Philip Long v. Commissioner of IRS

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Philip Long. Decision: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and Remanded. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10288
Non-Argument Calendar
_______________________
Agency No. 26552-10

PHILIP LONG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF IRS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
United States Tax Court
________________________
(November 20, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Philip Long appeals the United States Tax Court’s final order and decision
on his petition for redetermination of deficiency brought under 26 U.S.C. §
6213(a). Long argues that the Tax Court erred by concluding that the $5.75
million Long received from the assignment of his position as plaintiff in a lawsuit
constituted taxable ordinary income, rather than long term capital gains. Long also
argues that the Tax Court erred by concluding that Long’s $600,000 payment to
Steelervest, Inc. (Steelervest) did not qualify as a deductible expense. Long further
argues that the Tax Court erred by concluding that Long presented insufficient
evidence of unaccounted legal fees.
I.
In October 2007, Long filed a federal income tax return for 2006, reporting a
taxable income of $0. In September 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
served Long with a notice of deficiency, which indicated that Long had a taxable
income of $4,145,423 and had incurred $1,430,743 of tax liability in 2006. Long
filed a pro se petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of his deficiency
on the grounds that he properly reported his taxable income and that the IRS made
several errors in calculating his cost of goods and gross receipts. The IRS’s answer
denied any error in the notice of deficiency.
In October 2011, Long and the IRS executed a stipulation of facts and
exhibits, as required by the Tax Court, which the IRS supplemented three times
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thereafter. According to the stipulated facts, from 1994 to 2006, Long, as sole
proprietor, owned and operated Las Olas Tower Company, Inc. (LOTC), which
was created to design and build a luxury high-rise condominium called the Las
Olas Tower on property owned by the Las Olas Riverside Hotel (LORH). LOTC
never filed any corporate income tax returns and did not have a valid employer
identification number. Instead, Long reported LOTC’s income on his Schedule C
of his individual tax return.
From 1997 to 2003, Long also owned Alhambra Brothers, Inc. (Alhambra),
which was created to build a different luxury condominium in Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida. To facilitate the building of the condominium, Alhambra formed
Alhambra Joint Ventures (AJV) with Steelervest, a company owned by Henry J.
Langsenkamp, III.
In 1995, Steelervest entered into a contract to loan funds to LOTC for the
development of Las Olas Tower. In November 2001, Steelervest purchased
Long’s interest in AJV, and, as part of the deal (the AJV Agreement), Steelervest
agreed to forgive the loans previously issued to LOTC. As part of the same deal,
Long agreed to pay Steelervest $600,000 in the event that Long sold his interest in
the Las Olas Tower project, or twenty percent of the net profit resulting from the
development of the Law Olas Tower project.

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In 2002, Long, negotiating on behalf of LOTC, entered into an agreement
with LORH (the Riverside Agreement) whereby LOTC agreed to buy land owned
by LORH for $8,282,800, with a set closing date of December 31, 2004. LORH
subsequently terminated the contract unilaterally and, on March 26, 2004, LOTC
filed suit in Florida state court against LORH for specific performance of the
contract and other damages. LOTC won at trial, and on November 21, 2005, the
state court entered judgment in favor of LOTC, and ordered LORH to honor the
Riverside Agreement and proceed with the sale of the land to LOTC within 326
days from the date of entry of the final judgment. LORH appealed the judgment.
In August 2006, during the appeals process for the Riverside Agreement
litigation, Steelervest and Long renegotiated the terms of the AJV Agreement, and,
in a new agreement (the Amended AJV Agreement), Long agreed to pay
Steelervest fifty percent of the first $1.75 million, up to a maximum of $875,000,
of monies received by Long as a result of the Riverside Agreement litigation. On
September 13, 2006, Long entered into an agreement with Louis Ferris, Jr. (the
Assignment Agreement), whereby Long sold his position as plaintiff in the
Riverside Agreement lawsuit to Ferris for $5,750,000. While the Amended AJV
Agreement arguably entitled Steelervest to $875,000, Steelervest agreed to receive
$600,000 and release all rights to pursue collection under the Amended AJV
Agreement.
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At the April 11, 2012 Tax Court trial, Long began his testimony by arguing
that the $600,000 payment to Steelervest was a deductible business expense, not a
non-deductible loan repayment. Long insisted that the $600,000 paid to
Steelervest could not have been a debt repayment, because all debts were
extinguished by the AJV Agreement.
Long also testified that he began the Las Olas Tower project in 1995 when
he had the idea to build a luxury condominium in a prime real estate market. Long
claimed he intended to coordinate the development of the Las Olas Tower project,
and sought funding from his business partner and friend, Langsenkamp. Long
explained that he spent thirteen years working on the Las Olas Tower project, and,
in the end, he was able to sell his right to build the project.
Next, Long proffered a letter from his attorneys as evidence of $238,343.71
in unaccounted legal fees, but the Tax Court refused to admit the letter as
inadmissible hearsay. The Tax Court then afforded Long the opportunity to
continue the trial so that Long could find the appropriate documentation regarding
his legal fees and present witnesses to properly authenticate those documents.
Long stated, however, that he was going to “give up” and “concede” the issue of
unreported legal fees because he had no way of getting admissible evidence before
the Tax Court in a timely fashion.

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On cross-examination, Long testified that he was the developer of the Las
Olas Tower project, and his role was to design the property with an architect,
obtain local government approval for the project, and merchandise the property.
Long provided promotional material to potential clients, worked with clients to
execute contracts, and received deposits for approximately twenty percent of Las
Olas Tower’s sixty to ninety proposed condominium units. Long worked full-time
as the developer for the project.
After Long’s testimony, the IRS called John McCrory, Steelervest’s and
Langsenkamp’s attorney, who testified that AJV and the Ft. Lauderdale
condominium project were losing enterprises, and Langsenkamp’s only hope of
making money was to have the loans Steelervest gave to LOTC repaid out of
profits from the Las Olas Tower project. The purpose of the AJV Agreement was
to cancel the notes issued to LOTC, and transfer Long’s indebtedness to profits
from the Las Olas Tower project. Essentially, the $600,000 was a substituted
obligation for the cancelled promissory notes.
At the end of the trial, Long stated that his sole objection to the IRS’s
calculation of his 2006 tax liability was that his $600,000 payment to Steelervest
was a deductible business expense, not a loan repayment. Long also reiterated that
he agreed to give up on the additional legal fees. The IRS then noted its objection
to Long’s characterization of his 2006 income as capital gains.
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Long stated in his post-trial brief that he should not have withdrawn his
claim regarding unaccounted legal fees, and argued that the IRS improperly
omitted $238,544 of deductible legal expenses from his 2006 tax return.
Additionally, the $600,000 payment to Steelervest did not constitute a loan
repayment because the controlling documents indicated that the AJV Agreement
eliminated all of Long’s debt. Long also asserted that his income from the
Assignment Agreement constituted the sale of an asset, and, therefore, his tax
return should be completed using the long term capital gains method.
The IRS stated in its post-trial brief that the $600,000 payment to Steelervest
must have been a debt repayment because Steelervest was not a participant in a
joint venture with LOTC. The IRS also argued that the $5,750,000 received by
Long from the Assignment Agreement constituted ordinary income, not capital
gains. Specifically, Long received $5,750,000 in lieu of future ordinary income
payments, and, therefore, that money should be counted as ordinary income under
the “substitution for ordinary income doctrine.” See Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,
356 U.S. 260, 260 S. Ct. 691 (1958). Additionally, Long was not entitled to an
increased legal fee deduction because, at trial, he presented no evidence
demonstrating his entitlement to an increased deduction, and, regardless, he
affirmatively abandoned the issue.

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The Tax Court rejected Long’s arguments and found him liable for a tax
deficiency of $1,430,743. First, the Tax Court determined that Long’s concession
regarding the deductibility of additional legal fees amounted to a binding
stipulation that he was not entitled to an increased deduction. Moreover, even if
Long had not conceded the issue, he did not present sufficient evidence at trial
demonstrating his entitlement to an enhanced legal fee deduction. Second, based
on factors enumerated in previous published Tax Court decisions, the Tax Court
concluded that the AJV Agreement did not create a joint venture between
Steelervest and LOTC, and, therefore, the entire $5.75 million payment Long
received for his postion in the Riverside Agreement litigation constituted nondeductible, taxable income attributable to Long, including the $600,000 that Long
subsequently paid to Steelervest. Finally, the Tax Court, treating LORH’s land as
the putative capital asset, found that Long intended to sell the land to a developer
and concluded that the applicability of the capital gains statute “depend[ed] on
whether Long intended to sell the land to customers in the ordinary course of his
business.” The Tax Court determined that, while Long only intended to sell the
land for the Las Olas Tower project, and not the individual condominium units
themselves, the $5.75 million payment for Long’s position in the lawsuit
nevertheless constituted ordinary income because Long intended to sell the land to
customers in the ordinary course of his business.
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II.
We review decisions of the Tax Court “in the same manner and to the same
extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 26
U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review the Tax Court’s legal conclusions and
interpretations of the tax code de novo and its findings of facts for clear error.
Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Comm’r, 613 F.3d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir. 2010).
Additionally, we may affirm on any ground that finds support in the record.
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
III.
Long argues that the $5.75 million he received from the Assignment
Agreement should be assessed as a long term capital gain rather than as ordinary
taxable income. Long notes that he only had an option to purchase LORH’s land
and the only asset he ever had in the Las Olas Tower project was the Riverside
Agreement.
In response, the IRS argues that Long’s proceeds from the Assignment
Agreement were not a capital gain, but rather a lump sum substitution for the
ordinary income he would have earned from developing the Las Olas Tower
project. Thus, under the “substitute for ordinary income doctrine,” the $5.75
million lump sum payment was taxable as ordinary income. Additionally, in light
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of this analysis, the Tax Court’s discussion of factors to determine Long’s primary
purpose for holding the property was irrelevant. The IRS also argues that the
$5.75 million, which constitutes Long’s proceeds from the sale of his judgment, is
a short-term gain, because Long sold the judgment to Ferris on September 13,
2006, less than a year after the court entered judgment on November 21, 2005.
Long did not file a reply brief.
IV.
Income representing proceeds from the sale or exchange of a capital asset
that a taxpayer holds for over a year is considered a capital gain and is taxed at a
favorable rate. Womack v. Comm’r, 510 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007). Other
income, or “ordinary income,” is taxed at a higher rate. Id. “[T]he term ‘capital
asset’ means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his
trade or business), but does not include . . . stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the
taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business.” 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(1). In certain circumstances, contract rights may
be capital assets. See Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1967).
This Court has observed that “the statutory definition of ‘capital asset’ has
never been read as broadly as the statutory language might seem to permit, because
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such a reading would encompass some things Congress did not intend to be taxed
as capital gains.” Womack, 510 F.3d at 1299 (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he term ‘capital asset’ is to be construed
narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital-gains
treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of appreciation in
value accrued over a substantial period of time. Id.
The Tax Court erred by misconstruing the “property” subject to capital gains
analysis under § 1221. The Tax Court analyzed the capital gains issue as if the
land subject to the Riverside Agreement was the “property” that Long disposed of
for in return for $5.75 million. The record makes clear, however, that Long never
actually owned the land, and, instead, sold a judgment giving the exclusive right to
purchase LORH’s land pursuant to the terms of the Riverside Agreement. In other
words, Long did not sell the land itself, but rather his right to purchase the land,
which is a distinct contractual right that may be a capital asset. See Pounds, 372
F.2d at 346. The Tax Court erred by ignoring this distinction.
This distinction is material because the “property” subject to the capital
gains analysis was really Long’s exclusive right to purchase the property pursuant
to the Florida court judgment. The dispositive inquiry is not “whether Long
intended to sell the land to customers in the ordinary course of his business,” but
whether Long held the exclusive right to purchase the property “primarily for sale
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to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.” See 1221(a)(1).
There is no evidence that Long entered into the Riverside Agreement with the
intent to assign his contractual rights in the ordinary course of business, nor is there
evidence that, in the ordinary course of his business, Long obtained the Florida
court judgment for the purpose of assigning his position as plaintiff to a third party.
Rather, the record makes clear that Long always intended to fulfill the terms of the
Riverside Agreement and develop the Las Olas Tower project himself.
The IRS asserts two alternate grounds for affirming the Tax Court’s
decision.

First, the IRS incorrectly asserts that Long’s proceeds from the

Assignment Agreement constitute short-term capital gains. If the asset subject to
capital gains treatment was an assignment of litigation rights, then Long acquired
the asset when he filed suit in March of 2004, not when he obtained the judgment.
Additionally, the real asset at issue was Long’s exclusive right to purchase the
land, which he obtained pursuant to his execution of the Riverside Agreement in
2002, well over the one-year period required for long-term capital gains treatment.
See Womack, 510 F.3d at 1298.
Second, the IRS argues that Long’s proceeds from the Assignment
Agreement were a lump sum substitute for his future ordinary income, and under
the “substitute for ordinary income doctrine” the proceeds should be characterized
as ordinary income. We cannot agree.
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“[T]he substitute for ordinary income doctrine is the only recognized judicial
limit to the broad terms of [§] 1221.” Tempel v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 341, 347
(2011) aff'd sub nom. Esgar Corp. v. Comm’r., 744 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2014).
Therefore, “when determining whether property is a capital asset under [§] 1221,
unless one of the eight exceptions or the substitute for ordinary income doctrine
applies it is a capital asset.” Id.
The substitute for ordinary income doctrine provides that when a party
receives a lump sum payment that “essentially [is] a substitute for what would
otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income that lump sum payment
is taxable as ordinary income as well.” Womack, 510 F.3d at 1299 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The overall effect of the doctrine “has been to narrow
what a mechanical application of [§] 1221 would otherwise cause to be treated as a
capital asset.” Id. at 1300.
In determining whether a lump sum payment serves as a substitute for
ordinary income, we look to “the type and nature of the underlying right or
property assigned or transferred.” United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 291
(5th Cir. 1963).1 A lump sum payment for a fixed amount of future earned income
is taxed as ordinary income. See, e.g., Hort v. Comm’r, 313 U.S. 28, 30, 61 S. Ct.

1

The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted as binding precedent all decisions
rendered by the Fifth Circuit prior to close of business on October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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757, 757–58 (1941) (building owner’s receipt of lump sum payment in exchange
for cancelling a lease on his property constitutes ordinary income); Womack, 510
F.3d at 1301 (lottery winner’s receipt of lump sum payment in exchange for right
to future lottery winning disbursements constitutes ordinary income).
It cannot be said that the profit Long received from selling the right to
attempt to finish developing a large residential project that was far from complete
was a substitute for what he would have received had he completed the project
himself. Long did not have a future right to income that he already earned. By
selling his position in the litigation, Long effectively sold Ferris his right to finish
the project and earn the income that Long had hoped to earn when he started the
project years prior. Taxing the sale of a right to create—and thereby profit—at the
highest rate would discourage many transfers of property that are beneficial to
economic development.
Long possessed a “bundle of rights [that] reflected something more than an
opportunity…to obtain periodic receipts of income.” Comm’r v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d
125, 130–31 (2d Cir.1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). Long’s profit was
not “simply the amount [he] would have received eventually, discounted to present
value.” Womack, 510 F.3d at 1301. Rather, Long’s rights in the LORH property
represented the potential to earn income in the future based on the owner's actions
in using it, not entitlement to the income merely by owning the property. See id. at
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1302. We have already held that selling a right to earn future undetermined
income, as opposed to selling a right to earned income, is a critical feature of a
capital asset. United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1963).
The fact that the income earned from developing the project would otherwise be
considered ordinary income is immaterial. Id.
We hold that the profit from the $5.75 million Long received in the sale of
his position in the Riverside Agreement lawsuit is more appropriately
characterized as capital gains.

The ruling of the Tax Court is reversed and

remanded with instructions to determine Long’s new tax liability in accordance
with this opinion.
V.
Long next argues that the Tax Court erred by not treating his $600,000
payment to Steelervest as a deductible “reduction of income.” Specifically, Long
contends the $600,000 was not a non-deductible loan repayment, but rather a
payment due as part of a stipulated profit participation agreement and, therefore,
was a “reduction of income and a deductible expense.”
In response, the IRS argues that the AJV Agreement and Amended AJV
Agreement are debt instruments, and, as such, the $600,000 payment to Steelervest
constituted a non-deductible payment of indebtedness. Moreover, the IRS argues
that regardless of the characterization of the AJV Agreements, Long conceded that
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all of LOTC’s income flowed through him, and Long failed to identify any
provision of the tax code entitling him to deduct the $600,000.
“When a taxpayer receives a loan, he incurs an obligation to repay that loan
at some future date.” Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307, 103 S. Ct. 1826, 1831
(1983). “Because of this obligation, the loan proceeds do not qualify as income to
the taxpayer.” Id. “When [the taxpayer] fulfills the obligation, the repayment of
the loan likewise has no effect on his tax liability. Id.
Additionally, “deductions under the Internal Revenue Code are a matter of
legislative grace and the taxpayer who claims the benefit must bear the burden of
proof that he is entitled to the particular deduction.’ O’Neal v. United States, 258
F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001). As such, the taxpayer “must ‘clearly establish’
his entitlement to a particular deduction.” Anselmo v. Comm’r, 757 F.2d 1208,
1211 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985).
Throughout the proceedings in the Tax Court, Long never made clear
whether his argument was that (1) the $600,000 paid to Steelervest was its profit
share of a joint venture with LOTC (meaning, of the $5.75 million Long received
from the Assignment Agreement, only $5.15 million was his actual income), or (2)
the entirety of the $5.75 million was Long’s income, but the $600,000 paid to
Steelervest qualified as a deductible expense. Long concedes in his opening brief
that he did not participate in a joint venture with Steelervest, and, therefore, the
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entirety of the $5.75 million in proceeds from the Assignment Agreement was
attributable to Long’s income. Accordingly, the issue on appeal is whether the
$600,000 Long paid to Steelervest qualified as a deductible expense.
Here, the Tax Court committed no error because Long did not meet his
burden of clearly establishing his entitlement to deduct the $600,000 paid to
Steelervest. See O’Neal, 258 F.3d at 1276; Anselmo, 757 F.2d at 1211 n.2. The
record demonstrates that the nature and character of the Amended AJV Agreement
was to renegotiate Long’s repayment terms with respect to his indebtedness to
Steelervest. Accordingly, the $600,000 was a loan repayment that does not qualify
as a deductible expense. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307, 103 S. Ct. at 1831. Moreover,
regardless of the characterization of the Amended AJV Agreement, Long provides
no statutory support for his contention that LOTC’s alleged “profit participation”
with Steelervest constitutes a deductible expense. Accordingly, Long has not met
his burden of clearly establishing his entitlement to a particular deduction, and the
judgment of the Tax Court on this issue is affirmed.
VI.
Finally, Long argues that the Tax Court erred by refusing to include over
$200,000 in unreported legal fees in its assessment of his deficiency. He argues
that a letter from his attorneys was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the
unreported legal fees. Moreover, Long argues he was tricked into abandoning his
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claim by the Tax Court, and that counsel for the IRS behaved unethically by failing
to disclose that the evidence offered by Long was hearsay.
In response, the IRS argues that the Tax Court correctly determined that
Long’s proffered evidence of additional legal fees was both inadmissible and
insufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to a higher deduction.
We have repeatedly held that we will not consider issues on appeal that a
party expressly abandoned at trial. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1222 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004). This Court reviews claims of
judicial error in the lower courts, and if we were to regularly address questions that
a lower court never had a chance to examine, it would not only waste court
resources, but “also deviate from the essential nature, purpose, and competence of
an appellate court.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331
(11th Cir. 2004).
The taxpayer carries the burden of demonstrating with some substantiality
how much of a deductible expense was actually paid or incurred. Williams v.
United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). It is a basic requirement that the
petitioner present sufficient evidence that a deductible expense was, in fact, spent
or incurred for the stated purpose. See id.
Tax Court proceedings are conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Evidence applicable in a trial without a jury. Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262,
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1272 n.9 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7453). Hearsay is defined as a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid.
801(c). Absent an exception, hearsay is not admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 802.
As an initial matter, Long’s explicit abandonment of this issue at trial would
typically prevent appellate review because the Tax Court would not have made a
final ruling. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1222 n.8; Access Now, Inc.,
385 F.3d at 1331. However, Long re-raised the issue in his post-trial brief, and the
Tax Court ultimately addressed the merits of Long’s argument in its final decision.
Accordingly, this Court may review whether the Tax Court erred by concluding
that Long did not present sufficient evidence of unaccounted legal fees.
Additionally, the record contains no evidence of unethical behavior by the Tax
Court or IRS counsel, and, regardless, we need not consider issues of alleged
impropriety because Long raises them for the first time on appeal. See Access
Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1331.
Here, the Tax Court correctly concluded that Long’s evidence of
unaccounted legal fees was insufficient. Long’s sole piece of evidence regarding
the unaccounted legal fees, a letter from his attorneys indicating that certain fees
were paid, constitutes inadmissible hearsay, because the writer of the letter did not

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testify in court or otherwise authenticate the document. 2 See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c),
802. Accordingly, having presented no other evidence, Long did not present
sufficient evidence of a deductible expense. See Williams, 245 F.2d at 560.
Therefore, the judgment of the Tax Court on this issue is affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and remanded with instructions
for further proceedings.

2

While the attorney’s letter may have been admissible as a business record under Fed. R.
Evid. 803(6), Long makes no such argument in his opening brief and, therefore, this Court need
not consider the issue. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir. 2012).
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