Lakeland Health Care Associate v. National Labor Relations Board

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Petitioner Lakeland Health Care Associates, LLC. Decision: Affirmed in part and Reversed in part. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Signed. Lakeland's Petition for review in GRANTED, the Board's cross-petitoni for enforcement is DENIED and The Board's decison is VACATED. 11-12638X.

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Date Filed: 10/02/2012

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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 11-12000, 11-12638

N.L.R.B. Case No. 12-CA-27044
LAKELAND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
versus
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Petitions for Review of a Decision of the
National Labor Relations Board

(October 2, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,* District Judge.

*

Honorable Paul C. Huck, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.

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HUCK, District Judge:
Appellant, Lakeland Healthcare Associates, LLC (“Lakeland”), appeals a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) finding
Lakeland in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (1), for its refusal to bargain with the
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1625 (“Union”). The Board
cross-appeals for enforcement of the decision below. Lakeland admits that it
refused to bargain with the Union, but argues that its refusal does not violate the
Act because the Union was improperly certified in the underlying representation
proceedings (Board Case No. 12-RC-9426). Accordingly, the sole issue on appeal
is whether substantial record evidence supports the Board’s determination that
certain licensed practical nurses (“LPNs”)1 employed by Lakeland are
“supervisors” within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. For the reasons
described below, we vacate the Board’s decision and deny the petition for
enforcement.

1

All of the LPNs at issue in this case also serve as “team leaders”—a term which
Lakeland uses interchangeably with the term “charge nurses.” For convenience, we use the term
“team leaders” as the umbrella term for both LPNs and Resident Nurses (“RNs”) who perform
the functions of team leaders / charge nurses. We assign no significance to our use of one term
over the other.
2

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I.

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BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to this appeal are in all material respects not in dispute.

Lakeland is a nursing and long-term care facility that employs LPNs, RNs, and
certified nursing assistants (“CNAs”), among other full-time and part-time
employees. The Union currently represents all of Lakeland’s CNAs.
On August 11, 2010, the Union filed a petition with the Board seeking a
representation election to establish the Union as the collective bargaining
representative for Lakeland’s LPNs. Lakeland opposed the petition, arguing that
the LPNs are “supervisors” within the meaning of the Act and are therefore
ineligible for union representation. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
Between August 25, 2010 and August 30, 2010, an NLRB hearing officer
held a hearing devoted solely to the “supervisor” issue. The parties presented
testimony from eight different witnesses, and, following the hearing, submitted
substantive briefs to the NLRB’s Regional Director for Region 12. On September
24, 2010, after reviewing the record and the briefs, the Regional Director issued a
49-page Decision and Direction of Election (“DDE”) finding that the LPNs were
not supervisors under the Act.2 The Board denied Lakeland’s request for review
2

As a general rule, NLRB orders in representation proceedings are not reviewable by the
courts unless and until the employer has refused to bargain with the union once the union has
been certified. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477-79 (1964). In such cases,
section 9(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 159(d), provides that the findings in the underlying
3

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of the Regional Director’s decision on December 6, 2010, with one member of the
three-member panel dissenting. Following a representation election, the Union
was certified on January 6, 2011 as the exclusive bargaining representative for
Lakeland’s LPNs.
In order to seek judicial review of the Board’s findings, Lakeland refused to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the LPNs’ representative. The Union
responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, which, through
the Board’s general counsel, filed a complaint against Lakeland on February 22,
2011. On April 29, 2011, the Board entered a 3-page Decision and Order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Board’s general counsel (and thereby the
Union), finding that Lakeland violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Lakeland appeals.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Board’s summary judgment order is predicated on the findings

in the underlying representation case, we review the merits of those decisions
together on appeal. See Boire, 376 U.S. at 477-79. When reviewing an order of
the Board, we are “bound by the Board’s factual findings if they are supported by

representation proceeding are made a part of the record and are subject to review on appeal.
Boire, 376 U.S. at 477-79. We refer to the Regional Director’s decision throughout this opinion
as a decision of the “Board.”
4

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substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v.
NLRB, 127 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting NLRB v. Malta Constr. Co,
806 F.2d 1009, 1010 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Board’s
inferences from the record evidence, if plausible, should not be overturned, even if
we would have made different findings upon a de novo review of the evidence.
Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 127 F.3d at 1306. “[C]redibility resolutions are
peculiarly within the province of the [administrative law judge] and the Board and
are entitled to deference unless inherently unreasonable or self-contradictory.”
NLRB v. United Sanitation Serv., 737 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1984).
While we have described this standard of review as “exceedingly narrow,”
NLRB v. Contemporary Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2012), and
have noted that a “robust application” of the standard has typified review of
NLRB decisions, Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.
1999), we are not “obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp [our] affirmance of
administrative decisions that [we] deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or
that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.” Id. at 1261
(alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. ‘It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
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Contemporary Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v.
NLRB, 871 F.2d 980, 984 (11th Cir. 1989)). “[T]he Board cannot ignore the
relevant evidence that detracts from its findings.” Northport Health Svcs., Inc. v.
NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992). “When [it] misconstrues or fails to
consider important evidence, its conclusions are less likely to rest upon substantial
evidence.” Id.
The burden of establishing the supervisory status of an employee is on the
party asserting such status. NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532
U.S. 706 (2001); Cooper/T. Smith, 177 F.3d at 1263. Here, that party is
Lakeland.
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Framework

Whether Lakeland is in violation of the Act hinges on whether its LPNs are
properly regarded as “employees” or “supervisors.” Under the structure of the
Act, if the LPNs are “employees,” they are guaranteed the right to unionize. See
29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization . . . .”). If
they are “supervisors,” they are not. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term
‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor . . .
.”).
6

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Section 2(11) of the Act defines a “supervisor” as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Accordingly, an individual is a “supervisor” under the Act
if: (1) he or she has the authority to perform one of the twelve supervisory
functions described in the statute; (2) the exercise of that authority requires the use
of independent judgment; and (3) such authority is held in the interest of the
employer. See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994)
(“HCR”).
In this case, there is no dispute as to whether the authority held by
Lakeland’s LPNs is exercised “in the interest of the employer.” See HCR, 511
U.S. at 577 (1994) (“Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows
that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are the employer’s
customers, is in the interest of the employer.”). Thus, this appeal focuses on the
first two inquires under section 2(11). On the issue of the LPNs’ authority,
Lakeland argues that the record clearly establishes that the LPNs possess the
authority to discipline, suspend, and effectively recommend the termination of the
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CNAs, and to assign and responsibly direct the CNAs’ work. As to the second
issue, Lakeland maintains that the exercise of this authority requires the use of
independent judgment. Our task is to determine whether the Board’s conclusions
to the contrary are supported by substantial record evidence.
B.

Authority to Discipline, Suspend, and “Effectively Recommend”
Termination

According to Lakeland, the most compelling reason why the Board’s
decision should be vacated is because the LPNs, using their own independent
judgment and discretion, initiate the process to discipline, suspend, and terminate
CNAs. More to the point, Lakeland argues that the Board’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence inasmuch as it misconstrues and disregards
critical evidence concerning the LPNs’ role in the disciplinary process for CNAs.
Lakeland employs a progressive discipline system, which it describes as a
“coaching” program. Under the program, employees who engage in misconduct or
who are not meeting Lakeland’s performance expectations can receive either a
“level one” or “level two” “coaching,” depending on the severity of the issue.
Coachings are prepared by the LPNs, either on their own initiative or at the
instruction of management, and may or may not lead to formal discipline. Level
two coachings, which are reserved for “serious failures of customer service
standards,” automatically result in the suspension of the employee pending an
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investigation and frequently result in termination. Level one coachings, which are
issued for more minor infractions such as tardiness or failing to clock out for
lunch, require the employee and his or her “direct supervisor” to agree to a plan to
address the issue. Employees with four active level one coachings are
automatically terminated. We review the evidence related to LPN involvement in
level two and level one coachings independently.
1.

Level Two Coachings

Lakeland maintains that the LPNs are supervisors under the Act because
they have the independent discretionary authority to initiate and implement level
two coachings through which they can effectively suspend and terminate CNAs.
The Board rejected this argument, reasoning that the record establishes only that
the LPNs are responsible for reporting employee misconduct. That is, according
to the Board, to the extent that the LPNs even have disciplinary authority, the
exercise of such authority does not require the use of independent judgment.
While we are mindful of the limited nature of our review in this appeal, this
is not a case in which we merely disagree with the Board’s conclusions. Our
review of the record as a whole reveals that the Board meticulously excluded or
disregarded record evidence, which, when taken into account, compels a different
result. See Northport, 961 F.2d at 1552.
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With regard to the first prong of the analysis required under section 2(11) of
the Act–whether the employee has the authority to perform one of the twelve
supervisory functions–the Board rejected Lakeland’s testimonial and documentary
evidence as being in conflict, inconclusive, or conclusory. It was none of these.
The written job description for LPN charge nurses (team leaders) provides that the
“primary purpose of the Charge Nurse is to provide direct nursing care to the
residents, and to supervise the day-to-day nursing activities performed by the
[CNAs].” To this end, LPNs are charged with ensuring, among other things, that
nursing personnel: “are in compliance with their respective job descriptions,” “are
performing their work assignments in accordance with acceptable nursing
standards,” and “follow the department’s established policies and procedures.”
The job description also provides that LPNs shall “[i]nterpret the department’s
policies and procedures to personnel, residents, visitors, and government agencies
as required,” and “[m]ake recommendations for revisions” to the policies and
procedures.3
The record establishes that the LPNs fulfill these delegated supervisory
responsibilities, in part, through Lakeland’s coaching program. Lakeland’s
3

The job description also provides under the headings “Leadership” and “Supervisory
Authority” that an LPN “[r]eports performance related issues of CNAs to Nursing Supervisor.”
As discussed below, we do not take this to mean, as the Board suggests, that the LPNs’ only role
in the disciplinary process is to report employee misconduct.
10

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Director of Nursing, Garth Swearingen, testified that the LPNs “are considered to
be leaders of their team” and that, if they saw a CNA not performing his or her job
correctly, “they certainly would be able to coach them, talk to them, give them a
verbal warning, or do any coaching that they would need to do that . . . .”
Swearingen further confirmed that the coaching forms prepared and issued by
LPNs are for discipline, and, on cross-examination, testified that LPNs are “very
capable of coaching somebody at a Level 2, and they’re also very capable of
suspending any CNA. They’re capable of sending them home. This testimony is
consistent with Swearingen’s testimony elsewhere in the record:
Q:

And just to clarify the issuance of a Level 2
coaching plan, that results in somebody being - -

A:

That’s very serious.

Q:

Well, but it results in somebody being told, “Don’t
come back here ‘til the investigation’s over,”
right?

A:

That’s right.

Q:

That’s being sent home?

A:

Immediate suspension. That’s suspension
immediately.

....
Q:

And the team leaders can do that, right?
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A:

They can.

Q:

And they do?

A:

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And they do. And they have.

This testimony stands uncontradicted.4 Moreover it is consistent with the
testimony of Lakeland’s Daytime Shift Supervisor, Tammy Baxter, which is also
uncontradicted:
Q:

Based on your knowledge of the Level 2 coaching
process, a team leader LPN would have the
authority to issue a Level 2 coaching, correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And under a Level 2 coaching and the facility’s
policy, is an employee automatically suspended
upon receipt of a Level 2 coaching?

A:

Yes.

Q:

So is it fair to assume that if [an LPN] issued a
Level 2 coaching to [a CNA] that she would have
been suspended pending investigation?

A:

She would have sent her home.

Both Swearingen and Baxter followed this testimony with specific examples of
LPNs who effectively suspended or terminated a CNA through the level two

4

At oral argument, the Board was given the opportunity to demonstrate where in the
record this testimony was in any respect contradicted. It failed to do so.
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coaching process. Indeed, Baxter recounted one such example of a level two
coaching wherein she personally witnessed an LPN conduct the termination of a
CNA.5
Nor should this evidence have been disregarded because, according to the
Board, the examples cited by Swearingen and Baxter were “isolated” or
“sporadic.” As Lakeland points out, given that level two coachings are reserved
for the most serious infractions, one would reasonably expect that such
occurrences would be infrequent. Such infrequency does not suggest a lack of
disciplinary authority. Rather, it indicates only that the LPNs had only “isolated”
or “sporadic” opportunities to exercise this authority over the CNAs. The Board’s
task in this case was to determine whether the LPNs have been delegated the
authority to issue level two coachings, and whether, by virtue of that authority,
they could effectively discipline, suspend, and recommend the termination of
CNAs. The frequency with which an employee exercises disciplinary
authority–authority that, in an ideal workplace, will be exercised infrequently or
sparingly–cannot be determinative of the existence of supervisory authority. See
5

Both Swearingen and Baxter testified regarding an incident when an LPN issued a level
two coaching to a CNA after the CNA permitted a patient to smoke while using supplemental
oxygen. Swearingen testified that the LPN was involved in both the investigation and the
decision to terminate the CNA. Baxter, who testified that she spoke with the LPN who issued
the coaching, confirmed these facts. Baxter also testified that she personally witnessed the LPN
perform the CNA’s termination.
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Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1997).6
With regard to the second prong of the analysis required under section 2(11)
of the Act–whether exercise of the authority requires independent judgment–the
Board concluded that, in issuing level two coachings, the LPNs merely report
employee misconduct to management, after which time management conducts an
investigation and determines the appropriate discipline. To be sure, we take no
issue with the Board’s articulation of the appropriate legal standard. As noted by
the Board in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 693 (2006)
(“Oakwood”), the exercise of “independent judgment” is to be contrasted with
actions that are “merely routine or clerical.” To exercise independent judgment,
the individual “must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of the
control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing
data.” Id at 694. “[A] judgment is not independent if it is dictated or controlled by
detailed instructions . . . .” Id. at 693. “[T]he mere existence of company
policies,” however, “does not eliminate independent judgment from
decision-making if the policies allow for discretionary choices.” Id.

6

We recognize that, in some cases, the infrequency with which purported authority is
exercised may be relevant to determining whether such authority was actually vested in the
employee. However, logic dictates that this consideration has little relevance when the authority
claimed is the authority to discipline, suspend, or terminate, and the frequency of disciplinary
incidents is limited.
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Here again, however, the Board conclusion cannot be squared with the
record as a whole, which undermines the Board’s position that the LPNs merely
report misconduct to their superiors and exercise no discretion in the level two
coaching process. In reaching its decision, the Board again disregards compelling
and uncontradicted evidence to the contrary. For example, Baxter testified that,
when she was a team leader, she had the independent authority, which she
exercised,7 to discipline CNAs without involving another level supervisor. She
also testified that, upon learning of a CNA’s performance issue, she had the
discretion to determine whether, based upon the seriousness of the infraction, to
prepare a written coaching form or to resolve the issue only by speaking with the
CNA directly (i.e., by issuing a verbal warning directly to the CNA). Swearingen
likewise testified that, if a team leader learned of a performance issue, they
“certainly would be able to coach them, talk to them, give them a verbal warning,
or do any coaching that they would need to do that . . . .” He later added, “[t]he
LPN can take it on herself to do a Level 2 coaching anytime she chooses to do that
. . . .” “[T]hey have full authority at any time, they don’t need the direction of

7

The example cited by Baxter involved a situation wherein a CNA under her supervision
was not completing her assigned work, and, when Baxter approached her about the issue, the
CNA “got in [her] face” and threatened her. Baxter wrote the CNA up, sent her home, and
recommended to Swearingen that she be terminated. The CNA was terminated by the following
evening.
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anybody, at any time that they want to they can write up an employee.” This
unrebutted testimony establishes that, at a minimum, LPNs possess the
discretionary authority to determine whether formal discipline is warranted in the
first place. Yet, this testimony did not factor into the Board’s analysis of this
issue.
The language of Lakeland’s employee handbook and level two coaching
form also compel the conclusion that the LPNs exercise independent judgment.
The employee handbook and the coaching form list over a dozen actions that
would constitute violations of Lakeland’s level two “customer service
standards”–violations that, as noted above, would require a CNA’s immediate
suspension and, possibly, termination. While it is true that some of these actions,
such as “[s]leeping on the job” “ or “2 No Call/No Shows,” can be identified as
violations without the exercise of independent judgment, others, such as
“[u]nauthorized disclosure of confidential information,” “[n]egligent conduct
which results in the damage to the facility, or customer property,” “harassment,” or
“fraudulent activity,” plainly cannot. In such cases, finding a CNA in violation of
Lakeland’s customer service standards (a finding with immediate and severe
consequences) necessarily requires the LPN to exercise judgment as to what
information is “confidential” and what conduct rises to the level of “negligence,”
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“harassment,” or “fraud.” Further, the employee handbook and coaching form
also provide that the list of activities described therein that could constitute a level
two violation is not exhaustive. In other words, the LPNs can independently
determine that yet other actions are sufficiently serious so as to warrant a CNA’s
immediate suspension pending an investigation.
Critically, rather than focusing on this and other evidence of independent
judgment before it, the Board’s decision on this issue rests entirely on speculative
inferences from what the evidence could or might have shown. For example, the
Board clearly placed considerable weight on the fact that the level two coaching
form “does not indicate whether the LPN completing the form is the one who
suspends the CNA, or whether the LPN does so independently or needs the
approval of a nursing supervisor or unit manager.” The Board also stressed that
the form “does not have a space for any recommendation by the LPN completing
the form, and the Level Two coaching plans in the record do not discuss the LPN’s
recommendation.” Be that as it may, the fact that the forms in question could have
been drafted differently does not establish, as the Board concluded, that the LPNs
who prepared them did not exercise independent judgment. Likewise, the fact
that “[n]one of the LPNs who purportedly completed the Level Two coaching plan
forms in the record testified” is not reason enough to ignore the undisputed
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testimony of the managers who testified as to their own knowledge regarding
those LPN coachings.
In light of this uncontradicted testimony, the language of Lakeland’s
employee handbook, the LPNs’ job description, and the level two coaching forms
in the record, the record as a whole does not support by substantial evidence the
Board’s conclusion that the LPNs’ role in the level two coaching process is
“merely reportorial.”8
8

We note that our conclusion is in accord with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Extendicare
Health Servs., Inc v NLRB, 182 F. App’x 412 (6th Cir. 2006) and the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998). But see NLRB v. Saint Mary
Home, 358 F. App’x 255 (2d Cir. 2009); NLRB v . Hilliard Dev. Corp., 187 F.3d 133 (1st Cir.
1999). In Extendicare, the court noted:
The Board viewed the nurses’ “writing up” of assistants’
misconduct as a mere “reporting function” that “does not establish
supervisory status.” We do not think substantial evidence supports
the Board’s view. First, the record shows that Extendicare’s floor
nurses have discretionary authority to choose from among several
remedial measures, only one of which involves completion of a
disciplinary action report. The nurses decide independently
whether a nursing assistant’s misconduct is severe enough to
warrant disciplinary proceedings. As we have held elsewhere, the
use of independent judgment in writing up employees’ infractions
is a supervisory function.
Second, it is undisputed that a floor nurse’s completion of a
disciplinary action report initiates formal disciplinary proceedings
against a nursing assistant. By making such a report, therefore, a
nurse plays an effective part in the disciplinary process. The
administrator or director of nursing makes the final decision as to
whether, and how, an assistant will be disciplined, but the relevant
consideration for purposes of § 152(11) is effective
recommendation . . . rather than final authority. The Act does not
preclude supervisory status simply because a recommendation is
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Level One Coachings

The Board also determined that the LPNs’ involvement in level one
coachings does not establish their supervisory status. Specifically, the Board
concluded that there is no direct “nexus” between the issuance of level one
violations and future disciplinary action. The Board also found that the evidence
presented on this issue was either “vague,” and should therefore be disregarded, or
merely established that level one coachings are issued automatically without the
exercise of independent judgment. These conclusions are not supported by the
evidence.
As a starting point, the record makes clear that the issuance of level one
coachings, in and of itself, is a form of discipline. The employee handbook
provides that employees who fail to meet Lakeland’s customer service standards
will receive a level one coaching plan “developed by the employee and his/her
direct supervisor”–in the case of CNAs, an LPN or RN team leader. The level one
coaching forms contain a space for the team leader and the CNA to describe the

subject to a superior’s investigation.
182 F. App’x. at 416-17 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alternations in original
omitted). While the determination of supervisory status must be made on a case-by-case basis,
we find this reasoning persuasive.

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reason for the coaching, the coaching plan, and any additional corrective action or
training necessary. The employee’s “direct supervisor,” who signs the level one
coaching form next to the line designated “supervisor signature” or “coach’s
signature,” is charged with “implement[ing]” the plan. The plans “are
permanently filed in the employee’s personnel file,” and, if not satisfactorily
completed, “remain active regardless of the date of issue.” An employee who has
four active level one coaching plans will be terminated.9
Moreover, the Board disregarded undisputed evidence of LPNs disciplining
CNAs through coaching plans principally on the basis that Lakeland presented no
evidence that a CNA had been terminated as a result of multiple pending level one
coachings. For the reasons we discuss above, we reject the notion that the Board
may infer solely from the lack of CNA terminations resulting from level one
coachings that LPNs are not vested with the authority “effectively to recommend”
their termination. Similarly, the fact that CNAs receive “coaching” before
receiving other, more serious forms of discipline such as suspension or
termination–which may or may not need approval from the “chain of

9

The uncontradicted evidence establishes that LPNs disciplined CNAs on numerous
occasions through the level one coaching process.
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command”–does not make coaching any less of a disciplinary action.10 It is plain

10

The Board also relies on the testimony of Lakeland’s Unit Manager, Carol Hiner, who
stated that, when she was hired, she was told by Swearingen that “the immediate supervisors
needed to be the ones to do the coachings; as far as their disciplinary action, they had to be
follow-up [sic] with the chain of command.” On this point, we agree with the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit in Caremore:
[T]he NLRB relies heavily on the fact that the evaluations and
disciplinary notices filed by the LPNs were subject to review by the
Administrator. But the [Act] does not require, for example, that an
individual possess authority to fire an employee in order to be
considered a supervisor; it is sufficient that the individual has the
power “effectively to recommend” that an employee be fired.
129 F.3d at 369. Furthermore, we note that the Board’s analysis ignored unrefuted testimony to
the contrary from Baxter on this point–evidence that she, in fact, exercised her independent
authority to discipline CNAs:
Q:

[W]hat information was relayed to you and the other team
members as far as the scope of your authority for issuing
the coachings?

A:

That we were responsible for those patients on the hall, and
that we were responsible for making sure the CNAs did
their duties and if not, it was to be addressed.

Q:

So, was it your understanding that you had independent
authority to discipline a CNA without being required to
involve another level supervisor?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And did you engage in that practice - -

A:

Yes.

Q:

- - during your tenure as a team leader at Wedgewood?

A:

Yes.

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from the record that there is a nexus between the authority delegated to the LPNs
to issue level one coachings and the discipline, suspension, and effective
recommendation of termination of CNAs.
We also cannot accept the Board’s rejection of the testimony establishing
that the LPNs exercise independent judgment in issuing level one coachings solely
on the basis that it was “vague.” Lakeland’s evidence on this point was neither
refuted nor vague. For example, Baxter, when asked why she believed an LPN did
not ask her permission before issuing a level one coaching, replied:
A:

Because she knew she had authority to do it. That
was her hall and her patient, and it was the aides
on that hall that weren’t doing what they needed to
do.

Q:

So Ms. McQuain did not need your permission to
issue a Level 1 coaching to the CNA for not
wearing a gait belt?

A:

No.

Likewise, Carol Hiner, Lakeland’s Unit Manager, estimated that approximately 70
percent of coaching issued to CNAs are issued and handled solely by LPNs. As
noted above, “the Board cannot ignore the relevant evidence that detracts from its
findings.” Northport, 961 F.2d at 1550.
Further, this testimony is consistent with and buttressed by the provisions of
Lakeland’s employee manual and the more than 50 level one coaching plans that
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were introduced into evidence. These documents, which were not contested,
objectively refute the Board’s position that the issuance of level one coaching
plans is merely “routine” or “clerical.” The employee manual, for example,
describes twenty non-exclusive “examples” of customer service standards, which,
if not met, could lead to level one coaching discipline. To list a few, the program
requires that employees “[f]ollow the Facility’s policy and procedures and
Facility’s standards of practice,” “[a]lways act professional, respectful, and have a
positive attitude,” “[d]emonstrate flexibility in accepting assignments,”
“[m]aintain resident confidentiality,” and “[a]void disruptive actions or conduct in
the workplace . . . .” Naturally, enforcing these standards requires more than
merely checking an employee’s time sheets and/or reporting his or her misconduct
to superiors, as the Board concluded. Enforcement of these standards requires, for
example, independent judgment as to what is “respectful,” “professional,”
“flexible,” and “disruptive,” with respect to the CNAs providing adequate patient
care.
The level one coaching forms likewise illustrate how the LPNs exercise
independent judgment. As noted above, each form contains a section labeled
“Coaching Plan” wherein the employee and the “coach” (an RN or LPN team
leader) agree to a plan to help the employee meet Lakeland’s customer service
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standards. For example, in a coaching plan dated April 6, 2008, which reflects
that the “coach” was an LPN and the “employee” was a CNA, the CNA agreed to
attend a customer service “inservice training” the following week. The plan
indicates that there would be an additional review in 30 days or earlier, depending
on whether there were any further complaints. Similarly, a coaching plan dated
September 9, 2008, also prepared by a CNA and an LPN, addresses an instance
wherein a CNA failed to perform her work and act professionally in front of a
patient. The plan reflects that the CNA and LPN reviewed the customer service
standards together and contains a comment that the CNA “need[s] to display
positive attitude and continue to maintain good rapport [with] residents.” These
and the other plans in the record demonstrate that the LPNs must, in every instance
of discipline (with the exception, perhaps, of attendance violations), perform an
individual evaluation of the CNA’s shortcomings and develop a plan addressing
the issue.
On these facts, we find that the Board’s conclusion that LPNs do not have
the authority to discipline, suspend, or effectively recommend the termination of
CNAs through level one coaching was not supported by substantial evidence.11
11

The dissent maintains that we “fail[ ] to mention significant testimony that supports the
contrary finding by the Board.” Dissent at 43. In particular, the dissent cites to the testimony of
Rebecca Ward, an LPN called as a witness by the Board, who testified that she personally did not
consider herself a supervisor, that she has never hired, fired, promoted, or disciplined a CNA,
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C.

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Authority to Responsibly Direct and Assign CNAs

Although we find unreasonable the Board’s conclusion that the LPNs
involvement in CNA coaching does not make them supervisors under the Act, for
the sake of thoroughness, we will also consider whether the Board’s determination
that the LPNs do not “responsibly direct” and “assign” CNAs is supported by
substantial record evidence. Lakeland maintains that the LPNs have supervisory
authority because they are accountable for the work of the CNAs under their
supervision and because they assign and reassign CNAs specific tasks and shifts
based upon the needs and conditions of the center, its staff, and its residents.
1.

“Responsibly” Direct

The Board concluded that “the LPN team leaders have the authority to
direct CNAs,” noting that, “[t]he LPN team leaders ‘oversee the CNA’s [sic] job
performance and act to correct the CNAs when they are not providing adequate
care.’” DDE at 33 (citing Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr, 348 NLRB 727, 730

and that she has never been instructed that she possesses such authority. The dissent’s reliance
on this and similar evidence runs counter to the central reasoning of our decision. Whether an
individual qualifies as a “supervisor” under the Act does not necessarily rest on his or her
employer’s ability to provide actual examples of disciplinary authority. Rather, as we stress
throughout this opinion, the Act directs the Board to evaluate the putative supervisor’s authority
to discipline, suspend, and effectively recommend the termination of other employees. Where, as
with Rebecca Ward, the record does not reflect that there were adequate opportunities for the
putative supervisor to exercise such authority-authority which has been clearly delegated-the
frequency with which he or she actually exercises this authority, if ever, is not probative of this
central point.
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(2006) (“Golden Crest”)). The parties likewise do not dispute whether the
exercise of that authority requires independent judgement. Accordingly, our only
task here is to determine whether the LPNs exercise that discretion
“responsibly.”12
For guidance on the meaning of “responsibly,” the parties direct us to the
Board’s decision in Oakwood.13 In Oakwood, the Board held:
[F]or direction to be ‘responsible,’ the person directing
and performing the oversight of the employee must be
accountable for the performance of the task by the other,
such that some adverse consequences may befall the one
providing the oversight if the tasks performed by the
employee are not performed properly. . . . Thus, to
establish accountability for purposes of responsible
direction, it must be shown that the employer delegated
to the putative supervisor the authority to direct the work
and the authority to take corrective action, if necessary.
It also must be shown that there is a prospect of adverse
consequences for the putative supervisor if he/she does
not take these steps.

12

Lakeland devotes a section of its brief to arguing that LPNs’ involvement in the
performance evaluation process for CNAs is indicative of the LPNs’ supervisory status, and
directs the Court to extensive record testimony concerning the criteria of the evaluations and the
impact of the evaluations on the work of the CNAs. However, such evidence would establish
only that LPNs “direct” CNAs and exercise independent judgment in doing so, not that such
direction was “responsible.” Because these issues are not in dispute, consideration of this
evidence not required.
13

Because the term “responsibly” is ambiguous, we defer to the Board’s interpretation as
long as it is reasonable. See Cent. Fla. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d
489, 496 (5th Cir. 1981). All decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to October 1,
1981, are binding precedent in this circuit. See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d, 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981).
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348 N.L.R.B. at 691-92. This framework draws a distinction between “those
employees whose interests, in directing other employees’ tasks, align with
management, and those whose interests, in directing other employees, is simply
the completion of a certain task.” Id. at 692. “In the case of the former, . . . the
directing employee will have, if and to the extent necessary, an adversarial
relationship with those he is directing.” Id.
Lakeland concedes that there is no evidence establishing that an LPN has
ever been disciplined or discharged because of his or her failure to supervise
CNAs. Nonetheless, Lakeland maintains that to establish that an employee
“responsibly” directs another it is not necessary that the employer give specific
examples of where “adverse consequences” befell an employee who failed to
exercise proper supervision. Lakeland emphasizes that the Act requires only a
prospect of adverse consequences. We agree.14
14

After the parties filed their briefs, the Board brought to the Court’s attention two recent
decisions from the Seventh and Third Circuits involving the issue of “responsible direction”
under the Act. See Rochelle Waste Disposal, LLC v. NLRB, 673 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2012); Mars
Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2011). In both of these cases, the respective
courts upheld the Board’s decision finding that the putative supervisors did not responsibly direct
other employees. In Mars Home, the Third Circuit noted that “[t]he record before the Board
contained numerous examples of where assistant managers were not disciplined for the failure of
resident assistants to follow their directions. Rather, the record shows that the assistant managers
were disciplined for their own failings as managers.” 666 F.3d at 854. In Rochelle Waste, the
Seventh Circuit explained that “the Board found no evidence that Jarvis actually suffered as
‘adverse consequence’ . . . . Where a lower level employee performs inadequately, and the
purported supervisor is in fact not held accountable, it highly supports a finding that the
purported supervisor is not actually at risk of suffering adverse consequences.” 673 F.3d at 596.
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To begin with, Lakeland’s written job description for LPNs strongly
indicates that they are accountable for the performance of the CNAs. Under the
heading “Leadership,” the job description explicitly provides that the LPNs
supervise CNAs. Further, the job description explains that the “primary purpose”
of LPNs is to “provide direct nursing care to the residents, and to supervise the
day-to-day nursing activities performed by nursing assistants.” To this end, the
job description provides that the “essential duties” of LPNs are, among other
things, to “[d]irect the day-to-day functions of the nursing assistants in accordance
with current rules, regulations, and guidelines that govern the long-term care
facility,” “[e]nsure that all assigned nursing personnel comply with the written
policies and procedures established by the facility,” “[e]nsure that all nursing
service personnel are in compliance with their respective job descriptions,” and
“[m]ake daily rounds of [their] unit/shift to ensure that nursing service personnel
are performing their work assignments in accordance with acceptable nursing

The Seventh Circuit later added that, “Rochelle Waste does not point to anything in the record
that shows that [the purported supervisor was] ‘at risk’ of an adverse consequence for the poor
performance of other employees . . . .” Id. Relying on these and other cases, the Board reasons
that the absence in the record of any examples where an LPN was disciplined for the poor
performance of a CNA, combined with the numerous examples of coachings that evidence
misconduct by CNAs, conclusively establishes that the LPNs do not “responsibly” direct CNAs
work. We, however, do not read these cases as holding that actual examples of “responsible”
discipline are required under the Act. To the contrary, both Mars Home and Rochelle Waste
reaffirm the Board’s determination in Oakwood that the Act requires only that the putative
supervisor be at risk of suffering adverse consequences for the performance of others.
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standards . . . .” (emphasis added). This evidence, while generally noted in the
background section of the Board’s decision, was not considered in its analysis of
responsible direction.
We acknowledge that, standing alone, this “paper” evidence would likely
not be sufficient to support a finding of supervisory status. Cf. Golden Crest 348
N.L.R.B. at 731 (“But there must be a more-than-merely-paper showing that such
a prospect [of adverse consequences] exists.”). As the Board has properly
recognized, to base supervisory status solely upon a paper showing of titles or job
descriptions would enable employers to design their policies in a manner that
could effectively deprive non-supervisory employees of their right to collective
bargaining under the Act. This concern, however, does not command an
impossibly high evidentiary standard for establishing “prospective” consequences
for the putative supervisor. Written policies, job descriptions, performance
evaluations, and the like, when corroborated by live testimony or other evidence,
are obviously relevant to the issue of responsible direction.
In this case, Lakeland presented much more than a “paper showing” of
responsible direction.15 Lakeland also presented unrebutted testimony establishing
15

In its brief, the Board relies heavily on Golden Crest to support its conclusion that the
evidence presented by Lakeland was insufficient to establish that the LPNs’ direction was
responsible. In that case, decided the same day as Oakwood, the Board held that Golden Crest,
the employer, failed to establish that its LPNs responsibly directed the CNAs at its facility.
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that LPNs are “responsible” for ensuring the CNAs’ compliance with Lakeland’s
standards, and that they would be “written up” for failing to do so. For example,
Lakeland’s Director of Nursing, Swearingen, testified:
Q:

. . . Can a charge nurse be held responsible for a
CNA not doing his or her job?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Have you seen that happen?

A:

No.

Q:

Well, but if there’s a problem with patient care,
have nurses ever been -- have -- they are held
responsible for that?

A:

If they’re -- if a charge nurse saw a CNA do
something to the resident that was against a
standard practice, and I’ll give you an example, if
they saw a CNA verbally abuse or physically
abuse their resident, and if the charge nurse did
not have that CNA leave the building, that charge
nurse would be responsible, yes.16

Golden Crest, like Lakeland, offered no examples, positive or negative, of actions taken as a
result of the LPNs’ performance in directing the CNAs. Unlike this case, however, the only
evidence offered by Golden Crest on the issue of responsible direction consisted of evaluation
forms, which, among other factors, rated the LPNs on how well they “[d]irect[] CNAs to ensure
quality of care.” 348 N.L.R.B. at 731. The Board found that the evaluation forms, standing
alone, did not establish the supervisory status of Golden Crest’s LPNs.
16

Swearingen also testified to several other scenarios in which an LPN would be coached
for the poor performance of a CNA. For example:
Q:

If an LPN tells a CNA to turn a resident in a certain manner
on this day and the CNA doesn’t do it, and the LPN knows
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Likewise, Baxter testified:
Q:

If a CNA has been coached that they are doing
something improper, not very good at it, bedding,
showering, toiletry, whatever, and they don’t seem
to be improving on it, would an LPN be written up
because of the performance of a CNA?

A:

If the aide on the hallway is not doing their [sic]
job and that nurse is aware that that CNA is not
doing their [sic] job?

Q:

Uh-huh.

A:

Yes, I would write her up.

Q:

Have you ever written up an LPN?

A:

I have never had to. But I would. They are
responsible for that hall.

The Board disregarded this and other areas of testimony as “purely

the CNA didn’t do what she was supposed to do, will that
LPN be coached?
A:

Yes.

Q:

If an LPN tells a CNA to groom a resident in a certain
manner and the CNA doesn’t do it and the LPN knows that,
will the LPN be coached?

A:

Yes. . . .

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conclusory.” They were not. As noted above, under the Act, an employer may
establish “responsible” direction by presenting evidence of prospective
consequences. Swearingen’s and Baxter’s testimony provide specific examples of
scenarios in which, they opined, an LPN would be held accountable for the actions
of a CNA. Baxter’s unrefuted testimony also establishes that an LPN would be
held accountable in such a situation through a “write up” (presumably coaching),
which, as we note above, is a significant form of discipline. By focusing
exclusively on the lack of examples where an LPN “has experienced . . . material
consequences to her terms and conditions of employment . . . as a result of his/her
performance in directing CNAs,”(emphasis added) the Board effectively ignored
its own observation in Oakwood that a showing of prospective consequences is
sufficient under the statute.
Applying the framework of Oakwood, we conclude that the record as a
whole establishes that the LPNs’ interests are “aligned with management” and that
the LPNs would be held accountable for the poor performance of their CNAs.
There was no evidence directly refuting this accountability. Accordingly, the
Board’s conclusion that the LPNs do not responsibly direct CNAs was not
supported by substantial evidence.

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2.

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Assignment

Under the Act, the Board has interpreted the term “assign” as referring to
“the act of designating an employee to a place (such as a location, department, or
wing), appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or overtime period), or
giving significant overall duties, i.e., tasks, to an employee.” Oakwood, 348
N.L.R.B. at 689. “In the health care setting, the term ‘assign’ encompasses the
charge nurses’ responsibility to assign nurses and aides to particular patients.” Id.
It does not encompass a “nurse’s ad hoc instruction that the employee perform a
discrete task.” Id. Here, the Board concluded that, in terms of assigning duties to
CNAs, Lakeland’s LPNs assign only “discrete tasks.” The Board also concluded
that, while the LPNs are involved in assigning and reassigning CNAs to specific
shifts, rooms, and residents, they do not use independent judgment in the exercise
of such authority.
a.

Tasks

In determining that the LPNs do not assign “significant overall duties” to
the CNAs, the Board drew a parallel between this case and an illustration provided
in Oakwood. In Oakwood, the Board noted:
[I]f a charge nurse designates an LPN to be the person
who will regularly administer medications to a patient or
a group of patients, the giving of that overall duty to the
LPN is an assignment. On the other hand, the charge
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nurse’s ordering an LPN to immediately give a sedative
to a particular patient does not constitute an assignment.
348 N.L.R.B. at 689. Based on this example, the Board concluded that the LPNs’
specific assignments to CNAs, such as taking vital signs and preparing residents to
visit doctors, were more akin to the Board’s example of routine, “discrete tasks”
than the giving of an “assignment” under the meaning of that term in the Act.
Lakeland responds that “LPNs assign daily tasks to CNAs that are not
routine–they are medical in nature and dependent on the residents’ conditions–and
change frequently depending upon the resident’s individual medical needs and any
emergencies that arise.” The testimony which Lakeland cites bears this out.
However, Lakeland’s assertion and the cited testimony only underscore the
Board’s point: the tasks performed by the LPNs are situational, depending on
particular needs as they arise. The record does not demonstrate that LPNs assign
“significant overall duties” to LPNs. Therefore, we conclude that the Board’s
determination on this narrow issue–the assignment of tasks–is supported by
substantial evidence.
b.

Scheduling

Whether the Board was reasonable in concluding that the LPNs do not
exercise independent judgment in scheduling CNAs is a different question. The
facts material to this issue are not in dispute. Lakeland employs two unit
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managers who work from 7:15 a.m. until 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, and
three shift supervisors, two who work overlapping daytime shifts between 12:00
p.m. and 11:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and a third who works weekends
from 7:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m. Lakeland’s LPNs and CNAs work three shifts,
seven days a week: 6:45 a.m. until 3:15 p.m.; 2:45 p.m. until 11:15 p.m.; 10:45
p.m. until 7:15 a.m. During the third shift, seven days per week, LPNs are the
highest-ranking employees on the premises. The Director of Nursing is on call 24
hours per day, seven days per week, in case of an emergency.
The parties acknowledge that responsibility for staffing and scheduling of
CNAs lies, first and foremost, with a staffing coordinator who reports to the
Director of Nursing. The staffing coordinator is charged with preparing the
schedule on a monthly basis, as well as “unit shift assignment sheets” for the first
and second shifts, Monday through Friday.17 The staffing coordinator testified
that, in scheduling CNAs, she frequently takes into account requests from LPNs
that certain CNAs be assigned (or not be assigned) to their hall. She added that:
I don’t pick CNAs to work particular halls because I
don’t know how well they work with the nurse or with
the particular patients on [sic] a certain section. Only the
nurses know that. They work with the CNAs closely.
17

The assignment sheets set forth, among other things, the unit, date, shift, and room
assignments for the LPNs and the CNAs on their respective teams, as well as break and lunch
times for each CNA on the team.
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That’s why we allow them to choose their teammates
basically.

On the third shift and weekends, LPNs alone are responsible for preparing
the assignment sheets. The record indicates that they do so at least in part based
on the information the staffing coordinator has already placed on the assignment
sheets. The record also indicates that LPNs, while not principally responsible for
transferring CNAs between units, changing room assignments, and reassigning
tasks between CNAs, have the authority to do so, and have exercised this authority
in the past. Similarly, during the third shift and on weekends, LPNs have the
authority to approve or deny CNA requests to leave work before the end of their
shift. During the first and second weekday shifts, this authority lies principally
with the unit manager, who takes into consideration the recommendation of the
respective LPNs.
The crux of this issue is whether, under this arrangement, the LPNs exercise
independent judgment in scheduling (or recommending the scheduling of) CNAs
to particular shifts, halls, etc., or whether they merely follow existing guidelines
and directions while leaving judgment calls to their superiors. We have held that,
“for an assignment function to involve independent judgment, the putative
supervisor must select employees to perform specific tasks on the basis of a
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judgment about the individual employee’s skills.” Cooper/T. Smith, Inc., 177 F.3d
at 1265. The Board thus concluded that LPNs are not supervisors in this regard
because Lakeland failed to establish that in making scheduling recommendations
and modifications the LPNs matched the needs of specific patients with a
particular CNA’s skills and training. Rather, the Board noted, such decisions
appear to be based upon the personal preferences of the LPN or resident involved,
or solely to balance the workload among CNAs–neither of which requires
independent judgment. The Board was likewise not persuaded by the fact that the
third (night) shift LPNs, while the highest-ranking employees on the premises
during their shifts, have the independent authority to reassign CNAs in the event
of no calls and no shows.
The Board’s conclusions find support in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Providence Alaska Medical Center v. NLRB, which, under similar facts,
concluded that the employer’s charge nurses were not supervisors under the Act.
121 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1997). As in this case, the LPNs in Providence did not
prepare the CNAs’ monthly schedule, but had the authority to assign nurses to
particular residents at the beginning of each shift, and to reassign nurses if another
nurse was absent or nearing overtime. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the LPNs’
assignments were made “within the parameters of the supervisory nurse’s monthly
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assignment schedule” and were a “routine activity that does not require the
exercise of independent judgment.” Id. at 552.18 The Ninth Circuit also concluded
that the LPNs’ involvement in staffing and scheduling decisions was “more
clerical than supervisory.” Id. at 553.
At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Fourth Circuit, also under
similar facts, concluded that the “power to authorize schedule changes and
reassign workers rises above the mere incidental direction of assistants.”
Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 341. The Fourth Circuit found persuasive the fact that,
“[f]or two out of three shifts during the day, and all three shifts over the weekend,
there is no higher authority than the charge nurse . . . .” Id. The Fourth Circuit
explained:
We cannot fathom the Board’s position that for more
than two thirds of the week at a nursing home providing
twenty-four hour care, where patient conditions can
change on a moment’s notice, there is no one present at
the facility exercising independent judgment regarding
proper staff levels and patient assignments.
....
The authority to assign workers constitutes the power to
put the other employees to work when and where
needed. Such decisions are, in our view, inseverable
from the exercise of independent judgment, especially in
18

We cited this reasoning with approval in Cooper, which involved the supervisory status
of tug boat docking pilots. 177 F.3d at 1265. For the reasons that follow, we find that Cooper is
distinguishable from this case as to the level of independent judgment exercised by the putative
supervisor.
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the health care context where staffing decisions can have
such an important impact on patient health and
well-being.
Id. at 341-42 (internal citations, quotations, and bracketing omitted).
To be sure, the standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit–whether the putative
supervisor has the authority “to put the other employees to work when and where
needed”–is arguably less rigorous than the standard that we have applied in this
circuit, which requires that the supervisor assign work on the basis of the
employees’ individual skills. Compare id. with Cooper/T. Smith, Inc., 177 F.3d at
1265 (citing NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“[T]he putative supervisor must select employees to perform specific tasks on the
basis of a judgment about the individual employee’s skills.”) ). However, the
thrust of that decision–finding untenable the Board’s position that LPNs
mechanically follow established procedure in assigning and reassigning CNAs,
even when they are the highest-ranking staff on the premises–applies with equal
force in this case. As noted by Swearingen, the LPNs “are considered to be
leaders of their team.” They seek to “assure the best possible care that they can
give to those residents or patients that’s [sic] in that section by making sure that
the CNAs do the job that they’re assigned to.” Id. In view of this unrebutted
evidence, we cannot accept the conclusion that the LPNs, who are charged with
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“leading” Lakeland’s unit teams in order to insure proper patient care, and who are
the highest-ranking employees during a third of Lakeland’s operations, have the
authority to assign and reassign CNAs, but have no real flexibility in doing so.
Viewing the record as a whole, we find the Board’s determination that the LPNs
do not exercise independent judgment in assigning CNAs not supported by
substantial evidence.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we GRANT Lakeland’s petition for review; the Board’s

cross-petition for enforcement is DENIED; and the Board’s decision is
VACATED.

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PRYOR, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
“[I]n reweighing the facts and setting aside the Board’s order,” the majority
opinion “improperly substitute[s] its own views of the facts for those of the
Board,” NLRB v. Enter. Ass’n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler,
Pneumatic Tube, Ice Mach. & Gen. Pipefitters of New York & Vicinity, Local
Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 532, 97 S. Ct. 891, 905 (1977), and fails to adhere
to our deferential standard of review. As directed by Congress, “[t]his Court
reviews the . . . factual findings [of the National Labor Relations Board] to ensure
that they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” NLRB
v. Contemporary Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 160(e)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” id. (quoting Bickerstaff
Clay Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 980, 984 (11th Cir. 1989)), but it “is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence.” Id. “Provided any inferences drawn from the
record were plausible, this Court may not overturn the Board’s determination even
if it would make a different finding under a de novo review.” Id. (citing Cooper/T.
Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999)). “This is an
exceedingly narrow standard of review designed to allow disruption of the . . .
decision [of the Board] only when the [Board] exercises its discretion ‘in an
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arbitrary or capricious manner.’” Id. (quoting Daylight Grocery Co. v. NLRB, 678
F.2d 905, 908 (11th Cir. 1982)). Although “a split in the circuits has developed
about the degree of deference that should be accorded to the [Board] on its
determination that an employee is a ‘supervisor’ under [section] 2(11) of the
[National Labor Relations Act],” Cooper/T. Smith, Inc., 177 F.3d at 1262 n.3, our
Court has refused to make “judicial adjustments to [the] statutory standard of
review [because] we believe the wiser course is a robust application of the
standard that has typified review of Board decisions,” id. at 1262.
Substantial evidence in three ways supports the findings by the Board that
the licensed practical nurses at Lakeland lack any supervisory authority using
independent judgment, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). First, substantial evidence supports
the finding by the Board that the licensed practical nurses lack the authority to
discipline, suspend, or effectively recommend the termination of certified nursing
assistants. Second, substantial evidence supports the finding by the Board that the
licensed practical nurses do not responsibly direct certified nursing assistants.
Third, substantial evidence supports the finding by the Board that the licensed
practical nurses do not assign certified nursing assistants using independent
judgment.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding by the Board that the Licensed
Practical Nurses Lack the Authority to Discipline, Suspend, or Effectively
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Recommend the Termination of Certified Nursing Assistants.
The majority opinion faults the Board for “meticulously exclud[ing] or
disregard[ing] record evidence, which, when taken into account, compels” the
finding that the licensed practical nurses possess the authority to discipline,
suspend, and effectively recommend the termination of certified nursing assistants,
Majority Opinion at 9, but the majority opinion fails to mention significant
testimony that supports the contrary finding by the Board. Although Lakeland did
not call any licensed practical nurses as witnesses to testify at the hearing about
whether they possessed supervisory authority, the Board did. The licensed
practical nurse the Board called provided unequivocal testimony that the licensed
practical nurses neither possess nor exercise supervisory authority.
Rebecca Ward, a licensed practical nurse who had worked as a licensed
practical nurse at Lakeland for ten years and was “one of the most senior [licensed
practical nurses] at [Lakeland],” testified that she did not consider herself to be a
supervisor, and that neither she nor any other licensed practical nurse had attended
daily management meetings. Ward had never hired, fired, transferred, or promoted
a certified nursing assistant. Ward had never disciplined a certified nursing
assistant. Ward had never suspended a certified nursing assistant, and she had
never been instructed that she had the right to suspend certified nursing assistants.
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On one occasion, Ward issued a level one coaching form to a certified nursing
assistant who Ward felt “was rude to a resident,” but Ward did so only after she
discussed the situation with her weekend supervisor, Sharon Stein, who is a
registered nurse. Stein “instructed” Ward to issue the level one coaching form to
the certified nursing assistant, and both Stein and Ward met with the certified
nursing assistant to discuss the form. In the light of Ward’s testimony, the Board
could have drawn a plausible inference that the licensed practical nurses lack the
authority authority to discipline, suspend, or effectively recommend the discharge
of certified nursing assistants.
Putting aside Ward’s testimony, the evidence that the majority opinion cites
to support its conclusion that the licensed practical nurses possess the authority to
discipline, suspend, and effectively recommend the termination of certified
nursing assistants does not compel that finding. The majority contends, for
example, that the testimony of the director or nursing, Gartha Swearingen,
establishes that the licensed practical nurses have the power to discipline, suspend,
and effectively recommend the discharge of certified nursing assistants, Majority
Opinion at 10–12, but a review of Swearingen’s testimony establishes that her
statements about whether the licensed practical nurses possess that authority using
independent judgment were, at best, ambiguous. After counsel for Lakeland
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provided Swearingen with a copy of the level two coaching form about an incident
in which a resident was burned after Tracie Stevens, a certified nursing assistant,
allowed the resident to smoke while wearing an oxygen mask, counsel for
Lakeland asked questions about the role that the licensed practical nurse who
signed the form played in the investigation and termination of Stevens.
Swearingen stated that Sheena Smith, the licensed practical nurse, was “involved”
in the suspension and termination of Stevens, but Swearingen’s testimony does not
compel a finding that the licensed practical nurse used independent judgment
during her undefined “involvement” with the suspension and termination of
Stevens:
Lakeland: So [Stevens] was suspended, and there was an
investigation conducted?
Director of Nursing: Yes, there was.
...
Lakeland: Okay. Now, what was the role of the [licensed
practical nurse] in [Stevens’s] case? In this situation?
Director of Nursing: The [licensed practical nurse] did the
termination.
Lakeland: And [the licensed practical nurse] was involved in the
termination process?
Director of Nursing: Yes, she was involved in it.
Lakeland: Was [the licensed practical nurse] also involved in the
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investigation process?
Director of Nursing: Yes, she was.
Lakeland: Now, Kelly Brady’s signature is there as well. Who’s
that?
Director of Nursing: Yes. She, on 4/13/09, she was the
administrator.
Lakeland: Okay. So she signed off on [Steven’s level two
coaching form] as well, though, right?
Director of Nursing: Yes.
Lakeland: But it was the [licensed practical nurse] who was
involved in both the investigation and the decision to terminate this
[certified nursing assistant]?
Director of Nursing: As part of the investigation, yes, [the licensed
practical nurse] was involved, yes.
A plausible inference can be drawn from Swearingen’s testimony that the licensed
practical nurse who signed Stevens’s level two coaching form played some role in
the investigation, suspension, and termination of Stevens, but Swearingen’s
testimony does not compel a finding that the licensed practical nurse took an
adverse employment action against Stevens using independent judgment. And
even if it did, this isolated incident of a licensed practical nurse playing a role in
the suspension of a certified nursing assistant together with the one other similar
incident that the director of nursing described, would not have required the Board
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to find that the licensed practical nurses are supervisors. We have stated that
“nearly everyone at one time or another, under some condition, tells someone else
what to do, but that one who engages in an isolated incident of supervision is not
necessarily a supervisor under the Act.” TRW-United Greenfield Div. v. NLRB,
716 F.2d 1391, 1395 (11th Cir. 1983).
Tammy Baxter, a day shift supervisor and registered nurse who had
previously performed the same role at Lakeland as the licensed practical nurses,
provided more detail regarding the level two coaching form that Smith issued to
Stevens, but Baxter’s testimony also fails to compel a finding that Smith
suspended Stevens using independent judgment:
Lakeland: Did Ms. Smith relay to you that Ms. Stevens was
suspended?
Baxter: Yes. She told me she was suspended.
Lakeland: Okay. Did she relay to you how Ms. Stevens came to be
suspended? In other words, she suspended her?
Baxter: I don’t remember her saying exactly what happened at the
time she was suspended. She just told me that she was suspended and
that she wanted her terminated.
The Board was not required to find that the licensed practical nurses at Lakeland
are supervisors on the basis of this ambiguous testimony regarding sporadic
incidences of discipline by the licensed practical nurses.
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In the light of Ward’s testimony and the testimony of Swearingen and
Baxter, a conflict in the evidence exists about whether the licensed practical
nurses possess the authority to discipline, suspend, and effectively recommend the
termination of certified nursing assistants, and the Board was entitled to resolve
that conflict. The Board drew a plausible inference from this evidence that the
licensed practical nurses lack that authority, and our “exceedingly narrow
standard of review,” Contemporary Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d at 1370, requires us to
enforce the order of the Board. But the majority opinion instead substitutes its
view of the facts for the contrary finding by the Board.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding by the Board that the Licensed
Practical Nurses Do Not Responsibly Direct Certified Nursing Assistants.
The majority opinion maintains that, although no evidence was introduced
that a licensed practical nurse at Lakeland has been disciplined or discharged
because of her failure to supervise a certified nursing assistant, Lakeland
established a “prospect” that licensed practical nurses can be disciplined for
failing to direct certified nursing assistants, see Majority Opinion at 27, but the
record does not compel a finding of that “prospect.” Substantial evidence supports
the decision of the Board that Lakeland failed to prove that licensed practical
nurses can be held accountable for the actions of the certified nursing assistants.
Although an employer can establish responsible direction by presenting
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evidence that a purported supervisor faces the prospect of adverse consequences
for the actions of a subordinate, see In re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB
686, 692 (2006), the Board was presented with evidence that the licensed practical
nurses face no prospect of adverse consequences for the failings of the certified
nursing assistants. The Board heard evidence that certified nursing assistants had
engaged in gross misconduct–for example, Stevens allowed a resident to smoke
while wearing an oxygen mask, which led to a serious injury to the resident–but
no licensed practical nurse had been held accountable for that misconduct. As the
Seventh Circuit recently explained, “[w]here a lower level employee performs
inadequately, and the purported supervisor is in fact not held accountable, it highly
supports a finding that the purported supervisor is not actually at risk of suffering
adverse consequences.” Rochelle Waste Disposal, LLC v. NLRB, 673 F.3d 587,
596 (7th Cir. 2012). A reasonable mind would expect that the licensed practical
nurse who was allegedly accountable for Stevens’s misconduct would have faced
some adverse consequence for not preventing the serious injury to the resident
who had smoked while wearing an oxygen mask. The Board was entitled to draw a
plausible inference that, because no licensed practical nurse had been held
accountable for that misconduct, the licensed practical nurses at Lakeland do not
responsibly direct the certified nursing assistants. But the majority opinion instead
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substitutes its view of the facts for the contrary finding by the Board.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding by the Board that the Licensed
Practical Nurses Lack the Authority to Assign Certified Nursing Assistants Using
Independent Judgment.
The majority opinion provides no persuasive support for its conclusion that
the licensed practical nurses exercise independent judgment in scheduling certified
nursing assistants. “[F]or an assignment function to involve independent
judgment, the putative supervisor must select employees to perform specific tasks
on the basis of a judgment about the individual employee’s skills.” Cooper/T.
Smith, Inc., 177 F.3d at 1265. The parties do not dispute that the “responsibility
for staffing and scheduling of [certified nursing assistants] lies, first and foremost,
with a staffing coordinator who reports to the Director of Nursing,” Majority
Opinion at 35, and that, when the licensed practical nurses prepare assignment
sheets on the weekend “they do so at least in part based on the information the
staffing coordinator has already placed on the assignment sheets.” Id. at 36. But
the majority opinion nevertheless concludes that the licensed practical nurses use
independent judgment to assign certified nursing assistants.
The majority opinion “find[s] untenable the Board’s position that [the
licensed practical nurses] mechanically follow established procedure in assigning
and reassigning [certified nursing assistant], even when they are the
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highest-ranking staff on the premises,” Majority Opinion at 39, but this reasoning
fails. “Although on the . . . night . . . shifts the licensed practical nurses are the
highest-ranking employees on the premises, this does not ipso facto make them
supervisors.” NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1467 (7th Cir. 1983),
abrogated on other grounds by NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511
U.S. 571, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994). “A night watchman is not a supervisor just
because he is the only person on the premises at night . . . .” Id. The majority
opinion reasons that the licensed practical nurses must exercise independent
judgment to assign certified nursing assistants when they are the highest-ranking
staff on the premises because Swearingen testified that licensed practical nurses
“are considered to be leaders of their team,” Majority Opinion at 39 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), but that vague testimony did not compel the
Board to find that the licensed practical nurses have the authority to assign
certified nursing assistants using independent judgment. Although the licensed
practical nurses were sometimes the highest-ranking staff on the premises, the
record establishes that the “Director of Nursing is on call 24 hours per day, seven
days per week,” Majority Opinion at 35, and it is undisputed that the scheduling
coordinator exercised the primary authority for scheduling certified nursing
assistants. Based on this evidence, the Board was entitled to draw the plausible
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inference that the licensed practical nurses do not exercise independent judgment
in scheduling certified nursing assistants. But again the majority substitutes its
view of the facts for the contrary finding by the Board.
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. Our standard of review
bars us from reweighing the evidence. I would deny the petition for review and
enforce the order of the Board because substantial evidence supports its findings.

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