Jonie Key v. Mayor Jerry Lundy, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellants Joe Cassidy, Jerry C. Lundy, Steve A. Reed and Jerry K. Taylor. Decision: Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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Date Filed: 05/07/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12339
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00614-KD-M
JONIE KEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JERRY C. LUNDY,
STEVE A. REED, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(May 7, 2014)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In September 2012 Jonie Key filed suit against various public officials, law
enforcement officers, and the Town of Mount Vernon, Alabama, alleging that she

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was sexually assaulted by Mount Vernon Police Officer James Mott. In this
appeal, four of the defendants—Mount Vernon Mayor Jerry C. Lundy, Mount
Vernon Chief of Police Steve A. Reed, Acting Mount Vernon Chief of Police Joe
Cassidy, and Mount Vernon Public Safety Director Jerry K. Taylor (the
Defendants)—challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss based
on qualified immunity. Mott did not move to dismiss Key’s action against him and
he is not a party to this appeal. Upon review, we remand to allow Key to amend
her complaint in light of our recent decision in Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246
(11th Cir. 2013).
I.
Key makes the following factual allegations in her Amended Complaint,
which at the motion to dismiss stage are accepted as true. See Keating v. City of
Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). On September 29, 2010, Key was in
custody in the Mount Vernon city jail. Officer James Mott was on duty at the jail
that day. Mount Vernon’s policy or practice did not require same gender
supervision of inmates. While supervising Key’s use of the telephone located in a
small room at the jail, Mott forced Key to have nonconsensual sexual intercourse.
As background Key alleges that Mott was hired as a police officer by the
town of Mount Vernon, Alabama, in April 2010. Prior to working for Mount
Vernon, Mott had been terminated for cause or left each of his previous law
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enforcement positions due to reasons that included improper interactions with
inmates, failure to comply with prisoner handling guidelines, improper comments
to fellow employees, altering records, and allegations of sexual harassment.
Key alleges that the Defendants were policy makers with regard to the hiring
practices, supervisory practices, and training practices of the Mount Vernon Police
Department. She claims Defendants hired Mott despite their knowledge of his
previous employment record, and then failed to train or supervise him. Key further
alleges that the Defendants failed to take any action despite their belief that Mott
regularly drank alcohol and engaged in sexual activity in his patrol car while on
duty.
Based on these allegations, Key filed suit in the Southern District of
Alabama. All defendants (again, except for Mott) filed motions to dismiss Key’s
Amended Complaint. The district court granted these motions in substantial part.
The only claims remaining against the four Defendants who bring this appeal after
the district court’s order were those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on
violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected the Defendants’
argument that these § 1983 claims were barred by qualified immunity, finding Key
had stated a constitutional claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The
Defendants then filed this appeal.

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II.
We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo and determine whether
the complaint alleges a clearly established constitutional violation, accepting the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a “complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must assert “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65
(2007).
To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 for a constitutional violation,
as Key attempts to do here, she must allege that the supervisor-defendant
“personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or that there is a
causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1249 (emphasis added). A
causal connection can be established in a variety of circumstances, including where
the supervisor’s policy or custom resulted in deliberate indifference. See Cottone
v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
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Deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff allege subjective knowledge of
a risk of serious harm and disregard of that risk by conduct that is more than gross
negligence. Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1250. In order to prevail on the merits in a
§ 1983 action against a defendant in his individual capacity, the plaintiff generally
must show that the defendant was personally involved in specific acts or omissions
that resulted in the constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Harper v. Lawrence Cnty.,
Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1251
n.5 (noting that “[m]eeting these requirements without any individualized
allegations other than Appellants’ names and titles is unlikely”).
As in our recent decision in Franklin, the Defendants here argue that a claim
of deliberate indifference is no longer sufficient after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Instead they argue that Key must allege a purposeful
and intentional violation of her constitutional rights. However, we rejected that
argument in Franklin, another Eighth Amendment case. 738 F.3d at 1252 n.7. As
we noted in Franklin, the factors necessary to establish a § 1983 claim will vary
with the constitutional provision at issue. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129
S. Ct. at 1948). We also distinguished Iqbal—which involved claims of invidious
discrimination—from the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim at issue
in Franklin. Id. Similarly, Key’s § 1983 claims against the Defendants for
violations of the Eighth Amendment can survive without allegations of purposeful
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and intentional conduct as long as she meets this Circuit’s standard for deliberate
indifference.
Franklin also addressed the sufficiency of allegations of supervisory liability
under the deliberate indifference standard in a factual scenario strikingly similar to
that alleged by Key. Id. at 1250–52. Because the parties and the district court did
not have the benefit of our decision in Franklin, we remand with instructions that
the district court give Key an opportunity to amend her complaint in accordance
with that decision. Brisson v. Ford Motor Co., 349 F. App’x 433, 435 (11th Cir.
2009); Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting “wellestablished rule that ‘a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claims which would entitle him to relief’” (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 101–02 (1957) (footnote omitted)). The
Defendants may then renew their motion to dismiss if warranted.
III.
In light of our recent decision in Franklin, we REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REMANDED.

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