Young v. Wall

Filing

OPINION issued by Michael Boudin, Appellate Judge; David H. Souter, Associate Supreme Court Justice and Bruce M. Selya, Appellate Judge. Published. [10-1862]

Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

Entry ID: 5542506

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-1862
EDWARD EUGENE YOUNG, SR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ASHBEL T. WALL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE
RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Andrew B. Prescott, with whom Gauri A. Patil and Nixon Peabody
LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Thomas A. Palombo, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.

April 14, 2011

*

Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.

Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 2

SELYA,

Circuit

Judge.

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

This

appeal

Entry ID: 5542506

requires

us

to

determine whether a prison's unilateral suspension of its internal
policy

of

paying

interest

on

inmate

accounts

constitutional rights of an affected inmate.
thought not.

violated

the

The district court

Weighing in on an issue that has split the circuits,

we conclude that prison inmates lack a constitutionally protected
property

right

in

interest

not

yet

paid.

Accordingly,

the

defendant was at liberty to abrogate the policy prospectively.
The material facts are not in dispute. By statute, Rhode
Island authorizes inmates to pursue gainful, in-prison employment
while incarcerated.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-22.

Their wages are

deposited into inmate accounts maintained by the Rhode Island
Department of Corrections (RIDOC).
RIDOC places twenty-five percent of an inmate's earnings
(up to a maximum of $1,000) into what is known as an "encumbered
account."

This sum is retained until the inmate's release, at

which time it is tendered to him.

Id. § 42-56-22(a).

The balance

of the inmate's earnings is deposited in what is known as an
"available account."

That account may be supplemented through

other sources (e.g., gifts from family and friends). An inmate has
the option of transferring any unencumbered funds to a commercial
bank account.
Despite the nomenclature, there are limits on what an
inmate may do with the money in his available account.

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In

Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 3

accordance

with

Policy

No.

2.17

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

(the

Policy),

Entry ID: 5542506

some

uses

are

permitted (e.g., purchasing items at the prison commissary) and
others are prohibited (e.g., purchasing proscribed merchandise).
Inmates also are prohibited from making cash withdrawals.
There is a set procedure for transferring funds from
inmate accounts for approved expenditures.1
statements

detailing

their

transactions

Inmates get monthly
and

confirming

their

account balances.
In bygone days, the funds in the individual inmate
accounts were pooled and invested.

Any return on this investment

was then allocated to individual inmate accounts based on average
daily balances.

The Policy memorialized the practice of crediting

interest, stipulating that interest on funds in inmate accounts
would "accrue[] to the depositing inmates in an equitable fashion."
It is the putative right to the continued accrual of interest that
is at the epicenter of this appeal.
In 2001, RIDOC decided to outsource management of a wide
swath of back-room systems.

Comments from prospective vendors

prompted RIDOC to reevaluate the feasibility of paying interest on
inmate accounts. As a result, the pooling arrangement was scrapped
and, on June 1, 2002, RIDOC stopped paying interest.

A few weeks

later, RIDOC posted notices advising of this change in practice

1

The details of this procedure are not relevant to the issues
on appeal.
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Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 4

throughout the prison.

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

Entry ID: 5542506

A similar notice appeared in the prison

newsletter.
During August, RIDOC formally suspended those provisions
of the Policy that addressed interest on inmate accounts.

Withal,

it was not until May 6, 2003, that RIDOC promulgated a new policy,
which stated explicitly that no interest would accrue on funds held
in inmate accounts.
This

about-face

troubled

plaintiff-appellant

Edward

Eugene Young, Sr., who was incarcerated at the prison both before
and after the policy changed.

While serving his sentence, he had

performed various jobs for which he was paid; RIDOC had deposited
his earnings in inmate accounts; and RIDOC had paid him interest
until June 1, 2002 (when it stopped paying interest on inmate
accounts).

The plaintiff learned about this reversal of position

on or about June 20, 2002.
Nearly a year later, the plaintiff sued RIDOC's director,
individually and in his official capacity.

It would serve no

useful goal to track the tortuous travel of the case — including
the morphing of the original action into a second action — as it
wended its way through the district court.

Suffice it to say that,

after several years of legal wrangling, the case narrowed for all
practical purposes to two federal claims: (i) that the denial of
interest constituted an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's
property and (ii) that RIDOC's failure to afford the plaintiff

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Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 5

notice

and

an

opportunity

to

be

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

heard

before

Entry ID: 5542506

abandoning

the

practice of accruing interest violated his right to procedural due
process.2

In a series of rulings, the district court dismissed the

taking claim, see, e.g., Young v. Wall, 359 F. Supp. 2d 84, 94
(D.R.I. 2005), and granted summary judgment for the defendant on
the due process claims, see Young v. Wall, No. 07-34, 2010 WL
2553572, at *3 (D.R.I. June 18, 2010).

This timely appeal ensued.

In this court, as in the district court, the plaintiff
claims that RIDOC's decision to stop paying interest on inmate
accounts amounted to both an unconstitutional taking and a due
process violation.

That the district court disposed of the former

claim on a motion to dismiss, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the
latter claim on summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, is of no
particular moment; after all, the material facts are uncontroverted
and the appeal turns on questions of law.
Our review is de novo. See Ungar v. Palestine Lib. Org.,
599 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2010); ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522
F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008).

In this undertaking, we are not

wedded to the district court's reasoning but may affirm its rulings
on any ground made manifest by the record.

See InterGen N.V. v.

Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003); Houlton Citizens' Coal.
v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1999).

2

Along the way, the plaintiff raised a gallimaufry of statelaw claims, none of which is implicated in this appeal.
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Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 6

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

Entry ID: 5542506

Our inquiry is simplified because both of the plaintiff's
claims hinge on the existence vel non of a property right in the
accrual of interest on inmate accounts.
plaintiff lacks such a right.

As we explain below, the

Consequently, his claims fail.

It is axiomatic that "the Constitution protects rather
than creates property interests."
524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).

Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,

This means that a court charged with

determining the existence of a constitutionally protected property
interest must look to "existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."

Bd. of Regents of

State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

Some such source

must give rise to a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the
property in question.

Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano

de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S.
at 577). A unilateral expectation, by itself, is not sufficient to
create a constitutionally protected property interest.

Webb's

Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980);
URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir. 2011).
In this instance, the plaintiff posits that state law
creates the requisite claim of entitlement three times over.

In

the pages that follow, we explore the three avenues to which he
alludes: common law, statutory law, and policy and practice.
proves to be a dead end.

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Each

Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 7

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

Entry ID: 5542506

Before embarking on this odyssey, we pause to explain
that this case is not about either principal or interest previously
credited

to

inmate

contradiction

that

accounts.
an

inmate

It
has

balances held in his accounts.

a

is

clear

property

beyond

hope

of

interest

in

the

See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d

166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).

This case is about

interest not yet credited to an inmate's account.
The plaintiff's reliance on state common law as a source
of his supposed property right is mislaid.

He notes that he had a

property right in the principal balances in his inmate accounts and
adds

that,

at

common

law,

interest

follows

principal.

See

Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at
162.

In his view, the combination of these two facts signifies

that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to interest on an
ongoing basis.

We do not agree.

The most jagged rent in the fabric of the plaintiff's
argument is his failure to recognize the highly idiosyncratic
context that prison presents.
all

of

their

Although criminals do not forfeit

constitutional

rights

upon

conviction

and

incarceration, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974),
they traditionally enjoy a more modest constellation of rights than
other persons.

See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91, 93

(1987); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984); French v.
Butterworth, 614 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1980). This distinction has

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Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 8

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

particular force when it comes to property rights.
Ala.

Dep't

of

Corr.,

381

F.3d

1064,

1068

Entry ID: 5542506

See Givens v.

(11th

Cir.

2004)

(explaining that "[a]lthough non-inmates enjoyed an assortment of
property rights at common law, inmates did not"); see also CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974);
United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 239 F.3d 78, 90 n.16 (1st Cir.
2001).
At common law, prison inmates possessed no right to
profit from their labors; they could be compelled to work without
any recompense.

See Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 184-85

(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a policy of non-payment "would not
violate any traditional principle of property law").
common law echoes this theme.

Rhode Island

See Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425,

432 (R.I. 1916); see also R.I. Council 94 v. State, 714 A.2d 584,
592 (R.I. 1998) (acknowledging that "[e]mployment of prisoners at
hard

labor

existed

Constitution").

before

the

adoption

of

the

Rhode

Island

The reported decisions of the Rhode Island courts

do not offer the slightest indication that the common law creates
a property right enabling inmates to demand interest on RIDOC-held
accounts.

We conclude, therefore, that the common law does not

spawn the property right that the plaintiff envisions.
To be sure, this conclusion is at odds with the holding
in Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir.
1998).

But two other courts of appeals have rejected the Ninth

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Date Filed: 04/14/2011

Entry ID: 5542506

Circuit's reasoning, see Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068-69; Washlefske,
234 F.3d at 186, and we share their view.

The Schneider court

mechanically applied the mantra that interest follows principal
without giving due weight to the truncation of prisoners' property
rights that is characteristic of the common law.

We think that

this limitation easily tips the balance.
State statutory law proves no more accommodating to the
plaintiff's cause.

The pertinent provision allows an inmate to

receive a modest wage for his labors.

See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-

22(a) (stating that inmates "may be permitted to labor in the
discretion of the director . . . and in that case may be paid not
more than three dollars [per] day").

To that extent, the statute

creates a limited property right in inmate wages, once paid, that
did not exist at common law.3

The statute is silent, however, on

the subject of interest.

This silence undermines the plaintiff's

claim

creates

that

the

statute

interest on inmate accounts.

a

parallel

property

right

in

See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070;

Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
In an effort to resist this conclusion, the plaintiff
notes that the language of the Rhode Island statute differs from
the

language

of

the

state

Washlefske, respectively.

statutes

considered

in

Givens

and

This is true as far as it goes, but it

3

We say "limited" because there are formidable restrictions
on an inmate's ability to use his money. See Givens, 381 F.3d at
1069; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
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Entry ID: 5542506

does not take the plaintiff very far.
Specifically, the plaintiff points to language in section
42-56-22 making clear that encumbered funds are the prisoner's
property and are "to be turned over to the prisoner" upon his
release.

But this language refers only to principal balances, not

to any as-yet-uncredited interest.

The difference in wording,

then, is of no assistance to the plaintiff.
The last avenue that the plaintiff pursues in search of
a property right features a claim that the Policy and RIDOC's
practice under it resulted in a shared understanding that interest
would accrue on inmate accounts.
The basic premise on which this line of argument rests —
that

a

state's

policies

and

practices

can

underpin

constitutionally protected property interest — is correct.

a

See,

e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005); Wolff, 418
U.S. at 556-58; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069; cf. Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (concluding that a plaintiff "must be
given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim of such
entitlement

in

institution")

light

of

(quotation

the

policies

omitted).

But

and

practices

careful

of

the

perscrutation

discloses that this premise is inapposite here.
To begin, the Policy reflected an act of administrative
generosity, authorizing RIDOC to pay interest for so long as the
Policy was in effect.

It did not, however, obligate RIDOC to

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Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 11

follow that course indefinitely.

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

Entry ID: 5542506

A policy, once implemented, need

not be continued in perpetuity but, rather, in the absence of
special circumstances (say, detrimental reliance), may be modified
or abandoned prospectively.

See, e.g., Bova v. City of Medford,

564 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the city may
alter or abandon retirement policy); Biggers v. Wittek Indus.,
Inc., 4 F.3d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer was
under no obligation to continue severance benefits policy).

This

principle applies with full force in the prison context.

See

Murphy v. Shaw, 49 F. App'x 711, 714 (9th Cir. 2002); Clark v.
Perego, 39 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1994) (table).

It follows that RIDOC

was under no continuing obligation to pay interest on inmate
accounts.
The short of it is that RIDOC met its obligations under
the Policy for as long as the Policy remained in effect.

It

accrued interest on inmate accounts until it abandoned the Policy
and changed its preexisting practice.

The plaintiff received that

interest.
When RIDOC halted this practice, it did so prospectively
and uniformly.

Hence, the plaintiff was treated the same as every

other similarly situated inmate.

He was not singled out and

excluded from the operation of a general policy or practice that
continued in force.

This distinguishes the case at bar from those

cases in which a continuing policy or practice has been deemed

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Case: 10-1862 Document: 00116196572 Page: 12

sufficient

to

interest.

create

See,

e.g.,

a

Date Filed: 04/14/2011

constitutionally

Perry,

408

U.S.

at

Entry ID: 5542506

protected
602-03;

property
Concepcíon

Chaparro v. Ruíz-Hernández, 607 F.3d 261, 265 (1st Cir. 2010); cf.
Dasey v. Anderson, 304 F.3d 148, 161 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding no
property interest where employer's custom and practice did not
provide

employee

with

"reasonable

expectation

of

continued

employment"); Rosario-Torres v. Hernández-Colón, 889 F.2d 314, 31920 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc) (similar).
That ends this aspect of the matter.

We hold that

RIDOC's forward-looking change in policy and practice did not
deprive the plaintiff of any constitutionally protected property
right.
As

a

fallback,

the

plaintiff

suggests

that

he

was

entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before RIDOC
could effectuate the change in its policy and practice. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985);
Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7.

This suggestion puts the cart before

the horse.
With exceptions not relevant here, the Due Process Clause
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard when a state seeks
to deprive a person of a property interest.

Loudermill, 470 U.S.

at 542; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).

But where, as

here, there is no property interest, that procedural prophylaxis is
not required.

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Entry ID: 5542506

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we affirm the entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.

Affirmed.

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