Mercado v. Government of PR, et al
Filing
OPINION issued by Kermit V. Lipez, Appellate Judge; Michael Daly Hawkins,* Senior Appellate Judge and David J. Barron, Appellate Judge. Published. *Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. [15-1327]
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 1
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1327
ESTHER MERCADO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO;
OFICINA DE ADMINISTRACIÓN DE TRIBUNALES; and ADMINISTRACIÓN DE
SERVICIOS DE SALUD MENTAL Y CONTRA LA ADDICIÓN,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Hawkins, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Juan H. Saavedra Castro for appellant.
Rosa Elena Pérez-Agosto, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Margarita Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General, was on brief,
for appellees Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico, and Oficina de Administración de Tribunales.
Michael Craig McCall, with whom Luis Pabón Roca and Clarisa
Sola Gómez were on brief, for appellee Administración de Servicios
de Salud Mental y Contra La Addición.
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 2
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
February 29, 2016
Entry ID: 5980926
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
BARRON,
Circuit
Commonwealth
of
Puerto
governmental
entities
Page: 3
Judge.
Rico
under
Disabilities Act ("ADA").
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Esther
and
Title
three
II
of
Mercado
other
the
Entry ID: 5980926
sued
the
Puerto
Rico
Americans
with
She alleged that they had denied her
access to public services and discriminated against her because
she was "regarded as" having a physical or mental impairment within
the meaning of the ADA.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12132.
The only
question that we must decide is whether Mercado brought her suit
too late.
And the answer to that question turns on whether the
limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to her
case.
That
provision
establishes
a
four-year,
"catch-all"
limitations period for statutes that, like the ADA, do not set
forth their own limitations period.
But the catch-all period
applies only to actions "arising under" a federal statute enacted
after December 1, 1990, the date on which § 1658 became law.
The
parties agree that if that four-year, catch-all limitations period
does apply here, then Mercado's suit was timely filed.
Otherwise,
Mercado concedes that Puerto Rico law would supply the limitations
period, that the applicable period under Puerto Rico law would
only be one year, and that her suit would have been filed too late.
The District Court concluded that Mercado's "regarded
as" claims did not "aris[e] under" a federal statute enacted after
December 1, 1990, because the ADA was passed prior to that date.
- 3 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 4
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
Thus, the District Court applied the one-year Puerto Rico statute
of limitations and dismissed her suit as time-barred. We conclude,
however, that § 1658's limitations period does apply here because
Mercado's legal claims were made possible by the 2008 amendments
to the ADA codified in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("the
ADAAA").
We thus reverse the District Court's order of dismissal.
I.
Mercado initially filed her complaint in federal court
on August 14, 2013, before filing an amended complaint on March 1,
2014. [Dkt Nos. 1, 18]. The amended complaint (which we will refer
to as "the complaint" from here on out) names the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the "Oficina de
Administración
de
Tribunales,"
and
the
"Administración
de
Servicios de Salud Mental y Contra la Addición" as defendants.
[Dkt. No. 18].
The complaint alleges that the defendants subjected
Mercado to involuntary institutional confinement by ordering her
committed
to
a
psychiatric
opportunity to be heard.
hospital
without
giving
her
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4.1-4.4, 5.7].
an
The
complaint further alleges the defendants violated Title II of the
ADA because, in so confining her, they discriminated against her
and denied public services to her "by reason of her disability."
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5.5, 5.7, 5.9, 6.3].
- 4 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 5
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
The complaint sets out what it identifies as three
separate causes of action.
The first two are for damages based on
discrimination or denial of public services under Title II of the
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5.1-5.11, 6.1-6.3].1
ADA.
The last is for an
injunction ordering Puerto Rico to devise a system guaranteeing
counsel, as well as notice and the right to be heard, to any
disabled person who faces involuntary confinement in a psychiatric
hospital.
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7.1-7.6].
The
complaint
does
not
allege
that
Mercado
had
a
"disability" in the sense that she had what the ADA refers to as
an "impairment."
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A).
Nor does the
complaint allege that she was discriminated against because she
had such an impairment.
Instead, the complaint alleges that the
defendants discriminated against Mercado "by reason of" the fact
that she was "regarded as" having a physical or mental impairment
within the meaning of the ADA.
See id. §§ 12102(1)(C), 12132.2
In pleading "regarded as" discrimination claims under
the ADA, the complaint alleges that Mercado had a "disability"
1
The complaint also recites, within the two causes of action
for damages, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
But Mercado has not challenged the District Court's
dismissal of her Fourteenth Amendment claims, and so we will not
address that dismissal.
2
The parties do not separately address this request for
injunctive relief in their arguments to us. We thus treat this
request as pleading "regarded as" discrimination, just like the
other two "causes of action" identified in the complaint.
- 5 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 6
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
within the meaning of the ADA "[b]y virtue of the [ADA] Amendments
Act
of
2008,
and
changes
in
definition
of
the
term
'disability' . . . because defendants regarded [her] as having a
major 'mental impairment.'"
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4.19, 5.6].
The 2008
amendments altered the ADA by, among other things, stating that
[a]n individual meets the requirement of 'being regarded
as having such an impairment' if the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this chapter because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), §
3(3)(A),
122
Stat.
3553,
3555
(codified
at
42
U.S.C.
§
12102(3)(A)).
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.
They
argued that a one-year statute of limitations applied to Mercado's
claims under Puerto Rico law and that she had not filed within
that period.
[Dkts. No. 29, 30].
Mercado opposed the motion.
She did so solely on the ground that her claims' dependence on the
2008 amendments to the ADA made the four-year, "catch-all" period
in § 1658, rather than the one-year limitations period under Puerto
Rico law, applicable to her suit.
[Dkt. No. 40 (citing Jones, 541
U.S. at 382)].
The District Court rejected Mercado's argument.
District
Court
concluded
that
her
claims
"would
have
The
been
actionable under the original provisions of the ADA," Mercado v.
- 6 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 7
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
Puerto Rico, 86 F. Supp. 3d 46, 49 (D.P.R. 2015), and thus that
§ 1658's limitations period did not apply.
Because the District
Court agreed with the defendants that, under Puerto Rico law, a
one-year statute of limitations applied to Mercado's claims and
that she had not complied with it, the District Court dismissed
her complaint as time-barred.
Id. at 49-50.
On appeal, Mercado does not contest the District Court's
ruling that the one-year Puerto Rico statute of limitations would
apply to her suit if the four-year period established by § 1658
does not apply in its stead.
Nor does she contest that her suit
was not filed within that one-year time period.
Rather, she
challenges only the District Court's determination that § 1658's
four-year limitations period does not apply.
And so that is the
only issue that we address.
II.
The question that we must decide is one of statutory
interpretation, for which our review is de novo.
Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014).
But the question is not one that we answer on a blank slate.
Rather, in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382
(2004), the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the key phrase
in § 1658: "a civil action arising under an Act of Congress."
thus begin by describing Jones in more detail.
- 7 -
We
We then explain
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 8
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
why, in light of Jones, we conclude that the four-year limitations
period set forth in § 1658 applies to Mercado's claims.
A.
In Jones, the Court explained that many federal statutes
do
not
set
forth
their
own
limitations
period
and
that,
in
response, courts had developed the "settled practice" of borrowing
state statutes of limitations to fill the "void."
Id. at 377.3
Jones recognized, however, that this practice had "generated a
host of issues that required resolution on a statute-by-statute
basis" and, as a result, had "spawned a vast amount of litigation."
Id. at 377-78.
For example, Jones noted that in the course of
undertaking such gap filling, courts had confronted a range of
difficult issues.
Courts were required to decide, among other
things, from which state the limitations period should be borrowed,
which limitations period should be borrowed from that state, and
whether federal or state law governed certain procedural matters
related to the calculation of that period -- such as "when an
3
We have described this practice, which is still used when
§ 1658 does not apply, as one that requires the courts to identify
"the most analogous statute of limitations in the state where the
action was brought."
Greenwood ex rel. Estate of Greenwood v.
N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 527 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2008). Mercado
does not challenge the District Court's determination that the
"most analogous" Puerto Rico statute of limitations "is the oneyear term set for tort actions by Article 1868 of the Civil Code,
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5298(1)." See Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 86
F. Supp. 3d 46, 49 (D.P.R. 2015).
- 8 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 9
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
action was 'commenced,' or when service of process had to be
effectuated."
Id. at 378-79.
The Court emphasized that Congress was "keenly aware" of
the difficulties federal courts faced in filling the statute-oflimitations "void."
Id. at 380.
The Court thus concluded that
the "central purpose" of § 1658, which Congress enacted on December
1, 1990, was to reduce the need for courts to engage in such
litigation-inducing work.
In
light
of
Id.
this
legislative
purpose,
the
Court
explained that the phrase "a civil action arising under an Act of
Congress" in § 1658 should be interpreted in a manner "that fills
more rather than less of the void that has created so much
unnecessary work for federal judges." Id. The Court thus declined
to construe § 1658's text so narrowly that it would apply only to
claims that are based on "post–1990 statute[s] that establish[] a
new cause of action without reference to preexisting law."
Id. at
381 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
But the Court also agreed that § 1658 should not be
interpreted in a way that "disrupt[ed] the settled expectations"
of litigants.
Id.
And so the Court rejected a construction of
§ 1658 "under which any new amendment to federal law would suffice
to trigger the 4–year statute of limitations," id. at 382 (emphasis
added), no matter how inconsequential that amendment might be to
the plaintiff's ability to bring the claims at issue.
- 9 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Having
Page: 10
dispensed
with
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
each
of
these
Entry ID: 5980926
polar-opposite
interpretations of the scope of § 1658, the Court then described
the
course
that
it
concluded
Congress
had
actually
steered.
According to the Court, an enactment that "creates a new right to
maintain an action" is one under which a civil action may "aris[e]"
within the meaning of § 1658.
Id. at 382.
And the Court noted
that "Congress routinely creates new rights of action by amending
existing statutes, and altering statutory definitions, or adding
new definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of
amending statutes."
Id. at 381 (alterations, citations, and
internal quotation marks omitted).
No matter the form an enactment takes, though, the Court
made clear that "[w]hat matters is the substantive effect of an
enactment -- the creation of new rights of action and corresponding
liabilities."
Id.
Thus, Jones held, a claim that "necessarily
depend[s]" on such an enactment is a claim that "was made possible
by" a post-December 1, 1990 enactment and thus a claim for which
§ 1658 supplies the limitations period.
Id. at 382, 384.
The Court explained that it was "not persuaded that any
guess work is required to determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged a violation of the relevant statute as it stood prior to
December 1, 1990, or whether her claims necessarily depend on a
subsequent
amendment."
quotation marks omitted)).
Id.
at
384
(citations
and
internal
The Court did acknowledge that such a
- 10 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 11
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
determination could be "particularly complicated in cases in which
there was a split of authority regarding the scope of the original
statute."
Id. at 384 n.18.
A case of that type could require a
court "to determine whether the amendment clarified existing law
or created new rights and liabilities."
Id.
But the Court
concluded that such an analysis was "hardly beyond the judicial
ken."
Id.
After all, the Court noted, "[c]ourts must answer
precisely the same question when deciding whether an amendment may
be applied retrospectively."
Id.
B.
The Jones Court then applied § 1658 to the facts of that
case.
The
Jones
plaintiffs
had
brought
a
number
of
race
discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which was originally
enacted in 1866.
That statute protects, among other things, the
right "to make and enforce contracts" free from discrimination on
the basis of race.
Section
Id. at 372 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
1981
does
not
contain
its
own
limitations
period, however, and the two-year state-law limitations period
that would have otherwise applied in Jones had already expired by
the time that the Jones plaintiffs filed suit.
Id.
The Jones
plaintiffs nonetheless contended that their claims were not timebarred.
Id.
The plaintiffs argued that the four-year limitations
period established by § 1658 applied to their claims due to the
- 11 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 12
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
relationship between those claims and the changes that had been
made to Section 1981 after § 1658's enactment.
Id. at 372-73.
Specifically, in 1989, the Court had ruled in another
case that § 1981 "did not protect against . . . conduct that
occurred after the formation of the contract."
Id. (citing
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).
But, the
plaintiffs noted, in 1991 (and thus after the enactment of § 1658),
Congress amended § 1981 to define the term "make and enforce
contracts" to include the "termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
the contractual relationship."
1981(b)).
Id. at 373 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
As a result, this amendment "enlarged the category of
conduct that is subject to § 1981 liability" to include postcontract-formation discriminatory conduct like that alleged by the
Jones plaintiffs.
Id. at 383 (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 308 (1994)).
In light of this legislative change, the Court concluded
that § 1658 did supply the statute of limitations for the Jones
plaintiffs' claims.
The Court explained that their legal claims
"did not allege a violation of the pre–1990 version of § 1981 but
did allege violations of the amended statute."
Id. at 383.
As a
result, the Court held that the Jones plaintiffs' legal claims
were "made possible by" the 1991 amendment to § 1981, as their
suit to recover for defendants' post-contract-formation conduct
- 12 -
Case: 15-1327
could
Document: 00116965692
succeed
only
by
Page: 13
virtue
"necessarily depend[ed]" on it.
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
of
that
amendment
Entry ID: 5980926
and
thus
Id. at 383, 384.
C.
We have had one occasion to construe the scope of § 1658
following Jones.
In Millay v. Me. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of
Rehab., Div. for Blind & Visually Impaired, 762 F.3d 152, 155-56
(1st Cir. 2014), we considered whether a statutory amendment
sufficed to trigger the catch-all limitations period set forth in
§ 1658. We concluded that the amendment had a "substantive effect"
that "made possible" the claim at issue because the amendment
permitted
expanded
possibilities
for
judicial
review
administrative action that the plaintiff was challenging.
of
the
Id.
Of course, an amendment that makes a new avenue of
judicial review available has a "substantive effect" that is
distinct from the liability-enlarging effect of the amendment that
was at issue in Jones.
But we nevertheless concluded in Millay
that such an amendment still met the Jones standard of having "made
possible" the claim at issue.
Id. at 155.
We explained that, although some courts had previously
allowed similar challenges to the underlying administrative action
"to be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983," the relevant amendments
still "created a new and broader remedy" than the one that had
previously existed.
amendments
there
Id. at 156. We thus concluded that the
at
issue
(the
- 13 -
1998
amendments
to
the
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 14
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
Rehabilitation Act), even if deemed "purely procedural," id.,
"made possible" the plaintiff's claims because they "enabled the
plaintiff to bring the [then-]current proceeding for judicial
review," id.
And we explained that this conclusion made sense in
light of the great interpretive weight that must be given to
Congress's clear intention that § 1658 be applied broadly in order
to reduce the need for courts to borrow state limitations periods.
Id. at 157.
III.
In light of Jones, and consistent with our application
of that precedent in Millay, we conclude that § 1658 establishes
the limitations period for Mercado's "regarded as" claims.
To
explain why we reach this conclusion, we first describe the
"substantive effect" of the changes that the ADAAA made to the
ADA.
We then explain why Mercado's claims "necessarily depend" on
those amendments and thus why we conclude that the ADAAA "made
possible" Mercado's claims.
See Jones, 541 U.S. at 382.
A.
A review of the relevant legislative history reveals the
substantive effect of the change made to the ADA by the ADAAA.
When first enacted on July 26, 1990, the ADA defined the term
"disability" with respect to an individual as "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
- 14 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 15
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
Entry ID: 5980926
Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2), 104
Stat. 327, 329-30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).
Years later, however, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the
third prong of that original definition.
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
Sutton v. United Air
Specifically, the Supreme
Court interpreted that prong to require a plaintiff to plead and
prove that she was regarded as having an impairment that fit the
terms of the first prong -- that is, that she was regarded as
having an impairment that substantially limited one or more major
life activities.
Id.
Nearly a decade later, however, Congress passed the
ADAAA.
Those
2008
amendments
expressly
rejected
the
interpretation of "regarded as having such an impairment" that the
Court had set forth in Sutton.
2(b)(3).
In
enacting
those
Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 1, §
amendments,
Congress
changed
relevant portion of the ADA by adding a new paragraph (3).
the
That
new paragraph defined the scope of the term "being regarded as
having such an impairment," id. sec. 4, § 3(1)(C), as follows:
An individual meets the requirement of 'being regarded
as having such an impairment' if the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major
life activity.
- 15 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 16
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
Id. sec. 4, § 3(3)(A) (emphasis added).4
Thus, the 2008 amendments codified in the ADAAA made the
ADA's definition of being "regarded as" having an impairment
substantively broader than that definition had been in the period
after Sutton.
During that period, a plaintiff could maintain an
ADA claim based on being regarded as having an impairment only if
she pleaded that she was regarded as having a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limited one or more major life
activities.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
After the enactment of
the ADAAA, however, a plaintiff bringing a "regarded as" claim
under the ADA needs to plead and prove only that she was regarded
as having a physical or mental impairment.
Such a plaintiff no
longer needs to plead and prove that such impairment substantially
limited one or more major life activities.
sec. 4, § 3(3)(A).
Pub. L. No. 110-325,
Thus, while the change made to the ADA by the
ADAAA may not be as significant as the change made by the amendment
to section 1981 at issue in Jones, the change is still one that
had a substantive effect.
Cf. McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d
654, 663 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to apply § 1658 where the
operative amendments -- the 1992 Amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act -- "essentially changed the nomenclature in [the relevant
4
The ADAAA also amended the third prong of the definition of
disability to read: "being regarded as having such an impairment
(as described in paragraph (3))." Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(a).
- 16 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
section]
by
replacing
Page: 17
the
word
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
'handicap'
with
Entry ID: 5980926
the
word
'disability.'").
B.
The remaining question is whether Mercado's "regarded
as" claims "necessarily depend" on the substantive effect brought
about by the change that the ADAAA made to the ADA.
541 U.S. at 384.
See Jones,
We conclude that the claims she brought in her
2014 complaint do "necessarily depend" on that change and thus
that her claims were "made possible" by those 2008 amendments. See
id. at 382.
Mercado's
complaint
expressly
refers
amendments in pleading her "regarded as" claims.
to
the
2008
By "enlarg[ing]
the category of conduct that is subject to [] liability," id. at
383, those amendments permit Mercado to plead and prove one fewer
element of her "regarded as" claims than she would have been
required to plead and prove under the ADA as it existed prior to
those
amendments.
By
virtue
of
those
liability-enlarging
amendments, Mercado need not plead and prove that the defendants
regarded her as having a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity.
She need plead and
prove only that the defendants regarded her as having a physical
or mental impairment, no matter the defendants' view of the
magnitude of the effect of the perceived impairment on her life
activities.
- 17 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 18
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
For that reason, Mercado's legal claims "necessarily
depend" on the 2008 amendments.
See id. at 384.
Accordingly, her
claims "aris[e] under" an Act of Congress passed after December 1,
1990.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
C.
The District Court mistakenly concluded otherwise by
holding that the ADAAA merely "clarif[ied]" a pre-existing ADA
right to be protected from "regarded as" discrimination.
86 F. Supp. 3d at 49.
Mercado,
According to the District Court, this
conclusion followed because it was "apparent" that the "elements"
of the ADA's definition of "disability" were "identical" pre- and
post-amendment by the ADAA.
Id. at 49 n.2.
Thus, the District
Court ruled that Mercado's claims "would have been actionable under
the original provisions of the ADA."
But,
as
we
have
Id. at 49.
explained,
the
ADAAA
added
a
new
paragraph to the ADA that changed the definition of the term
"regarded as having such an impairment."
ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4, § 3(3)(A).
That new paragraph
removed a key element of that definition and thereby broadened the
ADA's substantive scope.
Thus, contrary to the District Court's
assertion, the elements of the definition pre- and post-amendment
are not identical.
They are instead substantively distinct, with
the consequence that the amended definition creates a broader right
- 18 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 19
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
to be free from "regarded as" discrimination than did the unamended
definition.
To be sure, the preamble to the ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110325,
sec.
originally
2,
§§
2(a)(4),
intended
the
2(b)(1),
term
does
state
"regarded
as
that
having
Congress
such
an
impairment" to be read more broadly than the Supreme Court read it
to be in Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
But, even if that statement can
be said to have characterized the 2008 amendments as having merely
clarified (rather than altered) the original scope of the ADA,
such a legislative statement cannot strip the 2008 amendments of
the "substantive effect" that they undeniably had.
explicitly rejected Sutton.
broadened
the
definition
The ADAAA
In so doing, the ADAAA quite clearly
of
being
"regarded
as"
having
an
impairment beyond what it had been under the previously controlling
Supreme Court interpretation of that phrase.
Pub. L. No. 110-325,
sec. 2, § 2(b)(3), sec. 4, § 3(3)(A).
Thus, this is not a case in which "there was a split of
authority regarding the scope of the original statute" that would
require us to "determine whether the amendment clarified existing
law or created new rights and liabilities."
385.
Jones, 541 U.S. at
Rather, this is a case in which the substantive effect of
the amendments in question is clear.
Those 2008 amendments
rejected the narrow interpretation of the statute set forth in a
controlling Supreme Court opinion.
- 19 -
By doing so, those amendments
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 20
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
clearly created new rights and liabilities.
have
explained,
Mercado's
claims
Entry ID: 5980926
And because, as we
"necessarily
depend"
on
the
expanded liability created by those amendments, her claims are
governed by the catch-all limitations period that § 1658 sets
forth.
See Jones, 541 U.S. at 384.
D.
The defendants do make one additional argument against
our conclusion, but we do not find it to be persuasive.
The
defendants argue that § 1658's limitations period does not apply
because Mercado's actual complaint alleges that she was regarded
by the defendants as having a "major" mental impairment rather
than a minor one. [Administración Br. 23]. The defendants contend
that this reference to a "major" impairment in her complaint shows
that her complaint alleges facts that would have been sufficient
to state a claim even under the ADA as it stood after Sutton but
before the enactment of the ADAAA. For that reason, the defendants
assert, Mercado's claims do not "necessarily depend" on -- and
thus are not "made possible by" -- the 2008 amendments set forth
in the ADA.
Rather, the defendants argue that her complaint -- on
the strength of the factual allegation that she was "regarded as"
having a "major" impairment -- states claims on which relief under
the ADA could have been granted even if the ADAAA had never been
enacted.
- 20 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 21
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
The defendants' contention arguably draws support from
the
fact
that
environment,
the
Jones
wrongful
plaintiffs'
termination,
claims
and
of
failure
hostile
to
work
transfer
"alleged violations of the amended statute" but "did not allege a
violation of the pre-1990 version of section 1981." 541 U.S. at
383 (emphasis added).
Here, by contrast, defendants contend that
Mercado is -- by referring to a "major" impairment in her complaint
-- alleging a claim that she could have brought under the original
version of the ADA.
But we do not believe Jones requires that we attribute
the significance that defendants do to the complaint's reference
to a "major" impairment.
The 1991 amendment to § 1981 that was at
issue in Jones left the pre-existing version of the discrimination
claim intact even as it also made possible new discrimination
claims by subjecting post-contract-formation conduct to § 1981
liability for the first time.
The ADAAA, by contrast, replaced
the pre-existing "regarded as" claim with a new "regarded as" claim
that requires a plaintiff to plead and prove one fewer element.
The ADAAA thus did not add a new claim so much as it reduced the
requirements to prove an existing one.
But this difference in the
form that Congress used to enlarge liability does not mean that
the ADAAA did not "ma[k]e possible" Mercado's claims.
541 U.S. at 382.
- 21 -
See Jones,
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 22
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
Just as the 1991 amendment to § 1981 at issue in Jones
allowed plaintiffs to plead and prove elements of a discrimination
claim that previously was not available, so, too, does the ADAAA.
Under the 2008 amendments, on which Mercado's 2014 complaint
relies, she may now recover for discrimination without showing (as
the ADA previously required) that the defendants regarded her
impairment
as
a
substantially
life-altering
one.
Thus,
by
asserting in her complaint a violation of the new, substantively
broader right protected by the amended ADA rather than the narrower
right protected by the unamended ADA, she is asserting a claim
that did not exist before just as was true of the plaintiffs in
Jones.
The
2008
amendments
therefore
"made
possible"
the
particular legal claims that Mercado has brought, even if her
complaint also contains factual allegations that perhaps could
have supported the different and harder-to-prove "regarded as"
claim that existed prior to the 2008 amendments but that Congress
has replaced and that she is not now bringing.5
Simply put, an amendment to a statute that bars a new,
broader form of discrimination may still "ma[ke] possible" a
plaintiff's suit to redress that discrimination, even if it may be
true that the plaintiff has also suffered a different, more
5
This conclusion obviates the need to engage with the
precedent cited by Mercado for the proposition that her complaint
would not have stated a claim under the pre-ADAAA version of the
ADA.
- 22 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
Page: 23
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
Entry ID: 5980926
specific form of discrimination that the unamended statute already
barred.
We thus conclude that -- notwithstanding the reference to
a "major" impairment in Mercado's complaint -- Mercado's legal
claims "necessarily depend" on the 2008 amendments to the ADA no
less
than
the
Jones
plaintiffs'
legal
claims
depend[ed]" on the 1991 amendment to § 1981.
"necessarily
See id. at 384.
Indeed, in this case, a contrary conclusion would oddly make the
catch-all limitations period that § 1658 sets forth applicable
only
if
Mercado
amended
her
complaint
to
delete
a
factual
allegation that she need not make in order to plead the only
"regarded
as"
complaint.
claims
that
she
actually
brings
in
her
2014
We decline to read Jones to require such a strange
result.
IV.
Congress enacted § 1658 in order to reduce the need for
litigation about how best to fill the "void" that arises when
statutes fail to specify the limitations period applicable to the
causes of action they create.
See Jones, 541 U.S. at 380.
Recognizing that purpose, Jones construed § 1658 broadly.
380-82.
Id. at
Following the same interpretive approach, and consistent
with our precedent instructing that we should do so, see Millay,
762
F.3d
at
155-57,
we
conclude
that
§
1658
supplies
the
limitations period here, due to the 2008 amendments that "made
possible" Mercado's claims.
See Jones, 541 U.S. at 382.
- 23 -
Case: 15-1327
Document: 00116965692
For
the
Page: 24
foregoing
Date Filed: 02/29/2016
reasons,
we
reverse
the
Entry ID: 5980926
District
Court's order of dismissal and we remand for further proceedings.
- 24 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?