United States v. Fishman

Filing

[9870933] Affirmed;Terminated on the merits after submissions without oral hearing;Written, signed, published; Judges Tymkovich, Seymour and Anderson (authoring). Mandate to issue.

FILED
Appellate Case: 09-5155

Document: 01018648613

United States Court of Appeals
Date Filed: 05/27/2011 Page: 1
Tenth Circuit

May 27, 2011
PUBLISH

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.

No. 09-5155

STEVEN FISHMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 4:07-CR-00195-CVE-4)

Submitted on the briefs: *
Steven Fishman, Pro Se, San Pedro, California, Defendant - Appellant.
Thomas Scott Woodward, United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma,
and Kevin C. Leitch, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Plaintiff - Appellee.

Before TYMKOVICH, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

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ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

Defendant and appellant Steven Fishman was found guilty by a jury of
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money
laundering. He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, three years of
supervised release, and $3,684,213 in restitution. Challenging his conviction and
sentence on numerous grounds, Mr. Fishman brings this appeal. We affirm his
conviction and sentence.

BACKGROUND
I.

Caribou Program
Beginning in the late 1990s, Mr. Fishman, along with co-conspirators

Robert Searles, Joseph Lynn Thornburgh, Wayne Davidson, and others,
participated in a fraudulent investment scheme based on the sale of interests in
worthless (except as collectibles) bonds issued in 1913 by the Chinese
government (“Chinese bonds”), 1 and in the 1850s by the long-since bankrupt
Galveston, Houston and Henderson Railroad (“GH&H” or “Galveston bonds”).
These and similar antique bonds were referred to as “historic bonds.” The sales

1

“Chinese Government 5% Reorganisation Gold Loan of 1913” bonds
issued by the Chinese government led by Yuan Shikai, as described by a Searles
depository certificate. R. Vol. 6 at 2001-02. Those obligations were later
repudiated by the succeeding government of the People’s Republic of China.
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pitch for the obsolete Galveston bonds, which were the primary product,
portrayed them as immensely valuable for use as secondary collateral to obtain
huge lines of credit from unspecified European banks. The supposed credit lines
would then support unspecified “high yield” trading programs which would
allegedly produce a return on bond investment of around ten-fold per week for
forty weeks. Thus, for example, it was represented, that an investment of
$100,000 to participate in the profits from one 1855 $100 face value ten percent
GH&H historic bond would yield profits of $1,100,000 per week for forty weeks,
for a total return in a year or less of $44,000,000. R. Vol. 1 at 60. And, to make
the investment opportunity more enticing, prospective investors were promised, in
writing, a full refund of their money in sixty days if profits were not paid as
specified.
To support such a rosy scenario for investors, the conspirators clothed the
bonds in value by paying an individual to act as an “authenticator” not only as to
the authenticity of a bond (actual original) but also as to its worth according to
the authenticator’s own terminology, theory and method. The authenticator then
determined worth not in terms of sale, investment or redemption value but in
terms of a “hypothecation valuation,” i.e., potential use as a pledge against credit,
by calculating compound interest for 144-plus years and the weight of gold to be
used for payment, valued at the current market, and then using a formula to arrive
at a result. The results were astronomical. Thus, for instance, as of January 1,
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2000, the authenticator, John Clancy, placed a hypothecation valuation of
$1,840,763,697 on each $100 GH&H ten percent bond. R. Vol. 6 at 2337-39. By
2003 Clancy was assigning a value of almost fifteen billion dollars to each $500
Galveston bond. Id. at 2153-54. The conspirators further bolstered their story by
representing that the Florida Supreme Court had secretly issued an opinion, being
kept under seal in chambers, which established the validity of the bonds. They
also assured prospects that the United States government had assumed the
railroad’s obligation for the bonds following the civil war, and that the obligation
represented by the bonds was still a “live” debt backed by the Federal
government. R. Vol. 4 at 1218.
In general (the details of each sale varied from investor to investor), the
mechanics of the operation called for investors to enter into a “NonCircumvention/Non-Disclosure and Joint Venture Agreement” (“Agreement”)
with Caribou Capital Corporation (“Caribou”), a North Carolina corporation set
up by Robert Searles and operated by him on behalf of the conspirators out of its
home office in Madisonville, Tennessee. Caribou was designated on the
documents as the Program Coordinator, and described in the Agreement as having
“valuable knowledge of private placement programs dealing in Historical Gold
Backed Railroad Bonds.” R. Vol. 1 at 60. Investor funds were largely deposited
in the Caribou bank account at the SunTrust Bank in Loudon, Tennessee, and
disbursements to the conspirators were mostly made from that account, with
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Searles acting as paymaster. The GH&H bonds, in the name of either Searles or
Thornburgh, were placed in a “Safekeeping Depository” which issued
Safekeeping Receipts or Certificates representing the bonds. The original
certificates were then sent to Patrick Henriette, the group’s designated “Program
Manager” in Europe, ostensibly for presentation to European banks. A certified
copy of each certificate was sent to the purchasing investor. Id.
After obtaining money from an investor, the conspirators employed stalling
tactics to explain away the lack of any promised return. For literally years, one or
another of the conspirators advanced excuse after excuse and glowing progress
reports designed to string the increasingly distressed investors along and lull them
into not taking any action. Some investors were also offered a new opportunity to
invest in the Chinese bonds for a “can’t miss” quick deal where the alleged
imminent redemption of those bonds by the current government of China would
make the investor whole. When those tactics finally wore out, investors were
offered yet another document (Termination and Hold Harmless Agreement) to
sign, promising a full refund of their initial investment on an agreement not to
sue. Predictably, no refund occurred. The end game had the conspirators
blaming each other, nefarious government agents, and government seizures of
bonds and files, for thwarting the investment program.
Throughout, the co-conspirators generally cooperated with one another,
interdependently, to further the goals of the conspiracy to sell interests in the
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worthless bonds. Mr. Searles, as president and organizer of Caribou, operated at
the business and banking center of the enterprise both as a salesman and a
manager. Mr. Thornburgh was in sales. Mr. Davidson was in sales in New
Zealand and Australia. Mr. Henriette provided the European window dressing,
and Mr. Fishman provided the “neural glue,” as described by the government. In
aid of the efforts by Messrs. Thornburgh, Davidson and Searles, Mr. Fishman
drafted and furnished documents, consulted with investors both before and after
investment, traveled to Europe with Mr. Thornburgh to meet with Henriette and
supposed bank contacts, hosted at least one meeting of investors at his home,
drafted and furnished lulling progress reports, provided bonds, picked up bonds
from escrow, supplied the names of “authenticators,” and sold or attempted to sell
both railroad and Chinese bonds. He and Mr. Thornburgh shared $108,000 or
more, paid directly to them by one investor supposedly to defray ongoing
personal expenses allegedly relating to the bond program. R. Vol. 3 (7 of 8) at
837.
That investor, Dr. Wayne Maltz, described his investment experience as
follows: There was a lot of correspondence, faxes and e-mails, “mostly . . .
written by Mr. Fishman” about the program. “Mr. Fishman came into the picture
to tell us how these bonds were going to be placed.” Id. at 808. Another witness,
an investor’s CPA, described the sales process this way:

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A. Well, Mr. Thornburgh – I would characterize him as the
salesperson. . . . [H]e’s the one that brought the parties to the table.
And then later, we were introduced to Mr. Fishman, who then would
reiterate the mechanics of the deal. And that’s how we got
knowledge of the next level of the investment.
...
A. We would be on the phone with Mr. Thornburgh, and we
would ask pointed questions. And he would always then refer us to
Mr. Fishman, who did have the answers to the more technical
questions.
Id. at 921-22.
...
A. [L]ater [after no payments were received] we started
calling Bob Searles. And Bob Searles actually was the only one that
seemed to try to help, quite frankly.
Id. at 933.
In 2002, Messrs. Thornburgh and Searles parted ways. However, Mr.
Fishman maintained relationships with both, and both remained involved in the
bond program.
The conspiracy ran to mid-2005. During its life no bonds were placed with
a financial institution, no lines of credit were granted, no trading programs, highyield or otherwise, were established, no profits or other returns were realized, and
no payments to investors were made under the terms of their agreements with
Caribou. 2 The total number of victims exceeded 250, and the total known loss

2

Small payments out of money paid in by later investors were made to some
investors who applied sufficient pressure. While those payments could be
(continued...)
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was $4,057,846.26. 3 Mr. Fishman received a total of $343,629.50 personally
from the Caribou program.

II.

Cooperation by Fishman
The conspiracy came to a halt following a lengthy investigation that started

with a complaint by an investor to the United States Postal Inspection Service in
the Northern District of Oklahoma in early 2003. The complainant said she had
made an investment in the Caribou program but had not received what she had
been promised. Several U.S. federal agencies joined in the investigation, as well
as an agency in New Zealand. Postal Agent Albert Chapa and IRS Agent
Katherine Beckner were the primary initial investigators in Oklahoma. This
investigation led to the indictment against Mr. Fishman and his co-conspirators,
first filed in November 2007.
While the investigation was being pursued in Oklahoma, a similar inquiry
was being conducted in Illinois into the activities of Peter Zaccagnino, with
whom Fishman as well as Thornburgh and Searles had been associated. Mr.
2

(...continued)
characterized as Ponzi-like, they were often labeled as loans, and probably were
more in the nature of a partial return of investment monies since they bore no
relationship to promised profits on investment.
3

The United States postal inspector who initially investigated complaints
about the Caribou conspiracy testified that there were twenty investors in the
United States and 490 international investors, mostly from New Zealand, where
co-conspirator Mr. Davidson lived and operated.
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Fishman testified before the grand jury in Illinois without raising his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination at any point. The investigating
authorities assured Mr. Fishman he was not, at that time, a target of the
investigation; rather he was a fact witness providing information about the
fraudulent scheme to sell railroad bonds. Additionally, at no time was Mr.
Fishman granted immunity of any kind for his testimony. Investigators in Illinois
then talked with the investigators of the Caribou program in Oklahoma, and they
told the Oklahoma investigators that Mr. Fishman had been cooperating. Agent
Chapa estimated that Mr. Fishman turned over to him approximately 5,000
documents relating to the Caribou program.
At some point after Mr. Fishman had turned over his bonds as part of the
documents he provided to the investigating authorities, he sought the return of the
bonds from Agent Chapa. They were returned to Mr. Fishman. Subsequently,
pursuant to Agent Chapa’s request, Mr. Fishman gave the bonds back after Agent
Chapa told Mr. Fishman that returning the bonds would be an act of good faith.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 2004, Mr. Fishman received a subpoena to testify
before a grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma. The subpoena did not
contain an advice of rights, and Mr. Fishman was not identified as a target of the
investigation being conducted at that time. When Mr. Fishman received a second
subpoena, dated August 24, 2006, it was a target subpoena identifying him as a
target of the investigation and it did contain an advice of rights. Among the
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“rights” listed was the following: “You are notified that you are a target of an
investigation for possible violations of federal criminal law.” Id. at 210.
That same day, Mr. Fishman sent an e-mail to Assistant United States
Attorney (“AUSA”) Kevin Leitch in Oklahoma, stating his concern about the
advice of rights, reminding Mr. Leitch of Mr. Fishman’s full cooperation and
stating that he did not intend to hire counsel. He further expressed his hope that,
after his grand jury testimony, the authorities would cease viewing him as a
target.
When Mr. Fishman appeared before the grand jury on September 6, 2006,
he declined to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He
did not receive immunity for his testimony. He alleges that he testified and
incriminated himself. Agent Chapa subsequently testified that, throughout the
investigation, Mr. Fishman had expressed his concern about his status as a
potential target, and repeatedly asked the agent if he would be charged with a
crime. Agent Chapa stated that he never offered Mr. Fishman a “deal” or
immunity of any kind, nor did he have the authority to do so.
When Mr. Fishman made another trip to Tulsa in February 2007 to meet
with Agent Chapa and AUSAs Leitch and Charles McLoughlin, he was handed a
letter notifying him that he was a target of a federal investigation. AUSA
McLoughlin told Mr. Fishman that he could be charged with a crime. Mr.
Fishman indicated he still wanted to cooperate. Agent Chapa drove Mr. Fishman
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to the Federal Public Defender’s office in Tulsa, where counsel was appointed to
represent Mr. Fishman.

III.

Subsequent Proceedings
Subsequently, Mr. Fishman, along with Mr. Thornburgh, went to trial on a

second superseding indictment, filed on June 2, 2009, alleging a conspiracy to
commit mail and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1349,
and a conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (h), and 1957(a). Count one addressed the promotion and
sale of the bonds, whose value was vastly overrepresented and promised returns
falsified. Count two addressed the distribution of funds through the SunTrust
account to Mr. Fishman and his fellow co-conspirators. Messrs. Fishman and
Thornburgh were also subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28
U.S.C. § 2461(c). 4
Mr. Fishman filed a host of pre-trial motions, all of which were denied.
We address each one as it is relevant to the issues Mr. Fishman raises on appeal.
Those issues are: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment as being the fruit of effectively immunized statements; (2) there was

4

While Mr. Fishman and Mr. Thornburgh were tried together, Mr. Searles
pled guilty. Mr. Searles’ recent challenge to his sentence was rejected by this
court on direct appeal. United States v. Searles, 2011 WL 488750 (10th Cir.
Feb. 11, 2011).
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insufficient evidence to support his convictions on both counts one and two;
(3) there was a fatal variance from the indictment because the indictment alleged
one conspiracy but the evidence at trial established multiple conspiracies; (4) the
applicable statute of limitations had expired by the time the indictment was filed;
(5) the jury instructions on money laundering were erroneous; and (6) the district
court erred in its application of the sentencing guidelines and in its selection of
the amount for restitution. Acting pro se, Mr. Fishman adds the issue that his
conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution. 5

DISCUSSION
I.

Motion to Dismiss Indictment Stemming from Allegedly Immunized
Statements
Mr Fishman argues that he believed that his substantial cooperation with

the investigating authorities, including his taking certain actions which he was
assured were viewed as “good faith” conduct, would implicitly provide him with

5

During the pendency of this appeal, we permitted Mr. Fishman’s first
court-appointed attorney, Stanley D. Monroe, to withdraw after he filed Mr.
Fishman’s opening brief. Mr. Monroe was replaced by a second court-appointed
attorney, J. Lance Hopkins, who filed a reply brief for Mr. Fishman. Mr. Hopkins
was also permitted to withdraw as counsel, pursuant to Mr. Fishman’s request,
and we permitted Mr. Fishman to proceed on appeal pro se. Mr. Fishman then
filed his own pro se reply brief, and asked that we strike from the record Mr.
Hopkins’ reply brief. We did so. See 11/4/10 Order at 2 (“The reply brief filed
by attorney Hopkins is stricken.”). We therefore do not consider the arguments
made by Mr. Hopkins in his reply brief.
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immunity from prosecution. He accordingly filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss
the indictment because it was based on statements he had made before the grand
jury and/or to authorities in other contexts, which he claims were effectively
immunized because of that substantial cooperation. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the court denied the motion, stating:
Defendant’s subjective belief that he would not be prosecuted
simply because he cooperated with the investigation was
unreasonable, and he has not made a prima facie showing that he had
any type of agreement with investigators or the United States
Attorney’s office that would prevent him from being charged with a
crime in this case. . . . There is no credible evidence that defendant
had an express or implied immunity agreement, nor is there any
evidence that defendant entered an agreement with the United States
Attorney’s office to reduce or eliminate his potential criminal
liability.
Op. & Order at 11, R. Vol. 1, Part 2 at 216. 6 We review the district court’s
decision whether to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Alcarez-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006).
“Congress has authorized the grant of use immunity to those persons
ordered to testify before a grand jury.” United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 972

6

There are two types of immunity for a witness—use immunity and
transactional immunity. Use immunity “confers immunity only against the use of
testimony compelled under the immunizing order; it does not confer transactional
immunity under which the witness could not be prosecuted at all for the
transactions about which he testifies.” In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan, 352
F.3d 437, 443 (C.A. D. C. 2003) (per curiam); see also United States v. Gutierrez,
696 F.2d 753, 756 n.6 (10th Cir. 1982) (“[F]or purposes of constitutional doctrine
use immunity is a subset of transactional immunity.”).
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(10th Cir. 1996). However, “[T]he United States attorney and his superiors have
the sole power to apply for immunity.” United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208,
1217 (10th Cir. 2005).
If “a defendant shows that he or she has been compelled to testify under a
grant of use immunity about a matter relevant to his or her prosecution, the
burden then shifts to the government to demonstrate that ‘all of the evidence it
proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.’” Id. (quoting
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972)). Mr. Fishman claims he
did, in effect, testify under a grant of use immunity, so he argues the government
must prove that all of the evidence it used to convict him was derived from
legitimate independent sources. We disagree.
In this case, it is clear that Mr. Fishman did not invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse to testify before the grand jury. And, despite his
many allusions to immunity, it is also clear that no one with the authority to grant
him use immunity did so. While he claims he thought asserting his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was merely a formality, the reality is
that his silence regarding that right indicates he waived it and testified without the
benefit of an immunity agreement.
Mr. Fishman also emphasizes Agent Chapa’s statement that he would be
demonstrating “good faith” by returning the bonds to the authorities; but that falls
far short of an expression of immunity. Agent Chapa made it clear, in any event,
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that he lacked authority to grant immunity. The district court accordingly did not
err in refusing to dismiss the indictment, or in permitting Mr. Fishman’s grand
jury testimony to be admitted at trial.

II.

Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Fishman made an oral motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 at the

close of the government’s case, and after all parties rested, for acquittal based on
the insufficiency of the evidence. He renewed the motion after the verdicts were
announced. The district court denied the motions on each occasion.
“We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, but in
doing so we owe considerable deference to the jury’s verdict.” United States v.
King, 632 F.3d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 2011) (further quotation omitted). We ask
only “whether taking the evidence—both direct and circumstantial, together with
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—in the light most favorable to
the government, a reasonable jury would find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (further quotation omitted). In conducting this review, we
do not “weigh conflicting evidence or consider witness credibility, as that duty is
delegated exclusively to the jury.” Id. (further quotation omitted).

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A. Count One: Conspiracy to Commit Mail and/or Wire Fraud
We begin with the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s guilty verdict as to count one, conspiracy to commit wire and
mail fraud. First, a conspiracy to commit wire and/or mail fraud does not require
proof of an overt act. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005)
(holding that criminal conspiracies modeled after the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
rather than 18 U.S.C. § 371, do not require proof of an overt act to obtain
conviction).
Accordingly, to prove such a conspiracy, the government must demonstrate
that “(1) two or more persons agreed to violate the law, (2) the defendant knew
the essential objectives of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily participated in the conspiracy, and (4) the alleged coconspirators were
interdependent.” United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1136 (10th Cir.)
(further quotation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2170 (2009).
Turning to the substantive crime, “[t]o convict a defendant of wire fraud,
the government must prove three elements: (1) the defendant participated in a
scheme to defraud; (2) the defendant intended to defraud; and (3) a use of an
interstate wire in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.” United States v.
Caldwell, 560 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2009) (further quotation omitted). 7

7

“Because the requisite elements of the two statutes [mail fraud and wire
(continued...)
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Mr. Fishman argues “[t]he evidence failed to show that Mr. Fishman shared
a common goal with the alleged co-conspirators, since the proof did not establish
that Mr. Fishman was aware of the objects of the alleged mail and wire fraud
conspiracy.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 53. He claims he made no false
statements to any of the Caribou investors, that he believed the bonds were
valuable, that he was merely a messenger between the investors and the other
members of the conspiracy, and that he made no money from the sale of bonds to
the Caribou investors. In short, he claims he acted in good faith, merely trying to
help people get rich quickly.
We have carefully reviewed the lengthy record in this case. There is an
abundance of evidence establishing that Mr. Fishman was deeply involved in the
entire fraudulent conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and that he was, as
the government characterized it, “the neural glue of the conspiracy.” Answer Br.
of the United States at 41. Interdependence was clearly proven, as was Mr.
Fishman’s awareness of all aspects of the fraudulent plan. It simply defies belief
that a reasonable juror would conclude that Mr. Fishman could be so integrally
involved in every aspect of the Caribou program and watch as months went by

7

(...continued)
fraud] are virtually identical, this court has held ‘[i]nterpretations of § 1341 are
authoritative in interpreting parallel language in § 1343.’” United States v.
Weiss, 630 F.3d 1263, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lake,
472 F.3d 1247, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007)). Thus, the elements for mail fraud are
essentially the same as those stated for wire fraud.
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with no investors receiving their promised extravagant returns, and yet have no
idea that the entire program was a fraudulent scheme.
Most telling, however, is Mr. Fishman’s admission in his testimony before
the grand jury that, by early 2000, he knew that the bonds had no real value and
that the program was “bogus.” R. Addendum Vol. 13 at 5021, 5038. Yet, the
record is replete with evidence of his continuing efforts to pacify increasingly
angry investors with further misrepresentations and misleading statements, and to
solicit new investors. In sum, there was ample evidence supporting the jury’s
guilty verdict as to count one, particularly in view of the deference we give to the
jury’s verdict. “[A]ny rational trier of fact could have found [Mr. Fishman] guilty
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222,
1228 (10th Cir. 2000).

B. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering
Mr. Fishman also claims there was insufficient evidence supporting the
jury’s guilty verdict on count two, conspiracy to commit money laundering.
Conspiracy to launder money requires proof “(1) that there was an agreement
between two or more persons to commit money laundering and (2) that the
defendant joined the agreement knowing its purpose and with the intent to further
the illegal purpose.” United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1103 (10th Cir.

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2009) (quoting United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 906 (5th Cir. 2006)). To
establish the crime of money laundering:
the government must prove four elements: (1) that the defendant
knowingly conducted a financial transaction; (2) that the funds
involved were proceeds of a specified unlawful activity; (3) that the
defendant knew that the funds involved were proceeds of that
unlawful activity; and (4) that the transaction was designed to
conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the
proceeds.
Caldwell, 560 F.3d at 1221. In this case, the “specified unlawful activity” was
the mail and/or wire fraud.
Mr. Fishman devotes a single paragraph using one-half of a page in his
opening brief to his argument that there was insufficient evidence supporting the
jury’s guilty verdict on the money laundering count. He simply reminds us to
remember the distinction between “money laundering” and “money spending”
(and inferentially the distinction between profits and receipts) in light of the
recent Supreme Court case United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). He thus
alleges, without development or support, that “[t]he focus must be on the criminal
profits, not receipts.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 57. Finally, he notes, again
without elaboration, that our decision in Caldwell is “helpful.” Id. He fails to
explain which element of the conspiracy charge or the money laundering charge
the government failed to prove. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) states that the “appellant’s
brief must contain . . . the argument, which must contain: . . . appellant’s
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of
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the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (emphasis
added). Mr. Fishman’s opening brief on this point is woefully inadequate. 8
Nonetheless, were we to address the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence for a
guilty verdict on the conspiracy-to-money-launder count, we would find the
evidence more than sufficient.
The record reveals ample evidence of the interdependence and constant
communication between Mr. Fishman and his co-conspirators. These
communications reveal Mr. Fishman’s awareness of every aspect of the Caribou
program, from the true value of the bonds, to the reality of where the investors’
money was going, to the fact that there were no high-yield trading programs
operated by major European banks for the benefit of the Caribou investors, and to
the fact that the promised returns to investors were non-existent. Furthermore,
Mr. Fishman was fully aware that some investor deposits were used by the
conspirators to lull restless and suspicious investors into believing that the
conspirators were busily trying to keep the program afloat and capable of

8

Additionally, citations to the lengthy record in this case are marginally
helpful. Few of the citations relate to the actual location in the record of the
material being cited.
We note that arguments regarding sufficiency of the evidence are only
made by Mr. Fishman’s counsel, in the opening brief. In Mr. Fishman’s pro se
reply brief, he makes no argument at all about sufficiency of the evidence. He
does, however, address the Santos issues of profits vs. receipts in the context of
the propriety of the jury instructions in this case. We address that as a separate
appellate argument, infra.
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generating sums of money. Other investor deposits were being distributed
through the SunTrust account and Caribou to the co-conspirators, including to
Mr. Fishman himself.
Once again, it defies belief that a reasonable juror would find that, given
Mr. Fishman’s involvement in every aspect of the Caribou program, he was
nonetheless somehow unaware of the true nature of the program, and that it was,
in fact, a fraudulent scheme involving mail and wire fraud and money laundering.
In sum, as we stated above with respect to count one, “[A]ny rational trier of fact
could have found [Mr. Fishman] guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Wood, 207 F.3d at 1228.
Mr. Fishman’s brief also cites to Santos. In that regard, he focuses in a
conclusory fashion on profits versus receipts. Because he did not raise this issue
below, we review the question under a plain error standard. See United States v.
Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
For the reasons stated in greater detail, infra, when we discuss the propriety
of the jury instructions on money laundering, we conclude that even assuming,
arguendo, that some error occurred on this subject with respect to the sufficiency
of the evidence, that error did not constitute plain error.

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Variance—One vs. Many Conspiracies
The second superseding indictment alleged a single conspiracy to commit

mail and wire fraud and launder the proceeds. Mr. Fishman “contends that there
were a minimum of three . . . or more conspiracies demonstrated at trial. Some of
the players were Sloan DuPont, Terry Nelson, David Watson, Peter Zaccagnino,
Deno Nerozzi, Sam Kram, Mr. Davidson, Mr. Searles, Mr. Thornburgh, among
others.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 58. In his reply brief, Mr. Fishman makes a
more specific argument, alleging that there were at least three separate
conspiracies—one involving Mr. Zaccagnino, the Caribou program, and the
Chinese bond conspiracy involving Norah Cali, the claimed niece of Alan
Greenspan. He suggests there was perhaps a fourth “activity,” which he claims
was not a conspiracy at all, involving the purchase of bonds from Mr. Fishman by
a woman named Barbara Johnson. Mr. Fishman concedes that perhaps the
Zaccagnino conspiracy was “peripheral” to the Caribou scheme, but steadfastly
maintains the others were entirely separate. Mr. Fishman failed to raise this issue
in his Rule 29 motion below.
“Where ‘an indictment charges a single conspiracy, but the evidence
presented at trial proves only the existence of multiple conspiracies,’ a variance
occurs.” United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Carnagie, 533 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)). In
reviewing a claimed variance, “‘we view the evidence and draw all reasonable
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inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, asking
whether a reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty of the charged
conspirac[y] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Carnagie, 533 F.3d at
1237). We consider the “existence of a variance that would support acquittal [a]s
a matter of law that we review de novo.” Id. (citing United States v. Griffin, 493
F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We treat a conspiracy variance claim as an attack
on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that each
defendant was a member of the same conspiracy.”)).
Because it is difficult to distinguish between a single large conspiracy and
several smaller conspiracies, “we will generally defer to the jury’s determination
of the matter.” Id. at 1329. In reviewing a jury finding that a single, rather than
multiple, conspiracy existed, “a focal point of the analysis is whether the alleged
coconspirators’ conduct exhibited interdependence.” United States v. Edwards,
69 F.3d 419, 432 (10th Cir. 1995). Co-conspirators are interdependent when they
“inten[d] to act together for their shared mutual benefit within the scope of the
conspiracy charged.” United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir. 1992).
“Circumstantial evidence alone is often sufficient to demonstrate
interdependence; indeed, it is often the only evidence available to the
government.” Caldwell, 589 F.3d at 1329. Moreover, “a single act can be
sufficient to demonstrate interdependence.” Id.

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In this case, there was substantial evidence of interdependence. Indeed,
each member of the conspiracy had his own particular role—Mr. Thornburgh and
Mr. Davidson were the salesmen of the bonds, Mr. Thornburgh in the United
States and Mr. Davidson abroad, primarily in New Zealand and Australia; Mr.
Searles was the banker and organizer, having established Caribou as the shell
corporation and serving as its president; a man named John Clancy was the
“authenticator,” charged with ensuring the purported authenticity of the bonds;
Mr. Fishman was a central figure, interacting with all of the other conspirators
and performing many essential functions. There were occasional modifications of
personnel and product. Mr. Zaccagnino dropped out of the conspiracy when he
closed Two-Thirds International. 9 The focus of the bonds shifted from railroad
bonds to Chinese bonds as the conspiracy wore on. But the record is replete with
evidence that the conspirators operated in a very interdependent and
complementary way. Even when Mr. Thornburgh and Mr. Searles had a falling
out of some kind, they continued to operate within the conspiracy, with Mr.
Fishman operating as a go-between. 10
9

Mr. Zaccagnino apparently was under investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
10

Mr. Searles testified as follows:

Q. Okay. So is there, then, a falling-out between you and
Mr. Thornburgh?
A. Yes.
(continued...)
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As we have stated before:
The goals of all the participants need not be congruent for a single
conspiracy to exist, so long as their goals are not at cross
purposes. . . . [A] single conspiracy is not transformed into multiple
conspiracies merely by virtue of the fact that it may involve two or

10

(...continued)
Q. And when that falling-out takes place, where does
Mr. Fishman land?
A. I guess in the middle. He’s still doing business with both
of us, as far as I know.
Q. All right. And are you still making contact with the
investors, the American investors?
A. Yes.
Q. To your knowledge, is Mr. Thornburgh still making contact
with those American investors?
A. I don’t know. Some of them told me they had tried to
reach him. Some of them told me they had reached him . . . .
....
Q. And did you do anything in writing with [the] American
investors? Bringing ourselves up to March of ‘03.
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do?
A. As time is progressing on, by December [2002], I’m
beginning to get written demands to me with some of these American
investors to get back their money. So by January, the pressure is
building. So I told Mr. Fishman . . . something has got to happen.
So he said, well, Mr. Thornburgh has entered into a hold harmless
agreement with someone, and . . . I think this will help you . . . .
....
So he sent me a copy of the document he had drawn up for Mr.
Thornburgh. So I took that document, and I revised it for my own
needs with my 15 investors, and I sent it to Mr. Fishman. And he
critiqued it for me and sent it back to me. And I executed it with the
15 people. And basically, I said, if I give you back your money, I
don’t owe you anything else.
Tr. of Trial Proceedings at 1266, 1269, R. Vol. 3, Part 8.
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more phases or spheres of operation, so long as there is sufficient
proof of mutual dependence and assistance.
United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 963 (2d Cir. 1990)). The common
denominators in all these “programs” were Mr. Fishman, Mr. Thornburgh and
Mr. Searles. They may have had greater or lesser involvement with particular
investors, but they all used similar paperwork and tactics—“safekeeping
depositories,” bonds (first railroad, then Chinese), bond “authenticators,” and
foreign “program managers.” A single conspiracy does not splinter into multiple
conspiracies because members come and go. See United States v. Coleman, 7
F.3d 1500, 1503 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence of defendant’s
participation in conspiracy even though she began her participation in the
conspiracy two years after venture had begun, participated for only two months,
and the conspiracy continued for six months after she was arrested); United States
v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir. 1980) (“A conspiracy is not terminated
simply by a turnover in personnel.”).
Mr. Fishman also claims the government used evidence of conduct for
which he was never criminally charged, and suggests this somehow indicates
there were multiple conspiracies or a prohibited variance. He also appears to
argue that, because Mr. Zaccagnino and Norah Cali were not charged as members
of the Caribou conspiracy, any activity he had with them was pursuant to a

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separate conspiracy or conspiracies. We disagree. The second superseding
indictment specifically stated that there were more conspirators, “known and
unknown,” and the fact that not all were charged does not necessarily mean they
operated in a separate conspiracy. As we have stated before:
The government need not show that each conspirator knew of or had
contact with all other members. Nor need it show that the
conspirators knew all of the details of the conspiracy or participated
in every act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Changes in the cast of
characters do not preclude a finding of a single overarching
conspiracy.
United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1276 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 10 (1 st Cir. 2004)), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, we find no evidence of a variance; rather, the record amply
supports the jury’s determination that there was only a single conspiracy. 11

IV.

Statute of Limitations
Mr. Fishman argues that the five-year statute of limitations applicable to

the charges here had expired by the time the initial indictment was filed on
November 30, 2007. He thus argues that the court should have granted his motion
to dismiss the indictment.

11

Mr. Fishman does nothing to explain how the list of names he provided in
his opening brief demonstrates the existence of multiple conspiracies. He
provides slightly more explanation in his reply brief.
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“A conspirator . . . is only liable for the acts of co-conspirators until the
conspiracy accomplished its goals or that conspirator withdraws.” United States
v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 2000) (further quotation omitted).
Mr. Fishman argues that the conspiracy here was “complete when the main
criminal objectives were achieved, the receipt of the funds from the investors in
2002 and before.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 62.
As indicated above, “a conviction for conspiracy to commit money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), does not require proof of an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 219; United States v.
Green, 599 F.3d 360, 372 (4th Cir. 2010) (“We are mindful that, . . . a money
laundering conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act.”). Nonetheless,
while not required,
proof of overt acts can be useful for, among other things:
(1) showing that a conspiracy begun more than five years before the
return of an indictment continued into a period within the statute of
limitations; [or] (2) showing that a particular defendant knowingly
joined (or remained a member of) a conspiracy.
Green, 599 F.3d at 372. And, as we stated above, conspiracy to commit wire
and/or mail fraud also does not require proof of an overt act.
Furthermore, for “‘conspiracy statutes that do not require proof of an overt
act, the indictment satisfies the requirements of the statute of limitations if the
conspiracy is alleged to have continued into the limitations period.’” United
States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1213 (11 th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
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Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citation and quotation marks
omitted)). Whether we look just at the indictment or also consider proof of the
conduct of Mr. Fishman, it is clear that the indictment against him was not barred
by the statute of limitations.
The second superseding indictment specifically states with respect to count
one, “Beginning at least as early as 1998 and continuing at least through August
2005, the exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, . . . Defendants JOSEPH
LYNN THORNBURGH, WAYNE LESLIE DAVIDSON, STEVEN FISHMAN
and others . . . knowingly and willfully conspired to [commit mail and wire
fraud].” Second Superseding Indictment at 3. It further specifically lists
incidents in 2003 and 2005 in which members of the conspiracy did particular
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id. at 11. Count two contains the
identical language regarding conspiring to commit money laundering. Thus, the
indictment squarely places the conspiracy within the five-year statute of
limitations.
Furthermore, the actions of the co-conspirators listed in the indictment are
amply supported in the record. Other evidence also demonstrates activity by the
co-conspirators until 2005, as evidenced by the following recitations of testimony
from several investors. For example, investors Henry Pham and David Franco
testified to contacts with Mr. Thornburgh and Mr. Fishman in 2003 and 2004.
Investor Tracey Grist testified about an e-mail she received in January 2004 from
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Mr. Fishman. Yet another investor, Barbara Johnson, testified that she wired
$13,000 to Mr. Fishman in April 2004, sent him a check for $50,000 in August
2004, sent him another check for $20,000 in October 2004, and then made a wire
transfer for $22,000 in January 2005. Ms. Johnson also described many telephone
conversations she had with Mr. Fishman in March, April and May of 2005.
Investor Marsha Longaberger described interactions with Mr. Thornburgh in
March and April 2003, relating to her investment, including Mr. Thornburgh’s
request in April that she lie to the postal inspector investigating the Caribou
program. Investor Jeff Hayslett also described an “end of 2002, maybe beginning
of 2003" telephone conversation with Mr. Fishman, one of many such
conversations he had with Mr. Fishman. Tr. of Trial Proceedings, Fishman
Record, Vol. 3, Part 7 at 964. 12 Investor Dr. Wayne Maltz testified that, in late
2002, on numerous occasions in 2003, and on a few occasions in 2004 and 2005,
he had, at Mr. Thornburgh’s request, paid for Mr. Thornburgh’s living expenses
and hotel debt allegedly incurred while Mr. Thornburgh was in Europe following
through on the bond investments. On at least one of these occasions in December
2002 and January 2003, Mr. Fishman was with Mr. Thornburgh in Europe. Some
of these payments were characterized by Mr. Thornburgh as necessary to keep the

12

Mr. Hayslett testified about a telephone conversation he had with
Mr. Fishman in December 2003, in which he apparently told Mr. Fishman that he
realized the whole endeavor was a sham and he wanted his money back. Tr. of
Trial Proceedings, Fishman Record, Vol. 3 (Part 7 of 8) at 981.
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whole bond enterprise afloat. Dr. Maltz also testified that he received many faxes
from Mr. Fishman and had many telephone conversations with him telling
Dr. Maltz how the bonds were going to be placed. All of this evidence shows
activity by Mr. Fishman and his co-conspirator Mr. Thornburgh well into the
statute of limitations time period.
Mr. Fishman also argues that the disagreement between Mr. Thornburgh
and Mr. Searles in July 2002 somehow indicates that the conspiracy had ended.
That is contradicted by the wealth of evidence that Mr. Fishman and Mr.
Thornburgh and others were continuing to pacify and solicit current and new
investors all the way through early 2005. Furthermore, that evidence
demonstrates that Mr. Fishman simply became the middleman between Mr.
Thornburgh and Mr. Searles, not that the conspiracy ended.
Finally, a reasonable jury could have concluded that a number of
communications between Mr. Fishman and investors were lulling letters,
“designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate
complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the
defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place.” United States v.
Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974); see also S.E.C. v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 144
n.24 (7 th Cir. 1982) (holding that for mail fraud and securities fraud, “[a] scheme
to defraud may well include later efforts to avoid detection of the fraud . . . .
Avoidance of detection and prevention of recovery of the money lost by the
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victims are within, and often a material part of, the illegal scheme. Further profit
from the scheme to defraud, as such, may be over, and yet the scheme itself may
not be ended.”) (further quotation omitted)). We accordingly conclude that the
statute of limitations provides no defense for Mr. Fishman.

V.

Jury Instructions
Mr. Fishman next argues that the district court gave an erroneous jury

instruction when it failed to define the term “proceeds” in the money-laundering
jury instruction as “profits.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 13

13

The relevant money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), stated as
follows at all times relevant to this case:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . .
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than
$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the
transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both.
The statute has since been amended (in 2009) so that “proceeds” is now defined
as “any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly,
through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such
activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9). But because all the relevant activities in this
case occurred before 2009, we apply the old version of the money laundering
statute.
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Mr. Fishman failed to object to the jury instruction, so we review it only
for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S.55, 59 (2002); see also
Searles, 2011 WL 488750, at *1 (Mr. Fishman’s co-defendant making the
identical Santos argument). “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is
plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted). An error is “plain” if it is “clear or obvious under
current law” and “contrary to well-settled law.” United States v. Whitney, 229
F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 2000). “In general, for an error to be contrary to
well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the
issue.” United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
The district court’s jury instruction used the term “proceeds” and then
stated that “‘proceeds’ can be any kind of property, not just money.” Jury
Instructions at 80. Now, relying on Santos, Mr. Fishman argues that the
government was obligated to prove that profits from the mail and wire fraud, not
just receipts or gross receipts, were laundered. He further alleges that proof of
profits was neither pled nor proven, and that the district court’s jury instructions
were erroneous because they did not require proof of profits.
We are releasing simultaneously with this decision our decision regarding
Mr. Thornburgh, one of Mr. Fishman’s co-conspirators and his co-defendant at
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trial. United States v. Thornburgh, No. 09-5156 (10th Cir. May 27, 2011). As we
explained in Thornburgh, the Santos decision has been interpreted by lower courts
in many different ways. We have therefore confined it to its factual setting, and
conclude that “proceeds” means “profits” for the purpose of the money laundering
statute only where an illegal gambling operation is involved. Alternatively,
assuming that Santos dictates that it was error in this case to not require proof of
profits, that error cannot be plain, in view of the widely differing interpretations
of Santos. See United States v. Parra, 2011 WL 728088 (10th Cir. March 3,
2011) (unpublished); Searles, 2011 WL 488750). We therefore conclude that the
district court did not err when, in its instructions to the jury, it failed to define
“proceeds” as “profits” in connection with the Caribou conspiracy. Mr.
Fishman’s argument based on the jury instructions therefore lacks merit.

VI.

Application of Sentencing Guidelines and Restitution
Mr. Fishman makes a very abbreviated argument that the district court

erred in its application of the sentencing guidelines as well as the imposition of
the amount of restitution ordered. He appears to argue that the amount of loss
attributed to him resulted in an unreasonable sentence and an unfair amount of
restitution. But he provides no explanation of why, and/or how much loss he
thinks is properly attributable to him. “We will not manufacture arguments for an
appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly when, as
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here, a host of other issues are presented for review.” Craven v. University of
Colorado Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (further quotation
omitted). Because he fails to develop this argument or provide any citations to
authorities or the record, we do not address it.

VII. Ex Post Facto/Due Process Violation
Proceeding pro se, Mr. Fishman argues that his conviction for count one
(conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349,
must be vacated because it contravenes the Ex Post Facto clause of the United
States Constitution. More specifically, he argues that, because one of the statutes
of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, did not go into effect until July 30, 2002, it is a
violation of the Ex Post Facto clause to convict him on the basis of conduct which
occurred before that date. He did not raise this issue below, so we review for
plain error.
We begin by noting that the Supreme Court has recently clarified the nature
of this claimed constitutional violation. In United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct.
2159 (2010), there was a situation similar to our case, in that the defendant had
been convicted of conduct (violation of the sex trafficking and forced labor
statutes) occurring both before and after the effective date of the statutes making
that conduct illegal. The defendant had not objected to the district court’s failure
to address this issue, by means of a jury instruction or some other means, so
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appellate review before the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court was for plain
error. The Second Circuit and the defendant had characterized this as an Ex Post
Facto Clause violation. The Supreme Court disagreed with that characterization,
stating that it is actually a due process question. “[I]f the jury, which was not
instructed about the [statute’s] enactment date, erroneously convicted [defendant]
based exclusively on noncriminal, preenactment conduct, [defendant] would have
a valid due process claim.” Id. at 2165. 14
Then, examining the familiar plain error standard, the Supreme Court stated
there was “no reason why this kind of error would automatically ‘affect
substantial rights’ without a showing of individual prejudice.” Id. The Court
therefore remanded the case back to the Second Circuit for it to apply the plain
error standard to the facts of that case, following the Supreme Court’s guidance.
On remand, the Second Circuit applied the plain error test and, at the third
step of the test (whether the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights) the
court required the defendant to “demonstrate that the error was prejudicial,”
noting that ordinarily, an error is prejudicial “where there is a reasonable
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v.
Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 42 (2nd Cir. 2010) (further quotation omitted). The court

14

The Court explained why the Ex Post Facto Clause is not involved: “‘The
Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does
not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.’” Marcus, 130
S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977)).
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found, with respect to the forced labor statute, that there was “no reasonable
probability that the jury would have acquitted [the defendant] absent the error.”
Id. There were two reasons for that conclusion. First, “the Government presented
post-enactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of the forced labor
statute.” Id. Second, the court found “no reasoned basis to differentiate between
[the defendant’s] pre- and post-enactment conduct, and [it] f[ou]nd no reason to
presume that the jury did so.” Id. at 43. Additionally, the defendant himself
offered no explanation of how his pre- and post-enactment conduct differed in
such a way as to create a reasonable probability that the jury would not have
convicted him without the due process error.
The court vacated the sex trafficking conviction, however, stating:
Unlike with the forced labor charge, the conduct supporting the sex
trafficking charge differed materially before and after [the date of
enactment], such that there is a reasonable probability that the
erroneous jury charge affected the outcome of the trial and affected
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings.
Id. at 44. We apply that analysis to Mr. Fishman’s due process claim.
Mr. Fishman makes two arguments in support of this claim. First, he
argues that, inasmuch as conspiracies for violations of the wire and mail fraud
laws, as well as the money laundering laws, do not require proof of an overt act,
“the conspiracy is complete upon the agreement itself.” Reply Br. of Appellant at
3. As he also puts it, “18 U.S.C. § 1349 is violated upon agreement alone.” Id. at
4. Thus, the entire conspiracy was completed before § 1349 went into effect.
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Furthermore, he claims that since the second superseding indictment did not
specifically list an overt act occurring post-enactment, his due process rights were
also violated because he was convicted of something for which he was never
charged.
“‘A conspiracy, once instituted, continues to exist until it is abandoned,
succeeds, or is otherwise terminated by some affirmative act.’” United States v.
Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Russell, 963 F.2d 1320, 1322 (10th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, the conspiracy here
began with the agreement, but it continued until abandoned, or until it
accomplished its mission, or was somehow affirmatively terminated. So we reject
Mr. Fishman’s argument that the Caribou conspiracy was completed when the
initial agreement was made. Additionally, since the conspiracies at issue here do
not require proof of overt acts, it is not fatal to the government’s case that it does
not list a specific overt act in the indictment.
The government concedes that it was error for the district court to fail to
instruct the jury on the fact that § 1349 did not come into effect until July 30,
2002. We agree that is an error, which is plain. We must next determine, as did
the court in Marcus, whether that error was prejudicial because there is a
reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. As in
Marcus, so too in this case, the government presented “post-enactment evidence
sufficient to satisfy the elements of” the conspiracy-to-commit-wire/mail-fraud
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statute. Marcus, 628 F.3d at 42. As we have previously indicated, there was,
indeed, substantial post-enactment evidence of Mr. Fishman’s conduct in
furtherance of the worthless bond investment conspiracy.
Additionally, we consider whether there is a “reasoned basis to differentiate
between [Mr. Fishman’s] pre- and post-enactment conduct.” Id. at 43. There is
no such basis. The evidence outlined above provides no support for separating
the conduct, nor does Mr. Fishman provide us with any persuasive analysis to the
contrary. We therefore have no reason to presume that the jury differentiated
between the two and convicted him on the basis of pre-enactment conduct only.
In short, while it may have been an error for the district court to have failed
to specifically instruct the jury that § 1349 was not effective until part way
through the conspiracy, perhaps even a plain error, that error did not affect
Mr. Fishman’s substantial rights, nor did it affect the fairness of the proceedings.
There was substantial evidence that the conspiracy continued long after § 1349
went into effect.
Mr. Fishman alternatively argues that he withdrew from the conspiracy
when he began cooperating with authorities. Withdrawal is generally not an
available defense to a conspiracy that does not require an overt act. See United
States v. Williams, 374 F.3d 941, 950 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Because there is no overt
act requirement under the drug conspiracy statute, withdrawal cannot relieve a
defendant of criminal responsibility for a conspiracy charged under § 846, though
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withdrawal may limit a defendant’s liability in situations not relevant here.”).
But, even in these non-overt act conspiracies, we have agreed that “withdrawal”
“may normally start the running of the statute of limitations.” Id. n.11. Thus, it
can have some relevance even in a non-overt act conspiracy.
So, assuming we are simply considering “withdrawal” in the context of
whether it shows Mr. Fishman had abandoned the conspiracy before § 1349 came
into effect, we conclude that his cooperation with authorities alone does not
necessarily demonstrate that he withdrew. The burden of establishing the
abandonment or withdrawal from the conspiracy is firmly on the defendant,
Mr. Fishman. See United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978) (“In order to
withdraw from a conspiracy an individual must take affirmative action, either
making a clean breast to the authorities or communicating his withdrawal in a
manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators.”).
“Neither arrest nor incarceration automatically triggers withdrawal from a
conspiracy.” United States v. Gomez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Given that there is ample evidence of Mr. Fishman’s activities furthering the
conspiracy during the time he claims he was cooperating with authorities, he has
failed to carry his burden to show that he withdrew from or abandoned or
completed the conspiracy before 18 U.S.C. § 1349 went into effect.

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Finally, and very significantly, the district court specifically instructed the
jury that Mr. Fishman had raised as a defense the claim that he had withdrawn
from the conspiracy prior to November 30, 2002. He argued that point to the jury
and, by its guilty verdict, the jury found that he had not withdrawn. That jury
verdict is amply supported by the record.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the conviction and sentence in this
case. 15

15

There were a host of motions filed by both Mr. Fishman and the
government, all of which have been referred to us as the merits panel. We
address each one in turn: (1) Mr. Fishman filed a motion on 11/23/09 to
supplement the record on appeal with the transcript of the deposition of Mr.
Henriette, which we grant. (2) The government filed a motion on 5/10/10 to
supplement the record with copies of certain exhibits, which we grant. (3)
Mr. Fishman filed a motion to strike the government’s exhibits involved in the
government’s 5/10/10 motion to supplement the record (which we just granted),
and we deny Mr. Fishman’s motion to strike and all other motions relating to
these exhibits, as moot. (4) Mr. Fishman filed a motion on 11/29/10 to order and
compel J. Lance Hopkins to turn over the case file of Mr. Fishman, which we
deny. (5) Mr. Fishman filed a motion on 11/29/10 to view the sealed response of
discharged attorney J. Lance Hopkins, which we deny. (6) Mr. Fishman filed a
motion on 11/29/10 to strike briefs filed by discharged/withdrawn counsel, which
we deny, except we have already stricken the reply brief filed by Mr. Hopkins.
(7) Mr. Fishman filed a motion on 11/29/10 to strike the government’s brief and
for a new briefing schedule, which we deny. (8) The government filed on 12/7/10
responses to Mr. Fishman’s motion to strike and to compel Mr. Hopkins, both of
which we deny as moot, and any other motions relating to Mr. Fishman’s motion
to strike and to compel are also denied as moot. (9) Mr. Fishman filed a motion
on 12/9/10 to supplement the record on appeal, which we deny as unnecessary.
(10) The government filed a response to Mr. Fishman’s motion to supplement the
record, which we deny as moot. (11) All other pending motions are denied.
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