MAZ Partners LP, et al v. PHC, Inc., et al

Filing

OPINION issued by Rogeriee Thompson, Appellate Judge; Bruce M. Selya, Appellate Judge and John J. McConnell , Jr.,*of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation. Published. [13-2273].

Case: 13-2273

Document: 00116723512

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Date Filed: 08/06/2014

Entry ID: 5843986

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2273
IN RE: PHC, INC. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
MAZ PARTNERS LP, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated; PETER BLAKESLEE, individually and on behalf of all
others situated,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PHC, INC.; BRUCE A. SHEAR; DONALD E. ROBAR; DOUGLAS J. SMITH;
HOWARD W. PHILLIPS; WILLIAM F. GRIECO; DAVID E. DANGERFIELD;
ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC.; and ACADIA MERGER SUB, LLC,
Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O’Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before
Thompson and Selya, Circuit Judges,
and McConnell, Jr.,* District Judge.

Chet B. Waldman, with whom Patricia I. Avery, Natalie Mackiel,
Wolf Popper LLP, David A.P. Brower, Brian C. Kerr, Brower Pivin PC,
Norman Berman, Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman DeValerio, Patrick J.
Sheehan and Whatley Kallas LLP were on brief, for appellants.
James H. Hulme, with whom Matthew Wright, Arent Fox LLP,
Richard M. Zielinski, Leonard H. Freiman and Goulston & Storrs were
on brief, for PHC Director defendants/appellees.

*

Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

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McConnell, Jr., District Judge. This stockholders’ class
action suit challenging the fairness of a corporate merger raises
the issue of whether the district court precipitately granted
summary judgment in light of plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) Affidavit
outlining the discovery they needed to respond to the dispositive
motion.

After a thorough and careful review of the entire record,

we find that plaintiffs should have been afforded the opportunity
to conduct additional discovery, and, therefore, remand this matter
for further proceedings below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs MAZ Partners, LP (“MAZ”) and Peter Blakeslee
were holders of Class A common stock of PHC, Inc. (“PHC”).

They

filed separate but similar class action suits in Massachusetts,
alleging that an announced merger between PHC and Acadia Healthcare
Company, Inc. (“Acadia”) was the result of an unfair process that
provided them with too little compensation.

Plaintiffs sued PHC,

Acadia, and Acadia Merger Sub, LLC (“Merger Sub”), an entity
created to facilitate the merger, as well as PHC’s chairman,
several

directors,

“Individual

and

Defendants”).

a

board
MAZ

member

filed

Mr. Blakeslee filed in federal court.

in

(collectively,
state

court,

the
while

Plaintiffs’ claims included

breaches of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting those breaches, and
a disclosure violation.
Plaintiffs claim that defendants breached their fiduciary

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duty to Class A stockholders because the announced merger between
PHC and Acadia gave them only one quarter of one share of Acadia
common stock for each share of PHC stock they owned.

In contrast,

in addition to the one quarter of one share of Acadia common stock,
a $5 million cash payment was made to the holders of PHC Class B
common stock, 93.2% of which was owned by defendant Bruce A. Shear,
PHC’s president, chief executive officer, and chairman.

Mr. Shear

negotiated the merger’s terms.
In the MAZ case, a Massachusetts Superior Court judge
entered a discovery order allowing discovery in connection with
MAZ’s filing of a preliminary injunction motion to stop the merger.
Defendants then removed the case to federal court.
reached an agreement:

The parties

plaintiffs would not seek remand and

defendants would provide expedited discovery.

MAZ alleges that

defendants only produced limited and redacted materials. After the
30-day period for remand expired, defendants filed a motion to stay
discovery.

Although the court ultimately denied the stay of

discovery, defendants produced only a handful of documents and no
depositions were taken.
Plaintiffs filed amended complaints and all defendants
moved to dismiss those complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the hearing on the motions to
dismiss, the federal district court consolidated the two cases1 and
1

MAZ Partners LP v. Shear, Civ. A. No. 1:11-cv-11099-GAO
consolidated with Blakeslee v. PHC, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1:11-cv-4-

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took the motions to dismiss under advisement.

Entry ID: 5843986

After the hearing

and while the motions to dismiss were pending, the merger was
consummated.
The district court granted in part and denied in part the
motions to dismiss.

In re PHC, Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No.

11-11049-GAO, 2012 WL 1195995, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2012). The
claims against PHC, the corporation itself, were dismissed, as was
the disclosure claim.
claims

—

breach

of

Id.

at *3-*4.

fiduciary

duty

Plaintiffs’ remaining
against

the

Individual

Defendants, and aiding and abetting against Acadia and Merger Sub
— all survived.

Id. at *2, *4.

Remaining

defendants

again

sought

to

dismiss

the

complaints, this time by filing a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
At

that

hearing,

the

district

court

denied

the

motion

for

procedural reasons and then stated that “a motion for summary
judgment may be appropriate” but the court did not “know whether
we’re at the stage yet where there would be agreement on both sides
that the factual record is so clear that that’s appropriate.”

The

district court went on to “anticipate the possibility” of a motion
under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and said
“I think we should maybe just permit some discovery before the
[summary judgment] motion is filed and head that off.”
11049-GAO and proceeded as In re PHC, Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. A.
No. 11-11049-GAO.
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A month after the denial of their Rule 12(c) motion,
defendants moved for summary judgment.

Apparently ignoring the

district court’s caution about the need for discovery first,
defendants argued that plaintiffs had no viable claims.

Regarding

the breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting claims,
defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked evidence.

Plaintiffs

opposed the motion, arguing that it was “entirely premature” and,
just as the district court predicted, submitted an affidavit
pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule

56

Affidavit”).

The

fourteen-page

Rule

56

Affidavit

chronicles plaintiffs’ attempts to obtain discovery and defendants’
failure to provide it. It delineates the categories of information
about which the identified witnesses are likely to have information
and specifies the essential information, in defendants’ hands, that
would support plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.

In addition to arguing that it was premature for the

district court to entertain a summary judgment motion, plaintiffs
also opposed the motion on its merits.
The district court granted summary judgment without
addressing

the

lack

of

discovery

or

the

Rule

56

Affidavit.

Instead, the district court concluded that the case “could be
framed as a lack of standing or as the absence of proof of an
essential element of the claims.

In either event, the fact that

the plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that they have suffered an

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actual injury is fatal to their claims.”

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In re PHC, Inc. S’holder

Litig., Civ. A. No. 11-11049, 2013 WL 5441745, at *2 (D. Mass.
Sept. 30, 2013).

Judgment entered in favor of defendants.

Plaintiffs appealed, asserting various substantive errors
in the district court’s ruling and arguing that the district court
abused its discretion by effectively denying their invocation of
Rule 56(d) by granting summary judgment. Defendants argue that the
Rule 56 Affidavit was legally insufficient and they seek affirmance
on other grounds.

In light of the Rule 56 Affidavit, we hold that

the district court abused its discretion by not allowing discovery
before ruling on the motion for summary judgment; we need not delve
into any other assertions of error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily, a review by this court of the grant of
summary judgment is de novo.
(1st Cir. 2009).

Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 18

However, because we ultimately conclude that the

district court erred in not affording appropriate consideration to
the Rule 56 Affidavit, our review is for abuse of discretion.

See

Rivera-Almodóvar v. Instituto Socioeconómico Comunitario, Inc., 730
F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We review a district court’s denial
of a Rule 56(d) motion for abuse of discretion.”).

“Under the

abuse of discretion standard, we will not reverse a district
court’s discovery order unless it appears that the order ‘was
plainly

wrong

and

resulted

in

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substantial

prejudice

to

the

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aggrieved party.’”

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Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT & T Mobility P.R.,

Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Universal Commc’n.
Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007)).
DISCUSSION
The district court’s summary judgment decision addressed
neither plaintiffs’ invocation of Rule 56(d) nor their assertion of
the lack of discovery.

The district court’s grant of summary

judgment, however, necessarily denied plaintiffs’ request for
relief pursuant to Rule 56(d).
Although our review of the decision below as it relates
to Rule 56(d) is for abuse of discretion, this court has been clear
and concordant in its direction to district courts regarding how to
analyze Rule 56(d) issues:

“Consistent with the salutary purposes

underlying Rule 56(f),2 district courts should construe motions
that invoke the rule generously, holding parties to the rule’s
spirit rather than its letter.”

Resolution Trust Corp. v. N.

Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir. 1994).
Under Rule 56(d), “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition” to a motion for summary

2

“Rule 56(d) was formerly Rule 56(f),” and “the textual differences
between current Rule 56(d) and former Rule 56(f) are purely
stylistic.” Nieves-Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 381 n.3
(1st Cir. 2013). Therefore, “case law developed under former Rule
56(f) remains controlling, and we cite to it where applicable.”
Id.
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judgment, then the district “court may: (1) defer considering the
motion

or

deny

declarations

or

it;

(2)

to

take

appropriate order.”
“Rule

allow

time

to

obtain

discovery;

or

(3)

affidavits

issue

any

or

other

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

56(d)

serves

a

valuable

purpose.”

Rivera-

Almodóvar, 730 F.3d at 28. “It protects a litigant who justifiably
needs additional time to respond in an effective manner to a
summary judgment motion.” Id. (citing Vargas–Ruiz v. Golden Arch
Dev., Inc., 368 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004)).

It “provides a safety

valve for claimants genuinely in need of further time to marshal
‘facts, essential to justify [their] opposition . . . to a summary
judgment motion.’”

Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 341 (1st

Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Mattoon v. City of
Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1, 7) (1st Cir. 1992)).
In order to gain the benefit of Rule 56(d), the party
opposing summary judgment must make a sufficient proffer:

“the

proffer should be authoritative; it should be advanced in a timely
manner; and it should explain why the party is unable currently to
adduce

the

facts

essential

to

opposing

Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d at 1203.

summary

judgment.”

If the reason the party

cannot “adduce the facts essential to opposing summary judgment” is
incomplete discovery, the party’s explanation (i.e., the third
requirement) should: (i) “show good cause for the failure to have
discovered the facts sooner”; (ii) “set forth a plausible basis for

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believing that specific facts . . . probably exist”; and (iii)
“indicate how the emergent facts . . . will influence the outcome
of the pending summary judgment motion.”

Id.

Thus, in a case

involving incomplete discovery, the Rule 56(d) proffer requirements
can be categorized as: “authoritativeness, timeliness, good cause,
utility, and materiality.”

Id.

“[T]hese requirements are not

inflexible and . . . . one or more of the requirements may be
relaxed, or even excused, to address the exigencies of a given
case.”

Id.

When all the requirements are satisfied, “a strong

presumption arises in favor of relief.”

Id.

With this in mind, we

turn now to our review of the record.
There is no question that plaintiffs have satisfied the
first

two

requirements,

“authoritativeness”

and

“timeliness.”

Plaintiffs promptly invoked Rule 56 shortly after defendants moved
for summary judgment, and they did so by filing an authoritative
affidavit.
Turning to the third requirement, the Rule 56 Affidavit
should

show

discovered

“good

or

proceedings.”

cause

for

[plaintiffs’]

marshalled

the

necessary

inability

facts

earlier

to

have

in

the

Mir-Yépez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 560 F.3d 14, 16

(1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernández, 502 F.3d
7,

10

(1st

Cir.

2007)).

A

review

of

the

litigation

below

establishes that discovery had barely begun before the court
entered summary judgment.

“Typically, when the parties have no

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opportunity for discovery, denying the Rule 56(f) motion and ruling
on

a

summary

discretion.”
2008).

judgment

motion

is

likely

to

be

an

abuse

of

CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 420 (6th Cir.

The Rule 56 Affidavit establishes plaintiffs’ persistence

in their pursuit of discovery at an early stage of the litigation.
On multiple occasions, the parties reached agreement on discovery
schedules but defendants did not comply; instead, they sought to
stay discovery and filed numerous motions.

We are mindful that a

party seeking “discovery expeditiously is not obligated to take
heroic measures to enforce his rights against a recalcitrant
opponent.”

Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 135 (1st Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although

defendants Acadia and Merger Sub represented that they had gathered
over 140,000 responsive pages that they would produce, and PHC and
the Individual Defendants had additional documents, plaintiffs
received only about 170 pages.

The parties took no depositions.

Much of the information sought was within defendants’ control, “a
factor which weighs heavily in favor of relief under Rule 56(f).”
Reid, 56 F.3d at 342.
To fulfill the fourth requirement, that of “utility,”
plaintiffs’ proffer must show “a plausible basis for believing that
additional facts probably exist and can be retrieved within a
reasonable time.”

Rivera-Torres, 502 F.3d at 10.

In the Rule 56

Affidavit, plaintiffs point to defendants’ admissions as proof of

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readily available additional facts.

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For example, the Individual

Defendants’ initial disclosures enumerate several persons and
entities likely to have relevant information regarding negotiations
and diligence related to the merger at issue, including the
valuation of Acadia.

Those disclosures also identify documents,

emails, and electronically stored information at PHC’s corporate
headquarters and on PHC’s servers regarding diligence and financial
analyses related to the merger.

Acadia and Merger Sub’s initial

disclosures identify several individuals involved with negotiating
and preparing the merger agreement.

They also specify email

communications related to the merger at issue, as well as due
diligence documents related to another Acadia merger.
Affidavit

also

describes

several

categories

about

The Rule 56
which

the

identified witnesses are likely to have information, such as the
merger ratio, the valuations of PHC and Acadia, and the $5 million
premium paid to the holders of Class B PHC common stock.
In a matter like this, when “plaintiffs’ case turns so
largely on their ability to secure evidence within the possession
of defendants, courts should not render summary judgment because of
gaps

in

a

plaintiff’s

proof

without

first

determining

that

plaintiff has had a fair chance to obtain necessary and available
evidence from the other party.”
otherwise

would

encourage

Carmona, 215 F.3d at 133.

defendants

“to

‘stonewall’

To rule
during

discovery — withholding or covering up key information that is

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otherwise available to them through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.”

Id.

Finally,

to

accomplish

the

fifth

requirement

of

“materiality,” the Rule 56 Affidavit “should indicate how the
emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the outcome of the
pending summary judgment motion.”
at 1203.

Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d

Because “[e]valuating the potential significance of

unknown facts in regard to unadjudicated issues is something of a
metaphysical exercise . . . . [T]he threshold of materiality at
this stage of a case is necessarily low.”

Id. at 1207.

In the Rule 56 Affidavit, plaintiffs articulate how the
discovery sought pertains to material factual disputes, such as the
Individual Defendants’ fiduciary duties, potential conflicts of
interest

of

Individual

financial
Defendants,

opportunities.

The

advisors,
and

lack

the

the
of

relationships

existence

discovery

of

on

among

other

these

the

merger

issues

was

acknowledged by the district court when it stated that “there are
no facts” to support the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary
duty.

In re PHC, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 5441745, at *1.
Plaintiffs

relevant

to

judgment.
discovery

the

issues

Despite
in

the

timely

sought

presented

plaintiffs’

conventional

discovery
in

the

motion

perseverant

sense

took

from

defendants
for

summary

efforts,

minimal

place.

Plaintiffs

survived several dispositive legal motions only to be faulted by a

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summary

judgment

circumstances,
detailed,

motion

the

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for

district

plausible,

and

Date Filed: 08/06/2014

lacking
court’s

evidence.
disregard

comprehensive

Rule

plainly wrong and an abuse of discretion.

Entry ID: 5843986

Under
of

56

these

plaintiffs’

Affidavit

was

See Reid, 56 F.3d at

341-42 (finding that the district court granted summary judgment
prematurely

where

plaintiff

made

timely

motion

supported

by

affidavit describing requested discovery); Resolution Trust Corp.,
22 F.3d at 1203-09 (district court abused its discretion by
granting summary judgment when discovery was incomplete); Nestor
Colón Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 39 (1st
Cir. 1992) (vacating portion of summary judgment where “plaintiffs
set forth enough to indicate that they may conceivably be able to
make

out

a

triable

issue”

(emphasis

in

original)

(citation

omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,

we

hereby

vacate

the

judgment

of

the

district court and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.3

Costs shall be taxed in favor of

the plaintiffs.

3

In as much as plaintiffs raise any legal issue that the district
court decided prior to his ruling in the motion for summary
judgment, this court takes no position.
Rather, the matter is
remanded to the district court in the same posture in which it
existed when summary judgment proceedings began.
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