USA v. Dwight Guthridge Espinoza

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Dwight Allen Guthridge Espinoza. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 14-10467

Date Filed: 10/20/2014

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10467
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20541-KMM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DWIGHT ALLEN GUTHRIDGE ESPINOZA,
a.k.a. Dwight Uthridge,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(October 20, 2014)
Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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After pleading guilty, Dwight Guthridge Espinoza appeals his 151-month
sentence for distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2). On appeal, Espinoza argues that his sentence is unreasonable. After
review, we affirm.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion using
a two-step process.” United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks omitted). “First, we look at whether the district court committed
any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory guidelines
range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. “Then, we examine whether the
sentence is substantively unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and
in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.1
The party challenging the sentence has the burden to show that it is
unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). We

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The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the serious of
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3)
the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences
available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to
provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” Id. at 1191 (quotation marks omitted).
II. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS
With respect to procedural reasonableness, Espinoza claims the district court
presumed the advisory guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment was
reasonable. See United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 880 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If a
district court applies the guidelines as though they were mandatory or treats the
range as presumptively reasonable, that is procedural error.”). Espinoza points to
comments the district court made in response to Espinoza’s request for a
downward variance.
Espinoza sought a variance based on the Sentencing Commission’s 2013
Report to Congress (“the 2013 Report”), which recommended changes to the
guidelines provision for non-production child pornography offenses, U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2, to reflect technological changes in the way typical offenders receive and
distribute child pornography. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the
Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses (December 2012). 2 In considering
Espinoza’s variance request, the district court suggested that Congress’s inaction
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At sentencing, Espinoza did not object to the district court’s guidelines calculations
based on U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 and does not raise any guidelines calculation error on appeal.
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on the 2013 Report might mean that Congress believes § 2G2.2 does not need to be
changed, but that if Congress is merely slow to act, as Espinoza urged, Espinosa
could request resentencing after Congress enacts legislation and the Sentencing
Commission makes those changes retroactive.
Espinoza’s focus on this suggestion, however, ignores the rest of the district
court’s comments, which make clear that the district court considered and rejected
Espinoza’s variance request based on the particular facts of Espinoza’s case and
not because the district court applied a legal presumption of reasonableness.
Specifically, after Espinoza’s counsel pointed out that some district courts already
were varying downward based on the 2013 Report, the district court acknowledged
that it could vary downward “if the offense conduct warrant[ed] it.” The district
court concluded, however, that “with this case,” a downward variance was not
appropriate. The district court pointed out that, when law enforcement first
uncovered Espinoza’s downloading of child pornography, agents gave Espinoza “a
break.” After forensic examination confirmed Espinoza’s confession that he had
downloaded and then deleted child pornography, the agents returned Espinoza’s
computer and warned him to stop downloading child pornography or face
imprisonment. Within three months, however, Espinoza had resumed
downloading child pornography and admitted in a second confession to agents that
he would not stop unless he was arrested. It was these facts, and not a presumption
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of reasonableness, that caused the district court to deny Espinoza’s request for a
downward variance.
We also reject Espinoza’s claims that the district court failed to consider
§ 3553(a) factors other than the guidelines range and failed to explain adequately
the chosen sentence. The district court explicitly stated that it had considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and cited several factors, including the offense conduct and the
need for deterrence and punishment. See United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d
1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Nothing requires the district court to discuss each of
the § 3553(a) factors, and an acknowledgment that it has considered each will
suffice.”). Furthermore, the district court adequately explained that it denied
Espinoza’s variance request because Espinoza’s failed to heed law enforcement’s
warning and stop downloading child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)
(requiring the district court to, at the time of sentencing, state in open court the
reasons for its imposition of a particular sentence); Cubero, 754 F.3d at 897
(explaining that the 2013 Report “does not heighten the district court’s statutory
duty [under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)]”).
III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
As to substantive reasonableness, Espinoza has not carried his burden to
show the district court’s imposition of a 151-month sentence, followed by lifetime
supervised release, was an abuse of discretion. Espinoza’s prison sentence is at the
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low end of the advisory guidelines range of 151 to 188 months, and well below the
applicable 20-year statutory maximum, both markers of reasonableness. See
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). By his own
admission, Espinoza downloaded child pornography for a decade—since he was
twelve years old—and would not, or could not, stop doing so even after being
discovered by law enforcement and threatened with imprisonment. Under the
circumstances, given the need to deter Espinoza and protect the public, we cannot
say either a 151-month sentence or a life term of supervision was an abuse of
discretion.
Espinoza argues that the district court gave insufficient weight to the 2013
Report, which undermines U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. “While a district court may certainly
consider the 2013 report in choosing the ultimate sentence, the report does not
invalidate § 2G2.2,” and “use of § 2G2.2 as an advisory guideline” does not make
the resulting sentence substantively unreasonable, “limit the district court’s
discretion to determine what weight to give each § 3553(a) factor,” or “require the
district court to vary from the § 2G2.2-based guidelines range.” See Cubero, 754
F.3d at 900. Here, the 2013 Report was only one factor the district court
considered, and it was within the district court’s discretion to give greater weight
to the fact that Espinoza was admittedly and demonstrably unable to stop
downloading child pornography and to the various § 3553(a) factors that fact
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implicated. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The
weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the district court.”).
Further, the record does not support Espinoza’s claim that the district court
“ignored” or “gave no weight” to his mitigating facts, such as that: (1) he did not
collect child pornography, (2) he had no means to obtain counseling; (3) he had
cooperated fully with law enforcement; and (4) his was an unsophisticated firstoffender who had not produced child pornography or had contact with children.
The district court heard Espinoza’s mitigation arguments, including those
supported by the 2013 Report, and was not required to explicitly address them.
See United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
the district court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean the district
court ignored or failed to consider that evidence in determining the sentence).
Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed a 151-month sentence and a life term of
supervised release.
AFFIRMED.

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