Krishna Reddy v. Gilbert Medical Transcription, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Krishna Reddy. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-14772

Date Filed: 10/14/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14772
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cv-01304-GKS-DAB
KRISHNA REDDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GILBERT MEDICAL TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE, INC.,
CAROLE J. GILBERT,
MERIT R. SOWARDS,
FELICIA SLATTERY,
GALLAGHER BENEFIT SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 14, 2014)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and HILL, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:
Krishna Reddy, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Reddy, in the complaint now before us, alleged violations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 and miscellaneous state law claims. The magistrate
judge, recognizing that the United States District Court for the Central District of
California had entered a final merits adjudication against most of the defendants
appearing in this case, held that the duplicative nature of the instant suit stripped it
of federal question jurisdiction and therefore recommended denying Reddy’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis before the district court and dismissing her
complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The district court
adopted those recommendations. Reddy argues on appeal that her complaint is not
duplicative of the prior proceeding because the California district court never
adjudicated the merits of the case as to Felicia Slattery and the other “Insurance
defendants” and also because newly acquired evidence allows her to bring her
claims as to all defendants. She also argues that her complaint states a claim
against all defendants and as to all causes of action.
We review dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim de
novo and view the allegations in the complaint as true. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d
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1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). The same standards governing dismissals under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) apply to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the facts as pleaded fail to
state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The “plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of
action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (brackets omitted). Despite the fact that a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). We may
affirm on any ground supported by the record. Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund,
Inc. v. Tyson, 671 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2012).
We may use the tools of preclusion and res judicata to further the public
interests of preventing inconsistent results, tamping down the cost and vexation of
multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources, and encouraging reliance on
adjudication. Borrero v. United Healthcare of New York, Inc., 610 F.3d 1296,
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1307-08 (11th. Cir. 2010). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
applies to bar a subsequent lawsuit re-litigating matters that were already litigated
or could have been litigated in the earlier suit. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1161 (11th Cir. 2003). Res judicata does not apply, however, when there was no
final judgment on the merits in the earlier action. Id. A dismissal without
prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and does not have a res judicata
effect. Id. If, on the other hand, a party has already litigated the same causes of
action against the same parties through to a final judgment, res judicata bars that
complaint. Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Atlanticus Holdings Corp., 734 F.3d
1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2013). Res judicata will bar a subsequent action if:
(1) the prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there
was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the parties were identical in both suits; and
(4) the prior and present causes of action are the same. Davila v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003). We evaluate the similarity of two
causes of action by looking to the broad “nucleus of operative facts” of the actions.
Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1308. To do so, we will “line up the former and current cases
side-by-side to assess their factual similarities.” Id. at 1309. We may consider the
preclusive effect of a prior judgment sua sponte. See Akanthos, 734 F.3d at 1272.
Section 1981 creates a federal right of action for victims of certain types of
racial discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To state a claim for non-employment
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discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege (1) she is a member of a racial
minority; (2) the defendant intended to racially discriminate against her; and
(3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the
statute. Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010).
The rights enumerated in the statute include the right to “make and enforce
contracts,” which means the “making, performance, modification, and termination
of contracts.” § 1981(a), (b). The statute also protects against the impairment of
contracts. Id. § 1981(c). Consistent with that language, the Supreme Court has
held that “Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation
of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an
existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would have rights
under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v.
McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 1250, 163 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2006).
Section 1985(3) provides a cause of action to people victimized by a
conspiracy to deprive them of equal protection of the laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
To state a successful claim under Section 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove: (1) a
conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
(4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any
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right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Park v. City of Atlanta, 120
F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff must show some racial
“invidiously discriminatory animus” behind the defendant’s actions. Id.
Section 1367(a) of Title 28 provides in part that “in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction,” there is supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims arising from the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). Absent a viable federal claim, however, the district court should
dismiss any state law claims. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir.
1999). The court should dismiss the state law claims without prejudice so that they
may be refiled in the appropriate state court. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339,
1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
Here, even if the district court arguably erred in its reasoning by conflating
an issue of preclusion with an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the record
supports dismissal of Reddy’s complaint on other grounds. First, Reddy’s claims
against all defendants except the Insurance defendants are barred by res judicata
because the California federal court has already adjudicated on the merits Reddy’s
claims, which arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as those asserted
here. Second, even construing Reddy’s claims against the Insurance defendants
liberally and taking all allegations in her complaint as true, Reddy fails to meet the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim upon which relief may be granted. Her
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conclusory allegations regarding the Insurance defendants’ alleged violations of
§§ 1981 and 1985 do not meet the requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court
regarding the sufficiency of pleadings. Furthermore, without a viable federal
claim, the district court did not err in declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Reddy’s remaining state law claims. However, we remand to the
district court for the limited purpose of clarifying its order that its dismissal of the
state law claims is without prejudice. For these reasons, the district court’s
dismissal of Reddy’s complaint is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

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