US v. Castrillon-Sanchez
Filing
OPINION issued by Rogeriee Thompson, Appellate Judge; William J. Kayatta , Jr., Appellate Judge and David J. Barron, Appellate Judge. Published. [16-1463]
Case: 16-1463
Document: 00117172115
Page: 1
Date Filed: 06/28/2017
Entry ID: 6102608
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1463
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROSA E. CASTRILLÓN-SÁNCHEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Kayatta, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Jose R. Gaztambide-Aneses, on brief for appellant.
James I. Pearce, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Leslie R. Caldwell,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Sung-Hee Suh,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Wifredo A.
Ferrer, United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida, H.
Ron Davidson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charles R.
Walsh, Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, and Luke Cass, Trial
Attorney, Criminal Division, on brief for appellee.
June 28, 2017
Case: 16-1463
Document: 00117172115
BARRON,
Circuit
Page: 2
Date Filed: 06/28/2017
Judge.
Rosa
E.
Entry ID: 6102608
Castrillón-Sánchez
("Castrillón") led a large-scale fraudulent financial scheme for
five years.
After the scheme came to an end, she pleaded guilty
to criminal charges, based on her conduct during the course of
the
scheme.
On
appeal,
she
substantively unreasonable.
contends
that
her
sentence
was
We affirm.
I.
In July 2010, a federal grand jury in the District of
Puerto Rico charged Castrillón and eight others with a variety
of criminal conduct.
with
conspiracy
violation
of
to
18
The first count charged all defendants
commit
U.S.C.
wire
fraud
§ 1349.
and
Castrillón
bank
and
fraud,
various
in
co-
defendants were also charged with eleven counts of wire fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; fourteen counts of bank fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and four counts of money
laundering,
Castrillón
in
violation
alone
was
of
18
charged
U.S.C.
with
§
four
1957(a).
counts
of
Finally,
aggravated
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
The charges pertained to a fraudulent scheme that ran
from April 2005 to March 2010.
During that time, Castrillón and
her co-defendants falsely and fraudulently induced over ninety
people to provide Castrillón with funds totaling more than five
million
dollars.
Those
funds
allegedly
came
from
victims'
savings and brokerage accounts, loans provided by their family
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Case: 16-1463
and
Document: 00117172115
friends,
and
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unsecured
Date Filed: 06/28/2017
personal
loans
made
by
Entry ID: 6102608
financial
institutions.
According
to
the
pre-sentence
investigation
report
(PSR) prepared by the probation office prior to sentencing, the
fraud
operated
individual
and
as
follows.
confide
Castrillón
that
she
was
would
the
befriend
beneficiary
of
an
a
Certificate of Deposit or trust for a large amount of money that
was either pledged as collateral or frozen at a local bank.
Castrillón would tell the targeted individual that she needed
money to enable her to obtain the funds that she was due as the
beneficiary of the Certificate of Deposit or trust, and that she
would pay the targeted individual back once she obtained her
funds.
Castrillón would often induce her victims to take out
bank loans and provide her with the proceeds of those loans.
Sometimes, Castrillón also prepared fraudulent documents for the
targeted
individuals
to
submit
to
banks,
so
that
those
individuals could obtain loans and then give the resulting funds
to
Castrillón.
Castrillón
also
used
targeted
individuals'
personal information to obtain loans or cash advances in their
names and without their knowledge.
fraud,
Castrillón
prevented
And, to help perpetuate the
targets
from
contacting
law
enforcement by giving them lulling payments or by threatening
them with violence, criminal liability, or the loss of their
money.
Overall, the fraud continued for five years.
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The grand jury indicted Castrillón in July 2010, and
she was arrested the next day.
In December 2013, Castrillón
pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to two of the
indictment's
counts:
one
count
of
conspiracy
to
commit
wire
fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and one
count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1028A.
The
District
Court
dismissed
the
remaining
counts
against Castrillón on the government's motion.
The
plea
recommendations
based
agreement
on
set
calculations
States Sentencing Guidelines.1
forth
made
under
sentencing
the
United
With respect to the conspiracy
count, the plea agreement calculated Castrillón's base offense
level as seven, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), and then applied an
eighteen-level enhancement based on the amount of money lost,
id. at § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J); a four-level enhancement based on the
number of victims who suffered substantial financial hardship,
id.
at
§
2B1.1(b)(2)(B);
Castrillón's
§ 3B1.1(a);
role
and
a
as
a
a
four-level
leader
two-level
of
enhancement
the
reduction
conspiracy,
based
on
based
on
id.
at
Castrillón's
acceptance of responsibility for her actions, id. at § 3E1.1(a).
The plea agreement thus determined Castrillón's total offense
1
All citations to provisions of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines are to the versions of those provisions in
effect at the time of Castrillón's plea agreement and
sentencing, respectively.
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level to be 31.
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Date Filed: 06/28/2017
Entry ID: 6102608
The plea agreement did not stipulate a criminal
history category for Castrillón.
But, the plea agreement did
note that, assuming a criminal history category of I (the lowest
level), a total offense level of 31 corresponds to a guidelines
sentencing range of 108-135 months' imprisonment.
U.S.S.G. Ch.
5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
For
the
aggravated
identity
theft
count,
the
agreement relied on a sentence prescribed by statute.
has
mandated
aggravated
a
sentence
identity
theft,
consecutively
with
any
§ 1028A(b).
The
plea
of
24
18
U.S.C.
other
term
agreement
months'
plea
Congress
imprisonment
§ 1028A(a)(1),
of
recommended
to
imprisonment,
thus
for
run
id.
a
at
total
sentence of 132 months' imprisonment: 108 months for conspiracy
to commit wire fraud and bank fraud -- the low end of the
guidelines range -- and 24 months for aggravated identity theft.
At sentencing, the District Court considered the PSR,
which
recounted
Castrillón's
conduct
in
detail
recommendations concerning Castrillón's sentence.
and
made
With respect
to the conspiracy count, the PSR's calculation of the total
offense level was identical to the plea agreement's calculation,
except in one respect: the PSR found applicable a two-level
enhancement based on the vulnerability of Castrillón's victims,
many
of
whom
3A1.1(b)(1).
were
elderly
and
unsophisticated.
U.S.S.G.
§
As a result, the PSR calculated a total offense
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level of 33, rather than the plea agreement's total offense
level of 31.
The PSR also determined that Castrillón's criminal
history category was II.
Based on these determinations, the PSR
calculated
sentencing
a
imprisonment.
guidelines
range
of
151-188
months'
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
With
respect to the aggravated identity theft count, the PSR, like
the plea agreement, noted the mandatory 24 months' imprisonment
required by 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
The
sentencing
District
memorandum,
Court
which
also
considered
contended
that
Castrillón's
the
two-level
enhancement for vulnerable victims added by the PSR wrongfully
"double counts" the enhancements already agreed upon in the plea
agreement.
Castrillón also contended that her criminal activity
was attributable to her gambling addition, that she had begun
the
process
of
rehabilitation,
that
the
probability
of
recidivism was low, and that in several past fraud cases the
various enhancements applicable to her were not applied and the
resulting sentences were considerably lower.
At sentencing, Castrillón's attorney told the District
Court that Castrillón did not dispute the facts set forth in the
PSR.
Castrillón's attorney also stated that Castrillón had no
objections beyond those set forth in her sentencing memorandum.
In sentencing Castrillón for the conspiracy count, the
District Court followed the PSR in finding Castrillón's total
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offense level to be 33.
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However, the District Court determined
Castrillón's criminal history category to be I rather than II.
The District Court thus concluded that the guidelines sentencing
range
for
Castrillón
for
months' imprisonment.
The
the
conspiracy
count
was
135-168
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
District
Court
stated
that
it
found
that
the
guidelines calculations "satisfactorily reflect the components
of the offense" and that it "ha[d] considered all factors" in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The District Court further noted "the grave
nature of the offense of conviction, the number of defendant's
victims and their deep suffering, [Castrillón's] leadership role
in the conspiracy, [and] the duration of the scheme and the
amount of the victims' losses."
For
Castrillón
to
these
135
reasons,
months'
the
District
imprisonment
Court
for
the
sentenced
conspiracy
count -- a sentence that is at the low end of the guidelines
range that the District Court found applicable.
The
District
Court
also
sentenced
Castrillón
to
24
months' imprisonment for the aggravated identity theft count, as
required by law.
serve
these
The District Court sentenced Castrillón to
terms
consecutively,
imprisonment of 159 months.
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for
a
total
term
of
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II.
Castrillón
filed
this
timely
appeal
in
which
she
challenges only the substantive reasonableness of her sentence,
as she disclaims any grounds for claiming procedural error.
The
government argues that Castrillón waived the right to appeal.
But, even if we look past the asserted waiver and assume that
Castrillón
is
permitted
to
bring
this
appeal,
her
challenge
fails.
For
a
preserved
challenge
to
the
substantive
reasonableness of a sentence, "we proceed under the abuse of
discretion
rubric,
circumstances."
taking
account
of
the
totality
of
the
United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223,
226 (1st Cir. 2015).
Where, as here, a defendant does not
preserve an objection to the substantive reasonableness of their
sentence,
"[t]he
applicable
standard
of
review
is
somewhat
blurred" as to whether the ordinary abuse of discretion standard
or
the
plain
error
standard
applies.
Id.
at
228.
But
Castrillón's challenge fails even under the abuse of discretion
standard.
"A sentence is substantively reasonable so long as it
rests
on
a
'plausible
'defensible result.'"
sentencing
rationale'
and
embodies
a
Id. at 228 (quoting United States v.
Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)).
"[T]here is not a
single reasonable sentence but, rather, a range of reasonable
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sentences," and, "[c]onsequently, reversal will result if -- and
only if -- the sentencing court's ultimate determination falls
outside the expansive boundaries of that universe."
Martin, 520
F.3d at 92.
In this case, the District Court explained that the
sentence was based on the gravity of the offense, given the
duration of the fraud, the losses suffered, and the nature of
the victims.
Moreover, the sentence fell within the range of
imprisonment set forth in the guidelines.
And, "a defendant who
attempts to brand a within-the-range sentence as unreasonable
must carry a heavy burden."
United States v. Pelletier, 469
F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States v. VegaSalgado, 769 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v.
King, 741 F.3d 305, 310 (1st Cir. 2014).
Castrillón
given
the
engaged.
fails
contemptible
to
nature
carry
of
that
the
burden,
conduct
in
especially
which
she
Castrillón does identify various mitigating factors
that she contends reveal that the District Court abused its
discretion by not imposing a lighter sentence.2
But, the fact
that "the sentencing court chose not to attach to certain of the
2
In particular, Castrillón identifies the following
mitigating facts: the many negative effects of her compulsive
gambling disorder, including the disorder's role as a cause of
her criminal activity; the pain caused by her separation from
her family, especially her son; her efforts at rehabilitation;
her low chance of recidivism; her remorse; and disparities
between her sentence and those in other cases.
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mitigating factors the significance that the appellant thinks
they deserved does not make the sentence unreasonable."
United
States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Colón-Rodríguez, 696 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir.
2012) (same).
To the contrary, we have upheld sentences as
substantively reasonable where -- as here -- "the district court
sufficiently weighed the history and characteristics of both the
offense and the offender" and sentenced "within the universe of
acceptable outcomes."
United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629
F.3d 68, 78 (1st Cir. 2010).
And, from all that the record
reveals, that is what the District Court did here.
III.
For these reasons, appellant's sentence is affirmed.
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