USA v. Charles Combs, II

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Charles Dana Combs, II. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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Date Filed: 12/06/2013

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-10554
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:98-cr-00283-SCB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES DANA COMBS, II
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 6, 2013)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Combs, II, appeals the district court’s determination that he violated
the terms of his supervised release by committing a new crime. On appeal, Mr.

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Combs argues that the district court erred by relying on inadmissible hearsay, not
permitting him to present certain evidence and testimony at his revocation hearing,
and not allowing him to rebut the contents of the transcript of his state court trial.
After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the underlying
facts of the case and recite only what is necessary to resolve this appeal.
In 1998, Mr. Combs pled guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a) and use of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). In addition to prison time, Mr. Combs was sentenced to 36 months of
supervised release.
In July 2009, the United States Probation Office petitioned the district court
for revocation of the term of supervised release because Mr. Combs had committed
an armed bank robbery. The Probation Office later filed an amended petition
stating that a state jury had found Mr. Combs guilty of robbery in connection with
that offense.
Mr. Combs moved to continue his final revocation hearing. At the hearing
on this motion, Mr. Combs denied his guilt with respect to the state bank robbery
charge and expressed the desire to call witnesses and present exculpatory evidence
at the revocation hearing that had not been before the state jury. The district court,
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at Mr. Combs’ urging, deferred ruling and reluctantly agreed to review the
transcript of the state trial to place Mr. Combs’ requests in their proper context. At
a second hearing, the district court announced that it had reviewed the trial
transcript and rejected Mr. Combs’ requests on the ground that they amounted to
re-litigation of the merits of the state trial. After allowing Mr. Combs to testify and
considering evidence and testimony from the government, including a certified
copy of Mr. Combs’ state conviction, the district court revoked Mr. Combs’
supervised release.
On appeal, Mr. Combs argues that the district court violated his due process
rights by allowing into evidence a certified copy of his state court judgment of
conviction, by denying him the ability to call witnesses and present exculpatory
evidence, and by relying on the transcript of his state trial without affording him
the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
II
We review the district court’s revocation of supervised release and
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cunningham, 607
F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (supervised release); United States v. Baker, 432
F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005) (evidentiary rulings). We review constitutional
questions de novo. See United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir.
2013).

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A
Mr. Combs first asserts that the district court erred in admitting into
evidence a certified copy of his state conviction, which he argues constitutes
inadmissible hearsay. “[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to supervised
release revocation proceedings.” United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 111 (11th
Cir. 1994).

Nevertheless, “the admissibility of hearsay is not automatic.

Defendants involved in revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due
process requirements.” Id. at 114 (citation omitted). Before it admits hearsay
testimony, the district court must determine that the hearsay statement is reliable
and must “balance the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses against the
grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation.”
omitted).

Id. (citation

We have recognized that a certified copy of an underlying state

conviction is proper evidence that the defendant violated a state law and therefore
violated a condition of his supervised release. See United States v. Hofierka, 83
F.3d 357, 363 (11th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 92 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir.
1996).
Mr. Combs contends that the district court violated his due process rights
when it relied on his certified conviction without first engaging in the balancing
test set forth in Frazier. See Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Although the district court
did not explicitly apply the Frazier balancing test, any error was harmless because
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“the properly considered evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that [Mr. Combs]
breached the terms of his supervised release.” Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Mr. Combs
acknowledged that he had been convicted in state court and that he intended to
appeal the conviction and, if necessary, institute collateral proceedings to challenge
it. Because the evidence leaves no doubt that Mr. Combs was convicted and hence
breached the terms of his supervised release, the district court did not violate his
due process rights. See Id. 114.
B
Mr. Combs next challenges the district court’s refusal to allow him to
present witnesses and exculpatory evidence to bolster his alleged innocence with
respect to his state court bank robbery conviction. A defendant in a revocation
proceeding is entitled to the opportunity to be heard, to present witnesses and
documentary evidence, and to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses unless
the court finds good cause not to allow confrontation. See Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (setting forth minimum due process rights for parole
revocation hearings). 1 See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) (requiring, among
other things, that a defendant subject to a revocation hearing have “an opportunity
to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court
1

We have held that the due process protections set forth in Morrissey with respect to
parole revocation extend to revocation of supervised release. See United States v. Copeland, 20
F.3d 412, 414 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“The same protections granted those facing
revocation of parole are required for those facing the revocation of supervised release.”).
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determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear”).
Notwithstanding these due process rights, however, “a supervised release
revocation proceeding is not the proper forum in which to attack the conviction
giving rise to the revocation.” Hofierka, 83 F.3d at 363.
We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that allowing Mr. Combs
to present evidence and theories that he did not introduce at the state trial, and to
submit testimony that he did not previously elicit, would amount to improper relitigation of the state trial. Although Mr. Combs asserts his innocence, as is his
right, and claims his state trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he would do
best to address these contentions through a direct appeal on the merits and, should
that fail, collateral proceedings in federal district court, not by raising these issues
in a revocation hearing. See Id. 2
C
Mr. Combs finally argues that the district court denied him due process
when it relied on the transcript of his state trial in revoking his supervised release
without allowing him to present mitigating evidence not included in that transcript.
As an initial matter, the district court only agreed to consider the transcript at Mr.
Combs’ urging and with great reluctance. To the extent that Mr. Combs now faults
the district court for relying on the transcript, his initial insistence that the district
2

Mr. Combs’ counsel, moreover, “obviously acknowledge[d] that it would not be an
abuse of discretion for [the district] court to deny [Mr. Combs’] request[.]” D.E. 148 at 8.
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court review it invited any error that may have been committed. See United States
v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (invited error occurs where “a
party induces or invites the district court into making an error.”) (citation omitted).
The district court, moreover, made clear that it did not consider the contents of the
transcript as “necessary” for carrying the government’s burden for establishing
revocation, noting that the government carried its burden by introducing sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Mr. Combs was on supervised release
at the time of the bank robbery and had been convicted of that robbery. See D.E.
161 at 69-70.
III
The district court’s revocation of Mr. Combs’ supervised release is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

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