USA v. Michael Chavou

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Michael Garrett Chavous. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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Date Filed: 07/01/2013

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16269
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20468-JAL-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL GARRETT CHAVOUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(July 1, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Michael Chavous plead guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the
District Court sentenced him to a prison term of 135 months. The 135-months’
term was at the bottom of the sentence range prescribed by the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Chavous appeals his sentence, arguing that in determining his sentence range
under the Guidelines, the District Court erred in (1) enhancing the base level for
his offense by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), based on his
possession of a firearm, (2) enhancing the base offense level by two levels
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), based on his role as an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor of criminal activity, and (3) determining that he was
ineligible for a two-level reduction of his offense level under the safety-valve
provision, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, because he played a supervisory role in
the offense and possessed a firearm in connection with the offense. We find no
error and affirm.
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
increase of the base offense level, “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)
was possessed.” “The enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present,
unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3(A)). The Government has the initial burden of
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showing that “the firearm was present at the site of the charged conduct or . . . that
the defendant possessed a firearm during conduct associated with the offense of
conviction.” United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006).
“[T]he government must show that the firearm had some purpose or effect with
respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the
result of accident or coincidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). However, the
Government need not prove that the firearm was used to facilitate the offense.
United States v. Audain, 254 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001). If the Government
is successful in meeting this initial burden, then the evidentiary burden shifts to the
defendant, who must demonstrate that a connection between the weapon and the
offense was “clearly improbable.” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220 (quotation omitted).
The District Court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement under §
2D1.1(b)(1). Chavous objected to the enhancement, but not to any of the facts
stated in the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), including the facts
supporting enhancement. Because Chavous did not object to any of these facts, he
effectively admitted the facts for sentencing purposes. See United States v. Wade,
458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v.Aleman, 832 F.2d 142, 145
(11th Cir. 1987). Here, the facts in the PSI are that (1) a loaded firearm found in
the center console of a truck driven to the drug transaction belonged to Chavous,
(2) Chavous had driven from Georgia to Florida with a large amount of cash that
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was to be used to purchase cocaine, and (3) it is probable that the cocaine would
have been transported in the truck, which contained a firearm, after the purchase of
cocaine was completed because the other vehicle involved in the offense did not
accompany Chavous to the transaction. Because this evidence demonstrated that
Chavous’s possession of a firearm was part of the offense conduct, Chavous had
the burden of demonstrating the “clear improbability” that the firearm was
connected to the offense. See Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220.
Chavous offered no evidence, other than a proffer in which he argued that
the gun was always in the vehicle’s glove compartment and that he always traveled
with a gun, that a connection between the firearm and the offense was “clearly
improbable.” This, alone, was insufficient to show a clear improbability. See
United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 847 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding, in the
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) context, that a defendant failed to show that a connection between a
firearm and an offense involving 300 kilograms of cocaine hidden inside and
outside of a warehouse was “clearly improbable” where the firearm was in a closed
office in the warehouse, the defendant was outside of the warehouse, and the
defendant only had the firearm because of his job as a security guard).
We review the application of the § 3B1.1(c) leadership role enhancement for
clear error. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1200 (11th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1066 (2012). In cases where a defendant is an “organizer,
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leader, manager, or supervisor” over one or more co-participants in a criminal
activity, a two-level sentencing enhancement applies. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) &
comment. (n.2).
Section 3B.1(c) of the Guidelines provides for the enhancement of the
offense level by two levels if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor in the criminal activity. The commentary to § 3B1.1 sets forth factors
the District Court should consider in determining whether the enhancement
applies: (1) the exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices;
(4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; (5) the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the
illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over others.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). All of these considerations need not be present.
United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2009). Evidence
showing that the defendant exerted influence or control over even one other
individual will be sufficient to support an enhancement under § 3B1.1(c). United
States v. Lozano, 490 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that, although the
defendant lacked decision-making authority, the district court appropriately applied
a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement because he instructed at least one co-conspirator to
engage in criminal conduct and was “intricately involved in the offense”); U.S.S.G.
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§ 3B1.1, comment. (n.2). The § 3B1.1 commentary further states that “[t]here can,
of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a
criminal association or conspiracy.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). The
government must prove the existence of a leadership role by a preponderance of
the evidence. United States v. Yates, 990 F.2d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993).
We conclude that the District Court properly applied a two-level § 3B1.1(c)
enhancement for Chavous’s role in the offense. The evidence showed that
Chavous exercised control over at least one of his codefendants because (1) the
codefendant told FBI agents that Chavous had asked him to drive with a second
codefendant to Florida, (2) the codefendant expected to be paid for his
participation, and (3) Chavous provided his codefendants with the car in which
they traveled to Florida for the drug transaction. Thus, as the record shows,
Chavous exerted influence and control over at least one codefendant, the court did
not clearly err in applying the § 3B1.1(c) role enhancement. See Lozano, 490 F.3d
at 1323. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that Chavous (1) exercised
decision-making authority, (2) participated in the offensive conduct to a higher
degree than two of his codefendants, and (3) stood to gain a higher profit from the
drug purchase than other participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4).
Furthermore, the fact that a codefendant may have acted as a leader did not
preclude the court from applying the aggravating-role enhancement. See id.
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A defendant has the burden of establishing his eligibility for “safety-valve”
relief. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997). A defendant
is eligible if he meets a list of criteria, including that he “was not an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense,” and did not “possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2), (4).
In United States v. Carillo-Ayala, we held that a defendant is not necessarily
precluded from arguing that he did not possess a firearm “in connection with” his
offense under § 5C1.2, even though he received a firearm enhancement pursuant to
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). 713 F.3d 82, 90-91 (11th Cir. 2013). We indicated that § 5C1.2’s
“in connection with” requirement could be satisfied by a showing that the firearm
(1) was in close proximity to drugs, or (2) facilitated, or had the potential to
facilitate, the offense. Id. at 91-93.
Here, because the District Court properly found that Chavous was a manager
or leader of others in the offense, he was ineligible for the safety-valve provision.
See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(4). Moreover, although he was not precluded from
arguing that he did not possess a firearm in connection with the offense based on
the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement for possession of a firearm, the evidence
demonstrates that the firearm had the potential to facilitate the offense. See
Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 93. The firearm was located in the truck in which
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Chavous drove to the drug deal. Had the cocaine purchase been successful,
Chavous likely would have driven the purchased cocaine in a vehicle containing a
firearm. As such, the gun had the potential to facilitate the offense, in that it had
the potential to be used once Chavous entered the vehicle with the cocaine.
AFFIRMED.

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