes himself or is able to

notify his co-workers and they make sure he does not fall.

Ramos-

Echevarría has never experienced an episode while working on a hot
surface.
drops

the

If he is working with a knife when he sees the aura, he
knife

until

the

convulsions

are

over.

Once

the

convulsions stop, he returns to work as soon as he is able.
Within the first week of his employment at Pichis, RamosEchevarría experienced an episode.

As Ramos-Echevarría tells it,

shortly thereafter Luis Emmanuelli, Sr. (Emmanuelli), who owns
Pichis, called Ramos-Echevarría into his office at 8:30 one morning
and told him that although he was an excellent worker, he could not
continue working there “because of [his] condition.”

Emmanuelli

told Ramos-Echevarría that he had to leave the premises.

Ramos-

Echevarría verbally requested a reasonable accommodation, but he

1

Despite Ramos-Echevarría’s disclosure claim, the copy of
the job application in the record does not include any reference to
his medical condition.
-3-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 4

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

did not present medical documents in making the request.2
by

his

decision

to

terminate

Ramos-Echevarría,

Sticking

Emmanuelli

responded, “no, there’s no reasonable accommodation for you, or for
anybody else.”
Ramos-Echevarría walked to the gate outside and then
returned to Pichis and asked for a letter stating the reason for
his dismissal.

Emmanuelli’s assistant told him to come back at

11 a.m.
When Ramos-Echevarría returned later that day, he spoke
with Luisito Emmanuelli (Luisito), Emmanuelli’s son.

Luisito told

Ramos-Echevarría that Pichis had “reconsidered taking you back,
because you’re an excellent worker,” and that he could continue
working for Pichis if he got a statement from his doctor confirming
that his medical condition did not prevent him from performing his
job duties.

Ramos-Echevarría got a medical certificate from his

doctor stating that his condition “does not prevent his working; he
should not drive a car, climb up to high places without protection,
[use] instruments that may be harmful to his health” and provided
it

to

Pichis.

Pichis

re-hired

Ramos-Echevarría,

and

he

has

continued to work there as a part-time kitchen assistant ever since
producing the medical certificate.

2

Throughout his employment,

Ramos-Echevarría later testified that the accommodation
he sought was to be moved to a housekeeping or maintenance
position, although it is unclear whether he communicated that to
Emmanuelli.
-4-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 5

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

Ramos-Echevarría has continued to suffer from seizures. Pichis has
never denied him medical assistance.
Ramos-Echevarría claims that he verbally requested fulltime employment from Pichis but did not get it.

He also asserts

that Luisito told him that he would never be authorized to work
full-time because of his epilepsy.

He further contends that while

he has been working for Pichis, other people - who were hired after
him -

were

positions.

given
Pichis

additional
counters

hours or increased
that

it did

not

to

full-time

increase

Ramos-

Echevarría’s hours because business was slow.
How We Got to This Point
Ramos-Echevarría

filed

a

complaint

with

the

Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that Pichis
discriminated against him because of his medical condition.

On

August 23, 2006, the EEOC issued Ramos-Echevarría a Notice of Right
to Sue under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.
In 2006, Ramos-Echevarría sued Pichis3 in the District of
Puerto Rico, alleging violations of Puerto Rico law and federal law

3

Ramos-Echevarría also sued “John Doe” and “Richard Roe,”
whom he identified as “those persons who are in any way responsible
for the events that gave rise to this claim,” and “insurance
companies of all the defendants.” Ramos-Echevarría did not serve
the complaint on any other defendant or move to substitute actual
defendants for the fictional parties, so the case proceeded with
Pichis as the sole defendant.
-5-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 6

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

including the ADA,4 Title VII,5 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6

Ramos-

Echevarría’s primary contention was that during his tenure, he was
not promoted or offered a full-time position, while other employees
hired after him were promoted to full-time.

He also complained of

several more minor actions that he argues were discriminatory that he never received a performance evaluation; that he worked
through meal breaks for which he was not paid; that he was excluded
from an employee meeting; that he once received a written warning
for beginning his shift half-an-hour early; and that Pichis created
a hostile work environment.
Pichis moved for summary judgment.

A magistrate judge

issued a report and recommendation proposing that the district
court (1) grant summary judgment in favor of Pichis on RamosEchevarría’s claims under the ADA; (2) dismiss Ramos-Echevarría’s
Title VII and section 1983 claims for failure to state claims
because

those

statutes

do

not

encompass

claims

based

on

4

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
qualified individuals on the basis of disability in regard to the
terms, conditions and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(a) (1990).
5

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
individuals “because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
6

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against those
who, acting under color of state law, violate federal law.
42
U.S.C. § 1983; see also Rodríguez-Cirilo v. García, 115 F.3d 50, 52
(1st Cir. 1997).
-6-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 7

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

disability;7 and (3) dismiss without prejudice his claims arising
under Puerto Rico law.

Over Ramos-Echevarría’s objections, the

district court adopted the report and recommendation in toto. This
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Disability Claim
We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo.

Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 617 F.3d at 84.

We affirm if

the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id.

A party

alleging discrimination may not rest on allegations made in the
pleadings, but instead must point to specific evidence supporting
his claim.

See Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 18

(1st Cir. 1998).
The ADA was enacted for “the elimination or reduction of
physical

and

social

present,

past,

or

structures
perceived

that

impede

impairments

people
from

with

some

contributing,

according to their talents, to our Nation’s social, economic and
civil life . . . .”
(Ginsburg,

J.,

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004)

concurring).

It

prohibits

an

employer

from

discriminating against a qualified person with a disability in
regard to “job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
7

Ramos-Echevarría does not pursue these claims on appeal.
-7-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 8

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” because of
his

or

her

disability

or

perceived

a

disability

disability.

42

U.S.C.

§ 12112(a) (1990).
To

prevail

on

discrimination

claim,

a

plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he (1)
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) is qualified to
perform the

essential

functions of

the

job, with

or

without

reasonable accommodations; and (3) was subject to an adverse
employment action based in whole or part on his disability.

See

Soto-Ocasio, 150 F.3d at 18; Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96
F.3d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 1996).

He may prove his case by presenting

direct evidence of discrimination or he may prove it indirectly “by
using the

prima

facie

case

and

burden

shifting

methods

that

originated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 . . .
(1973).”

Jacques, 96 F.3d at 511 (quoting Katz v. City Metal Co.,

87 F.3d 26, 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The McDonnell Douglas analysis requires the plaintiff to
offer

evidence

sufficient

to

establish

that

he

“(i)

has

a

disability within the meaning of the [ADA]; (ii) is qualified to
perform the
reasonable

essential

functions of

accommodations;

(iii)

the

was

job, with

subject

to

or

without

an

adverse

employment action by a company subject to the [ADA]; (iv) was
replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably

-8-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 9

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

than non-disabled employees; and (v) suffered damages as a result.”
Id.

If he establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its action.

Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91,

99 (1st Cir. 2007); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
802.

If the employer offers a non-discriminatory reason, the

burden

then

shifts

back

to

the

plaintiff

to

show

that

the

employer’s justification is mere pretext cloaking discriminatory
animus.

Freadman, 484 F.3d at 99.

Our review of the record

indicates that Ramos-Echevarría’s case stumbles at the very first
step – making out a prima facie case showing that he has a
disability as that term is used in the ADA.
Under the ADA, a disability is a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual’s
major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990). Disability
may also be established by having a record of such an impairment or
being

regarded

as

having

such

an

impairment.

42

U.S.C.

§§ 12102(2)(B), (C) (1990); see also Santiago Clemente v. Exec.
Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2000).

Ramos-Echevarría

contends that he actually has an impairment and that he also has a
record of such an impairment.

He does not argue that Pichis

regarded him as having such an impairment.
We apply a three-part analysis to determine whether an
impairment qualifies as a disability under the ADA. See Bragdon v.

-9-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 10

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998); Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d
231, 238 (1st Cir. 2002). First, the plaintiff must establish that
he suffers from a physical or mental impairment.8
F.3d at 238.

Carroll, 294

Second, he must demonstrate that it affects life

activities that are “major,” i.e., “of central importance to daily
life.”

Id.

Major life activities are basic activities of daily

life that an average person in the general population can perform
with little or no difficulty – “functions such as caring for
oneself,

performing

manual

tasks,

walking,

seeing,

hearing,

speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)
(1991).

Finally, he must show that the impairment “substantially

limits” the identified major life activity.

Carroll, 294 F.3d at

238 (citing Lebrón-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251 F.3d 236, 239-40
(1st Cir. 2001)).
In assessing whether someone is disabled under the ADA,
we

must

consider

individual.

the

impairment’s

Katz, 87 F.3d at 32.

effect

on

the

particular

The limitation caused by the

impairment must be permanent or long-term. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); see also 29 C.F.R.

8

The EEOC defines an impairment as “[a]ny physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or any mental or
physiological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1991).
-10-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 11

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

§§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii), (iii) (1991). Evidence of a medical diagnosis
of

impairment,

disability.

standing

alone,

is

insufficient

to

prove

a

See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 198.

What is required is evidence showing that the impairment limits
this particular plaintiff to a substantial extent.

See Carroll,

294 F.3d at 238 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at
691-92) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Step 1: Whether There is an Impairment
The parties concede that Ramos-Echevarría suffers from an
impairment - epilepsy - so we proceed to examine the second and
third factors in the disability analysis.
Step 2: Whether The Impairment Affects a Major Life Activity
Establishing

disability

under

the

ADA

is

an

individualized inquiry. See Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238. To prevail,
a plaintiff must show that his impairment affects a major life
activity.

Id.

Courts have required the plaintiff to specify the

major life activity in which he claims to be substantially limited.
See, e.g., Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th
Cir. 2007); Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. P’ship, 209 F.3d
678, 683 (7th Cir. 2000).
Ramos-Echevarría argues that his impairment – epilepsy –
affects a major life activity – his ability to work.

He contends

that he cannot perform this major life activity or that he is
substantially limited in performing it, as compared to the average

-11-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 12

person in the general population.
major life activity.

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

Working can be considered a

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1991).

Yet, other

than showing that he has to stop working temporarily when he has an
episode, Ramos-Echevarría has introduced no evidence showing any
particular way in which his illness affects his ability to work.
Although his medical certificate indicates that he cannot perform
certain activities (driving, climbing without protection, and using
certain instruments), he is not required to engage in any of those
tasks in the course of his work as a kitchen assistant.
Ramos-Echevarría also failed to introduce evidence that
his impairment
workplace.
routine.

affects

a

major

life

activity

outside

of

the

He testified that he engages in a typical daily
For example, he discussed playing at the park with

children, completing regular household chores, and even remodeling
his house (with the exception that he was unable to climb up to put
a parapet on the house).

Similarly, Ramos-Echevarría’s medical

certificate does not show that his epilepsy affects any major life
activities.

Other jurisdictions have held that on their own,

driving a car and climbing heights are not major life activities.
See, e.g., Kellogg v. Energy Safety Servs. Inc., 544 F.3d 1121,
1126 (10th Cir. 2008) (driving is not a major life activity under
the ADA); Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 758
n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Climbing is not such a basic, necessary

-12-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 13

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

function . . . [as] to qualify as a major life activity under the
ADA.”).
With this in mind, we proceed to the third step in the
disability

analysis

-

whether

Ramos-Echevarría’s

epilepsy

substantially limits his ability to work.
Step 3: Whether the Impairment “Substantially Limits”
the Identified Major Life Activity
To satisfy the third element in a disability analysis
under the ADA, a plaintiff must “prove a disability by offering
evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of [his] own
experience

.

.

.

is

substantial.”

Albertson’s,

Inc.

v.

Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999).
The EEOC defines “substantially limits” as “[u]nable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform”; or “[s]ignificantly restricted as
to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a

particular

major

life

activity

as

compared

to

the

condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life activity.”9
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (1991).

29

As applied to working, the EEOC

9

Although Congress amended the ADA in 2008 to include a
more liberal standard for “disability,” ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553-55 (2008), those
amendments became effective on January 1, 2009 and do not apply
retroactively. Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., 587 F.3d 27, 34
n.3 (1st Cir. 2009).
The events in this case occurred before
January 1, 2009, so we apply the more restrictive standard in
effect at that time.
-13-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 14

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

defines “substantially limits” as “significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in

various

classes

as

compared

to

the average

comparable training, skills, and abilities.

person having

The inability to

perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation . . . .”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1991); Toyota

Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 200 (citing Sutton v. United
Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999)).
In evaluating a plaintiff’s claim, we must consider
available corrective or mitigative measures. “To be sure, a person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating
measures

still

has

an

impairment,

but

if

the

impairment

is

corrected it does not ‘substantially limit’ a major life activity.”
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.

Accordingly, we must assess whether

Ramos-Echevarría is substantially limited under the ADA while he is
taking medication to control his epilepsy.
Ramos-Echevarría

himself

provides

perhaps

the

key

evidence showing that his epilepsy does not substantially limit his
ability to work.

Although he testified in his deposition that a

couple of times each year he experiences such severe seizures that
he has to leave work, when asked, he testified that his medical
condition does not significantly affect his work:

“No, it doesn’t

limit me, but rather . . . I stop for a moment and go back to the
activity I was . . . engaged in, again.”

-14-

He further testified that

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 15

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

he has never applied for Social Security benefits “[b]ecause I feel
capable to work.

If the time ever comes when I feel disabled, and

truly am unable to work, then I’ll apply.”
In

addition

to

Ramos-Echevarría’s

testimony,

other

evidence shows that he is not substantially limited in his ability
to work.

The medical certificate that Ramos-Echevarría gave to

Pichis states that his epilepsy does not impede him from working.
Even

though

it

also

says

that

he

should

not

use

certain

instruments, Ramos-Echevarría admits that he routinely works with
knives and ovens in the workplace and has not experienced any
problems.

Moreover, Emmanuelli and Luisito told Ramos-Echevarría

that he was an “excellent worker.” Furthermore, since 2002, he has
held a second job at another restaurant, Palacio Chino.
Ramos-Echevarría, nevertheless, attempts to show that his
epilepsy substantially limits him from working in a substantial
class or broad range of jobs.

He cites statistics showing that a

diagnosis of epilepsy is relatively rare and that the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services characterizes epilepsy as a “chronic
disease.”

He notes that he requires medication, that he sometimes

requires medical treatment and hospitalization for his seizures,
and that he cannot drive, climb ladders, or handle certain tools.
From

this,

he

contends

that

he

is

substantially

limited

in

performing a broad class of jobs compared to the average person in

-15-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

the general population.

Page: 16

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

See Carroll, 294 F.3d at 239 (considering

whether plaintiff can show he is significantly restricted in his
ability to perform “a class of jobs” or a “broad range of jobs in
various classes”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Ramos-Echevarría’s epilepsy clearly affects his
life, the evidence in the record falls short of showing that it
substantially limits him from working in any broad class of jobs or
any broad range of jobs in various classes.

See id. at 240.

The

record contains no expert vocational testimony or labor market
statistics

supporting

Ramos-Echevarría’s

contention

that

his

epilepsy substantially limits him from performing jobs other than
his own.

See id.

“[A] conclusory allegation without evidentiary

support” is insufficient to carry Ramos-Echevarría’s burden of
establishing a prima facie case.

See id.

The evidence in the record, including Ramos-Echevarría’s
own statements, plainly reveals that he is not substantially
limited - as that term is defined in the ADA - in his ability to
work or in other major daily life activities.
Record of Impairment
Relying upon an alternative point of entry in the ADA,
Ramos-Echevarría claims that he has a record of a substantially
limiting impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1990).

The EEOC

defines an individual with a record of such an impairment as
someone who has “a history of, or has been misclassified as having,

-16-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 17

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1991).

The

“record” provision in the ADA protects “those who have recovered or
are

recovering

from

substantially

limiting

discrimination based on their medical history.”

impairments

from

Román-Oliveras v.

P.R. Elec. Power Auth., No. 09-1503, 2011 WL 3621548, at *4 (1st
Cir. Aug. 18, 2011) (citing Bailey v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d
1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Ramos-Echevarría points to his medical records showing
that he has received medical treatment for his seizures in support
of his argument that he has a “record of impairment.”

However,

these records (many pages of which are illegible or written only in
Spanish, and all of which appear to be irrelevant, given that
Ramos-Echevarría’s diagnosis and medications are not disputed) do
not suggest that his epilepsy has ever substantially limited him in
working or in performing any other major life activities.

Thus,

although Ramos-Echevarría has a record of having epilepsy, he does
not have a record of an impairment that substantially limits his
ability to perform a major life activity.

Therefore, he is not

entitled to relief under the “record of impairment” prong of the
ADA.

See Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1132

(10th Cir. 2003) (employee who had been completely unable to work
for a short time did not qualify for relief based on a “record of
impairment”); Rakity v. Dillon Cos., 302 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.

-17-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 18

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

2002) (supermarket employee with substantial limitations in his
ability to perform manual tasks including lifting and reaching did
not qualify for relief based on a “record of impairment”).
Because Ramos-Echevarría failed to establish that he
falls within the ADA’s provisions, we need not address whether
Pichis discriminated against him because of an impairment or record
of impairment.
alternative

Similarly, we do not need to consider Pichis’

argument

that

Ramos-Echevarría’s

claims

are

time-

barred.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
In

addition

to

his

federal

claims,

asserts state-law claims against Pichis.

Ramos-Echevarría

After concluding that

there was no triable federal cause of action, the district court
chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed
without prejudice the claims based on Puerto Rico law.
We review a district court’s unwillingness to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.
Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir. 1991).

Newman v.

The district court has

considerable authority whether to exercise this power, considering
factors

such

as

judicial

litigants, and comity.

economy,

convenience,

fairness

to

Id.

When a plaintiff’s anchor claim is a federal cause of
action and the court unfavorably disposes of the plaintiff’s

-18-

Case: 10-1522

Document: 00116280005

Page: 19

Date Filed: 10/21/2011

Entry ID: 5589962

federal claim at the early stages of a suit, well before trial, the
court generally dismisses any supplemental state-law claims without
prejudice.

Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177

(1st Cir. 1995); see also Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990 (1st
Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal without prejudice of pendent claims
when the district court determined “far in advance of trial that no
legitimate federal question existed”).
district

court

order

granting

We affirm the basis of the

summary

judgment

on

Ramos-

Echevarría’s federal claim and conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ramos-Echevarría’s state-law
claims without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Based on a record that reveals no material factual
dispute as to whether Ramos-Echevarría is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Pichis on his ADA claim.

After disposing of

this claim, the district court acted within its discretion in
dismissing without prejudice his state-law claims. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court judgment.

-19-