USA v. Daniel Metz

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Daniel M. Metz. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 13-15867

Date Filed: 07/16/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15867
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cr-00189-GAP-GJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANIEL S. METZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(July 16, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Metz appeals his convictions for knowingly making false, fictitious,
or fraudulent claims against the United States government and obstruction of
justice. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

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I
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the underlying
facts of the case and recite only what is necessary to resolve this appeal.
Following the initiation of a civil investigation into his personal tax
activities, Mr. Metz belatedly submitted purportedly “self-prepared” tax returns for
2005, 2006, and 2007, with which he included sixteen 1099 Original Issued
Discount (“OID”) forms. Certain peculiarities in these OID forms prompted the
IRS to open a criminal investigation. As the investigation progressed, Mr. Metz,
among other things, allegedly forced Paul Cratty, the IRS agent on the case, to
disclose his social security number before Mr. Metz would provide information;
moved to quash summonses that the IRS issued; and sought injunctive relief
against the IRS.
Mr. Metz was ultimately indicted on three counts of knowingly making
false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims against the United States government, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, and one count of obstruction of justice, in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The district court held a three-day jury trial, during which
Mr. Metz sought to establish that he had acted in mistaken but good-faith reliance
on the advice of legal and accounting professionals.
On direct examination, Agent Cratty testified that Mr. Metz demanded that
he provide his social security number before Mr. Metz would provide him with

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requested information. On cross-examination, Mr. Metz’s counsel asked, “There's
nothing wrong with a taxpayer asking an agent what his authority is for doing
something, is there?” Agent Cratty answered in the negative. The district court
interjected, “I don’t know about asking for a social security number, though.” Mr.
Metz’s counsel then thanked the district court for raising the issue.
Mr. Metz later called Dana Kaufman, a CPA and attorney, to testify as an
expert witness as to the obstruction charge. On cross-examination, the government
asked Mr. Kaufman whether he had ever previously “seen an OID with the credit
card limits listed as the original issue discounts.” Mr. Kaufman responded in the
negative, but stated that he had “heard about the people who teach others to fill out
OID forms that way.” The district court asked whether Mr. Metz’s petition to
quash “strike[s] [Mr. Kaufman] as being in terms of its language and content
similar to some of the tax protester stuff that you see from these other people that
tell people how to fill out OIDs.” It went on to ask Mr. Kaufman for clarification
that he “had heard about or seen people who recommend using OIDs as a tax
strategy,” and then inquired whether “some of the language in th[e] petition [is]
similar to the language used by those people.”
On re-direct, Mr. Metz’s counsel asked Mr. Kaufman about certain language
in Mr. Metz’s petition to quash that cited a Supreme Court case and Corpus Juris
Secundum for the proposition that the United States is a corporation. Mr. Kaufman

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opined that he did not believe Mr. Metz, as an engineer lacking legal training,
“would have any idea how to come up with these cites.” At the close of re-direct,
the district court returned to this line of questioning and asked Mr. Kaufman,
“[A]re you telling me that you know a lawyer that would write a paragraph like
that and submit it to federal court without being in fear of sanctions?”
Mr. Metz finally called Carlos Samlut to testify as an expert on OIDs. On
direct examination, Mr. Metz’s counsel inquired into Mr. Samlut’s views on Craig
Holcomb, whose seminars Mr. Metz allegedly attended to learn how to file OIDs.
Asked if he agrees with what Mr. Holcomb teaches, Mr. Samlut responded, “No. I
don't agree with anything that Craig Holcomb or any of those other individuals that
teach this 1099 OID method or theory, so no, I do not agree with them.” In
response, the district court asked, “Is it fair to say you wouldn't expect to find any
legitimate CPA who would agree with that strategy?”
With respect to comments made during trial, the district court instructed the
jury as follows: “You should not assume from anything I have said during the
course of the trial that I have any opinion about the facts of this case. Except for
my instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything I may have said
during the trial in arriving at your own decision about the facts." The jury returned
a guilty verdict.

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On appeal, Mr. Metz argues that, by posing the questions and interjecting the
comments at trial cited above, the district court improperly abandoned its neutrality
and acted as an advocate for the government, denying him a fair trial in the
process.1
II

We ordinarily review a district court’s conduct during trial for abuse of
discretion.

United States v. Palma, 511 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 2008).

Because Mr. Metz did not object to the district court’s questions and comments at
issue here, however, we review for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez,
627 F.3d 1372, 1380-82 (11th Cir. 2010). To satisfy this standard, the defendant
must show that (1) there was an error (2) that was plain (3) that affected his or her
substantial rights and (4) seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings. Id. at
1380. Showing that an error affected substantial rights almost always requires that
the error affected the outcome of the case. Id. at 1382. The defendant must
establish a “reasonable probability” of a different result but for the error. Id.
In determining the impact of the district court’s questions and comments, we
“consider the record as a whole, not merely isolated remarks.” Newman v. A.E.

1

Mr. Metz also takes issue with the district court’s characterization of certain advice on
which he purportedly relied as “malarkey.” Because the district court made this remark outside
the presence of the jury, it does not factor into our analysis. United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807,
845 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Staley Mfg. Co., 648 F.2d 330, 334-35 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1981). We may only
reverse based on the district court’s improper conduct where it had a “clear effect”
on the jury. United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 845 (11th Cir. 2011). The district
court therefore abuses its role only when it “strays from neutrality,” and its
remarks demonstrate “pervasive bias and unfairness that actually prejudice a
party.” Id. at 845-46.
III

Mr. Metz contends that the district court’s questions and comments
amounted to plain error and deprived him of a fair trial. We are not persuaded.
Although a defendant is entitled to an impartial judge, a district judge is not
“relegated to complete silence and inaction during the course of criminal jury
trial.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004). The district
court may comment on the evidence, question witnesses, and elicit facts not yet
adduced or clarify those previously presented. Hill, 643 F.3d at 845. See also Fed.
R. Evid. 614(b) (“The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the
witness.”); United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it "suggested to the
government the manner in which [confusing testimony] might be clarified"). The
district court, however, abuses its authority when it assumes the role of advocate.
See Fed. R. Evid. 614, Advisory Committee Note; Wright, 392 F.3d at 1274.
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Viewing the record as a whole, and assuming, without deciding, that the
district court’s remarks were improper, Mr. Metz has not made a showing that the
district court’s errors had a “clear effect” on the jury that affected his substantial
rights and amounted to plain error. See Hill, 643 F.3d at 845; Newman, 648 F.2d
at 334-35. The jury heard substantial evidence from the government establishing
Mr. Metz’s fraudulent filing of personal tax returns and the actions he took to
obstruct the IRS’s investigation into his personal tax activities. It also heard
lengthy testimony from Mr. Metz himself and several expert witnesses in support
of Mr. Metz’s good-faith defense. Moreover, the jury received an instruction from
the district court to disregard any commentary from the court on the facts of the
case, and we presume the jury followed that instruction. Hill, 643 F.3d at 846.
Although the district court might have phrased some of its questions and
comments more artfully, in light of the government’s evidence against him and the
district court’s curative instruction, Mr. Metz cannot meet his burden of showing a
“reasonable probability of a different result” amounting to plain error. Hill, 643
F.3d at 846; Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1382. 2
IV
Mr. Metz’s convictions are affirmed.

2

The parties dispute whether we should review the district court’s purportedly improper
statements individually or for cumulative error. We conclude that the result would be the same
under either analysis.
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