Randy Spencer v. Melissa Olin, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Randy Lavern Spencer. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 14-10667

Date Filed: 09/21/2015

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10667
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00038-HES-JRK

RANDY SPENCER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY MELISSA OLIN,
CIRCUIT JUDGE LEANDRA JOHNSON,
SHERIFF MARK HUNTER,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 21, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Randy Spencer, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his civil rights complaint, filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Spencer—who was charged with, and ultimately pled guilty
to, two counts of sale or delivery of a controlled substance, two counts of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, three counts of possession
of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia—
claimed in his complaint that Florida Circuit Judge Leandra Johnson conspired
with Assistant State Attorney Melissa Olin to deprive him of due process of law.
He alleged that Judge Johnson set an excessive bond, was biased against him, and
conspired with Ms. Olin to deny him pretrial discovery by refusing to have him
transported to the hearings pertaining to his requests for discovery. In addition,
Mr. Spencer alleged that Sheriff Mark Hunter denied him access to the courts by
limiting his use of the law library and refusing to allow him to copy his legal
documents and view evidence he needed to prepare his defense.
Mr. Spencer requested relief in the form of a declaration that Judge
Johnson’s “neutrality evaporated [when she made an] adverse ‘guilty’
determination at [his] first appearance proceeding,” which violated his due process
rights. In addition, he requested a declaration that Judge Johnson and Ms. Olin
denied him a reasonable opportunity to make his own defense (Mr. Spencer was
proceeding pro se in the criminal case) in violation of his right to due process, and
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a declaration that Sheriff Hunter’s inadequate law library access violated due
process.
The district court construed Mr. Spencer’s complaint as a request for
mandamus relief and determined that it did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus to direct the state circuit court or any of its judges in the performance of
their duties. See, e.g., Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County Superior Court, 474 F.2d
1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the general power to issue
writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the
performance of their duties .”). 1 The district court also ruled that, to the extent Mr.
Spencer was seeking habeas relief, such an action would be premature as Mr.
Spencer had not yet been convicted and sentenced as of the date of its order.
On appeal, Mr. Spencer contests this re-characterization of his complaint
and argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims because he
demonstrated an exceptional circumstance meriting equitable relief under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Mr. Spencer asserts that “[J]udge Johnson,

[P]rosecutor Olin, and Sheriff Hunter forced [him] to plea[d] guilty by irreparably

1

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), we adopted as binding all
Fifth Circuit precedent prior to October 1, 1981.
3

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injuring [his] Faretta 2 right to make [his] own defense, where they denied [him]
access to law library books, equipment, and material.”
Younger and its progeny generally direct federal courts to abstain from
granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state
judicial proceedings.

See Younger, 401 U.S. at 40-41.

See also Samuels v.

Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (extending Younger to requests for declaratory
relief). Absent “extraordinary circumstances,” abstention in favor of state judicial
proceedings is required if the state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate
important state interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to
litigate federal claims. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Federal abstention is not required, however, if a
plaintiff can demonstrate: (1) evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith,
(2) that irreparable injury would occur, or (3) that there is no adequate alternative
state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised. See Hughes v. Att’y Gen.
of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45,
53–54).
Mr. Spencer’s state criminal proceedings commenced prior to the filing of
his § 1983 complaint in this matter, and at the time the district court dismissed the
complaint, the proceedings remained pending. Mr. Spencer could have raised his

2

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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constitutional claims (the denial of due process and the denial of access to the
courts) in the state criminal proceedings. We find no extraordinary circumstances
in this appeal warranting an exception to federal abstention. Accordingly, we
conclude that Younger abstention was appropriate here, and, although not for the
reasons stated in the district court’s order, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Spencer’s
complaint. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.
2007) (“We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in
the record, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the
court below.”).3
AFFIRMED.

3

Even if we were to conclude that Mr. Spencer sufficiently demonstrated an exception to the
applicability of Younger abstention with regards to his access to courts claim (which we do not),
Mr. Spencer’s claim would nevertheless fail because we have previously held that a pro se
criminal defendant has no constitutional right of access to a law library or legal materials where
counsel has been offered. See Edwards v. United States, 795 F.2d 958, 961 nn. 1 & 3 (11th
Cir.1986) (rejecting a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction based on the denial of library
access while the petitioner proceeded pro se at trial, and concluding that “[w]hen counsel is
offered, the alternative of a library is not mandatory”).
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