United States v. Coleman

Filing

[9896885] Affirmed. Terminated on the merits after oral hearing. Written, signed, published. Judges Murphy, Brorby and Tymkovich (authoring judge). Mandate to issue.

FILED
Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

United States Court of Appeals
Date Filed: 08/26/2011 Page: 1
Tenth Circuit

August 26, 2011
PUBLISH

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

No. 10-6134

MARCUS DEON COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 5:09-CR-00259-C-1)

Michael S. Johnson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Jonathon E. Boatman, Assistant United States Attorney (Sanford C. Coats, United
States Attorney, and Ashley L. Altshuler, Assistant United States Attorney, with
him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Appellee.

Before MURPHY, BRORBY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to determine whether drug-trafficking convictions
that are initially adjudicated under Oklahoma’s Youthful Offender Act qualify as

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 2

“serious drug offenses” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e). We conclude they do, and affirm.
I. Background
Marcus Deon Coleman’s extensive criminal history began in 1998, when he
was thirteen years old. He was convicted of selling crack cocaine and marijuana
on three separate occasions in 2002, in violation of Oklahoma’s Trafficking in
Illegal Drugs Act, O KLA S TAT . tit. 63, § 2-414–20 (2002). 1 Because he was
between the ages of 16 and 17 when he committed these crimes, the state court
adjudicated him under Oklahoma’s Youthful Offender Act, O KLA . S TAT . tit. 10,
§§ 7306-2.1–2.13 (2002) (YOA). 2 Coleman received a sentence of 10 years’
confinement for each conviction, the maximum sentence permitted under the
YOA. See id. § 7306-2.9(B). He was then placed in the custody of the Oklahoma
Department of Juvenile Affairs (OJA).
Coleman escaped from OJA custody in 2003. After he was rearrested in
2004, a state judge converted the prior YOA sentences to adult convictions and

1

Coleman was convicted of drug trafficking a fourth time, in 2004, based
on his statements and evidence gathered when he was rearrested. He pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently
with his other sentences. Because Coleman was already 18 when he was
rearrested, this conviction is not material to the question presented in this case.
2

In 2009, Oklahoma amended and recodified its Youthful Offender Act at
O KLA . S TAT . tit. 10A, § 2-5-201. The parties agree the 2002 version of the Act
was in effect at the time Coleman committed the offenses.
-2-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 3

committed him to the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to
serve the remainder of his sentences. Coleman was paroled in 2007.
In 2009, Coleman pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Coleman’s presentence
report determined his drug-trafficking convictions qualified as “serious drug
offenses” under the ACCA and recommended the application of the armed career
offender guideline, United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) §4B1.4(b).
Under the ACCA, Coleman’s minimum term of imprisonment is 15 years. The
district court sentenced Coleman to 20 years’ imprisonment.
Coleman timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Discussion
We review the interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v.
Ford, 613 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010). Coleman contends his drugtrafficking convictions as a youthful offender cannot constitute serious drug
offenses under the ACCA. And because a youthful offender whose adjudication
is converted to an adult conviction can only be sentenced to the remainder of his
original sentence, Coleman concludes his adult convictions are not serious drug
offenses, either. We disagree on both counts.

-3-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 4

A. The ACCA and Oklahoma’s Youthful Offender Act
Federal law prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 924(g). When an individual convicted under
§ 924(g) has three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug
offenses, the ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence. Id. § 922(e)(1). A
“serious drug offense” includes a state law offense involving the distribution of a
controlled substance where “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or
more is prescribed by law.” Id. 922(e)(2)(A)(ii). Thus, the ACCA defers to the
judgment of state legislatures—as evinced in the states’ sentencing policies—to
measure the seriousness of a drug offense. See United States v. Rodriquez, 553
U.S. 377, 388 (2008).
The criminal prosecution of minors in Oklahoma is governed by the YOA,
which at the time of Coleman’s crimes was codified at O KLA . S TAT . tit. 10,
§ 7306-2.1–2.13 (2002). Under the Act, 16- and 17-year-olds who are charged
with drug trafficking are treated as youthful offenders. Id. § 7306-2.6. Youthful
offenders are tried similarly to adult defendants, but they are placed in OJA
custody and their maximum sentences ordinarily cannot exceed 10 years’
confinement. See id. § 7306-2.9. Under certain circumstances, such as when a
court determines a youthful offender would not reasonably complete a
rehabilitation plan, an adult sentence can be imposed. Id. § 7306-2.8. If an

-4-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 5

individual is sentenced as a youthful offender but subsequently escapes from a
juvenile facility, a court may
impose the remainder of the sentence as provided by law for an adult
punishment of the offense committed . . . including transfer of the
youthful offender to the custody or supervision of the Department of
Corrections for the remainder of the youthful offender sentence.
Id. § 7306-2.10(F)(5). Finally, § 7306-2.10(H) specifies, “[a]n order transferring
custody of a youthful offender to the Department of Corrections shall result in an
adult conviction and shall be a final order.”
B. Coleman’s Convictions
Coleman contends the drug-trafficking crimes he committed as a juvenile
cannot constitute serious drug offenses under the ACCA. His reasoning is as
follows: the maximum sentence a youthful offender can receive is 10 years’
imprisonment. 3 If a juvenile conviction is converted to a criminal conviction,
then the maximum sentence of the adult conviction is 10 years minus the time
served in OJA custody. And because the resulting adult conviction will always be
less than 10 years, it follows the conviction cannot be for a serious drug offense.

3

During oral argument, Coleman’s counsel contended for the first time
that the state court acted inappropriately when it sentenced Coleman to 10 years’
confinement, because youthful offenders should actually be sentenced only to
rehabilitation plans of indeterminate length. This argument is inconsistent with
the plain language of the Youthful Offender Act. See O KLA . S TAT . tit. 10, § 73062.9(B) (2002) (“[T]he court shall impose sentence as a youthful offender. In no
event shall the sentence exceed the amount of time of a possible sentence of an
adult convicted of the same offense or ten (10) years, whichever is less.”). Since
Coleman did not raise this argument in his briefs, we do not consider it here.
-5-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 6

We cannot accept this logic. To determine whether a conviction is for a
serious drug offense, the Supreme Court tells us to first look to “the maximum
term prescribed by the relevant criminal statute, not the top of a sentencing
guidelines range” or other external limitations on “the term to which the state
court could actually have sentenced the defendant.” Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at
390–91. A review of case law supports our conclusion that the relevant criminal
statute in this case is the Trafficking in Illegal Drugs Act, not the YOA.
Although no circuit has addressed the precise question in this case, the
closest precedent is United States v. Weekes, 611 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 180 L. Ed. 2d 850 (2011). In Weekes, the First Circuit held that two of
the defendant’s prior convictions were for serious drug offenses under the ACCA,
even though the defendant could not have received 10-year sentences for those
crimes. The defendant had been tried in state district court, which was not
authorized by statute to impose a sentence of more than 2.5 years’ imprisonment.
Id. But Massachusetts law authorized a potential sentence of 10 years’
imprisonment for the defendant’s crimes if he had been prosecuted in a different
state court venue. Id. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriquez arose
from a mandatory guidelines regime, the Weekes court concluded, “there is no
apparent reason for a different rule when the restriction on a court’s sentencing
authority is more general, as here.” Id.

-6-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 7

We reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Hill, 539 F.3d 1213,
1221 (10th Cir. 2008). In that case, we found the phrase “crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) focuses on
“the maximum punishment for any defendant charged with that crime,” not the
characteristics of a particular offender. Id. So although the Hill defendant only
faced a maximum sentence of eleven months’ imprisonment under state law,
based on the severity level of his crime and his criminal history, see id. at 1218,
we upheld his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. In doing
so, we adopted an interpretation of § 922(g)(1) that is crime-centered, rather than
defendant-centered. See United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1999)
(determining the statutory maximum for a state felon-in-possession conviction on
the basis of the maximum statutory sentence for the offense class, not the
defendant’s prior criminal-record status).
We interpret the ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense similarly.
Here, the maximum punishment for any defendant charged under Oklahoma’s
Trafficking in Illegal Drugs Act is life imprisonment. See O KLA S TAT . tit 63, § 2415 (2002). The YOA does not specify a term of imprisonment for drugtrafficking convictions; it merely sets sentencing limitations on certain types of
defendants (i.e., juveniles). As with Hill, Coleman’s sentence limits are based
solely on his individual characteristics, not the offense itself. See 539 F.3d at
1221. And because the YOA only affects “the term to which the state court could
-7-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 8

actually have sentenced the defendant,” Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 390, it is not
relevant to the question of whether drug trafficking in Oklahoma constitutes a
serious drug offense. 4
Coleman contends Rodriquez and Hill are not germane because they apply
only to adult convictions, but he cites no case law supporting his assertion that
juvenile convictions cannot demonstrate serious drug offenses. Coleman’s
position is also contrary to the plain language of the ACCA, which provides a
mandatory 15-year sentence based on three previous convictions “for a violent
felony or serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The definition of serious
drug offense contains no exceptions for juveniles; it is based entirely on the
maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law. See id. § 924(e)(2)(A). In
contrast, “violent felony” is defined as “any crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the
use of or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, [involving
physical force or certain specific crimes].” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
4

Nor are we persuaded by Coleman’s argument that his time served in
juvenile custody should not be counted in determining whether he could face 10
years’ imprisonment. Again, we look to the offense and not the actual sentence
when determining whether a crime is a serious drug offense. And we certainly do
not look to the place or status of confinement.
-8-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 9

503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). The ACCA’s differing definitions show that
Congress knows how to include or exclude juvenile status when it so desires. It
made a choice, when defining violent felonies, to include juvenile delinquencies
only when they involve certain dangerous weapons, thereby excluding schoolyard
brawls and other unarmed altercations that could be prosecuted as violent felonies
if committed by adults. In contrast, juvenile convictions for serious drug offenses
do not need special treatment because the requirement that they be punishable by
10 years’ imprisonment—ten times the sentence length for a violent
felony—ensures they are sufficiently grave to justify the ACCA’s 15-year
minimum sentence.
Furthermore, the YOA permits an eligible youthful offender to receive an
adult sentence under certain circumstances, see O KLA S TAT . tit. 10, § 7306-2.8.
Thus, Coleman could have received adult sentences in excess of 10 years in his
initial adjudications. And, of course, Coleman could—and did—receive 10-year
sentences, even as a youthful offender. But even if Oklahoma law did not permit
a youthful offender to receive a 10-year sentence, Coleman’s crimes would still
constitute serious drug offenses because the ACCA does not exclude drugtrafficking convictions simply because they are committed by a juvenile. Instead,
we look to the relevant criminal statute, not an external limit on a court’s
sentencing authority, to determine whether a violation of state law constitutes a
serious drug offense under the ACCA.
-9-

Appellate Case: 10-6134

Document: 01018700752

Date Filed: 08/26/2011

Page: 10

In summary, because the relevant criminal statute in this case, Oklahoma’s
Trafficking in Illegal Drugs Act, carries a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment, the district court did not err in determining Coleman’s drugtrafficking convictions are serious drug offenses.
III. Conclusion
We affirm Coleman’s sentence.

-10-