Nystedt, et al v. Nigro, et al
Filing
OPINION issued by Sandra L. Lynch, Chief Appellate Judge; Bruce M. Selya, Appellate Judge and Norman H. Stahl, Appellate Judge. Published. [12-1245]
Case: 12-1245
Document: 00116458854
Page: 1
Date Filed: 11/20/2012
Entry ID: 5691618
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1245
DOUGLAS O. NYSTEDT, JR., individually and as
Administrator of the Estate of Evan T. Nystedt,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
EUGENE A. NIGRO ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
William P. Corbett, Jr., with whom The Corbett Law Firm was on
brief, for appellant.
Christopher R. Conroy, with whom Elizabeth A. Houlding and
Peabody & Arnold LLP were on brief, for appellees.
November 20, 2012
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SELYA, Circuit Judge.
Date Filed: 11/20/2012
Entry ID: 5691618
This case requires us to explore
the parameters of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.
The
underlying litigation is a will contest turned conspiracy case.
The plaintiff prevailed in probate court, but only after two and a
half years of pretrial discovery and legal wrangling.
All the
while, the estate's assets waned and the legal fees waxed.
In the end, the plaintiff, although found to be the sole
lawful heir of the decedent, had little to show for his victory.
Seeking retribution, he sued a bevy of persons involved in the will
contest.
The central theme of his suit was the allegation of a
wide-ranging conspiracy.
In a preliminary ruling, the district court found two of
the defendants (a lawyer who had served as a court-appointed
discovery master and the lawyer's firm) immune from suit by reason
of quasi-judicial immunity.
partial final judgment.
The court certified this ruling as a
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
After careful
consideration, we affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
"Because this case was decided below on a motion to
dismiss, we rehearse the facts as revealed by the complaint and the
documents annexed thereto." Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69
(1st Cir. 2012).
This imbroglio began with the death of Evan Nystedt in
May of 2004.
Soon thereafter, the decedent's attorney and friend,
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Earl Munroe, offered a purported will for probate.
court provisionally appointed Munroe as executor.
Laws ch. 192, §§ 13-14 (repealed 2008).
Entry ID: 5691618
The probate
See Mass. Gen.
Munroe neglected to
provide the statutorily required notice to heirs, see id. § 13, and
used
his
position
as
temporary
executor
to
squander
estate
resources.
The decedent's closest living relative was plaintiffappellant Douglas Nystedt, who eventually learned of the probate
proceedings.
He asserted his rights as heir at law and, in August
of 2004, initiated a will contest.
On December 17, 2004, the probate court appointed Eugene
Nigro, a practicing lawyer, as a special master "to monitor the
discovery
process"
and
ensure
"full[]
compl[iance]
reasonable [discovery] requests" "on a timely basis."
with
[]
The court
authorized the special master to charge the parties, equally, his
usual and customary hourly rates.
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 53(c);
Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 26(j).
The
plaintiff
alleges
that
performance left much to be desired.
the
special
master's
He asserts that the special
master failed to respond to several letters imploring him to
schedule
a
discovery
discovery requests.
conference
and
compel
Munroe
to
honor
He also asserts that the special master
engaged in ex parte communications with Munroe's counsel, George
Lordan.
He laments that, after eighteen months of service, the
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special master had only two depositions and one hundred pages of
"generally irrelevant" documents to show for his efforts.
In May of 2006, the plaintiff sought to oust the special
master.
The probate court rejected this entreaty.
Discovery
continued until February of 2007, when trial commenced.
Following
the trial, the probate court, noting that Munroe was both the
preparer of the will and the person who stood to inherit from it,
disallowed the will.
The rejection of the will left the plaintiff
as the decedent's administrator and the sole beneficiary of the
estate.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190, §§ 2-3 (repealed 2008).
appeal, the probate court's decision was affirmed.
On
See Munroe v.
Nystedt, No. 07-P-944, 2008 WL 4778297 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 4,
2008).
The plaintiff's success was bittersweet.
By the time
that he prevailed and took control of the assets, the value of the
estate had been greatly diminished.
To make matters worse, he had
spent over $200,000 in waging the will contest.
Having
been
left
holding
a
nearly
empty
bag,
the
plaintiff, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the
decedent's estate, sued a phalanx of will-contest participants.
These defendants included the special master and the law firm in
which he was a partner, Nigro, Pettepit & Lucas, LLP (the Firm).
For
ease
in
exposition,
we
refer
collectively, as the Nigro defendants.
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to
these
two
defendants,
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After his suit was docketed in the federal district
court, the plaintiff twice amended his complaint.
The operative
pleading for present purposes — the second amended complaint —
contains twenty-three counts against nine defendants.
The claims against the Nigro defendants are narrowly
focused. The complaint posits that the special master's delinquent
performance of his duties prolonged the will contest and, thus,
caused the value of the estate to plummet.
The plaintiff frames
this plaint as both a racketeering conspiracy charge under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and a civil conspiracy charge under common
law.
In essence, he avers that the special master's misdeeds
furthered a conspiracy crafted by Munroe and others.
Viewed from
that coign of vantage, the dispatch of each of the fifty-five
invoices sent
by
the Nigro
defendants
was
intended
to "reap
illicit[] benefits" from the conspiracy. These mailings ostensibly
amounted to instances of mail fraud, which served as predicate acts
for the racketeering charge.
invoices
and
ex
parte
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1962.
communications
also
allegedly
The
abetted
Munroe's unlawful conversion of estate assets.
The Nigro defendants moved to dismiss the claims against
them on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity.
12(b)(6).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
The district court granted this motion by means of a
docket entry because, in its view, all of the Nigro defendants'
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actions "relate[d] to [Nigro's] quasi-judicial work as a discovery
master."
The district court then certified its order of dismissal
as a final judgment.
See Nystedt v. Munroe, No. 10-10754, 2012 WL
244939 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
This timely appeal followed.
II.
ANALYSIS
Before
us,
the
plaintiff
challenges
certification order and the order of dismissal.
both
the
Without the
certification, we would lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
942 F.2d 34, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, we begin with the
certification order and then mull the dismissal order.
A.
The Certification Order.
"When an action presents more than one claim for relief
. . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct
entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all,
claims or parties . . . ."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
This procedure,
though sometimes useful, is in obvious tension with the "longsettled and prudential policy against the scattershot disposition
of litigation."
Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 42
(1st Cir. 1988).
"It follows, then, that entry of judgment under
the rule should not be indulged as a matter of routine or as a
magnanimous accommodation to lawyers or litigants."
Id.
Rather,
Rule 54(b) should be applied sparingly and "only if the court
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expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).
When contemplating Rule 54(b) certification, a trial
court first must ensure that the ruling underlying the proposed
judgment is final.
Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 42.
Such a determination
embodies a judgment about a matter of law and, thus, engenders de
novo review. González Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d
313, 317 (1st Cir. 2009).
"dispose[]
completely
To qualify as final, a ruling must
either
of
all
claims
against
a
given
defendant or of some discrete substantive claim or set of claims
against the defendants generally."
Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-
Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1994).
This requirement is
plainly satisfied here: the order granting the Nigro defendants'
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss terminated all of the plaintiff's
claims against them.
The plaintiff attempts to parry this thrust.
He argues
that the dismissed claims against the Nigro defendants were part of
counts in which other defendants were also named.
With this in
mind, he insists that the district court's order could not be
"final" as the counts at issue remained in the case.
This argument exalts form over substance. A single count
in a complaint may contain multiple claims and implicate multiple
defendants.
By its terms, Rule 54(b) permits the entry of a final
judgment as to "one or more . . . parties," without reference to
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the fact that the pleader may have organized such claim or claims
within
counts
containing
claims
against
other
parties.
See
Feinstein, 942 F.2d at 39-40 (upholding Rule 54(b) certification of
an order dismissing claims against some, but not all, defendants
named in a single RICO count).
In addition to finality, Rule 54(b) requires the trial
court to make an express determination that there is "no just
reason for delay."
We examine the district court's evaluation of
the equities inherent in this determination with a deferential eye.
See Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 43-44.
In the case at hand, the district court focused on the
importance of protecting the Nigro defendants' reputation in the
legal community.
Nystedt, 2012 WL 244939, at *1.
The court noted
that pending RICO and conspiracy charges might well dissuade
potential clients from using their services.
Id.
To cinch
matters, the court found nothing to suggest that the immediate
entry of a partial final judgment would prejudice the rights of any
party.
Id.
We discern no error.
We think that the district court's
assessment of the equities is reasonable, and that Rule 54(b)
certification is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. We
note, moreover, that the policy of the law favors the resolution of
immunity defenses as early in a lawsuit as may be practicable.
See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
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U.S. 139, 145 (1993); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). This factor, too, counsels in favor of immediate appellate
review.
B.
The Dismissal Order.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground that Nigro, as a court-appointed discovery master, was
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.
decision de novo.
Cir. 2006).
We review this
Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st
"In conducting that review, we accept as true all
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor."
Santiago v. Puerto
Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011).
There is a wrinkle here that potentially affects our
review.
The plaintiff's complaint contains both federal and state
claims.
Where, as here, a federal court proceeds to adjudicate
state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction, it is obliged to
apply state substantive law to those claims.
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010).
Perry v. Blum, 629
As a result, we must apply federal law
to some claims and state law to others.
dichotomy is more apparent than real.
Here, however, this
There are only minute
distinctions between the two bodies of immunity law, and no such
distinction is implicated in this case.
Consequently, we rely
interchangeably on federal and state precedents with respect to the
scope of quasi-judicial immunity.
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The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity provides absolute
immunity
for
those
who
perform
tasks
that
are
inextricably
intertwined with the judicial function.
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S.
Mass.
193,
200
(1985);
Coggeshall
v.
Bd.
of
Regis.
of
Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 662-63 (1st Cir. 2010); LaLonde v.
Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (Mass. 1989).
rooted in
the
wise
idea
that
those who
This doctrine is
perform
adjudicative
functions "require a full exemption from liability."
Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
Court-appointed
judicial functions.
discovery
masters
plainly
perform
Under accepted Massachusetts practice, they
"control the extent of discovery, including the scheduling and
oversight
of
depositions
[and]
the
time
for
completion
of
discovery, and [they] resolve any discovery disputes which may
arise during the course of the litigation."
26(j).
Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P.
During his performance of these duties, a master is
"functionally indistinguishable from a trial judge."
AccuSoft
Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted). It follows inexorably, as night
follows day, that court-appointed discovery masters, acting in that
capacity, share a judge's immunity from suit.
Cf. Brown v.
Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing acts of
court-appointed evaluators); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito
Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976) (discussing acts of
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court-appointed receiver).
its
absence,
"lightning
orders."
Page: 11
for
Entry ID: 5691618
This immunity makes perfect sense; in
court-appointed
rod[s]
Date Filed: 11/20/2012
discovery
harassing
masters
litigation
would
aimed
at
become
judicial
Kermit Constr., 547 F.2d at 3.
The plaintiff acknowledges the general proposition that
a court-appointed discovery master may be entitled to quasijudicial immunity.
To avoid this dead end, however, he tries to
invoke two recognized exceptions to the general proposition.
The
first of these exceptions relates to non-judicial acts, see, e.g.,
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993); Cok
v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989); the second relates to
acts, which,
"though
judicial
in
nature," are
"taken
in
the
complete absence of all jurisdiction," Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11-12 (1991).
We examine these claims separately.
The
transmittal
plaintiff
of
invoices
argues
and
the
that
the
special
Nigro
defendants'
master's
ex
parte
communications with Lordan are non-judicial acts sufficient to
trigger
the
first
exception.
This
argument
rests
on
a
misapprehension of the exception.
Judicial acts are those that are "intimately associated"
with the judicial function.
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For this purpose, the
judicial function has been defined as the adjudication of disputes
between parties. Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435. Nigro's performance of
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his duties as a court-appointed discovery master falls comfortably
within this sphere.
This includes the sending of invoices for
services rendered and the alleged ex parte communications — acts
that were intimately associated with the adjudication of discovery
disputes.
As to the invoices, they were sent in furtherance of the
probate court's direction about how the special master should be
paid
and
were
compensation.
an
unremarkable
vehicle
for
securing
that
As to the communications, the plaintiff has not
alleged — nor does the record in any way suggest — that they
pertain to anything other than Nigro's work as a court-appointed
discovery master.
Indeed, the probate court denied the motion to
remove the special master, which was based on the same allegations
of ex parte communications. There is no reason to look behind that
ruling. In any event, a mere claim of ex parte contact, alleged to
be in violation of Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:09, canon 3(B)(7), does
not, without more, establish that the nature of the communication
was not inextricably intertwined with the judicial function.
The
fact that a court-appointed discovery master performs a judicial
function in an imperfect (or even unethical) way does not, by
itself, dissolve his quasi-judicial immunity. See Cok, 876 F.2d at
3
(holding
that
"allegations
of
malice,"
"bad
faith,"
or
"conspiracy" will not circumvent absolute quasi-judicial immunity).
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As a fallback position, the plaintiff avers that sending
an invoice is an "administrative," rather than a "judicial" act.
This averment suggests a false dichotomy.
The administrative
character of an act might make a difference if the act was not
intimately
associated
with
the
performance
of
core
judicial
functions. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)
(holding discriminatory dismissal of court employee to be a nonjudicial act).
invoices was
Here, however, the administrative act of sending
integrally
related
to
Nigro's
work
as
a court-
appointed discovery master and, therefore, the immunity attaches to
the act.
Cf. New Eng. Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arbit. Ass'n,
199 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that administrative
tasks associated with processing a party's demand are arbitral acts
for purposes of arbitral immunity).
The plaintiff's attempt to invoke the second exception —
for actions taken in the absence of all jurisdiction — is equally
unavailing.
He bases this argument on a number of perceived
procedural glitches, including the fact that the record does not
indicate
any
"special
reasons"
sufficient
to
justify
the
appointment of a discovery master pursuant to former Mass. Prob.
Ct. R. 20 (amended 2011); the fact that Nigro neither lived nor
maintained an office in the county in which the probate court sat,
as required by that rule; the fact that the special master's
billings were in excess of the billings permitted by that rule; the
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fact that the appointment was not temporally limited, as required
by former Mass. Prob. Ct. R. 21 (amended 2011); and the fact that
the special master's ex parte communications with Lordan were
unethical.
We need not address these allegations item by item. Even
if procedural irregularities of this sort existed, they would not
strip Nigro
of
his
discovery master.1
jurisdiction
to
act
as
a
court-appointed
The Supreme Court has squarely held that
absolute judicial immunity is ineffaceable even in the presence of
"grave procedural errors."
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359
(1978); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 357
(1871) (distinguishing the "validity of the act" from the question
of whether judicial immunity attaches); New Eng. Cleaning Servs.,
199 F.3d at 546 (similar).
The errors here (if errors at all) were
not grave and, in all events, fall within the prophylaxis afforded
by Stump.
If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — there is
an
even
more
basic
defect
in
1
the
plaintiff's
"absence
of
We do not mean to imply that the alleged procedural flaws
were flaws at all. Although we need not (and do not) pass upon the
question, it seems likely that the probate court was applying Mass.
R. Dom. Rel. P. 26(j) rather than the probate court rules. See
generally Mass. Supp. Prob. & Fam. Ct. R. 20 reporter's notes
(2012) (noting that the 2011 amendment, which cross references the
Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, reflects the
"usual practice" of the probate courts). The appointment at issue
here appears to conform to the requirements of Mass. R. Dom. Rel.
P. 26(j).
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jurisdiction" argument.
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His claims amount to nothing more than
claims of error that could, and should, have been addressed in the
will
contest
itself.
After
all,
"[w]ere
collateral
and
retrospective attacks on technical defects of court appointments
permitted, the court's work in an already difficult litigation
field would often be undone, with consequent uncertainty, delay,
and frustration."
Brown, 291 F.3d at 94.
The plaintiff could, for
example, have brought the alleged procedural flaws to the attention
of the probate court and, if that court denied relief, could have
raised the points on appeal.
After all, one of the primary
purposes of judicial immunity is to "establish appellate procedures
as the standard system for correcting judicial error."
Forrester,
484 U.S. at 225.
Here, too, the plaintiff has a fallback position.
He
strives to persuade us that the special master acted in the
complete absence of jurisdiction because his failure to respond to
the plaintiff's letters anent discovery orders constituted an
abandonment of his office (and, hence, his jurisdiction to act).
We are not convinced.
The law is clear that even bad faith or malice will not
divest the cloak of judicial immunity.
U.S. at 11.
See, e.g., Mireles, 502
A fortiori, negligence in performing judicial duties
affects neither a defendant's immunity nor his jurisdiction; the
judicial
officer
(or
the
person
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performing
tasks
intimately
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associated with core judicial functions) retains the power, whether
or not negligent, to act in that capacity.
See Cok, 876 F.2d at 4
(holding that "negligent performance" or "dereliction of duty" does
not divest an individual of authority granted by the court).
The plaintiff's final argument is that the Firm, as
contrasted with Nigro himself, was not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity.
In this regard, he points out that the Firm was not
mentioned in the probate court's appointment order and had no
standing in the will contest.
This is whistling past the graveyard.
independent
involvement
in
the
will
contest.
The Firm had no
From
what the
complaint reveals, the Firm's only contribution was through the
special master's use of its resources (such as staff assistance,
stationery,
and
the
like).
This
kind
of
support
for
the
performance of judicial acts warrants quasi-judicial immunity. See
Lewittes v. Lobis, 164 F. App'x 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); Quitoriano
v. Raff & Becker, LLP, 675 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
In much the same way that a law clerk who helps in the formulation
of an opinion is entitled to share in the judge's immunity, a law
firm whose partner enjoys quasi-judicial immunity is entitled to
share in that immunity for helping the partner to perform his
judicial tasks. Cf. Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regis. in Med., 904 F.2d
772, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of quasi-judicial
immunity
to
legal
adviser
to
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board
performing
judicial
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functions).
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Any other result would render illusory the important
protections afforded by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.
III.
CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we affirm the district court's grant of dismissal.
Affirmed.
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