Mauchlin v. Bier, et al

Filing 920100927

Opinion

U n i t e d States Court of Appeals T e n t h Circuit

FILED

S e p t e m b e r 27, 2010
U N I T E D STATES COURT OF APPEALSl i s a b e t h A. Shumaker E F O R THE TENTH CIRCUIT
C l e r k of Court

P E T E R P. MAUCHLIN, Plaintiff­Appellant, v. B I E R , SIS Correctional Supervisor; A . OSAGIE, Physician Assistant; D A L G L E I S H , EMT; BARRY, C o r r e c t i o n a l Supervisor; HAM, C o r r e c t i o n a l Supervisor; JOHN D O E 1, Correctional Officer; J O H N DOE 2, Medical Officer, Defendants­Appellees. N o . 10-1035 ( D . C . No. 1:07-CV-02593-CMA-MEH) ( D . Colo.)

O R D E R AND JUDGMENT * B e f o r e TACHA, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

P e t e r P. Mauchlin, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from a grant o f summary judgment dismissing his Eighth Amendment claims. Exercising j u r i s d i c t i o n under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

T h e case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant t o Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is n o t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, a n d collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and j u d g me n t s ; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

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I F o l l o w i n g an x-ray and Mauchlin's admission that he swallowed a sewing n e e d l e encased in plastic, he was moved to a "dry cell" (a cell with no running w a t e r ) to allow prison officials to recover the contraband. Mauchlin was wearing a t-shirt and boxer shorts when he was placed in the dry cell on the afternoon of D e c e mb e r 28, 2006. He was given a mattress for the cell's cement bed and a b l a n k e t . Throughout his three-day confinement, he was provided with regular me a l s , hot water, coffee, and tea. L i e u t e n a n t Marty Bier, one of the defendants, explained in his affidavit that " [ t ]h e dry cell has two doors, an inner grill (a door with bars), and an outer solid d o o r . Because the inmate is under constant supervision, typically only the inner d o o r remains secured." Mark Masar, a heating, ventilating, and air conditioning s u p e r v i s o r , averred that "during the winter, indoor temperature is maintained at a p p r o x i ma t e l y 69-70 NF throughout the institution." He also explained that the dry c e l l "is a `negative pressure' cell, which means that it does not have a supply air i n p u t into the cell." Although the dry cell does not contain its own heater, heat " i s pulled into the cell by the exhaust fan located adjacent to the cell, which runs a t a high rate when turned on." According to Masar, "[t]he area outside the dry c e l l would have been approximately 70-71 NF in late December 2006." M a u c h l i n claims that the temperature inside the dry cell during his c o n f i n e me n t averaged from 40 to 45 NF . The prison's log book reflects that he
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r e p e a t e d l y complained that he was cold between the evening of December 30 and t h e morning of December 31. He was released early in the evening of D e c e mb e r 31, after the contraband was recovered. On January 12, 2007, Mauchlin reported that he was suffering a sinus i n f e c t i o n . He was examined that same day by a physician's assistant, who d i a g n o s e d him with probable sinusitis and prescribed an antibiotic. The p r e s c r i p t i o n was available the next day and was successful in relieving his s y mp t o ms . B a s e d on the cold conditions in the dry cell and the one-day delay in o b t a i n i n g medication for his sinusitis, Mauchlin filed suit for damages under B i v e n s v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 3 8 8 , 389 (1971). A magistrate judge issued a report recommending that summary j u d g me n t be granted to one defendant, but denied as to the remaining defendants. The district court concluded that all of the defendants were entitled to summary j u d g me n t on the basis of qualified immunity. Mauchlin timely appealed. II " W e review a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified i mmu n i t y de novo." Harman v. Pollock, 586 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2009), p e t i t i o n for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3590 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2010) (No. 09-1195). Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery and d i s c l o s u r e materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
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a s to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of l a w . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). S u mma r y judgment orders deciding qualified immunity questions are r e v i e w e d "differently from other summary judgment decisions." Martinez v. B e g g s , 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 1 3 0 S. Ct. 259 (2009). "When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary j u d g me n t , the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant v i o l a t e d a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly e s t a b l i s h e d . " Id. "[T]he court has discretion to determine `which of the two p r o n g s of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the c i r c u ms t a n c e s in the particular case at hand.'" Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 1 2 9 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)). A T o prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, an i n ma t e must satisfy a two-part test. He must first establish the objective c o mp o n e n t , i.e., that "he [was] incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial r i s k of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation o mi t t e d ) . Second, an inmate must meet the subjective prong, which requires him t o establish that the prison official had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation omitted). In conditions-of-confinement cases,

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" t h a t state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety." Id. (quotation omitted). But we do not decide whether the defendants violated Mauchlin's Eighth A me n d me n t rights, because we can "decide that there was no violation of clearly e s t a b l i s h e d law before turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant f a c t s make out a constitutional violation at all." Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 820. "Our i n q u i r y into whether a constitutional right was clearly established must be u n d e r t a k e n in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general p r o p o s i t i o n . " Bowling v. Rector, 584 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations o mi t t e d ) . The question is "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that h i s conduct was unlawful in the situation. Summary judgment based on qualified i mmu n i t y is appropriate if the law did not put the officer on notice that his c o n d u c t would be clearly unlawful." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). For a r i g h t to be clearly established, there must be "a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit d e c i s i o n on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts [ mu s t hold] the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Id. (quotation and alteration o mi t t e d ) . M a u c h l i n relies on Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), and Mitchell v. M a y n a r d , 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996). In Mitchell, the plaintiff was "stripped o f his clothing, placed in a concrete cell, with no heat at a time when nighttime t e mp e r a t u r e s hovered in the mid-fifties, provided no mattress, blankets or bedding
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o f any kind, . . . not provided with adequate ventilation, [and] not provided with h o t water." 80 F.3d at 1442. We held that these conditions, in combination, c o u l d establish a constitutional violation. Id. The Wilson Court held that [ s ] o m e conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth A me n d me n t violation in combination when each would not do so a l o n e , but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that p r o d u c e s the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as f o o d , warmth, or exercise--for example, a low cell temperature at n i g h t combined with a failure to issue blankets. W i l s o n , 501 U.S. at 304 (quotation marks omitted). But unlike the plaintiff in Mitchell or the hypothetical in Wilson, Mauchlin w a s provided a blanket, mattress, some clothing, hot water, tea, and coffee. These provisions mitigated the effects of low cell temperature to some extent. We agree with the district court that the conditions in the dry cell, when c o n s i d e r e d as a whole, were not so severe as to make it "clear to a reasonable o f f i c e r that his conduct was unlawful in the situation." Bowling, 584 F.3d at 964 ( q u o t a t i o n omitted). Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity w i t h respect to Mauchlin's conditions-of-confinement claim. B M a u c h l i n also argues that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated b e c a u s e of a one-day delay in receiving the antibiotic prescribed for his sinusitis. "A prison official's deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs v i o l a t e s the Eighth Amendment." Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209

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( 1 0 t h Cir. 2000). However, the undisputed evidence shows that "[s]inusitis is not a life-threatening condition, except in very rare circumstances. [It] is most-often t r e a t e d by allowing the infection to resolve on its own." Accordingly, the district c o u r t correctly concluded that the brief delay in dispensing antibiotics did not v i o l a t e Mauchlin's constitutional rights. III W e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. We GRANT Mauchlin's mo t i o n s to supplement his opening and reply briefs. We remind Mauchlin that t h e district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, and t h a t his obligation to make partial payments continues until the entire filing fee is paid. E n t e r e d for the Court,

C a r l o s F. Lucero C i r c u i t Judge

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