Jonathan Lewis v. Secretary, Department of Corr, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Jonathan Kyle Lewis. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-14642

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14642
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-00547-JES-DNF

JONATHAN KYLE LEWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHARLOTTE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION EMPLOYEES, et al.,
Defendants,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 16, 2014)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Lewis, a state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his third amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
complaint purported to advance 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens1 claims of inmatemail violations by Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) officers and the
United States Postmaster General (“postmaster general). The dismissal order was
made in a full opinion: approaching 40 pages.
The appeal presents these issues:
(1)

Whether the district court erred in denying Lewis’s motions for extension
of time to respond to the defendant’s motion to dismiss

(2)

Whether the district court erred by dismissing Lewis’s complaint before
(A) the postmaster general filed a motion to dismiss and (B) the parties
conducted discovery

(3)

Whether the court erred in dismissing Lewis’s complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it concluded that
(A) Lewis pleaded only unsupported, general, conclusory allegations;
(B) the defendants were entitled to sovereign-immunity protections; and
(C) Lewis did not have a right to send mail at the prison’s expense

(4)

Whether the district court erred in dismissing Lewis’s complaint for abuse
of the judicial process where he misrepresented his litigation history

1

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
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No reversible error is presented by this appeal.

a.

Where an act must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good
cause, extend that time. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1). We review a district court’s denial
of an extension of time for abuse of discretion. See Young v. City of Palm Bay,
Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2004). Under the abuse-of-discretion
standard, “so long as the district court does not commit a clear error in judgment,
we will affirm.” Id. at 863.
Lewis was granted one extension of time and was informed that no other
extensions would be granted. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Lewis additional extensions of time to respond to the FDOC’s motion to dismiss.
Lewis’s many filings during the time in which he had to respond to the motion to
dismiss undercut his contention that he needed additional time. Furthermore,
Lewis’s complaint was due to be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

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b.

A “court shall review, … as soon as practicable,” a complaint filed in a
prisoner’s civil action against a governmental entity or officer and will dismiss any
portion of the complaint that “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1). We review a district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) de novo. Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of
Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2008). We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). But “even in the case of pro se litigants this
leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v.
Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted),
overruled on other grounds, as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709
(11th Cir. 2010).
To prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that he or she was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Griffin v.
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City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). A complaint is subject
to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal when its allegations indicate the existence of an
affirmative defense, AS long as the defense clearly appears on the face of the
complaint. Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 1993).
“Under the Eleventh Amendment, state officials sued for damages in their
official capacity are immune from suit in federal court.” Jackson v. Georgia Dep’t
of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994). A Bivens action does not lie
against a federal agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1006,
127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994).
The district court did not err by dismissing Lewis’s complaint for failing to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Lewis’s complaint was devoid of
specific factual allegations against the defendants. Lewis -- making only general,
conclusory allegations claiming that the FDOC mishandled his mail -- failed to
show that he was deprived of a federal right. See Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303.
Moreover, a claim for damages against the FDOC officers fails because the state
officials sued in their official capacities are immune from such relief. See Jackson,
16 F.3d at 1575. And Lewis has no Bivens claim against the postmaster general in
his official capacity, which is construed as a claim against the United States Postal
Service. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484-86, 114 S.Ct. at 1005-06. For background on
suits against USPS, see USPS v. Flamingo Indus. (USA), Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 744,
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124 S.Ct. 1321, 1327, 158 L.Ed.2d 19 (2004) (although Congress waived the
immunity of the postal service, “Congress did not strip it of its governmental
status”: an important distinction because “[a]n absence of immunity does not result
in liability if the substantive law in question is not intended to reach the federal
entity”). Furthermore, to the extent Lewis argues that the court prematurely
dismissed his complaint before a response from the postmaster general or a
discovery period, this argument is contrary to the screening requirements of
§ 1915A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In addition, Lewis failed to disclose his
litigation history, although instructed to do so.
AFFIRMED.

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