US v. Caparotta
Filing
OPINION issued by Sandra L. Lynch, Chief Appellate Judge; David H. Souter, Associate Supreme Court Justice and Norman H. Stahl, Appellate Judge. Published. [11-1713]
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 1
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1713
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
BRANDON CAPAROTTA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Tina Schneider, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Thomas E.
Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
April 5, 2012
*
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 2
STAHL, Circuit Judge.
firearms
and
possessing
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
After pleading guilty to stealing
stolen
firearms,
defendant
Brandon
Caparotta received a sentence of fifty-four months' imprisonment.
That sentence was based, in part, on the district court's finding
that Caparotta qualified as a "prohibited person" who, because of
his
history
firearms.
of
substance
abuse,
was
barred
from
possessing
Caparotta raises two arguments on appeal, both stemming
from an interview with the Pretrial Services Office during which he
disclosed information about his drug use at the time of the
offense.
That information, he claims, was obtained upon a promise
of confidentiality, and it was therefore a violation of his due
process rights and of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 for it
to be included in his Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and
used against him at sentencing.
He also claims that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, when his trial attorney allowed him to disclose the
information. We find that Caparotta's due process claim is waived,
that he has not demonstrated a violation of Rule 32, and that his
Sixth Amendment claim fails.
We therefore affirm.
During the early morning hours of August 23, 2010,
Caparotta participated in a burglary of the Mill Creek Rod and Gun
store, a federally-licensed firearms dealer in Orrington, Maine.
Caparotta was arrested on August 26, 2010.
On August 27, 2010, the
Pretrial Services Office conducted an interview with Caparotta
-2-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 3
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
(which we will refer to as the "bail interview") to determine
whether he was eligible for release on bond.
Caparotta's attorney
was present at that interview, during which Caparotta discussed,
among other things, his history of substance abuse.
After the interview, the Pretrial Services Office issued
a Pretrial Services Report, dated August 31, 2010.
According to
the report, Caparotta admitted during the bail interview that he
had begun using marijuana at age nine (some ten years prior), used
it twice per week, and had last used it "two days ago."1
He also
admitted to heroin use beginning at age fourteen and ending three
years prior and to Vicodin use beginning at age sixteen and ending
four weeks prior.
The report also indicated that Caparotta had
received residential and outpatient treatment for substance abuse
in the past. The following "Notice of Confidentiality" appeared at
the top of the report: "Pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. 3153(c)(1),
' . . . Information obtained in the course of performing pretrial
services functions in relation to a particular accused shall be
used only for the purpose of a bail determination and shall
otherwise be confidential.'"
On November 10, 2010, Caparotta pled guilty to one count
of stealing firearms from the premises of a federally-licensed
1
We assume this means two days before the interview with the
Pretrial Services Office, which occurred on August 27, 2010. In
any event, Caparotta does not dispute that he admitted to drug use
within days of the August 23, 2010 offense.
-3-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 4
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), and one count of
possessing stolen firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).
Included in the prosecution's version of events, to which Caparotta
consented when he pled guilty, were descriptions of several text
messages he had sent to Robert Barker, who allegedly stored stolen
guns for Caparotta and purchased guns from him. The text messages,
obtained through a search of Barker's cell phone, revealed that
Caparotta had been soliciting drugs and referencing his own drug
use in the days immediately surrounding the crime.2
In
December
2010,
the
Probation
Office
conducted
a
presentence investigation interview (which we will refer to as the
"presentence
attorney
was
interview")
also
with Caparotta,
present.
Again,
at
which
Caparotta
Caparotta's
discussed
his
substance abuse history, but this time, on the advice of his
attorney, he declined to discuss any drug use specifically in
August 2010.
In its ensuing PSR, dated December 29, 2010, the
Probation Office noted that Caparotta had reported "a significant
history of substance abuse," including that he used marijuana "'all
day long' through August 2010." The PSR also discussed Caparotta's
past use of several other drugs, including morphine, heroin, powder
2
Specifically, three days before the burglary, on August 20,
2010, Caparotta sent Barker a text message asking Barker, "Can u
get crack?" Three days after the burglary, on August 26, 2010,
Caparotta sent Barker a message asking if Barker wanted to "burn a
bowl," to which Barker responded, "I can't[,] gotta take a piss
test after the weekend."
-4-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 5
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
cocaine, crack cocaine, opiate pain killers, and LSD.
Though
Caparotta's base offense level (BOL) would otherwise have been 12,
see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(7), the Probation Office recommended a BOL
of 14 because Caparotta "was a regular user of and addicted to
illegal drugs" at the time he committed the offense and thus
qualified as a "prohibited person," see id. § 2K2.1(a)(6).3
We pause for a moment to explain that term.
The federal
Sentencing Guidelines require a BOL of 14 if the defendant "was a
prohibited person at the time [he] committed the instant offense."
Id.
The Guidelines define "prohibited person" as any person
described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or (n).
Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.3.
Section 922(g)(3), applicable here, bars firearm possession by a
person "who is an unlawful user of . . . any controlled substance."
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
We have held that the term "unlawful user"
in section 922(g)(3) "requires a 'temporal nexus between the gun
possession and regular drug use.'"
United States v. Marceau, 554
F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Edwards, 540
F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Thus, "an 'unlawful user' is
one who engages in '[(1)] regular use [(2)] over a long period of
3
The Probation Office also recommended a six-point
enhancement for the number of firearms involved, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(C), a two-point enhancement because Caparotta
possessed
multiple
firearms
that
were
stolen,
see
id.
§ 2K2.1(b)(4), and a four-point enhancement for using at least one
stolen firearm while participating in the offense, see id.
§§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), 2K2.1 cmt. n.14.
Including a three-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, the
PSR thus recommended an overall offense level of 23.
-5-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 6
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
time [(3)] proximate to or contemporaneous with the possession of
the firearm.'" Id. (citing United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386,
392 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006)).
Caparotta objected to the PSR's finding that he was a
"prohibited person" on the grounds that he had not admitted, during
the presentence interview, that he had been using drugs at the time
of the offense in August 2010.
In an Addendum to the PSR, filed on
January 26, 2011, the Probation Office confirmed that, during his
presentence interview, Caparotta had declined to discuss "drug use
near the time of the possession of the firearms" but noted that he
had "indicated that he was a regular drug abuser through July 2010,
with the instant offense occurring on August 23, 2010."
The
Addendum also stated that, during his bail interview on August 27,
2010, Caparotta had "admitted that he had last smoked marijuana a
couple of days ago and was using the drug twice a week."
In a February 23, 2010 sentencing memorandum, Caparotta
expounded upon his objection to the use of his bail interview
statements that he had last used marijuana "two days ago" and was
using the drug twice a week in August 2010.4
4
He invoked 18 U.S.C.
The government argues that Caparotta must have admitted to
using marijuana in August 2010 during his presentence interview,
because the PSR said that he "indicated that he used [marijuana]
'all day long' through August 2010," and the "all day long"
characterization could not have come from his bail interview,
during which he only admitted to using the drug "twice a week" in
August 2010, with his last use "two days ago" (at least according
to the Pretrial Services Report). However, the Addendum to the
PSR: (1) acknowledged that Caparotta had declined, during his
-6-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 7
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
§ 3153(c)(1), which states that "[e]xcept as provided in [18 U.S.C.
§ 3153(c)(2)], information obtained in the course of performing
pretrial services functions in relation to a particular accused
shall be used only for the purposes of a bail determination and
shall otherwise be confidential."
Caparotta argued that there was
no applicable exception in section 3153(c)(2) and that section
3153(c)(3)
explicitly
bars
the
admission
of
information
made
confidential under section 3153(c)(1) "on the issue of guilt in a
criminal judicial proceeding."
18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(3).
At a sentencing hearing on June 6, 2011, the district
court found that Caparotta was an unlawful user of controlled
substances and thus a "prohibited person."
The court rejected
Caparotta's argument that section 3153(c) bars the use of bail
interview statements at sentencing, noting that "the language [of
that section] is restricted to guilt" and "[w]e're not deciding the
issue of guilt today."
As for whether, considering the bail
presentence interview, to discuss his drug use near the time of the
offense; (2) emphasized that he had admitted "that he was a regular
drug abuser through July 2010"; but (3) did not state that he had
admitted, during his presentence interview, to any drug use
whatsoever in August 2010. Presumably, if Caparotta had stated
during the presentence interview that he had used marijuana "all
day long" through August 2010, the Probation Office would have made
that clear in the Addendum. It thus seems likely that, during the
presentence interview, Caparotta admitted to using marijuana "all
day long" through July 2010, and the Probation Office mistakenly
wrote "August 2010" in the PSR. In any event, we will assume here
that Caparotta did not admit to any drug use in August 2010 during
his presentence interview and that the district court therefore
relied on his bail interview statements when it concluded that he
used marijuana through August 2010.
-7-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
interview
information,
Page: 8
Caparotta's
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
drug
use
was
Entry ID: 5631601
sufficiently
proximate to or contemporaneous with the offense to satisfy the
"unlawful user" standard, see Marceau, 554 F.3d at 30, the district
court
recognized
that
there
was
"no
direct
evidence
that
[Caparotta] actually used marijuana . . . as he was holding the gun
at the Mill Creek Rod and Gun shop" but nonetheless found that
Caparotta's use of marijuana through August 2010 made it clear that
he was an unlawful user.
The court thus used a BOL of 14 and applied the increases
and reduction that the Probation Office had recommended.5
With a
total offense level of 23 and a Criminal History Category of II,
Caparotta's recommended guideline sentencing range was fifty-one to
sixty-three months.
The court imposed a sentence of fifty-four
months on each count, to run concurrently.
Had the district court
not found Caparotta to be a "prohibited person," the government
concedes that his offense level would have been at least four
points lower.6
5
In this timely appeal, Caparotta challenges the
See supra note 3.
6
The district court would have started with a BOL of 12, see
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(7), and the two-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) would not have applied, see id. § 2K2.1
cmt. n.8(A). Caparotta argues that his offense level would have
been six points lower without the "prohibited person" finding,
because there would have been insufficient evidence for the
district court to apply a six-level increase for possession of
twenty-five or more firearms, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C), but the
government disagrees. We need not resolve that dispute, because we
find that the court properly concluded that Caparotta was a
"prohibited person."
-8-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 9
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
district court's conclusion that he was a "prohibited person" and
argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when
his attorney allowed him to disclose his August 2010 drug use
during the bail interview.
We begin with the "prohibited person" classification.
The first two prongs of the Marceau test are not at issue here;
Caparotta does not contest the district court's finding that he
engaged in regular drug use over a long period of time.
554 F.3d
at 30. He takes issue only with the district court's determination
that his drug use was "proximate to or contemporaneous with the
possession of the firearm."
Id.
Specifically, he argues that it
was a violation of his due process rights and of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 for the Probation Office to include in his
PSR, and for the district court to consider at sentencing, his bail
interview statements regarding his drug use in August 2010, which
he says he provided based on a promise of confidentiality. He also
argues that, without those statements, there was insufficient
evidence of drug use proximate to or contemporaneous with the
offense.
We would normally review claims of legal error made at
sentencing de novo, United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 92 (1st
Cir. 2009), but we do not do so here, because Caparotta has waived
one of his arguments and forfeited the other, see United States v.
Walker,
665
F.3d
212,
227
(1st
Cir.
difference between waiver and forfeiture).
-9-
2011)
(describing
the
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 10
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
Before the district court, Caparotta objected to the use
of his bail interview statements on the grounds that no exception
in
section
3153
§
3153(c)(2),
and
covered
that
the
those
statements,
statements
could
determine guilt, see id. § 3153(c)(3).7
see
not
18
be
U.S.C.
used
to
He did not raise an
objection on due process grounds, nor did he invoke Rule 32.
These
are new arguments, raised for the first time on appeal, and we
review such arguments, if at all, for plain error only.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Ríos-Hernández, 645 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 2011).
However, Caparotta's due process argument is simply not developed
enough for us to decipher it; the argument consists of just two
sentences and two cursory citations in his brief.
It is therefore
waived, and we will not address it here. United States v. Zannino,
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
As for Caparotta's Rule 32 claim,
he must satisfy the plain error standard, which requires him to
demonstrate that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error "was clear
and obvious"; (3) the error affected his substantial rights; and
(4) the error "seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings."
7
Ríos-Hernández, 645
Caparotta has not renewed that argument on appeal, perhaps
because he now recognizes that the statute explicitly carves out an
exception whereby probation officers can use information obtained
by Pretrial Services "for the purpose of compiling presentence
reports." 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(2)(C); see also Pretrial Services
Office Confidentiality Reg. 5(D).
-10-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 11
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
F.3d at 462 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Caparotta cannot clear that "high bar."
Id. at 463.
The relevant subsection of Rule 32 reads as follows:
(3) Exclusions. The presentence report must
exclude the following:
(A) any diagnoses that, if disclosed, might
seriously disrupt a rehabilitation program;
(B) any sources of information obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality; and
(C) any other information that, if disclosed,
might result in physical or other harm to the
defendant or others.
Fed.
R.
Crim.
P.
32(d)(3).
Caparotta
claims
that
his
bail
interview statements were "sources of information obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality" and thus should have been excluded from
his PSR pursuant to Rule 32(d)(3)(B).8
8
Id.
However, Caparotta has
The government has not raised the issue here, and we do not
decide it today, but it is unclear whether the Rule 32(d)(3)(B)
exclusion could ever apply to a defendant's own statements. The
plain language of the rule excludes from a PSR "any sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality," not "any
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(d)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, the exclusion seems
to be designed to protect confidential sources who provide
information to the Probation Office, not to ensure the
confidentiality of statements that the defendant has made. See,
e.g., United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (Rule 32(d)(3)(B) "protects someone
who, for example, might tell something relevant to the sentence to
the probation officer, but fears retaliation if his or her identity
is revealed"); United States v. Hamad, 495 F.3d 241, 248 (6th Cir.
2007) (a district court's summary to the defendant of any
information excluded from a PSR under Rule 32(d)(3)(B) "may not
disclose the source of the information"); United States v. Trevino,
89 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Granted, the 'chilling effect'
on contributors should be ameliorated somewhat now that sources of
-11-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 12
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
presented no evidence that he was made a promise of confidentiality
at the start of his bail interview, or that he made the statements
at issue in reliance on that promise.
Caparotta points to the
confidentiality notice printed at the top of the Pretrial Services
Report, but that report was published after Caparotta made the
statements in question, so he could not have relied on the notice
in providing the statements. Nor will we infer from the notice, as
Caparotta urges us to, that the Pretrial Services Office must have
made Caparotta a similar promise of confidentiality at the start of
his bail interview.
Under the circumstances presented here, the Probation
Office
had
the
authority
to
use
Caparotta's
bail
interview
statements in preparing his PSR, see 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(2)(C), and
the district court had broad discretion to determine whether the
information was appropriate to consider at sentencing, see, e.g.,
United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 489 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2007).
There was no error, much less an error that was "clear and
obvious."
Ríos-Hernández, 645 F.3d at 462.
Finally, we turn to Caparotta's argument that his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated when his trial attorney allowed him
confidential information can no longer be named in the PSR.");
United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1992)
(referring to disclosure of "the name of a confidential source");
United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1171 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1983) (under a prior version of the rule, the court could
withhold from the defendant information contained in a PSR "to
protect confidential sources").
-12-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 13
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
to disclose his August 2010 drug use during the bail interview,
which
he
claims
"prohibited
led
person"
directly
under
to
the
U.S.S.G.
§
finding
that
2K2.1(a)(6).
he
was
a
Although
Caparotta did not bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
before the district court, "[w]e have recognized an exception to
the preference for resolving ineffective assistance arguments via
collateral attack where the critical facts are not genuinely in
dispute and the record is sufficiently developed to allow reasoned
consideration of an ineffective assistance claim."
United States
v. Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the record is
sufficiently developed for us to conclude that Caparotta's claim
lacks merit. See id. (disposing of a clearly meritless ineffective
assistance claim on direct review).
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of
counsel,
a
defendant
must
show
that:
(1)
his
attorney's
performance was deficient; and (2) "the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense."
687 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
If the defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the
Strickland test, his claim fails.
See id. at 697; Tevlin v.
Spencer, 621 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) ("A defendant's failure to
satisfy one prong of the Strickland analysis obviates the need for
a court to consider the remaining prong.").
-13-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Page: 14
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
Here, Caparotta cannot establish prejudice, because there
was ample evidence for the district court to conclude that he was
a "prohibited person" even without the bail interview information.
Caparotta admitted during his presentence interview that he had
used marijuana regularly through July 2010, with the offense
occurring in August 2010, and he sent text messages three days
before the burglary and three days after the burglary soliciting
drugs and referencing drug use.
He has not argued that it would
have been improper for the court to consider any of that evidence,
which alone supported a finding that he used drugs "proximate to or
contemporaneous with the possession of the firearm."
Marceau, 554
F.3d at 30; see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (defining "unlawful use" as
use that "has
occurred
recently
enough
to indicate
that the
individual [was] actively engaged in such conduct" at the time of
the offense, even if he did not use the substance "at the precise
time" that he possessed the firearm).
Thus, assuming simply for
the sake of argument that Caparotta's attorney committed an error,
Caparotta cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for
the
error,
different."
"the
result
of
the
proceeding
would
have
been
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
We do not mean to suggest that Caparotta's attorney's
performance was deficient. Indeed, we highly doubt that it was, as
there appear to have been valid tactical reasons why she allowed
Caparotta to discuss his recent drug use with the Pretrial Services
-14-
Case: 11-1713
Document: 00116358543
Office.9
Page: 15
Date Filed: 04/05/2012
Entry ID: 5631601
See id. at 689 (noting "the wide latitude counsel must
have in making tactical decisions").
But we need not decide the
issue, because we can dispose of Caparotta's ineffective assistance
claim on the prejudice prong alone.
See id. at 697; Tevlin, 621
F.3d at 66.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
9
As the attorney explained in her sentencing memorandum, "In
this case, Mr. Caparotta's reporting of his recent drug use was of
utmost importance in his bond proceedings, in that having him
subject to drug testing would allow the Pretrial Services Office to
monitor his drug intake and ensure that he was not using drugs
after having been released on bond. Substances such as marijuana
can stay in a person's system for up to thirty days, depending on
past use patterns. If Mr. Caparotta had refused to discuss his
pattern of drug use, he may have been subject to pretrial
detention."
-15-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?