Pamela Atkins v. Commissioner, Social Security

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Pamela Atkins. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11191
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00249-MP-GRJ

PAMELA ATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(January 7, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Pamela Atkins appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. Unlike most claimants appealing to this Court,
Atkins does not raise the issue of whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision. Instead, she contends that the district court erred in
applying our decision in Kennedy v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1987), and
in determining that the doctrine of administrative res judicata does not apply in her
case.
I.
In May 2005, Atkins applied for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. The Social Security Administration found that
Atkins was not disabled and denied her applications. Upon Atkins’ request, the
Social Security Administration reconsidered her applications but again denied
them. Atkins then requested and received a hearing before an administrative law
judge (ALJ). In August 2007, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision
determining that Atkins was disabled from December 31, 2003 until June 2, 2006.
Atkins asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s finding that her disability
ceased on June 2, 2006, and the Appeals Council denied that request in October
2009.

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In December 2009, Atkins filed a complaint in the district court. She sought
review of the ALJ’s finding that her disability ceased on June 2, 2006, and
requested that any remand from the district court “specifically limit the ALJ’s
decision to the time period on appeal” (namely, the time period beginning on June
3, 2006). In response, the Commissioner moved to remand the action “for a de
novo hearing” under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because significant
portions of the recording of the hearing could not be transcribed. 1 Atkins did not
oppose the Commissioner’s motion. In March 2010, the district court remanded
Atkins’ case “under sentence six for further proceedings by the Appeals Council.”
In May 2010, the Appeals Council vacated the Commissioner’s final
decision and remanded the case to the ALJ. Consistent with the district court’s
remand order, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to “take any further action
needed to complete the administrative record and issue a new decision.” 2 After
conducting a new administrative hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in December
2010 determining that Atkins was not disabled for any period of time.

1

Sentence six of § 405(g) gives a federal court the power to remand an application for
benefits to the Commissioner for the taking of additional evidence upon a showing “that there is
new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such
evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.”
2

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.983, when a district court remands a claimant’s case to the
Commissioner, the Appeals Council may make a decision, or it may remand the case to an ALJ
with instructions either to take action and issue a decision or to return the case to the Appeals
Council with a recommended decision.
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Atkins filed exceptions to the ALJ’s December 2010 decision. 3 The Appeals
Council remanded the case on the grounds that the unfavorable December 2010
decision did not address the partially favorable August 2007 decision or explain
why a different outcome was justified on the same record. The Appeals Council
ordered the case to be assigned to a different ALJ for a third administrative
hearing, during which Atkins would be able to submit additional or updated
evidence for the ALJ’s consideration. In July 2012, a different ALJ issued a
decision concluding that Atkins was not disabled for any period of time. Atkins
filed exceptions to the ALJ’s July 2012 decision, to no avail.
Atkins then appealed to the district court, arguing that the Appeals Council
had denied her procedural due process by impermissibly directing reexamination
of an issue she did not raise — namely, whether she was disabled from December
31, 2003 until June 2, 2006 — without first giving her notice. Atkins also argued
that the doctrine of administrative res judicata barred the Appeals Council from
permitting an ALJ to review the August 2007 finding that she was disabled from
December 31, 2003 until June 2, 2006. A magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation rejecting Atkins’ arguments and recommending that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. Atkins did not object to the magistrate

3

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(b).
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judge’s report and recommendation, and the district court adopted it and affirmed
the Commissioner’s decision. This is Atkins’ appeal.
II.
Whether the Appeals Council denied Atkins procedural due process and
whether administrative res judicata applies in Atkins’ case are questions of law that
we review de novo. See Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir.
2000). The fact that Atkins did not object to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation does not bar her from challenging the magistrate judge’s legal
conclusions, nor does it limit the scope of our review of those conclusions. See
Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2013).
Atkins argues that the Appeals Council’s May 2010 remand order violated
her procedural due process rights by directing reexamination of an issue she did
not raise without providing the notice required under our decision in Kennedy v.
Bowen, 814 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1987). Kennedy held that, where a claimant
seeks review of a limited issue (in that case, the date of onset of disability), the
Appeals Council may not on its own initiative expand the scope of its review
beyond that limited issue without first giving the claimant notice of its intent to do
so. Id. at 1527. But Kennedy and its progeny are grounded in the specific notice
requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 404.973, which applies when the Appeals Council itself
is reviewing the claimant’s case. See id. at 1526–28 (explaining that “the notice
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requirement must stem from the Social Security Administration’s regulations” and
that 20 C.F.R. § 404.973 establishes the notice requirement for when the Appeals
Council decides to review a case in a claimant-initiated appeal); Bivines v. Bowen,
833 F.2d 293, 295–97 (11th Cir. 1987) (confirming that “a notice requirement . . .
must have its genesis in the regulations of the Social Security Administration”);
see also Baker v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 319, 320–21 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Kennedy’s notice requirement applies when the Appeals Council reviews a case on
remand from the district court). That regulation provides that, “[w]hen the
Appeals Council decides to review a case, it shall mail a notice to all parties at
their last known address stating the reasons for the review and the issues to be
considered.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.973. Its specific notice requirement does not apply
in a case like this one, where the Appeals Council complies with the district court’s
remand order and remands the case to the ALJ for a de novo hearing. Instead, this
case is governed by 20 C.F.R. § 404.983, which provides that, “[i]f the case is
remanded by the Appeals Council” to the ALJ, “[a]ny issues relating to [the
claimant’s] claim may be considered by the administrative law judge whether or
not they were raised in the administrative proceedings leading to the final decision
in [the claimant’s] case.” (Emphasis added.) The district court correctly
concluded that Kennedy’s notice requirement does not apply here.

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In any event, Atkins’ lack-of-notice argument fails in light of the record,
which establishes that she did have notice. In March 2010, the Commissioner
moved to remand Atkins’ case for a de novo hearing under sentence six of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Atkins did not oppose the Commissioner’s motion or request (as
she had done in her complaint) that the district court’s remand order specifically
limit the ALJ’s decision to the time period beginning on June 3, 2006. Based on
the Commissioner’s unopposed motion, the district court remanded Atkins’ case
“for further proceedings by the Appeals Council” and in no way limited the scope
of the remand. Because Atkins consented to the Commissioner’s motion to
remand the case for a de novo hearing, she was on notice that she would get a de
novo hearing. Similarly, in its second remand order, the Appeals Council
specifically provided that Atkins would be able to submit additional or updated
evidence for the ALJ’s consideration. In light of that remand order, Atkins cannot
claim that the Appeals Council caught her “off-guard and unprepared,” or that the
second ALJ determined that she was not disabled for any period of time without
considering “all the relevant evidence and legal arguments.” Kennedy, 814 F.2d at
1526.
Atkins’ administrative res judicata argument also fails. Administrative res
judicata applies when the agency has “made a previous determination or
decision . . . about [a claimant’s] rights on the same facts and on the same issue or
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issues, and [that] previous determination or decision [has] become final by either
administrative or judicial action.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); see Cash v. Barnhart,
327 F.3d 1252, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2003). Although Atkins did not challenge the
first ALJ’s determination that she was disabled from December 31, 2003 until June
2, 2006, the ALJ’s decision never became final because the Appeals Council
vacated it in May 2010. Cf. Quarles v. Sager, 687 F.2d 344, 346 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Claim preclusion does not apply in this case. The judgment of the district court
was vacated; thus, no final judgment on the merits exists.”); United States v.
Lacey, 982 F.2d 410, 412 (10th Cir. 1992) (“A judgment that has been vacated,
reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all conclusive effect, both as
res judicata and as collateral estoppel. The same is true, of course, of a judgment
vacated by a trial court.”) (quotation marks omitted); Social Security Admin.,
Program Operations Manual System (POMS), GN 03106.036 Court Remand
Orders, https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203106036 (last visited November 3,
2014) (“[A district] court order vacating the [Commissioner’s] prior decision and
remanding the case to the Commissioner voids the prior decision . . . and thus
returns the case to the status of a claim ‘pending’ before the [Social Security
Administration].”). 4 The ALJs properly declined to give res judicata effect to the
August 2007 decision during later hearings.

4

We attach a copy of the internet material cited as an appendix to this opinion.
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AFFIRMED.

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