USA v. Christopher Hefflin

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Christopher Hefflin. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-12451

Date Filed: 04/21/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12451
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:91-cr-00017-WLS-TQL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER HEFFLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(April 21, 2014)
Before CARNES, Chief Judge, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Christopher Hefflin appeals his 51-month sentence, imposed following the
mandatory revocation of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). Hefflin
was originally convicted in 1992 of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). He was sentenced as an armed
career criminal to 210 months imprisonment, to be followed by five years of
supervised release.1 After completing his custodial sentence, but while serving his
term of supervised release, Hefflin was convicted in 2010 of obstructing a police
officer and driving with a suspended license, both in violation of Georgia law. The
following year he was convicted in Georgia on two counts of selling cocaine and
was sentenced to 30 years in custody, but was allowed to serve 27 of those years
on probation.
By violating state law, Hefflin violated the terms of his supervised release.
And his convictions for selling cocaine made revocation of his supervised release
mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (mandating revocation where the defendant
unlawfully possessed a controlled substance). Accordingly, the district court
revoked his supervised release and, using the 2012 version of the sentencing
guidelines, calculated a guidelines range of 46 to 57 months imprisonment. It then
imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 51 months.
I.
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Hefflin was initially sentenced to 360 months imprisonment, but that sentence was later
reduced to 210 months.
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Hefflin challenges his 51-month sentence on two grounds. He first argues
that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the sentencing factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). That argument is misplaced. Where, as here,
revocation of supervised release is mandatory under § 3583(g), a district court is
not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing a sentence. United
States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000). Instead, the only limitation
on a sentence imposed following the mandatory revocation of supervised release is
that it not “exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under
[§ 3583(e)(3)].” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). Because Hefflin’s original conviction under
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) was for a class A felony carrying a maximum penalty
of life imprisonment, the maximum term that could be imposed following the
revocation of his supervised release was five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(providing that when the underlying offense is a class A felony, the term of
imprisonment imposed after revocation of supervised release may not exceed five
years); id. § 3559(a)(1) (classifying an offense as a class A felony if the maximum
penalty is life imprisonment); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the statutory maximum under § 924(e) is life in prison).
Hefflin’s sentence of 51 months, or 4.25 years, was below the statutory maximum.
Hefflin next contends that his sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution because the district court used the 2012 version of the sentencing
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guidelines, the version in effect on the date he was sentenced, to calculate the
guidelines range for his violation of supervised release, instead of the 1992 version
in effect at the time of his original sentencing. He asserts that the imposition of a
51-month sentence under the 2012 guidelines, when combined with his original
sentence of 210 months, “creates a longer sentence than was available to the court
at the time of [his] initial sentencing,” which he insists was 20 years.
A sentencing court must generally apply the version of the guidelines “in
effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless doing so would violate ex
post facto principles. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), (b)(1) (2012). The Ex Post Facto
Clause “bars application of a law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Johnson
v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 1800 (2000) (alterations and
quotation marks omitted). For a law to run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause, two
elements must be present — it must “operate[] retroactively,” applying to conduct
completed before its enactment, and it must “raise[] the penalty from whatever the
law provided when [the defendant] acted.” Id.
The Supreme Court has suggested that for ex post facto purposes postrevocation penalties should be treated “as part of the penalty for the initial
offense,” not as “punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised
release,” meaning that penalty provisions enacted after the original conviction but
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before the violation of supervised release operate retroactively, satisfying the first
requirement for an ex post facto violation. See id. at 700, 120 S.Ct. at 1800–01.
Even so, the district court was not required to use the 1992 version of the
guidelines to calculate Hefflin’s advisory sentencing range because the 2012
version, the version in effect at the time of sentencing, does not satisfy the second
requirement for a violation — it did not raise the penalties associated with
Hefflin’s violation of supervised release. In the case of revocation of supervised
release, the applicable range of imprisonment is set forth in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4,
which has not changed since 1992. Compare U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) (1992), with id.
§ 7B1.4(a) (2012). Under either version of the guidelines, Hefflin’s advisory
sentencing range, based on a grade A violation while on supervised release for a
class A felony and a criminal history category of V, is 46 to 57 months
imprisonment. See id. § 7B1.4(a) (1992); id. § 7B1.4(a) (2012).
Hefflin’s argument that the use of the 2012 guidelines allowed the district
court to impose a longer sentence than was available at the time of his initial
sentencing is simply wrong. Contrary to his assertions, the maximum sentence that
the district court could have imposed in 1992 for a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) was life imprisonment, not 20 years. See Brame, 997
F.2d at 1428. And even if that were not the case, district courts can impose an
additional term of imprisonment on a defendant for violating his supervised
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release, even if the defendant has already served the maximum statutory penalty
for his underlying conviction. United States v. Proctor, 127 F.3d 1311, 1312–13
(11th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.
1991) (“We hold that § 3583 authorizes the revocation of supervised release even
where the resulting incarceration, when combined with the period of time the
defendant has already served for his substantive offense, will exceed the maximum
incarceration permissible under the substantive statute.”).
For these reasons, we affirm Hefflin’s sentence following the revocation of
his supervised release.
AFFIRMED.

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