Libby v. Astrue

Filing

OPINION issued by Sandra L. Lynch, Chief Appellate Judge; Juan R. Torruella, Appellate Judge and Michael Boudin, Appellate Judge. Unpublished. [11-2066]

Case: 11-2066

Document: 00116358540

Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/05/2012

Entry ID: 5631600

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-2066
TAMMIE LIBBY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
Sarah H. Bohr, Bohr & Harrington, LLC, Francis M. Jackson and
Jackson & MacNichol on brief for appellant.
Timothy A. Landry, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney and Thomas
E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

April 5, 2012

Case: 11-2066

Document: 00116358540

Per Curiam.

Page: 2

Date Filed: 04/05/2012

Entry ID: 5631600

After carefully considering the briefs and

record on appeal, we affirm the denial of disability benefits.
The appellant argues that the ALJ committed two errors in
finding that she did not satisfy the mental retardation listing. 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05(C). First, she claims
that she was not required to prove that she had deficits in
adaptive functioning in addition to proving that she satisfied the
IQ criteria of subparagraph C before age 22. Secondly, she claims
that

substantial

evidence

did

not

support

the

ALJ's

finding

concerning deficits in adaptive functioning.
We review the interpretation of the listing de novo and
factual findings for substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31 (1st. Cir. 1999). The appellant had
the burden of proving that she satisfied the listing. Dudley v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 816 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1987).
To satisfy the listing, the appellant had to establish
that she had deficits in adaptive functioning manifest before age
twenty-two, as well as that she satisfied the IQ criteria of
subparagraph C. The listing contains two parts: (1) an introductory
paragraph that describes mental retardation in terms of subaverage
intellectual

functioning

and deficits

in

adaptive

functioning

manifest before age 22; and (2) subparagraphs specifying the
required level of severity. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §
12.05. The general introduction to the Mental Disorders listings

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Case: 11-2066

Document: 00116358540

Page: 3

Date Filed: 04/05/2012

Entry ID: 5631600

provides that satisfying the listing requires satisfying both the
diagnostic

description

in

the

introductory

paragraph

and

the

criteria of a subparagraph. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §
12.05(A). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3); Randall v. Astrue,
570 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that the
appellant failed to show that she had the requisite deficits in
adaptive functioning. The psychologist's reports differed. The ALJ
could reasonably discount the diagnosis of retardation because it
was not supported by appropriate findings of adaptive deficits, and
it was not corroborated by other professional opinion or other
reports in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(3) & (4). Resolving
the conflict was the ALJ's prerogative. Rodriguez v Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1981). The appellant does
not show that the record rationally required a contrary result.
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 336 F.3d 51 (1st Cir.
2003).
Affirmed. 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.0(c).

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