USA v. James Jenkins, Jr.

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant James Craig Jenkins, Jr.. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-11542

Date Filed: 04/07/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11542
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cr-00084-VMC-MAP-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES CRAIG JENKINS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 7, 2014)
Before PRYOR, JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Craig Jenkins, Jr. appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C.

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§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Jenkins challenges two evidentiary rulings and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
The district court did not violate Jenkins’s constitutional right to crossexamine Officer James Emmerson, an undercover officer who led the investigation
of the conspiracy. The district court allowed Jenkins to impeach Emmerson
through cross-examination, as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, in a way that enabled Jenkins to “expose[] the jury to facts sufficient
to evaluate [Emmerson’s] credibility . . . and . . . to establish a record from which
[Jenkins] . . . [could] argue . . . [that Emmerson] [was a] less than reliable” witness.
United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Baptista–Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1371 (11th Cir. 1994)). Jenkins
elicited from Emmerson that he had relied on a confidential informant, Lalo Garza,
to target Jenkins; Garza had “an interest in making [Emmerson] happy” because
Garza could have an existing sentence reduced and obtain future assistance; Garza
recorded about 88 of his telephone conversations with Jenkins, but they also had
some unrecorded conversations; Emmerson was uncertain what quantity of cocaine
Jenkins intended to buy until they met in a hotel room; Jenkins acquired
significantly less cocaine than he first offered to buy; and Jenkins said repeatedly
that he could pay for only two kilograms of cocaine. Based on this information,
the jury could evaluate Garza’s motives for cooperating with Emmerson, the
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reliability of Emmerson’s testimony about his investigation and the transaction,
and Jenkins’s argument that he conspired to possess with intent to distribute two
kilograms of cocaine and was pressured to accept additional kilograms on
consignment. Jenkins’s cross-examination was not limited like the defendant in
United States v. Baptista–Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994), who was
prevented from eliciting from a key witness information vital to his defense, id. at
1366–67, or the defendant in United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir.
1992), who was prohibited from exposing a key witness’s motive for cooperating
with the government, id. at 1548–49. Emmerson testified about eight telephone
calls that he had with Jenkins, and on cross-examination, Jenkins questioned
Emmerson about some telephone calls between Garza and Jenkins in which
Jenkins said he could afford to buy only two kilograms of cocaine. And after
Emmerson testified on redirect examination about two conversations between
himself, Jenkins, and Garza, Jenkins questioned Emmerson about whether Jenkins
agreed to purchase only two kilograms of cocaine and whether he was pressured to
accept more cocaine. Jenkins argues that he was entitled to ask Emmerson about
more telephone calls between Garza and Jenkins, but Jenkins fails to explain what
facts he intended to elicit from Emmerson. Additional information about Jenkins’s
limited resources or Garza’s motives would have been cumulative. See United
States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009).
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The district court also did not abuse its discretion by admitting Emmerson’s
testimony that Jenkins met with leaders of the drug cartel. Jenkins argues that
Emmerson’s testimony was hearsay, but his testimony was not offered to prove
that Jenkins met with or sold drugs for the cartel. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
Emmerson testified about the drug cartel to explain how he learned about and why
he decided to investigate Jenkins. See United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520,
1535–36 (11th Cir. 1996). Emmerson’s testimony was not hearsay.
Sufficient evidence supports Jenkins’s conviction. We need not address
whether Jenkins conspired to possess with intent to distribute cocaine because, as
he states in his opening brief, he “freely conceded [at trial that] he was guilty of
conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine.” At trial, Jenkins argued that he
conspired to possess two kilograms of cocaine, but ample evidence supports the
jury’s finding that Jenkins intended to possess five or more kilograms of cocaine.
See United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005). The
government introduced audio recordings of telephone calls in which Jenkins
agreed to pay for two kilograms, asked for an additional five kilograms on
consignment, and boasted that he could distribute 12 kilograms of cocaine in one
day; a video recording of Emmerson’s transaction with Jenkins in which he
observed seven kilograms of cocaine and tested one kilogram package to determine
its quality; and Jenkins’s statement to law enforcement that he had asked for 12
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kilograms of cocaine, but agreed to purchase two kilograms of cocaine and to be
fronted an additional three or five kilograms of cocaine. Jenkins argues, for the
first time on appeal, that the “evidence demonstrated only that he [had] buy-sell
relationships” with Christopher Carlton and a person referred to as “Stick,” but
Jenkins waived this argument by admitting that he was guilty of conspiracy. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993).
We AFFIRM Jenkins’s conviction.

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