USA v. Farut Mendez

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Farut Jennifer Ruiz Mendez. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 12-16568

Date Filed: 08/16/2013

Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16568
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20623-JAL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
FARUT JENNIFER RUIZ MENDEZ,
a.k.a. Gabriel Lacayo,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 16, 2013)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 12-16568

Date Filed: 08/16/2013

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Farut Jenniffer Ruiz Mendez appeals his 52-month sentence, imposed within
the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, after pleading guilty to one count of
reentry by a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). On
appeal, Mendez argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, in light of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, because the district court placed too much
emphasis on his criminal history, and failed to weigh mitigating evidence of his
family circumstances. Mendez also contends that his 52-month sentence falls near
the high end of the Sentencing Guidelines range, in contrast to the low-end
sentences received in other multiple reentry cases. Finding no reversible error on
the part of the district court, we affirm.
This court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128
S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). Under this standard, we will not vacate a sentence unless
the district court’s ruling constitutes a clear error of judgment. United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In reviewing the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence, we must ensure that the district court imposed a
sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes”
of sentencing, including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct,
and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C.
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Date Filed: 08/16/2013

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§ 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
The appellant bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable
in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d
1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the guideline
range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator
of reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (holding the defendant’s sentence was reasonable in part
because it was well below the statutory maximum). The weight given to any
specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). A court’s failure to
explicitly discuss mitigating evidence presented by the defendant does not render a
sentence unreasonable where the court indicates it considered all the § 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Mendez’s 52-month sentence is substantively reasonable.
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The sentence is in the middle of a 46- to 57-month guideline range; consequently,
we expect it to be reasonable. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. Additionally, Mendez’s
sentence is well below the statutory maximum 20-year penalty, which serves as
another indication of its reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Mendez
argues the district court failed to adequately consider his family circumstances
under § 3553(a). To the contrary, the court explicitly stated it had considered the
parties’ statements in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Additionally, although the
court acknowledged it was particularly mindful of Mendez’s extensive criminal
history, the weight to accord any given factor is within the sound discretion of the
court. Clay, 483 F.3d at 743.
Mendez also argues his 52-month sentence falls near the high end of the
guideline range, in contrast to low-end sentences handed down in other multiple
reentry cases. Once again, Mendez’s sentence falls roughly in the middle of the
46- to 57-month guideline range. Even if we were to accept that Mendez’s
circumstances are factually similar to other multiple reentry defendants who
received lower-end sentences, Mendez’s sentence merely reflects the broad range
of discretion that a district court has in imposing a reasonable sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

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