Toledo-Colon v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al

Filing

OPINION issued by Juan R. Torruella, Appellate Judge; Rogeriee Thompson, Appellate Judge and David J. Barron, Appellate Judge. Published. [13-2073]

Case: 13-2073

Document: 00116784988

Page: 1

Date Filed: 01/09/2015

Entry ID: 5878585

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2073
EDWIN TOLEDO-COLÓN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, represented by Hon. Gov. Luis
Fortuño-Burset in his personal and official capacity; PUERTO RICO
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by Hon. Luis Somoza Colombani
in his official capacity; PUERTO RICO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, represented by Hon. Miguel Romero in his
personal and official capacity; VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION
ADMINISTRATION; NYDIA COLÓN, in her personal and official
capacity; MARIDELI ARRIETA, in her personal and official
capacity; WANDA LOZADA, in her personal and official capacity;
GILDA DACOSTA-MARTEL, in her personal and official capacity;
RUBÉN BONILLA, in his personal and official capacity; LEYDA
SANTIAGO, in her personal and official capacity; MARÍA BENÍTEZ,
in her personal and official capacity; CARMEN DÍAZ-TRINIDAD, in
her personal and official capacity; MYRNA CAMBRELEN, in her
personal and official capacity,
Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gustavo A Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.

Carlos Rodriguez García for appellant.
Tanaira Padilla-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General, with whom
Margarita L. Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General, and Susana I.

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Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, were on brief, for
appellees.

January 9, 2015

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PER CURIAM.

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Plaintiff Edwin Toledo-Colón appeals from

several adverse rulings by the district court on his federal and
state claims sounding in discrimination and retaliation.

Finding

that Toledo-Colón failed to adequately allege a claim on any count,
we affirm the district court's dismissal of his case.
BACKGROUND
Toledo-Colón suffers from Avoidant Personality Disorder,
which entitles him to support from the Vocational Rehabilitation
Administration (VRA).

Since 2002, he has received services in

support of his higher education, including funding for room and
board, classes, and computer equipment.
requested

computer

equipment

costing

In 2003, Toledo-Colón
approximately

$37,000.

Thereafter, he submitted a formal complaint with the Office of the
Advocate for Persons with Disabilities (Office) against the VRA.
According to Toledo-Colón, upon his filing of the complaint, the
VRA

agreed

to

provide

the

equipment;

however,

once

the

administrative proceedings concluded (with a finding that the VRA
did not have to provide the equipment) the VRA formally denied his
request for the computer equipment.1
1

In spite of not having the

Though our focus here is on the complaint, we note that in
their motion for summary judgment, defendants contended that
Toledo-Colón's request was denied because he did not actually need
the expensive equipment. They cited the fact that his master's
thesis professor "unequivocally stated that not all theses require
the equipment that plaintiff is requesting" and Toledo-Colón's
desire to present his thesis in the form of a documentary (which is
what was necessitating the equipment) did not derive from any
university requirement.
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benefit

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of

the

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sought-after

Date Filed: 01/09/2015

equipment,

Toledo-Colón

Entry ID: 5878585

earned

a

bachelor's degree, and then commenced a master's degree program; he
continued to receive benefits from the VRA.
In 2010, Toledo-Colón sued the VRA, the Commonwealth of
Puerto

Rico,

the

Puerto

Rico

Department

of

Labor

and

Human

Resources, the Puerto Rico Department of Justice, and several
individual defendants in their official and personal capacities.
In short, Toledo-Colón alleged that the VRA discriminated against
him by failing to provide the requested computer equipment, and
then retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the Office.
He asserted federal claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Federal Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., along with violations of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Toledo-Colón

also brought claims under state law, specifically Puerto Rico Law
115, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194(a), Puerto Rico Law 44, P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 1, §§ 501 et seq., Articles 1802 and 1803 of the
Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141-5142,
and the Puerto Rico Constitution.
In 2011, the district court dismissed all claims except
for the claims for injunctive relief and monetary damages against
the defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983.

A

couple years later, the court granted defendants' motion for

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summary judgment on the remaining claims, and then denied ToledoColón's motion to alter the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Toledo-Colón appeals the district court's various adverse
judgments, citing multiple supposed errors, but the particulars of
the court's rationale is not something we need to get into.

We are

not bound by the district court's reasoning, and may affirm its
decision on any basis in the record.

Lydon v. Local 103, Int'l

Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 770 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2014).
after

fruitlessly

searching

Toledo-Colón's

Here,

complaint

for

allegations that might support his discrimination and retaliation
theories, we conclude that he failed to state any plausible claims
under federal or state law.
In

reviewing

the

complaint,

we

discard

conclusory

allegations and determine whether the remaining charges, which we
assume are true, state a plausible claim upon which relief may be
granted.

Lebrón v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 770 F.3d 25, 29

(1st Cir. 2014).

The allegations must suffice to "raise [the]

right to relief above the speculative level."

Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

It is not enough to

"tender[]

of

naked

enhancement."

assertion[s]

Ashcroft

v.

devoid

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

further
662,

678

factual
(2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).
We turn to Toledo-Colón's specific claims.

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A. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
A plaintiff states a claim for discrimination under Title
II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by alleging
that the defendant "engaged in some wrongful action" against the
plaintiff on account of his disability.

Lebrón, 770 F.3d at 31

(citing Lesley v. Hee Man Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2001)
(Rehabilitation Act); Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (ADA)).
Here, the complaint states that the denial of computer
equipment

was

an

"irrational

act

of

.

.

.

discrimination."

However, Toledo-Colón fails to allege a single fact to support his
claim that his request was denied on account of his disability.
When pressed at oral argument, even Toledo-Colón's counsel was
unable to point to anything in the record that supported such an
inference.

Without more, the statements in the complaint do not

suffice to state a claim that Toledo-Colón was discriminated
against because of his disability.

See id.

Equally inchoate is

Toledo-Colón's retaliation claim.
To make out a claim of retaliation under either statute,2
a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected conduct, was

2

In addition to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, Toledo-Colón
references the anti-retaliation provision of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., insofar as the
Rehabilitation Act has incorporated its procedural requirements.
It does not appear that Toledo-Colón is attempting to make out a
distinct Title VI claim. To the extent he is, it would fail for
the same reasons his other retaliation claims fail.
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subject to an adverse action by the defendant, and that there was
a causal nexus between the protected conduct and the adverse
action.

D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41

(1st Cir. 2012).
It is undisputed that the VRA denied the request for
$37,000 worth of computer equipment (though it continued to provide
funding for Toledo-Colón's education) and that advocating for one's
right to be free from disability-based discrimination constitutes
protected conduct for the purposes of a retaliation claim. See id.
However, on the causal-nexus piece, Toledo-Colón's claim falters.
Though he alleges that "retaliatory events . . . commenced and have
continued" after he filed the complaint, and that the equipment
denial was an "irrational act of retaliation," Toledo-Colón fails
to allege any facts permitting a plausible inference that the VRA
denied the request in order to get back at Toledo-Colón for filing
a complaint.

He offers nothing more than conclusory allegations

that the defendants retaliated against him.

Again, just saying

something does not make it so.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
A sufficient equal protection claim, under the Fourteenth
Amendment,
compared

"must
with

allege

others

facts

indicating

similarly

situated

selective
.

.

.

treatment
based

on

impermissible considerations such as . . . malicious or bad faith
intent to injure a person." Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of Puerto Rico,

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445 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Toledo-Colón does not allege any facts tending to show he was
treated differently than other similarly situated individuals;
indeed, his complaint only refers to individuals with physical, as
opposed to mental, disabilities.

There are also no allegations

speaking to malicious or bad faith intent.
contains

no

facts

that

permit

us

to

That is, the complaint

infer

defendants attempted to injure Toledo-Colón.
states

that

"Defendants

planned

and

that

any

of

the

Rather, he simply

place[d]

into

action

an

elaborate scheme to deny the Plaintiff of his Constitutional and
statutory federal rights."

This fails to suffice.

C. First Amendment Claim
To

prove

a

First

Amendment

retaliation

claim,

the

plaintiff is required to show that he "engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct" and that he "was subjected to an adverse action
by

the

defendant"

for

which

"the

substantial or motivating factor."

protected

conduct

was

Esposito, 675 F.3d at 43.

a
It

is entirely unclear what Toledo-Colón's First Amendment claim is
based on.

In the complaint, he references the "right of free

speech," referring to case law providing that statements to, and
appearances before, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are
protected from retaliation under the First Amendment.

However,

there is no allegation, or indication in the record, that ToledoColón was in any way involved in EEOC proceedings.

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Even assuming

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he seeks to characterize his filing of the complaint with the
Office as constitutionally protected activity,

he (as we have

already said) has failed to plausibly allege that it was this
filing that motivated the VRA.
D. State Law Claims
Toledo-Colón also brings a panoply of state law claims,
citing the relevant laws but offering us nothing else.

As the

state law claims simply seem to mirror Toledo-Colón's federal law
theories, we find that Toledo-Colón fails to allege any facts from
which we might plausibly infer that the defendants discriminated or
retaliated against him in violation of state law.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, Toledo-Colón's complaint is convoluted at its
best, and incomprehensible at its worst. As he has failed to state
any claim upon which relief can be granted, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of his case.

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