Yin Chen v. U.S. Attorney General

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Petitioner Yin Chan Chen. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. Petition DENIED.

Case: 12-16482

Date Filed: 07/10/2013

Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-16482
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A079-683-171
YIN CHAN CHEN,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(July 10, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 12-16482

Date Filed: 07/10/2013

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Yin Chan Chen, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her motion to reopen her removal
proceedings based on changed country conditions. After review, we deny Chen’s
petition.
Chen contends the BIA abused its discretion in denying her motion to
reopen because it misconstrued the motion as being based on changed personal
circumstances, instead of changed country conditions, and only relied on select
parts of the evidence, effectively ignoring the favorable portions. Specifically, she
asserts she established there had been an increase in the persecution of those who
violated China’s family planning laws, and local family planning officials in Fujian
Province, where she lived, would view her as violating these laws even though her
children were born abroad. Moreover, she asserts she also established there had
been an increase in the persecution of Christians in China. Lastly, she contends
she demonstrated prima facie eligibility for relief on account of violating China’s
one-child policy and her Christian religion.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen
because she failed to establish changed country conditions in China since her
removal proceedings in May 2004. See Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252,
1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating we review the denial of a motion to reopen for an
abuse of discretion). Because Chen’s motion to reopen was filed eight years after
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Date Filed: 07/10/2013

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her removal order was entered, Chen was required to show “changed country
conditions arising in [China], if such evidence is material and was not available
and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).
Chen’s argument the BIA misconstrued her motion to reopen as one based
on changed personal circumstances is without merit, as the BIA explicitly
acknowledged that her motion was one based on changed country conditions, and
then proceeded to list and discuss the evidence Chen submitted in this regard.
Subsequently, based on this review, the BIA determined the evidence did not show
a material change in conditions with respect to the treatment of individuals who
violated China’s family planning laws, or the treatment of members of unregistered
Christian churches. We likewise agree Chen failed to demonstrate that, since her
removal proceedings, there had been an escalation in the enforcement of China’s
family planning laws by forcible sterilization in Fujian Province, let alone
increased enforcement targeting repatriated Chinese who had given birth to
multiple children overseas. 1 Her evidence also did not sufficiently demonstrate
changed country conditions concerning the negative treatment of Christians in
China.
1

Moreover, because Chen’s official documents from various local governments
regarding China’s family planning policies were not certified or otherwise authenticated, the BIA
did not abuse its discretion in discounting them. 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b); see Yang v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1202-03 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Because Chen did not show materially changed country conditions with
respect to the use of forcible sterilizations or the treatment of Christians in China,
she was not entitled to reopen her removal proceedings. Thus, we do not consider
further whether she established a prima facie case for relief based on either of
these claims. Accordingly, we deny Chen’s petition.
PETITION DENIED.

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