USA v. Juwan Hunter

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Juwan Hunter. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 1 of 9

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15354
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 7:12-cr-00495-LSC-JEO-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUWAN HUNTER,
a.k.a. Woop,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(October 16, 2014)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 2 of 9

Juwan Hunter appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty
to five counts of violations of federal law arising out of a string of armed robberies
of convenience stores. Hunter argues on appeal that the district court failed to
evaluate the four factors enumerated in United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472
(11th Cir. 1988), and should have permitted him to withdraw his plea because he
did not receive close assistance of counsel. After careful review, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Hunter to
withdraw his guilty plea.
I.
A federal grand jury indicted Hunter on four counts of robbery affecting
interstate commerce (“Hobbs Act robbery”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a),
and three counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Pursuant to a written plea
agreement, Hunter pled guilty to all four counts of Hobbs Act robbery and one of
the firearm counts. In the agreement, Hunter stipulated to a total sentence of 300
months’ imprisonment.
Less than two weeks after the plea hearing, Hunter filed a pro se motion to
appoint new counsel and withdraw his guilty plea, but in the motion, he did not
explain the basis for requesting withdrawal. The court held a hearing on the
withdrawal motion on the same day as, and immediately before, Hunter’s
2

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 3 of 9

sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Hunter stated that he sought a new attorney
and wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because his attorney never visited him,
never reviewed defenses with him, and did not communicate with him. He also
stated that he had always wanted to take the case to trial, but his attorney thought
he was guilty. According to Hunter, his attorney had his mother try to convince
him to plead guilty. Hunter claimed that he took the plea under duress, from peer
pressure, and because he was scared of the district judge as a result of rumors that
he had heard. The judge indicated that he thought Hunter wished to withdraw his
plea because Hunter’s co-defendant had been found not guilty.
When asked by the court for a response, Hunter’s attorney stated that he had
visited Hunter five or six times in jail and was ready for trial, but Hunter had
decided that he wanted to plead guilty. Although Hunter did briefly change his
mind after that and state his intention to proceed to trial, according to the attorney,
Hunter ultimately decided to plead guilty after talking over the potential sentencing
ranges and speaking with his parents. The district court denied Hunter’s pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and then sentenced him to the stipulated
sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment. This appeal, from the denial of the motion
requesting withdrawal of the guilty plea, followed.
II.

3

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 4 of 9

We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). The
district court does not abuse its discretion unless its denial is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Id. We likewise review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
decision about whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id.
III.
Hunter argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea without first conducting an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the four
factors enumerated in Buckles.

Hunter concedes that the colloquy conducted

pursuant to Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., at the plea hearing shows that the plea was
knowing but contends that he did not have a “working relationship” with counsel,
which affected his ability to understand the consequences of pleading guilty.
Hunter requests a remand for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing.
Defendants seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after the court has accepted the
plea but before sentencing must “show a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Whether a defendant’s motion to
withdraw shows a fair and just reason is to be liberally construed; however, the
decision to allow withdrawal is left to the sound discretion of the district court, and
we will reverse only if the court’s decision is “arbitrary or unreasonable.” Buckles,
843 F.2d at 471.
4

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 5 of 9

In determining whether a defendant has met his burden to show a “fair and
just reason” to withdraw a guilty plea, a district court may consider the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the plea, including whether (1) close assistance of
counsel was available, (2) the plea was knowing and voluntary, (3) judicial
resources would be conserved, and (4) the government would be prejudiced if the
defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea. Id. at 471-72. If an appellant does
not satisfy the first two factors of the Buckles analysis, we need not “give particular
attention” to the remaining factors. United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d
796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987).
In light of Hunter’s statements at his plea hearing, we do not find convincing
Hunter’s contentions that he did not have a “working relationship” with his
attorney or that his attorney failed to discuss the case adequately with Hunter.
Specifically, Hunter stated under oath at the plea hearing that he had read and
reviewed with his attorney his indictment, guilty-plea advice-of-rights certification,
and plea agreement and that he had no complaints about his attorney’s
representation of him, describing his attorney as having done a “good job.” Hunter
further expressed his belief that his attorney had spent “a sufficient amount of time
meeting with [him] and talking to [him]” about the case.

And, in his plea

agreement, Hunter stated that he had discussed his case and constitutional rights
with his attorney and that he was satisfied with his lawyer’s representation. He
5

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 6 of 9

further acknowledged his understanding that the plea agreement was “binding as to
the Parties . . . .”
The district judge also fully explained to Hunter that he had a right to
proceed to trial, and he described all of the attendant rights to Hunter. Hunter
stated that he understood his rights, including his rights to persist in a not-guilty
plea and to have a trial. And throughout the course of the plea colloquy, the judge
continued to advise Hunter that he did not have to plead guilty and that he could
proceed to trial. Before ultimately asking Hunter what his plea was, the district
court again explained, “Mr. Hunter, I am prepared to accept your guilty plea[s] if
you want to offer them. You don’t have to. You can say, ‘Nope, I want a trial.’
Do you understand me?” Hunter replied that he did and then pled guilty.
These statements under oath directly contradict Hunter’s later contentions
that he “always wanted to go to trial.” They are also contrary to defense counsel’s
statements regarding his meetings with Hunter and his readiness for trial. A strong
presumption exists that Hunter’s statements made under oath during his plea
hearing were true, and Hunter must overcome a heavy, but not insurmountable,
burden of proving those statements false. See United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d
185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir.
1988).

6

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 7 of 9

All he offers to satisfy this burden, however, are his allegations that he was
under duress to plead guilty because his mother and his attorney had advised him
to do so and because he had heard rumors that the judge was a tough sentencer.
These circumstances do not satisfy Hunter’s burden to prove false his statements
during the plea colloquy. Particularly in light of Hunter’s numerous statements
under oath during his change-of-plea hearing, the record in the case, and counsel’s
unrebutted statements that he had met with Hunter five or six times and was ready
for trial, Hunter’s allegations of duress are also insufficient to show that he did not
receive close assistance of counsel or that his plea was involuntary. See Buckles,
843 F.2d at 472.
At the plea hearing, Hunter acknowledged that nobody threatened or coerced
him into pleading guilty and that he was entering the plea voluntarily. As with his
post-change-of-plea statements about always wanting to go to trial, Hunter has also
failed to overcome the presumption that the statements regarding the lack of
cognizable coercion were false when made, and his subsequent contentions that he
was “under duress” and “wasn’t in [his] right state of mind” when he pled guilty
are insufficient. “All pleas of guilty are the result of some pressures or influences
on the mind of the defendant,” and “[a] defendant cannot complain of coercion
where his attorney, employing his best professional judgment, recommends that
the defendant plead guilty.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Hunter has made no
7

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 8 of 9

allegation that his attorney or others improperly pressured or coerced him into
pleading guilty; rather, his allegations are indicative of the kinds of pressures and
tradeoffs inherent in the difficult decision of whether to plead guilty.
Consequently, it was well within the district court’s sound discretion to discredit
Hunter’s allegations concerning his attorney’s representation in connection with
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298; Buckles, 843
F.2d at 471-72.
Because Hunter received close and adequate assistance of counsel and
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hunter’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, despite the
relatively short period between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw that
plea. See Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 801 (noting that the time between the
entry of the plea and the motion to withdraw may be indicative of a defendant’s
motivation in entering a plea). In making this determination, we do not “give
particular attention” to the final two Buckles factors. See id.
Finally, Hunter did not allege in the district court and has not argued on
appeal that the trial judge did not comply in full with Rule 11 at the plea hearing.
In fact, Hunter concedes that the Rule 11 colloquy was sufficient to show that the
plea was knowing. Because the district court conducted a comprehensive Rule 11
hearing that thoroughly evaluated the knowing and voluntary nature of Hunter’s
8

Case: 13-15354

Date Filed: 10/16/2014

Page: 9 of 9

guilty plea, the court did not err by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his
motion to withdraw the plea. See United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1514
(11th Cir. 1986) (the refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing is not an abuse of
discretion where the trial court made extensive Rule 11 inquiries before accepting
the defendant’s plea).
IV.
In sum, Hunter did not meet his burden of showing a “fair and just reason”
for withdrawal of his plea, and the district court’s refusal to permit Hunter to
withdraw his guilty plea was not arbitrary or unreasonable. We, therefore, affirm.
AFFIRMED.

9