Thomas Burgess v. USA

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Thomas Burgess. Decision: Vacated and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-14209

Date Filed: 07/13/2015

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14209
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 9:12-cv-80340-KLR; 9:11-cr-80012-KLR-1
THOMAS BURGESS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 13, 2015)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Burgess, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial, following an evidentiary hearing, of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to

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vacate his conviction and 125-month sentence for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. After review, we vacate and remand for further consideration
consistent with this opinion. 1
In Clisby v. Jones, this Court instructed district courts to resolve all claims
for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to granting or denying
relief. 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (involving state prisoner’s 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition); see Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th
Cir. 2009) (applying Clisby to a federal prisoner’s § 2255 motion). If the district
court does not address all claims prior to issuing judgment, this Court “will vacate
the district court’s judgment without prejudice and remand the case for
consideration of all remaining claims.” Clisby, 960 F.2d at 938.
Burgess argues, and the government concedes, that the district court failed to
address a number of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raised in his
counseled amended § 2255 motion filed on May 10, 2013. We agree that the
district court failed to address Burgess’s constitutional claims that trial counsel
1

We recognize that the certificate of appealability (“COA”) in this case—granted on
whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by
failing to address several “federal constitutional claims” raised by Burgess—does not expressly
identify the constitutional claims for which Burgess has satisfied the standard of making “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), (c)(3);
Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1137-38 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc). However, the
government has not raised the issue of a potentially defective COA. Although we could sua
sponte raise the defective COA issue, we exercise our discretion not to do so because, under the
totality of the circumstances of this particular case, the COA sufficiently indicates that Burgess
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with the claims raised in his
May 2013 amended § 2255 motion.
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rendered ineffective assistance in failing to (1) advise Burgess that he could plead
guilty without a plea agreement (“Ground I.E”), (2) research and advise Burgess
about the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“Ground I.G”), (3) object to the
presentence investigation report’s assessing criminal history points for two prior
offenses for which Burgess was “never lawfully arrested” (“Ground I.L”), and
(4) argue at sentencing that Burgess’s criminal history category overrepresented
the seriousness of his criminal history (“Ground IV”).
As to the first two claims listed above, the government argues that the
district court considered the claims “indirectly” because the court addressed the
factual bases supporting these claims in resolving other claims. However, even
assuming that the district court made some findings arguably relevant to these
claims, the district court never identified these as claims raised by Burgess,
resolved the ultimate issue of whether counsel was ineffective, or otherwise
disposed of the claims on timeliness or other procedural grounds.
The government also contends that the Clisby violation was “harmless”
because the unaddressed claims were “patently without merit.” We decline the
government’s invitation to consider the merits of the unaddressed claims. Under
Clisby, our role is to vacate the judgment “without prejudice” and remand to the
district court for consideration of the unaddressed claims in the first instance. See

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Clisby, 960 F.2d at 938 (noting that we will vacate and remand “whenever the
district court has not resolved all such claims” (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment without prejudice and remand this case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including, but not limited to, a
consideration of the timeliness of the unaddressed claims under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. We express no opinion as to the merits,
or the timeliness, of the unaddressed claims. 2
VACATED AND REMANDED.

2

Burgess filed his initial § 2255 motion pro se, but the district court appointed him
counsel when it granted him an evidentiary hearing. Burgess moved to discharge his counsel on
appeal, and this Court granted the motion. That is how he became pro se on appeal.
4