USA v. Tavares Wiggin

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Tavares Ontario Wiggins. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 12-14129

Date Filed: 05/28/2013

Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14129
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:00-cr-00650-PCH-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAVARES ONTARIO WIGGINS,
a.k.a. Tavaris Wiggins,
a.k.a. Tavares Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 28, 2013)

Case: 12-14129

Date Filed: 05/28/2013

Page: 2 of 3

Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tavares Wiggins appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce
his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We affirm. 1
Wiggins argues his sentence, imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 for being an armed career criminal, should be reduced based on
Amendments 750 and 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Wiggins does not have a
meritorious claim.
Amendment 750 provides Wiggins no basis for relief, as that amendment
does not affect armed-career-criminal sentences imposed pursuant to § 4B1.4. See
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 750 (reducing the base offense levels for crack cocaine
offenses); see also United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780–81 (11th Cir. 2000).
Also, Wiggins’s claim premised on Amendment 706 is not only legally meritless,
cf. United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1327–28 (11th Cir.2008), but is also
barred under the law-of-the-case doctrine, see United States v. Escobar-Urrego,
110 F.3d 1556, 1560–61 (11th Cir. 1997). Because Wiggins’s previous
§ 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendment 706 failed, see United States v.
Wiggins, 331 F. App’x 648, 648–49 (11th Cir. 2009), his present § 3582(c)(2)
1

We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its
authority under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2008). We may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the
district court. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Case: 12-14129

Date Filed: 05/28/2013

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motion based on an identical Amendment 706 claim must fail, see United States v.
Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that appellate decisions
“bind[] all subsequent proceedings in the same case”).
Wiggins’s remaining arguments are also unavailing. The Fair Sentencing
Act (“FSA”) does not support Wiggins’s motion because that law did not affect the
armed-career-criminal provisions pursuant to which Wiggins was sentenced. See
Pub. L. No. 111-120, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (increasing the amounts of crack
cocaine required to trigger 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)’s statutory-maximum and
mandatory minimum sentences). We also reject Wiggins’s claim the Sentencing
Commission violated the Administrative Procedures Act by declaring in a policy
statement that the FSA is inapplicable to career offenders. Because the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statements are not proposed guidelines, they are not subject
to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. See United States v. Colon, 707
F.3d 1255, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2013). Wiggins has offered no legitimate reason his
sentence should be reduced, and therefore the district court did not err in denying
his § 3582(c)(2) motion.
The district court’s order denying Wiggins’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is
AFFIRMED.

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