Olivia Monroe v. Social Security Administratio, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Olivia Monroe. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13581
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00102-LGW-JEG

OLIVIA MONROE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 23, 2014)
Before MARCUS, KRAVITCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 2 of 7

Olivia Monroe appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for attorney’s
fees, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). An administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) initially denied Monroe’s application for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”), finding that she did not have a requisite impairment under the
Listings of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. Monroe then filed a
complaint to the district court. In response, the Commissioner of Social Security
(“the Commissioner”) argued that Monroe did not qualify as mentally retarded
under Listing 12.05(C). After the district court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of
Monroe’s SSI application, we reversed, holding that Monroe had met the standard
for mental retardation under Listing 12.05(C), and, as such, her application should
have been granted. See Monroe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 504 Fed.App’x 808 (11th
Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
Monroe then filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA,
which the district court denied. In support, the district court found that,
notwithstanding our reversal, the Commissioner’s position that Monroe did not
meet the requirements of Listing 12.05(C) was substantially justified.
Accordingly, the court concluded that Monroe was not entitled to attorney’s fees
under the EAJA. On appeal, Monroe argues that the court should have granted her
motion because the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified.

2

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 3 of 7

We review the district court’s decision whether to award attorney’s fees
under the EAJA, as well as the determination as to whether the government’s
position was substantially justified, for an abuse of discretion. Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2547, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988).
This standard requires great deference to the district court’s findings of fact but
allows for close scrutiny of its rulings on questions of law. Reese v. Sullivan, 925
F.2d 1395, 1396 (11th Cir. 1991).
Following entry of a favorable judgment in a Social Security case, a
prevailing party may obtain attorney’s fees in two different ways. First, under 42
U.S.C. § 406(b), the district court may award a “reasonable fee . . . , not in excess
of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled.”
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). This fee is paid directly to the party’s attorney, not to
the party herself. Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 2008). Under the
EAJA, by contrast, a prevailing party shall recover attorney’s fees and costs if,
inter alia, the position of the United States was not “substantially justified.” 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 155, 110 S.Ct.
2316, 2317, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990). We have held that an award under the EAJA
is separate from an award under § 406(b). Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601
F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). 1

1

This appeal involves only attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA.
3

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 4 of 7

To be “substantially justified” under the EAJA, the government’s position
must be “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Jean, 496
U.S. at 158 n.6, 110 S.Ct. at 2319 n.6 (quotations omitted). Thus, the
government’s position must have a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Reese,
925 F.2d at 1396 (quotations and emphasis omitted). “The government bears the
burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.” Stratton v. Bowen,
827 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1987). The outcome of the underlying litigation is
not dispositive as to whether the government’s position was substantially justified.
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569, 108 S.Ct. at 2552. Furthermore, a position can be justified
even if it is not correct. Id. at 566 n.2, 108 S.Ct. at 2550 n.2.
With regard to our review of an ALJ’s denial of a claimant’s SSI
application, we review an ALJ’s decision to determine whether it was supported by
substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied.
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(quotations omitted). “Even if the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. at 1158-59 (quotations omitted). We have affirmed
denials of motions for attorney’s fees under the EAJA where the Commissioner’s
4

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 5 of 7

litigation position was an application of a correct legal standard. See, e.g.,
Jefferson v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 461, 462-63 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step sequential process used
to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Specifically under Step 3, the claimant must show that her alleged impairment
meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings of Impairments. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
Listing 12.05 deals with mental retardation. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1 § 12.05. Listing 12.05(C) requires a “valid verbal, performance, or full
scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an
additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” Id. § 12.05(C).
“Generally, a claimant meets the criteria for presumptive disability under section
12.05(C) when the claimant presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 to 70 inclusive, and
evidence of an additional mental or physical impairment that has more than
‘minimal effect’ on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.”
Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). An ALJ may find the
results of an IQ test to be incredible such that Listing 12.05(C) is not satisfied. See
Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a claim of
Listing 12.05(C) mental retardation where the claimant’s IQ score of 69 was
inconsistent with other evidence and there was good reason to believe that the
5

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 6 of 7

claimant exaggerated his problems). Further, an ALJ “may reject any medical
opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d
278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
Commissioner’s position that Monroe did not meet the requirements of Listing
12.05(C) was substantially justified. First, the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the Commissioner’s position had a reasonable basis in fact. The
record shows that a physician diagnosed Monroe as having an IQ score of 51,
which was sufficient to establish that she was presumptively disabled. See Lowery,
979 F.2d at 837. Nevertheless, the Commissioner’s position that Monroe’s IQ
results were not valid and, thus, did not establish that she met the requirements of
Listing 12.05(C), was based upon evidence in the record. Specifically, Monroe’s
physician noted that the test results were a “low estimate” of her actual IQ, and that
her depression and the side effects of her medication had compromised her IQ
score by between 10 and 15 points. Additionally, none of the other mental-health
reports included in the record indicated that Monroe suffered from mental
retardation. Moreover, two consulting physicians had independently concluded
that Monroe’s IQ score was not consistent with her adaptive skills, and that a
diagnosis of mental retardation was not warranted or supported. Accordingly, the

6

Case: 13-13581

Date Filed: 06/23/2014

Page: 7 of 7

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Commissioner’s
position had a reasonable basis in fact. See Reese, 925 F.2d at 1396.
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
Commissioner’s position also had a reasonable basis in law. Under our precedent,
the ALJ was not required to accept Monroe’s IQ score, and was permitted to reject
it on the basis of the contrary evidence in the record. See Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at
280. Additionally, the ALJ had the discretion to find that the results of the IQ test
were incredible, such that Listing 12.05(C) was not satisfied. See Popp, 779 F.2d
at 1499-1500. Given this precedent, the Commissioner had a reasonable basis in
law for defending the ALJ’s finding that Monroe’s IQ results did not satisfy
Listing 12.05(C). Accordingly, the Commissioner’s position was substantially
justified, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Monroe’s
motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA.
AFFIRMED.

7