Jarrod Gooden v. Cedric Mormon, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Jarrod Gooden. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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Date Filed: 07/31/2013

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 11-14725
Non-Argument Calendar
_____________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00070-WLS-TQL

JARROD GOODEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CEDRIC MORMON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_____________________________
(July 31, 2013)
Before MARCUS, JORDAN, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jarrod Gooden, a Georgia state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of his civil

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rights action against Officer Cedric Mormon and Deputy Warden Angela Williams
for deliberate indifference. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After review, we affirm.
I.
The complaint 1 alleges that on July 20, 2010, while Mr. Gooden was housed
in segregation at the Autry State Prison in Pelham, Georgia, inmates serving as
dorm orderlies came into his cell to clean up a water spill. While the cleanup was
underway, Officer Mormon handcuffed Mr. Gooden, and left him in the cell
unsupervised for five minutes or less. During that time, Mr. Gooden was sexually
assaulted by another inmate. This incident caused Mr. Gooden to suffer scratches
in his groin area, and to experience painful urination and erectile dysfunction.
The complaint further alleges that Mr. Gooden filed a witness statement
form the next day addressed to Deputy Warden Williams explaining that he had
not been seen by medical or mental health staff within the past 24 hours “of his
assault” in violation of the prison’s standard operating procedure. One week later,
Mr. Gooden filed an informal grievance with Deputy Warden Williams describing
the July 20th incident. His grievance, however, neglected to mention the severity
of his injury or the need for medical care, and the only relief he requested was to
1

After Mr. Gooden filed his complaint, the district court determined that “additional
information [was] needed to screen [Mr. Gooden’s] complaint” and ordered Mr. Gooden to
answer a series of questions seeking greater specificity with respect to his factual allegations. See
Order, D.E. 8. In assessing the merits of Mr. Gooden’s claim, we rely on both the initial
complaint and the supplemental response, just as the district court did in its initial screening.
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press charges against Officer Mormon and to speak to Internal Affairs. Mr.
Gooden was not seen by prison medical staff for approximately 22 days until after
he filed a second informal grievance complaining about his lack of medical care.
Mr. Gooden eventually brought suit under § 1983 against Officer Mormon
and Deputy Warden Williams for deliberate indifference. He claims that Officer
Mormon left him unsupervised, defenseless, and exposed to a risk of serious harm.
He also claims that Deputy Warden Williams knew that he was in need of medical
care and nevertheless failed to timely respond. Pursuant to § 1915A, the district
court conducted an initial screening of Mr. Gooden’s complaint to determine if it
was “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). After reviewing the complaint, the district
court held that Mr. Gooden’s claims warranted dismissal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim
pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). See Leal v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276,
1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint, on its face,
does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67879, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). We must accept as true all factual allegations
in the complaint. Id. at 678. And because Mr. Gooden is proceeding pro se, his
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pleadings must be liberally construed. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
We first address Mr. Gooden’s claim against Officer Mormon for failure to
protect him from serious harm. “[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. . . . It is not, however,
every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into
constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976-77 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, prison officials are only liable
for a constitutional violation under § 1983 when they “(1) have subjective
knowledge of the risk of serious harm, and (2) nevertheless fail to reasonably
respond to the risk.” Id. at 837. Officer Mormon’s alleged conduct in this case does
not meet this standard.
According to Mr. Gooden, he was left unattended in his cell for no more
than five minutes while other inmates cleaned a water spill. Mr. Gooden claims
that Officer Mormon should have known that this would have exposed him to
serious risk of injury because the other inmates appeared to be in a hostile mood
and made aggravating remarks about having to clean up the spill in his cell.
Though this purportedly led to an unfortunate incident, the allegations fail to
establish that Officer Mormon had subjective knowledge that Mr. Gooden could be
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seriously harmed. There are no allegations, for example, that Mr. Gooden alerted
Officer Mormon about a specific threat from any of the inmates or that Officer
Mormon knew of prior attacks by these particular inmates. See Brown v. Hughes,
894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The known risk of injury must be a strong
likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before a guard’s failure to act can
constitute deliberate indifference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on
these allegations, Officer Mormon’s decision to leave Mr. Gooden handcuffed and
unsupervised for approximately five minutes may have been negligent, but it was
not deliberately indifferent. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (“But an official’s failure
to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as [a constitutional
violation].”).
We next address Mr. Gooden’s claim against Deputy Warden Williams for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.2 Under the Eighth
Amendment, a prison has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it
is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285,
290 (1976). The failure to address those medical needs can serve as grounds for

2

Mr. Gooden’s complaint also appeared to state a claim against Deputy Warden
Williams for rejecting his grievance against Officer Mormon without conducting a proper and
prompt investigation. This claim fails because prison inmates do not have a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in the inmate grievance process. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011).
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liability under § 1983 when “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 104
(internal quotation marks omitted). In order to state a claim for deliberate
indifference against Deputy Warden Williams, Mr. Gooden had to establish her
“(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and
(3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d
1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). Much like the claim against Officer Mormon, the
allegations against Deputy Warden Williams do not meet this standard because
they fail to establish her subjective knowledge of serious harm.
Mr. Gooden alleges that he made Deputy Warden Williams aware of his
serious medical needs by filing a witness statement form on July 21, 2010, and an
informal grievance six days later explaining that he was the victim of a sexual
assault.3 Yet he did not allege that either document mentioned the nature of the
assault or of his injuries or the need for any prompt medical attention, and the
grievance form itself did not describe the assault. These omissions are significant
because not all sexual assaults—as that term is used in Georgia—necessarily cause
serious physical injury requiring immediate medical care. For example, under
3

Mr. Gooden attached a copy of the informal grievance to his complaint, but he did not
include a copy of the witness statement form. We therefore rely on the complaint’s description of
the form’s contents, which allegedly “explain[ed] how [he] had not seen medical or mental
health within 24 hours of [his] assault as stated in the [prison’s standard operating procedures].”
Supplement, D.E. 9 at 2. The supplement does not contain any other description of the witness
statement form.
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Georgia law, simple assault is defined as either an “attempt[] to commit a violent
injury” or “an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately
receiving a violent injury.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-20. 4 See also Mathis v. State,
361 S.E.2d 856, 859 (Ga. App. 1987) (“[A]ssault, simple or aggravated, does not
require physical contact or harm, but rather the apprehension of harm.”) (emphasis
in original). Because sexual assault may be committed without causing physical
harm, we cannot assume that Deputy Warden Williams knew that Mr. Gooden
required medical attention by virtue of the witness statement form or the informal
grievance.
We also cannot infer Deputy Warden Williams’ subjective knowledge based
upon Mr. Gooden’s contention that it is standard prison policy to conduct a
medical and mental examination of any victim of sexual assault within 24 hours of
the incident. Deputy Warden Williams’ alleged failure to comply with prison
policies may very well be negligent, but it is not, in and of itself, a constitutional
violation. Cf. Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569, 575 (5th Cir. 1980) (implying that
warden’s violation of an internal prison regulation did not justify relief under §
1983). Consequently, Mr. Gooden has failed to establish that Deputy Warden
4

We note that Georgia law has the separate crime of “sexual assault.” See GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-5.1. But that crime is limited to individuals—such as school employees, parole
officers, law enforcements officials, hospital staff, correctional officers, psychotherapists,
nursing home staff, or at-home caretakers—who engage in sexual contact towards those in their
care or custody. Notably, the crime of sexual assault encompasses “any sexual contact” and also
does not require proof of physical harm. See id.
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Williams knew about a serious medical need and deliberately chose to ignore it. Cf.
Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 2004) (“At most, their claim is that
the defendants were negligent or careless in not gathering the information, or that
they negligently or carelessly failed to follow Department guidelines.”).
III.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Gooden’s
complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for failing to state claims upon which relief
can be granted.
AFFIRMED.

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