Manuel Pardo, Jr. v. John Palmer, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Manuel Pardo, Jr. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. Motion for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and stay of execution is denied. [6738688-2].--[Edited 12/12/2012 by CPM]

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Date Filed: 12/11/2012

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-16280
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-01328-TJC-JBT
MANUEL PARDO, JR.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JOHN PALMER,
in his official capacity as the Warden of Florida
State Prison,
KENNETH S. TUCKER,
in his official capacity as the Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections,
DOES 1-50,
in their official capacities as Executioners for
the State of Florida,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 11, 2012)

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Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Manuel Pardo, Jr., is a death row prisoner scheduled to be
executed by the State of Florida on December 11, 2012. On December 6, 2012,
Pardo brought suit in federal district court, filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and filing a motion for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
and a stay of execution. Pardo contends that: (1) Florida’s three-drug lethal
injection protocol violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment; and (2) Appellees’ deviation from the core
components of the execution process set forth in the written protocol violates his
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because we have recently addressed nearly identical claims in Ferguson v.
Warden, No. 12-15191, 2012 WL 4946112 (11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012), the district
court specifically requested additional briefing on the issue of whether Pardo’s
case is in any way distinguishable from Ferguson. On December 10, 2012, after
an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Pardo’s motion. Pardo v. Palmer,
No. 3:12-cv-1328, __ F. Supp.2d __ (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2012). The district court
concluded that because Pardo failed to demonstrate that his claims were
distinguishable from the ones that we considered and rejected in Ferguson, he

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failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Id. This appeal followed.
“A stay of execution is equitable relief which this Court may grant only if
the moving party shows that: (1) he has a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) the stay
would not substantially harm the other litigant; and (4) if issued, the injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest.” DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319,
1324 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review the denial
of a stay of execution under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” Powell v. Thomas
(Powell (Williams)), 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert.
denied Williams v. Thomas, 131 S. Ct. 2487 (2011).
A. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Pardo’s constitutional arguments mirror those raised by Ferguson just two
months ago. Like Ferguson, Pardo argues that Florida’s lethal injection protocol
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because (1) Florida’s September
4, 2012 protocol resulted in a substantial change to the execution protocol; (2)
evolving standards of decency show that the three-drug protocol creates an
“objectively intolerable risk of harm”; and (3) Florida’s implementation of its
three-drug protocol is flawed.

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1. Eighth Amendment Violation
In order for Pardo to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, he must
demonstrate that:
(1) the State is being deliberately indifferent (2) to a condition that
poses a substantial risk of serious harm to him. In the lethal injection
context, this standard requires an inmate to show an objectively
intolerable risk of harm that prevents prison officials from pleading
that they were subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment.
DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). We
conclude that Pardo has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. As properly recognized by the district
court, we addressed the substantive merits of each of Pardo’s claims in Ferguson,
and squarely rejected them. See Ferguson, No. 12-15191, 2012 WL 4946112.
Pardo’s efforts to distinguish his case are not successful.
Here, unlike Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam),
the district court properly treated the question of whether a significant change has
occurred in Florida’s lethal injection protocol as a fact-dependent inquiry. Pardo
was granted an evidentiary hearing by the district court and an opportunity to
present witnesses to support his Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection claims,
as well as an opportunity to cross-examine the state’s witnesses regarding the
changes wrought by Florida’s September 4, 2012 lethal injection protocol. Based
on a review of the record, we are convinced that the district court correctly
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identified the governing legal principles, and then carefully considered Pardo’s
evidence and allegations with a fresh look.
With regard to the statute of limitations, “[w]e have consistently held that a
method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is
complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or
substantially changed execution protocol.” Ferguson, No. 12-15191, 2012 WL
4946112, at *2 (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Pardo filed his “method of
execution” challenge outside of the running of the statute of limitations, and
because we have explicitly held that changes to the first and second drugs in the
three-drug sequence do “not constitute a substantial change,” see id. (citing Powell,
643 F.3d at 1304), Pardo’s claim comes too late.
Pardo’s allegedly distinguishable contention that “the one-drug protocol is
now constitutionally required” is insufficient to differentiate this case from
Ferguson. We likewise addressed Ferguson’s “evolving standards of decency”
claim—which Pardo reiterates here—and found it lacking: “[a]lthough the onedrug protocol is a feasible alternative that could be readily implemented, ‘a
condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a State’s method of execution
merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative.’” See Ferguson, No.
12-15191, 2012 WL 4946112, at *3 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51, 128 S.
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Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008)). Even if nine of our sister states have adopted a one-drug
protocol, it is not our role to transform ourselves into a “board[] of inquiry charged
with determining the ‘best practices’ for executions.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 51, 128 S.
Ct. at 1531.
Moreover, as to the merits of Pardo’s claim, Dr. Heath’s expanded
declaration fails to add anything new to our inquiry, as his testimony presents
nothing more than mere speculation. As we stated in Ferguson, “speculation as to
the parade of horribles that could possibly occur during [an] execution does not
meet the burden of proof required by the Eighth Amendment.” Ferguson, No. 1215191, 2012 WL 4946112, at *2 (citing DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1325).
Accordingly, because Pardo has failed to distinguish Ferguson on any ground, his
arguments, too, must fail.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Violation
Pardo also contends that he is likely to succeed on his claim under the Equal
Protection Clause because the State might deviate from the “core components of
the execution process” set forth in the written protocol. “To state an equal
protection claim, [Pardo] must show that the State will treat him disparately from
other similarly situated persons.” DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1327 (citing Amnesty
Int’l. USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2009)). “Second, ‘[i]f a law
treats individuals differently on the basis of . . . [a] suspect classification, or if the
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law impinges on a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny.’” Arthur, 674
F.3d at 1262 (alterations in original) (quoting Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub.
Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Pardo fails to assert that any of the alleged deficiencies will result in
disparate treatment from other death row inmates. Ferguson raised this exact
claim, and nothing about the protocol has changed in the last two months. “Under
Florida’s 2012 protocol, all death row inmates facing execution will be subject to
the same sequence of drugs, the same procedures, and the same safeguards in the
execution process.” Ferguson, No. 12-15191, 2012 WL 4946112, at *3. As such,
Pardo has presented no evidence to substantiate his claim of disparate treatment.
B. Remaining Arguments
Finally, Pardo avers that he will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is
not granted. We need not decide whether Pardo has established irreparable injury
because he has failed to satisfy his burden regarding the substantial likelihood of
success on the merits. Likewise, Pardo’s arguments regarding the equities of
execution and the public interest are outside of our purview. Accordingly, Pardo’s
motion for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and stay of
execution is denied, and the district court’s order is affirmed.

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MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND STAY OF EXECUTION IS DENIED;
DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER IS AFFIRMED.

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